Nos.

169
G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ALLAN DIAZ Y ROXAS, Accused-Appellant.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLAN DIAZ Y ROXAS, AccusedAppellant.
RE S O LUTI ON
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Challenged in this final recourse is the February 11, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04206, which affirmed in toto the November 5, 2009 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 08-263032 convicting
appellant Allan Diaz y Roxas (appellant) of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Factual Antecedents
In an Information3 dated August 7, 2008, appellant was charged with illegal sale of shabu in
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 committed as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about August 2, 2008, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having
been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, or give away to another any dangerous drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale one (1) heat[-]sealed
transparent plastic sachet with markings ARD-1 containing ZERO POINT ZERO ONE
EIGHT (0.018) [gram] of white crystalline substance known as SHABU, [or]
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon his arraignment on August 22, 2008 and filed a
petition for bail. The petition was denied for lack of merit on November 17, 2008.
The parties respective versions of the incident are as follows:
On August 1, 2008, a confidential informant reported to the Pandacan Police Station (PS-10),
Manila Police District, about appellants illegal drug trade activities in Kahilum I, Pandacan,
Manila. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was held and a buy-bust team
composed of PO2 Arthuro Coronel, (PO2 Coronel), as poseur-buyer, PO3 Edgar Lacson, PO1

Ramil Carel and PO1 Richard Sibayan, as back-ups, was created. PO2 Coronel was provided
with three pieces of 100-peso bills which he marked with his initials AC1-AC3.5 A PreOperation Report and Coordination Sheet6were then prepared and sent to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency.
At about 4:00 a.m. the next day, the team along with the informant proceeded to Kahilum I,
Pandacan on board three vehicles. From a distance, they saw appellant chatting with a male
companion. The informant and PO2 Coronel approached appellant who was by then already
alone. The informant introduced PO2 Coronel to the appellant as a buyer of shabu. Appellant
informed them that he has available shabu by saying mayroon. Thus, PO2 Coronel gave
appellant the previously initialed three 100-peso bills and, in exchange therefor, the latter gave
him a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. At that
juncture, PO2 Coronel made the pre-arranged signal and immediately arrested appellant. After
appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights, the buy-bust team brought him to the police
station and turned him over to the investigator. At the police station, the plastic sachet containing
the suspected shabu was marked by PO2 Coronel with ARD-1, the initials of appellant. A
request for laboratory examination7 of the subject item was thereafter prepared by Police Senior
Inspector Peter L. Nerviza. Later, the submitted specimen weighing 0.018 gram was found
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug, per Chemistry
Report No. D-725-08.8cralawlawlibrary
Appellant, on the other hand, claimed that between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. of August 1, 2008, he
was walking home when he was suddenly arrested, allegedly for verification purposes only, by
policemen whose names he cannot recall. He was brought to a police station and thereafter to an
inquest prosecutor in the City Hall of Manila where he first came to know that he was being
charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted appellant as charged and accordingly sentenced him in its
Decision9 of November 5, 2009 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding accused, Allan Diaz y Roxas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.cralawred
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant appealed to the CA contending that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since the police officers failed to mark, conduct a physical inventory of, and
photograph the subject item in his presence and those of the persons mentioned under Sec. 21(1)
of R.A. No. 9165.

By its assailed Decision11 of February 11, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. It
found that the prosecution was able to establish appellants guilt to a moral certainty. Moreover,
the CA did not doubt that the shabu presented before the RTC was the same shabu seized from
appellant since the prosecution likewise established its unbroken chain of custody.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 2 dated
November 5, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellant assails the trial courts assessment of the credibility of prosecution witness PO2
Coronel. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2 Coronels testimony
regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial.
[P]rosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that the factual findings of the
trial [court] and those involving credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can
be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of
witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the [CA],13 as in this case. The Court has thoroughly examined the records of this
case and finds the testimony of PO2 Coronel credible. The said testimony is pertinently
supported by documents such as the marked buy-bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of
arrest, among others, which all clearly attest to the fact that a sale of shabu took place between
him and appellant. On the other hand, appellants defense of denial, aside from being selfserving, is unsubstantiated and thus, has little weight in law. Hence, the lower courts correctly
gave more credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
Appellant banks on the prosecutions alleged failure to comply with the requirements of
law14 with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the seized
specimen. However, it does not escape the Courts attention that appellant failed to contest the
admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance did he manifest or
even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item
which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. As held by the Court in People v.
Domado,15 citing People v. Hernandez,16 objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered,
he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal. In this case, appellant raised the police operatives alleged noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal before the

CA. Thus, following established jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the
prosecutions case.
In any event, it is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long as
the chain of custody remains unbroken.17 Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able
to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the moment
it was seized from appellant up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus
delicti. As aptly observed by the CA:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he contention of appellant that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of
paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper procedure in the custody and disposition
of the seized drugs, is untenable. Record shows that PO2 Coronel marked the confiscated sachet
of shabu at the police station and in the presence of appellant and the duty investigator. PO2
Coronel clarified that the reason why he marked the said shabu at the police station and not at
the scene of the crime was because the place where they transacted was dark. Thus, it is only
proper to preserve the confiscated item and mark it in a lighted and safe place which is at the
police station. Then, the said shabu was properly turned over to the duty investigator, together
with the marked money. Afterwards, the alleged shabu was brought to the forensic chemist for
examination. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their affidavits of arrest
immediately after appellant was apprehended and at the trial, PO2 Coronel positively identified
the seized drugs. Indeed, the prosecution evidence had established the unbroken chain of custody
of the seized drugs from the buy-bust team, to the investigating officer and to the forensic
chemist. Thus, there is no doubt that the shabu presented before the court a quo was the same
shabu seized from appellant and that indeed, he committed the crime charged in the
information.18
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
All told, the Court finds appellants conviction of the offense charged, as well as the imposition
upon him of the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of fine of P500,000.00, proper. It
must be added, however, that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.19cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 04206 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Allan Diaz y
Roxas shall not be eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* , Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
*

Per Special Order No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.

CA rollo, pp. 77-85; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Elihu A. Ybaez.

Records, pp. 75-80; penned by Judge Alejandro G. Bijasa.

Id. at 1.

Id.

Exhibits F-1, F-2 and F-3, id. at 16.

Id. at 12-13.

Exhibit A, id. at 11.

Exhibit C, id. at 18.

Id. at 75-80.

10

Id. at 80.

11

CA rollo, pp. 77-85.

12

Id. at 85.

13

People v. Laposaran, G.R. No. 198820, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 663, 673.

14

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

cralawred
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;
15
635 Phil. 73, 84 (2010).
16

607 Phil. 617, 638 (2009).

17

People v. Amarillo, G.R. No. 194721, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 568, 579.

18

CA rollo, p. 84.

19

See Section 2, Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Nos. 170
G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v.
PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, COURT OF APPEALS, 20TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY,
Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, COURT OF

APPEALS, 20TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the May 2, 2006
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737, which denied the motion
for intervention and reconsideration of its January 21, 2005 Decision,2 filed by petitioner Office
of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman).

The Antecedents

The present controversy stemmed from the administrative complaint lodged by Gilda D. Daradal
(Daradal), a clerk in the Provincial Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar, against private
respondent Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar, with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman-Visayas) for Sexual Harassment and Oppression,
docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-96-04846.

In her complaint, Daradal alleged that on July 19, 1996, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning at
the Motor Pool Division of the Provincial Engineering Department, Catbalogan, Samar, Quimbo
asked her to massage his forehead and nape. In the course thereof, he said, You had been lying
to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see yours? She was appalled as
the utterance was made in the presence of her co-employees. She added that by virtue of a
Memorandum,3 dated August 6, 1996, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service
Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name
was removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office from August
16-31, 1996 because of her refusal to submit to his sexual advances.

In his defense, Quimbo retorted that the charge instituted against him was fictitious. He claimed
that Daradal enjoyed a very important person (VIP) treatment for a long period of time and,
when required to work, rebelled against him. He asserted that the charge of sexual harassment
and oppression was intended to embarrass and ridicule him and that the discretion to order her
detail was validly exercised.

On March 26, 1996, Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint. The motion,
however, was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order, dated August 11, 1998.

The Ombudsman-Visayas Ruling

On December 9, 1998, after due proceedings, the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution4

dismissing the case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of oppression.
The Ombudsman-Visayas imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay. The
dispositive portion of the said resolution reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Office finds Prudencio C. Quimbo, guilty of
Oppression, thus mete upon him, the penalty of SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS without
pay, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service
Commission.

SO RESOLVED.5

Engr. Quimbo moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas
in its Order,6 dated April 15, 1999.

The CA Ruling

Aggrieved, Quimbo elevated the case before the CA by way of a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. The case, entitled Prudencio C. Quimbo vs. Gilda D. Daradal, was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54737.

On January 21, 2005, the CA reversed the December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999
Order of the Ombudsman-Visayas. In reversing the said ruling, the CA
ratiocinated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Office of the Ombudsman has no power to directly impose sanctions against government
officials and employees who are subject of its investigation as its power is only limited to
recommend the appropriate sanctions but not directly to impose the same.

In Tapiador vs. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court pronounced:

cralawred
x x x

Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were (sic) administratively liable, the Ombudsman
has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly
from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

x x x
There is no gainsaying the fact that the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with the jurisdiction
to take cognizance of cases for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not public servants have
committed administrative offenses. However, their power is only to recommend to the
disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out and it is best left to the proper
disciplining authority to impose such penalty, which in this case is the Office of the Governor of
the Province of Samar.7
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, the fallo of the January 21, 2005 Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

GRANTING the petition filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated December
9, 1998 and the Order dated April 15, 1999 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMBVIS-ADM-96-0486 in so far as it directly imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of suspension
from the service.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8

On February 14, 2005, the Ombudsman filed an omnibus motion for intervention and
reconsideration of the CA decision, dated January 21, 2005.

In its Resolution,9 dated May 2, 2006, the CA denied the said motion. In so doing, the CA
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For one, we have noted that the person adversely affected by our ruling in SP No. 54737 is
respondent Gilda D. Daradal who opted not to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Basic is
the rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.

x x x x.

For another, as a quasi-judicial body, the office of the Ombudsman can be likened to a judge who
should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.

In filing a motion for intervention and reconsideration, the Ombudsman dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to hear, investigate
and decide administrative and appropriate criminal cases against public official[s] or employee[s]
instituted by or brought before it directly, and not to litigate. Therefore, we rule that the Office of
the Ombudsman has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bench.cralawred

xxxx

Not in conformity with the pronouncement of the CA, the Ombudsman instituted a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA. It posited that there was no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge the validity of
the assailed CA Resolution, dated May 2, 2005. Thus, it was constrained to resort to the filing of
the said petition.

The Ombudsmans Position

In its Memorandum,10 the Ombudsman stressed that, as the champion of the people, it had the
right and legal interest to seek redress on the apparent erroneous reversal by the CA of its
decision in an administrative disciplinary case. It insisted that, as the disciplining authority, it has
the power and prerogative to directly impose any administrative penalty. It asserted that the
obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsma (Tapiador)11 heavily relied
upon by the CA, to declare its disciplinary powers as merely recommendatory had been rejected
by the Court in numerous cases.

Respondent Quimbos Position

In his Memorandum,12 Quimbo contended that the Ombudsman had no legal standing to
intervene or to seek reconsideration of the assailed CA decision because the real party in interest
was Daradal. He further stated that the assailed CA decision was based on prevailing
jurisprudence at the time the said decision was rendered.

ISSUES

Based on the parties respective contentions, the issues for this Courts resolution are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the Ombudsman lacks the power
to directly impose administrative penalties against erring public officials or employees.

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in denying the Ombudsmans plea to validly
intervene in its proceedings for lack of legal interest.

The Courts Ruling

The Court grants the Ombudsmans petition.

Preliminary matters

The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties against public
officials or employees.

In the case of Ombudsman v. Apolonio,13 the Court categorically delineated the Ombudsmans
power to directly impose, not merely recommend, administrative sanctions against erring public
officials or employees, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on
the allegation that the Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been
rejected by this Court.

The Court first rejected this interpretation in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, where the Court,
speaking through Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, held:

The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees, thus:
cralawred
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
cralawred
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law
on November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act
promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of
government officers and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote
efficient service by the Government to the people.

The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case
is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but
not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with
law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the
Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

xxxx

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee
at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis, underscoring and italization in the original.)

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals (Ledesma),14 the Court definitively stated that the statement in
Tapiador regarding the Ombudsmans power was merely an obiter dictum and, as such, could not
be cited as a doctrinal pronouncement. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [A] cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of
the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative
case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an
obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

The import of the Ledesma ruling is crystal clear. Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3),
Article XI15 of the Constitution merely indicates a recommendatory function, this does not
divest Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those
stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose
administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the
lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord
with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past, the
powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the
Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who might file and prosecute criminal,
civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of
justice, the current Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, is intended to
play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other
offenses committed by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an activist
watchman, not merely a passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions.16cralawlawlibrary

The Ombudsman has the legal interest to intervene in the proceedings before the CA.

The issue of whether or not the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to intervene in
the proceedings where its decision is at risk of being inappropriately impaired has been laid to
rest in Ombudsman v. De Chavez.17 In the said case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if
the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, part of its broad powers

include defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court, 18 the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest
on the matter is beyond cavil. The Court elucidated, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed
against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of public
officers and employees) is at stake.cralawred

xxx

The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject matter of
litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall
writ of preliminary injunction averred:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress on the
apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision x x x x.

In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman correctly
summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its
role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary authority vested with
quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases against public officials. To
hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the guardian
of public trust and accountability.

Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether
respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the
Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act
as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that petitioner had to be
given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.

It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the
exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided
in the Constitution and RA 6770.cralawred

xxxx

Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose decision
was in question. This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of the power,
duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be
detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in
administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the
government and public interest. What further proof of a direct constitutional and legal interest in
the accountability of public officers is necessary? (Italics supplied. Citations omitted.)

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the present case, gravely erred in
disallowing the Ombudsmans motion to intervene. It failed to consider the essence of the
Ombudsmans constitutionally and statutorily conferred powers establishing its clear legal
interest in ensuring that its directive be implemented.

Substantive Aspect

Significantly, Section A, Subsection 13 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No.

30, series of 1989 (CSC MC No. 30), the applicable rule then, expressly
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A. Grave Offenses

xxxx

13. Oppression
1st Offense Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;

2nd Offense Dismissal.

In the present case, the Ombudsman found Quimbo administratively liable for the grave offense
of Oppression and correspondingly meted out a penalty of suspension for six (6) months without
pay. While his administrative liability for Oppression is undisputed, it behooves the Court to
adjust the penalty imposed upon him to conform to CSC MC No. 30. Accordingly, the Court
finds it necessary to modify the penalty to suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day without
pay to accurately reflect the classification of the offense for which he was found liable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 21, 2005 Decision and the May 2, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP No. 54737 are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999 Order
of the Office of the Ombudsman, in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-0486, are hereby REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty of SUSPENSION to be imposed upon Prudencio C. Quimbo
be for SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY without pay.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Villarama, Jr.,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.chanrobleslaw

Endnotes:

* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No.
1910, dated January 12, 2015.

* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, who
recused himself from the case due to prior action in the Court of Appeals, per Raffle dated
October 20, 2014.

1Rollo, pp. 37-39. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Ramon
M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.

2 Id. at 40-46. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Sesinando
E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring.

3 Id. at 138.

4 Id. at 47-49.

5 Id. at 49.

6 Id. at 66-68.

7 Citations omitted.

8Rollo, p. 45.

9 Id. at 37-39.

10 Id. at 297-325.

11 429 Phil. 47 (2002).

12Rollo, pp. 276-296.

13 G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 583, 592-594.

14 503 Phil. 396 (2005).

15 Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

xxxx

3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.

16Ombudsman v. Masing, 566 Phil. 253, 268-269 (2008).

17 G.R. No. 172206, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 399, 404-406, citing Ombudsman v. Samaniego,
586 Phil. 497 (2008).

18 Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.

Nos. 171
G.R. No. 176973, February 25, 2015 - DAVID M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. FEDERICO M.
PARAGAS, JR., Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 176973, February 25, 2015

DAVID M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to annul and set aside the July
31, 2006 Decision1 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 80942. The said issuances modified the July 21, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 200, Las Pias City (RTC) in Civil Case No. LP-02-0165, a case for Declaratory
Relief and Sum of Money with Damages filed by petitioner David M. David (David) against
Philam Plans Inc. (PPI), Severo Henry G. Lobrin (Lobrin), respondent Federico M. Paragas, Jr.
(Paragas), Rodelio S. Datoy (Datoy), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Paranaque Branch
(RCBC), and Gerald P.S. Agarra (Agarra).

The RTC Order resolved the Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint filed by David and the
Joint Omnibus Motion4 filed by David, Lobrin and Datoy. In the said Order, the RTC admitted
the attached supplemental complaint and approved the compromise agreement.5 The questioned
CA decision nullified the approval by the RTC of the compromise agreement.

The Antecedents

Sometime in 1995, David, Paragas and Lobrin agreed to venture into a business in Hong Kong
(HK). They created Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia) under HK laws. Olympia had offices
in HK and the Philippines. David handled the marketing aspect of the business while Lobrin and
Datoy were in charge of operations. In late 1995, Olympia started with selling, through
catalogs, consumer products such as appliances, furniture and electronic equipment to the OFWs
in Hong Kong, to be delivered to their addresses in the Philippines. They coined the name
Kayang-Kaya for the venture.6cralawlawlibrary

In early 1998, Olympia became the exclusive general agent in HK of PPIs pre-need plans
through the General Agency Agreement. In late 2001, Olympia launched the Pares-Pares
program by which planholders would earn points with cash equivalents for successfully enlisting
new subscribers. The cash equivalents, in turn, would be used for the payment of monthly
premiums of the planholders. PPI authorized Olympia to accept the premium payments,
including the cash equivalent of the bonus points, and to remit the same, net of commissions, to
PPI in the Philippines. The money from HK was to be remitted through Olympias account in
RCBC. In turn, Olympia was to pay the planholders bonuses as well as the share of profits for
the directors.7 David was tasked to personally remit said amounts to PPI as he was the only
signatory authorized to transact on behalf of Olympia regarding the RCBC accounts.

As Paragas alleged, the amount remitted by Olympia to RCBC from September 2001 to May 25,
2002 reached P82,978,543.00, representing the total net earnings from the pre-need plans, 30%
of which comprised the bonus points earned by the subscribers under the Pares-Pares program.
The rest was to be distributed among the four partners.

In 2002, the state of affairs among the partners went sour upon Lobrins discovery that David
failed to remit to PPI the 30% cash equivalent of the bonus points.

In a meeting held on June 1, 2002 in HK, David tried to explain his side, but no settlement was
reached.

Later, Lobrin discovered that only P19,302,902.13 remained of the P82,978,543.00 remitted
from HK to the RCBC account. As the Chairperson of Olympias Board of Directors (BOD), he
demanded the return of the entire P82,978,543.00.

On June 17, 2002, the BOD stripped David of his position as a director. It then informed RCBC
of his removal. In another letter, it also instructed RCBC to prohibit any transaction regarding the
funds or their withdrawal therefrom pending the determination of their rightful owner/s.

Meanwhile, a Watch-List Order was issued against David pursuant to the letter sent by Paragas
counsel to the Bureau of Immigration. As a result, he was prevented from boarding a flight to
Singapore on June 29, 2002.

Constrained by these circumstances, David filed a complaint for Declaratory Relief, Sum of
Money and Damages before the RTC. He insisted on his entitlement to the commissions due
under the regular and Pares-Pares programs in his capacity as Principal Agent under the General
Agency Agreement with PPI; that he be allowed to hold the cash deposits of P19,302,902.00 to
the extent of P18,631,900.00 as a trust fund for the benefit of the subscribers of the Pares-Pares
program; that RCBC be ordered to recognize no other signatory relative to the said deposits
except him; and that Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy be held liable in an amount not less than
P20,000,000.00, representing the missing amount and/or unauthorized disbursements from the
funds of Olympia, plus the payment of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Paragas and Lobrin filed their answers with compulsory counterclaims8 against David, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First Counterclaim - to mandate David to render an accounting of the amounts mentioned;

Second Counterclaim - to require David to turn over such books of accounts and other
documents owned by Olympia as well as all records pertaining to Olympias business
transactions in the Philippines;

Third Counterclaim - to make David pay the amount of P24,893,562.90 to Philam as cash
bonuses of the respective original subscribers;

Fourth Counterclaim - to make David pay Lobrin and Paragas the amount of P24,521,245.00
each, as and by way of actual damages, representing (1) Lobrin and Paragas respective shares as
co-owners in the net profit of Olympia from the sale of the Pre-need plan under the pares-pares
program in the amount of P14,521,245.00 and the amount of P10,000,000.00 representing the
cost of plane fares, living allowances and unrealized profit;

Fifth Counterclaim - to hold David liable to pay Lobrin and Paragas the amount of
P20,000,000.00 each, as and by way of moral damages;

Sixth Counterclaim - to make David pay the amount of P10,000,000.00 as and by way of
exemplary damages; and

Seventh Counterclaim - to hold David personally liable to pay Lobrin and Paragas the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus such amount as may be proved during the trial as litigation
expenses and cost of suit.9
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 5, 2003, David filed the supplemental complaint, with a manifestation that an
amicable settlement was struck with Lobrin and Datoy whereby they agreed to withdraw the
complaint and counterclaims against each other. On May 6, 2003, Lobrin and Olympia through
their counsel, confirmed that on March 26, 2003, they had arrived at a compromise.10 The
agreement clearly stated that Lobrin was acting on Olympias behalf, on the basis of a resolution
passed during the board meeting held on March 21, 2003. The settlement
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Agreement, entered into by and between:

DAVID M. DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino and with address at 23 Pablo Roman Street,
BF Homes, Paranaque, hereinafter referred to as DMD;

-and-

OLYMPIA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of Hong Kong, with principal office at 13/F Li Dong Building, 7-11 Li Yuen Street East, Central,
Hong Kong, and herein represented by its Attorney-in-Fact, Henry G. Lobrin, and herein after
referred to as Olympia;

WITNESSETH: That

WHEREAS, Olympia has passed a board resolution during the meeting of its Board of Directors
held in Hong Kong on 21 March 2003 constituting and appointing as such its herein Attorney-inFact for the purposes stated in said resolution, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A;

WHEREAS, there is a pending case before Branch 200 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Pi[]as City docketed as Civil Case No. LP-02-0165 (the Case) and among the defendants in
said Case are Henry G. Lobrin, Federico M. Paragas, Jr. and Roberto S. Datoy who are presently
directors of Olympia;

WHEREAS, the causes of action in the complaint in said Case against aforesaid Lobrin, Paragas,
Jr. and Datoy are in their capacity as shareholders/directors of Olympia, and likewise concern the
relationship and rights between DMD and Olympia International Ltd., including the status of the
latters operations and financial position;

WHEREAS, another issue in said case is the respective rights of herein parties DMD and
Olympia under and pursuant to the General Agency Agreement (GAA) with Philam Plans Inc.,
(PPI) dated 10 February 1998;

WHEREAS, corollary to the issue of the GAA is the respective obligation of DMD and Olympia
to the planholders of PPI under the regular and pares pares program, specifically the binhing
yaman and pamilyaman benefits due to approximately 12,000 planholders of Philam Plans Inc.
(PPI) as per the list attached to the complaint in said Case;

WHEREAS, both DMD and Olympia are desirous of settling the Case amicably under mutually
acceptable terms and conditions:

NOW, THEREFORE, parties hereby agree as follows:

Olympia hereby waives its rights and interests to the trust fund presently in Account Nos. 1-21425224-0, 07214108903-003 and 0000005292 with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and Account No. 0301-01334-5 with the Equitable PCI Bank pertaining to the cash
benefits of the approximately 12,000 planholders of Philam Plans, Inc., per the list attached to
the complaint in the Case;

Olympia further agrees that the same shall be settled exclusively by DMD, subject to the
requirement that it shall be furnished a copy of the Statement of Benefits pertaining to each
planholder;

Olympia likewise no longer interposes any objection/opposition to the payment of the cash
benefits to the planholders from said trust funds, and shall make of record in the Case the
withdrawal of its opposition;

DMD shall drop as party Defendants from the Case Severo Henry G. Lobrin, Federico M.
Paragas, Jr. and Rodelio S. Datoy;

Olympia shall withdraw its First Compulsory Counterclaim, Second Compulsory Counterclaim
and Third Compulsory Counterclaim as stated in the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims
dated 3 October 2002 filed in said Case, because the subject matters of said compulsory
counterclaims are exclusively the concern of Olympia as a corporation and are now the subject
of this Compromise Agreement;

Olympia shall likewise withdraw the Fourth Compulsory Counterclaim, Fifth Compulsory
Counterclaim, Sixth Compulsory Counterclaim and Seventh Compulsory Counterclaim in so far
as they refer to claims to which the claimants will be entitled in their capacity as shareholder
and/or director of Olympia;

The Fourth Compulsory Counterclaim, Fifth Compulsory Counterclaim, Sixth Compulsory

Counterclaim and Compulsory Counterclaim (sic) will also be withdrawn by Henry G. Lobrin in
his personal capacity;

For this purpose, the following motions shall be filed pursuant to this Agreement;

A Joint Motion shall be filed in the case for the dismissal of the complaint and compulsory
counterclaims as above stated;

A Motion to Withdraw Opposition to the Motion to Release Benefits and Supplemental Motion
(to Release Benefits) be filed by Olympia through its Attorney-in-Fact.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, parties hereto set their hands this ____ day of _________ in
____________________.

DAVID M. DAVID
OLYMPIA
INTERNATIONAL
Ltd.

By:
HENRY G. LOBRIN
Attorney-in Fact

HENRY G. LOBRIN
In his personal capacity

[Emphases supplied]11

On May 15, 2003, David and Lobrin filed the Joint Omnibus Motion to formally inform the RTC
of the compromise agreement. They asserted the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Said agreement was executed between Plaintiff and Olympia, the latter being represented by
Defendant Lobrin as Olympias Attorney-in-Fact, pursuant to a resolution passed by a majority
vote during the board meeting held in Hong [Kong] on 21 March 2003 wherein Defendants
Lobrin, Paragas, Jr. and Datoy were all present, authorizing said Attorney-in-Fact to negotiate a
compromise settlement regarding instant case, the payment of the accrued benefits due the
planholders of Philam Plan, Inc. under the regular and Pares-Pares program as well as the
disposition of the cash and other deposits with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and other accounts in other banks. Said resolution is appended to the Agreement as its Annex
A;

By virtue of said Agreement, Olympia no longer questions and hereby waives whatever rights
and interest it may have to the deposits constituting the trust fund pertaining to the cash benefits
of the approximately 12,000 planholders of Philam Plans Inc., per the list attached to the
complaint in instant case in Account Nos. 1-214-25224-0, 07214108903-003 and 0000005292
with RCBC and Account No. 0301-01334-5 with the Equitable-PCI Bank;

Olympia further withdraws its objection/opposition to the payment of the cash benefits to the
planholders from said trust funds which shall remain to be the sole responsibility/accountability
of Plaintiff, subject to the requirement that Olympia through its authorized Attorney-in-Fact shall
be furnished a copy of the Statement of Benefits pertaining to each planholder;

As a consequence of the above, Defendants Severo Henry G. Lobrin, Federico M. Paragas, Jr.
and Rodelio S. Datoy shall be dropped as party defendants in instant case, to which no objection
will be interposed by Plaintiff, and the motion to declare Defendant Datoy in default for failure
to file his Answer is similarly withdrawn for having been rendered moot and academic by the
Agreement;

Olympia hereby withdraw[s] its First, Second and Third Compulsory Counterclaims against
herein Plaintiff considering that the legal and factual bases thereof are matters which are
exclusively the concern of Olympia as a corporation and have been the subject of the Agreement;

Olympia likewise withdraws the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Compulsory Counterclaim in
so far as they refer to the claims pertaining to Defendants Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy in their
capacity as shareholders and/or directors of Olympia;

Defendant Lobrin likewise withdraws the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Compulsory
Counterclaim in so far as they refer to claims pertaining to him in his personal capacity;

Plaintiff likewise withdraws his complaint against Defendant Gera[l]d P.S. Algarra based on the
statements contained in the latters Answer, and said Defendant likewise withdraws his
Counterclaims against plaintiff, however, Plaintiff reserves his right to implead the proper party
Defendant; and

This motion is without prejudice to the right of Defendant Paragas to join and/or avail of the
benefits of the Agreement and instant Motion hereinafter.12

On May 8, 2003, Paragas questioned the existence of the cited BOD resolution granting Lobrin
the authority to settle the case, as well as the validity of the agreement through an affidavit duly

authenticated by the Philippine Consul, Domingo Lucinario, Jr. He pointed to the fact that
Olympia, as an entity, was never a party in the controversy.

On July 21, 2003, the RTC granted Davids Motion to Admit the Supplemental Complaint and
approved the compromise agreement, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Further, finding the agreement in the JOINT OMNIBUS MOTION to be well-taken, not contrary
to law, public policy and morals, the same is hereby APPROVED and the motion GRANTED.
The resolution is hereby rendered based thereon, thus, the parties concerned are enjoined to
faithfully comply with all the terms and conditions stated therein. As prayed for by the parties
concerned in the JOINT OMNIBUS MOTION, let Henry G. Lobrin, Rodelio S. Datoy and
Gera[l]d PS Algarra BE DROPPED as party defendants except defendant Federico Paragas, Jr.
who filed an Opposition thereto, and the compulsory counterclaims between defendants Lobrin,
Datoy and Algarra and plaintiff David against each other DISMISSED. The withdrawal of the
motion to declare defendant Datoy is hereby noted.13

On August 15, 2003, Paragas moved for reconsideration,14 claiming that although the parties
had the prerogative to settle their differences amicably, the intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the
compromise agreement, as well as its basis, may be questioned if illicit and unlawful.

In its September 30, 2003 Order,15 the RTC denied the motion of Paragas.

Unperturbed, Paragas elevated the issue to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

In its July 31, 2006 Decision, the CA reversed the RTCs approval of the compromise agreement.
It explained that the agreement entered into by David, Lobrin and Datoy was invalid for two
reasons: First, the agreement was between David and Olympia, which was not a party in the
case; and second, assuming that Olympia could be considered a party, there was no showing that
the signatory had the authority from Olympia or from the other parties being sued to enter into a
compromise.

David moved for reconsideration. In its February 23, 2007 Resolution, the CA denied his motion.

Hence, this petition.

GROUNDS OF THE PETITION

RESPONDENT COURT LACKED AND/OR EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT

MODIFIED THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 21, 2003, DESPITE THE
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR BEING SPECIFICALLY LIMITED TO THE ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 2003 WHICH DENIED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT

OLYMPIA IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE BELOW, HENCE, THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT AND COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS ARE PERSONAL IN NATURE TO
THE PARTIES AND IS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 2 OF RULE 17

THERE IS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN RESPONDENT COURT

ANNULLED THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BASED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT CONTAINED IN THE PETITION.16

In his reply,17 David limited his discussion to the issue that still has a practical bearing on the
case below,18 that is, whether or not the nullification of the Compromise Agreement similarly
nullified the dismissal of both the complaint as against the defendants xxx.19cralawlawlibrary

In the Resolution, dated February 16, 2011, the Court gave due course to the petition and
directed the parties to file their respective memoranda.20 While Paragas was able to file his
memorandum on May 16, 2011, Davids memorandum was dispensed with in a resolution, dated
June 19, 2013, for his failure to file one within the extended period granted by the
Court.21cralawlawlibrary

Position of David

David charges the CA with grave abuse of discretion in dispensing a relief more than what
Paragas prayed for. According to David, the CA exceeded its jurisdiction when it annulled the
compromise agreement despite the fact that the assignment of error in the petition of Paragas
before the CA was limited only to the review of the correctness of the RTCs September 30, 2003
Order denying the motion for reconsideration and not the July 21, 2003 Order approving the
compromise agreement. In other words, David is of the view that because Paragas did not assail
the July 21, 2003 Order, the same should not have been modified by the CA.

He further insists that the CA should not have annulled the compromise agreement because the
July 21, 2003 RTC Order did not refer to the approval of the compromise agreement, but to the
agreement of the parties to dismiss the claims and counterclaims against each other. In support of
this position, David takes refuge in the RTC statement that the parties had the right to amicably
settle their issues even if subject compromise agreement had not been entered into. To him, it
was not the Compromise Agreement that was approved, but the underlying agreement
between the parties to withdraw their claims against each other which are personal to them in
nature.

Lastly, David submits that he was denied due process of law when the CA annulled the
compromise agreement based on unsubstantiated allegations of fact, that is, the allegation that
the board meeting granting Lobrin the authority to enter into compromise with him on behalf of
Olympia and on behalf of the other parties did not take place. He believes that Paragas failed to
prove his allegations and, therefore, the meeting, as supported by the minutes signed by one
Flordeliza Sacapano, must be respected as a matter of fact.

The Courts Ruling

The Court denies the petition.

The CA did not exceed its

jurisdiction in modifying

the July 21, 2003 RTC Order

In his petition, David claims that the CA exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the July 21,
2003 Order of the RTC by admitting Davids supplemental complaint and approving the earlier
mentioned compromise agreement even though Paragas petition for certiorari before the CA
only questioned the September 30, 2003 Order of the RTC denying his motion for
reconsideration.22cralawlawlibrary

This Court is unmoved by this position advocated by David.

In countless cases, the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds or matters not raised
or assigned as errors. In the case of Cordero vs. F.S. Management & Development
Corporation,23 the Court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While a party is required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors and only those assigned
shall be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case, appellate courts have ample
authority to rule on matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if these are indispensable or
necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues. Thus this Court has allowed the
consideration of other grounds or matters not raised or assigned as errors, to wit: 1) grounds
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) matters which are evidently plain or clerical
errors within the contemplation of the law; 3) matters the consideration of which is necessary in
arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or
to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; 4) matters of record which were raised in the trial court
and which have some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which
the lower court ignored; 5) matters closely related to an error assigned; and 6) matters upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. [Emphases supplied]24

In this case, while it is true that Paragas petition for certiorari before the CA only assailed the
subsequent order of the RTC denying his August 15, 2003 Motion for Reconsideration, he did
pray in the said motion for reconsideration that it set aside and reverse its approval of the Joint
Omnibus Motion. The prayer reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the Order dated 21 July
2003 be MODIFIED to SET ASIDE and REVERSE the approval of the Joint Omnibus Motion
dated 15 May 2003 and a new one be issued DENYING said motion.25

Obviously, the resolution of his motion for reconsideration necessarily involved the July 21,
2003 Order of the RTC as it was indispensable and inextricably linked with the September 30,
2003 Order being assailed.

The CA did not err in annulling the

compromise agreement.

At the outset, David asserts that the CA based the annulment of the compromise agreement
exclusively on the unsubstantiated allegations of Paragas.

The Court disagrees. A careful reading of the assailed CA decision reveals that it did not merely
rely on the claims of Paragas. What the CA did was to analyze and appreciate the circumstances
behind the compromise agreement. In revisiting and delving deep into the records, the Court
indeed agrees with the CA that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in approving the agreement
for the following reasons:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First, the subject compromise agreement could not be the basis of the withdrawal of the
respective complaint and counterclaims of the parties for it was entered into by David with a
non-party in the proceedings. Even if the Court interprets that the RTC approved the underlying
agreement to withdraw the claims and counterclaims between the parties, the terms and
conditions of the subject compromise agreement cannot cover the interests of Olympia, being a
non-party to the suit.

Second, the RTC had no authority to approve the said compromise agreement because Olympia
was not impleaded as a party, although its participation was indispensable to the resolution of the
entire controversy.

A compromise agreement could not be

the basis of dismissal/withdrawal of a
complaint and counterclaims if it was
entered into with a non-party to the suit.

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order
to resolve their differences and, thus, avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their
difficulties in the manner they have agreed upon, disregarding the possible gain in litigation and
keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by the danger of losing. It must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs and public policy, and must have been freely and intelligently
executed by and between the parties.26 A compromise agreement may be executed in and out of
court. Once a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, however, it becomes more than
a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a
determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment.27cralawlawlibrary

Verily, a judicially approved compromise agreement, in order to be binding upon the litigants
with the force and effect of a judgment, must have been executed by them. In this case, the
compromise agreement was signed by David in his capacity as the complainant in the civil case,
and Olympia, through Lobrin as its agent. The agreement made plain that the terms and
conditions the parties were to follow were agreed upon by David and Olympia. Datoy and
Paragas never appeared to have agreed to such terms for it was Olympia, despite not being a
party to the civil case, which was a party to the agreement. Despite this, David claims that the
concessions were made by Olympia on behalf of the non-signatory parties and such should be
binding on them.

David must note that Olympia is a separate being, or at least should be treated as one distinct
from the personalities of its owners, partners or even directors. Under the doctrine of processual
presumption, this Court has to presume that Hong Kong laws is the same as that of the
Philippines particularly with respect to the legal characterization of Olympias legal status as an
artificial person. Elementary is the rule that under Philippine corporate and partnership laws, a
corporation or a partnership possesses a personality separate from that of its incorporators or
partners. Olympia should, thus, be accorded the status of an artificial being at least for the
purpose of this controversy.

On that basis, Olympias interest should be detached from those of directors Paragas, Lobrin,
Datoy, and even David. Their (individual directors) interest are merely indirect, contingent and
inchoate. Because Olympias involvement in the compromise was not the same as that of the
other parties who were, in the first place, never part of it, the compromise agreement could not
have the force and effect of a judgment binding upon the litigants, specifically Datoy and
Paragas. Conversely, the judicially approved withdrawal of the claims on the basis of that
compromise could not be given effect for such agreement did not concern the parties in the civil
case.

David, nevertheless, points out that the validity of the dismissal of the claims and counterclaims
must remain on the argument that the compromise agreement was made in their personal
capacities inasmuch as he filed the complaint against Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy also in their
personal capacities. He draws support from the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims28 filed
by Paragas and Lobrin. The counterclaims against him did not involve Olympia, save for the
demand to render an accounting as well as to turn over the books of account and records
pertaining to the latter. David, thus, stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is very clear from the order of July 21, 2003 that the agreement being referred to as having
been approved is not the Compromise Agreement but the agreement of the parties to dismiss the
claims and counterclaims against each other. This is obvious when the order stated that it is
within the right of the parties to amicably settle the issues even if subject Compromise
Agreement had not been entered into. Clearly, it was not the Compromise Agreement that was
approved, because precisely it involved Olympia, but the underlying agreement between the
parties to withdraw their claims against each other which are personal to them in nature. As
noted by the trial court, even without the Compromise Agreement, parties could still settle the
case amicably and withdraw the claims against one another which is precisely what the parties
did.29
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
His contention is devoid of merit.

While David repeatedly claims that his complaint against Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy was
personal in character, a review of the causes of action raised by him in his complaint shows that
it primarily involved Olympia. As defined, a cause of action is an act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. It requires the existence of a legal right on the part of the

plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right and an act or omission of
such defendant in violation of the plaintffss rights.30cralawlawlibrary

In his complaint, David raised three causes of action. The first one dealt with the alleged
omission on the part of the other venture partners to respect his right, being Olympias beneficial
owner and PPIs principal agent under the GAA, over the income generated from the sale PPIs
pre-need plans. The second dealt with his right over all amounts that the venture partners
disbursed in excess of those authorized by him, under the premise that he remained Olympias
beneficial owner. The third dealt with the acts of the venture partners in causing undue
humiliation and shame when he was prevented from boarding his Singapore-bound plane
pursuant to the Watch-List Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration at the behest of a letter
sent by the counsel of Paragas. Accordingly, David prayed that the
RTC:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Declare him as the one entitled to the commission due under the regular and Pares-Pares
programs net of the agents commission in his capacity as Principal Agent under the General
Agency Agreement with Philam Plans, Inc.;

Hold the cash deposits of P19,302,902.00 to the extent of P18,631,900.00 as a trust fund for the
benefit of the subscribers of the Pares-Pares Program and validly held in-trust by [him];

Order Defendant RCBC to recognize no other signatory to said deposits except [him].

x x x x 31

Essentially, David was asking for judicial determination of his rights over Olympias revenues,
funds in the RCBC bank accounts and the amounts used and expended by Olympia through the
acts of its directors/defendants. Nothing therein can be said to be personal claims against
Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy, except for his claim for damages resulting from the humiliation he
suffered when he was prevented from boarding his Singapore-bound plane. Obviously, the
argument that they executed the compromise agreement in their personal capacities does not hold
water.

For even if the Court looks closer at the concessions made, many provisions deal with Olympias
interests instead of the personal claims they have against one another. A review of the Joint
Omnibus Motion would also show that the compromise agreement dealt more with David and
Olympia. Given this, Olympia did not have the standing in court to enter into a compromise
agreement unless impleaded as a party. The RTC did not have the authority either to determine
Olympias rights and obligations. Furthermore, to allow the compromise agreement to stand is to
deprive Olympia of its properties and interest for it was never shown that the person who signed
the agreement on its behalf had any authority to do so.

More importantly, Lobrin, who signed the compromise agreement, failed to satisfactorily prove
his authority to bind Olympia. The CA observed, and this Court agrees, that the board
resolution allegedly granting authority to Lobrin to enter into a compromise agreement on
behalf of Olympia was more of a part of the minutes of a board meeting containing a proposal
to settle the case with David or to negotiate a settlement. It should be noted that the said
document was not prepared or issued by the Corporate Secretary of Olympia but by a Secretary
to the Meeting. Moreover, the said resolution was neither acknowledged before a notarial
officer in Hong Kong nor authenticated before the Philippine Consul in Hong Kong.32
Considering these facts, the RTC should have denied the Joint Omnibus Motion and disapproved
the compromise agreement. In fine, Olympia was not shown to have properly consented to the
agreement, for the rule is, a corporation can only act through its Board of Directors or anyone
with the authority of the latter. To allow the compromise agreement to stand is to deprive
Olympia of its properties and interest for it was never shown that Lobrin had the necessary
authority to sign the agreement on Olympias behalf.

Olympia is an indispensable
Party

In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz,33 the Court reiterated that an indispensable party is a partyin-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence
of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to
hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. 34cralawlawlibrary

Considering that David was asking for judicial determination of his rights in Olympia, it is
without a doubt, an indispensable party as it stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of
the main proceeding. It has such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect its rights. Not having been impleaded, Olympia cannot be prejudiced by any
judgment where its interests and properties are adjudicated in favor of another even if the latter is
a beneficial owner. It cannot be said either to have consented to the judicial approval of the
compromise, much less waived substantial rights, because it was never a party in the
proceedings.

Moreover, Olympias absence did not confer upon the RTC the jurisdiction or authority to hear
and resolve the whole controversy. This lack of authority on the part of the RTC which flows
from the absence of Olympia, being an indispensable party, necessarily negates any binding
effect of the subject judicially-approved compromise agreement.

Time and again, the Court has held that the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even to those present. The failure to implead an indispensable party is not a
mere procedural matter. Rather, it brings to fore the right of a disregarded party to its
constitutional rights to due process. Having Olympias interest being subjected to a judiciallyapproved agreement, absent any participation in the proceeding leading to the same, is
procedurally flawed. It is unfair for being violative of its right to due process. In fine, a holding
that is based on a compromise agreement that springs from a void proceeding for want of
jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable party can never become binding, final nor
executory and it may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
35cralawlawlibrary

Lest it be misunderstood, after the remand of this case to the RTC, the parties can still enter into
a compromise agreement on matters which are personal to them. That is their absolute right.
They can dismiss their claims and counterclaims against each other, but the dismissal should not
be dependent or contingent on a compromise agreement, one signatory to which is not a party. It
should not also involve or affect the rights of Olympia, the non-party, unless it is properly
impleaded as one. Needless to state, a judicial determination of the rights of Olympia, when it is
not a party, would necessarily affect the rights of its shareholders or partners, like Paragas,
without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals and
its February 23, 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 80942 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No.
1910, dated January 12, 2015.

1Rollo, pp. 40-55. Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos with Justices Fernanda Lampas
Peralta and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, concurring.

2 Id. at 38. Penned by Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman
and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, concurring.

3 Id. at 127-130. Pened by Judge Leopoldo E. Buraquin.

4 Id. at 109-111.

5 Id. at 112-115.

6 Id. at 41.

7 Id. at 42-43.

8 Id. at 73-108.

9 Id. at 27-28.

10 Id. at 44-45.

11 Id. at 112-114.

12 Id. at 109-111.

13 Id. at 130.

14 Id. at 131-137.

15 Id. at 138.

16 Id. at 24.

17 Id. at 227-232.

18 Id. at 228.

19 Id.

20 Id. at 239.

21 Id. at (299).

22 Id. at 25-26.

23 536 Phil. 1151, 1159 (2006).

24 Id.

25Rollo, p. 135.

26Magbanua, v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 518 (2005).

27Armed Forces of the Philippines Benefit Association, Inc. v. CA, 370 Phil. 150, 163 (1999).

28Rollo, pp. 73-108.

29 Id. at 29.

30 Spouses Noynay v. Citihomes, G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014.

31 Id. at 70.

32 Id. at 53-54.

33 502 Phil. 816 (2005).

34 Insular Savings Bank v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, 525 Phil. 238, 250 (2006).

35Spouses Crisologo v. JEWM, G.R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014, citing Buena v. Sapnay. 116
Phil. 1023 (1962), citing Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921(1918): Lipana v. Court
of First Instance of Cavite, 74 Phil. 18 (1942).

Nos. 172
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners,
v. COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST

DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO,
AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21,
dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents
Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz,
Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace, Maranding,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-yearold minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of
March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her
against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to
the offense charged.5cralawlawlibrary

Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains
at-large.

The factual antecedents follow:

On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony.
Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA
then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her
bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from
the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation
dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at
the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to
go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside
the Alsons Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they
again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas,
a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to
celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.

They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2)
glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass
containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor
before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAAs turn,
she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses
were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.

Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing
her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and
simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed
her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They
helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, Hubuga na, hubuga na, (You
make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, You drink it, you drink
it. She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her
the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they
insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was
asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would
thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was
conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having
intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals.
She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused
her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private
organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last
time, she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt
heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The
upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red
stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached
their house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them that she

was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a
report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.

Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26,
2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and hyperemia or redness at the
posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in
the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemenos
house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at
Alsons Palace, owned by the latters family. When they reached the place, Oporto told
Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30
p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alsons Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The
party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz,
Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.

Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas,
Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno,
Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain
Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to
tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oportos lap. She even showed her
scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked,
What was that, penis? Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back.
Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other
again.

Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola
Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around
midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons Palace to see her friends
there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oportos lap. Fiel
told AAA to go home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye,
just shook her head, and said, I just stay here. Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the
lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again, and saw AAA and
Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they
went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.

After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed
them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and
Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime. Alquizola then opened
Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single
bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The
latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her
hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at
the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on
the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAAs legs and had
intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to
get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the
room. When AAA saw him, she said, Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem.
Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held
his penis and performed fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and
calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet.
Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons
Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house.
They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola
had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he
arrived.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas,
Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion
perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in

the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of
P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and
Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and

e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount
of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola
shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the
requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since
then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and
detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered
voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del
Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17
September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release
from the custody of the DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to
prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6,
2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial courts ruling and,
consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.8

In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents
were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for
help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the
medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAAs genitalia,
giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also
stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened
to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had
premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule
65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents conviction and ardently
contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7,
2008 to assail the petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE

PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT.

III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST

FILED.

IV.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns
the following errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS

TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.

II.

THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.12
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair
and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of
achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due
process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.13 Liberal construction
of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension
of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when
compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.14cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal
is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with
respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double
jeopardy.17cralawlawlibrary

As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v.
Santiago:18cralawlawlibrary

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by

the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may
file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the OSG.
True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can
only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA
is solely vested in the OSG.20cralawlawlibrary

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private
counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted
private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her
name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in
the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v.
CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a
special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled
that the Solicitor Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the
Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the
Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioners cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling
the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor.23cralawlawlibrary

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA
can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy,
still, it must be dismissed for petitioners failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.

True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for
certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This
rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is
a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same

as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from
an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.24cralawlawlibrary

Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private
respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would
prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as
will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions right to due process was
violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to
deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.25cralawlawlibrary

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion,
totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of fact, thereby adopting
hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents narration of facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of

discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.27cralawlawlibrary

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the
defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of
the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more
careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the
testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the
accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private
respondents testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that transpired during the
crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos house to the following morning at the Alquizola
Lodging House. As a result, it presented the private respondents account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support
its ruling of acquittal.

Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of
one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one partys cause and
brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties
tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are
saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CAs blatant disregard of material
prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of
discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right to due process.33cralawlawlibrary

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its
own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact
that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against
the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed
consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
cralawred
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge
of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years
of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could
handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They
never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason
or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily
concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any
physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate court never
provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it
cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is
and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible.
Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in

effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the
test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the
nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the
accused is the complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was
not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a
public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she
narrated her harrowing experience.37cralawlawlibrary

AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to
resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found
AAAs testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court
likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and
straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.38
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain your
consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador
Brandy.cralawred

xxxx

Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle
of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.

Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of
light.

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.cralawred

xxxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.cralawred

xxxx

Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.

Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.

Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.

ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is
crying.cralawred

xxxx

ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.

ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was
there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.cralawred

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana,
sir.

Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel (sic)
something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that
their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid
culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court
only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by
surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims
that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the
burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be
established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that
it is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases,
conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity
which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his
favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party
having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and
adjudication for him of the issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual
sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses
attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim.
Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to
prove his defense by substantial evidence.45cralawlawlibrary

Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately
failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the
room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached
her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed
AAAs lower garments and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between
AAAs legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he
had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing AAAs shirt

and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and
underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down.
When Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then
stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him.
Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and
slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room
and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to
the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last
time.47 Despite said shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that
the lack of any physical resistance on AAAs part amounts to approval or permission. They
failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not
simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a
valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when
testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of
a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the attending circumstances.49cralawlawlibrary

When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.50 Matters of credibility are addressed
basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the
weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared
before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and
have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and
credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the
advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the
private respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the
findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive
and binding.53cralawlawlibrary

The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to

be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually
consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina
becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that
complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal
laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however,
failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex
orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident,
having just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case,54 the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men or
three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each other, unless she were a
prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication
that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact,
appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the
commission of the crime charged.55
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim
were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same
could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who was a
woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of
rape. The victims moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that
the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable
the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential
elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the
hymen or laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for
rape.58cralawlawlibrary

Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is
a truism that the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and the people react differently.59 Different people react differently to a given
type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted

with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration and
dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night
before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled
by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full
faith and credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to
immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she
ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private
respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of which her
family disapproved.63 She never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried
rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and
identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the
charge against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to
obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the
private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been
debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings
are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65
contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and
jurisprudence on the crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas liability is not of a
conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there
be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall
have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing
evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a
common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or
after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect
to the commission of the offense.70cralawlawlibrary

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's
participation in the crime conflict on material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the mauling
and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated
that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.

In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this case, the
rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven.
Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)

In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was
conspiracy:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC held that:

While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the
testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private
parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private
parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it is
quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the
young victim.

The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous
participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing
nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was
properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime.73
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime is not at all
uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape
could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently

watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop
the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other
parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola
to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola
including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola
guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court,74 he waived
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review
of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75cralawlawlibrary

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however,
actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary
knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint
or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the
same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.80
The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a
motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they
are deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the
acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the
same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no
violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them because the
Information, in fact, stated that they took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of
AAA on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to support
the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the
accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs
and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse
with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.83
Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a
total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every
act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual
organ into AAAs mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor

because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the
filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion
temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the
range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the
maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there
being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance.85 With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed.86
However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87
which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
he committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows:89cralawlawlibrary

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be
taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who
have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00

shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from committing the same
bestial acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:

a)
Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four
(4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in each case;
b)
Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts
of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c)
Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,* and Reyes, JJ., concur.chanrobleslaw

March 23, 2015

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on ___February 25, 2015___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on March 23, 2015 at 2:45 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order
No. 1896 dated November 28, 2014.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and
Mario V. Lopez; concurring; rollo, pp. 69-103.

2 Penned by Judge Jacob T. Malik; rollo, pp. 28-67.

3 In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006,
502 SCRA 419, 426; citing Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children, Sec. 40; Rules
and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act," the real names of the rape victims will
not be disclosed. The Court will instead use fictitious initials to represent them throughout the
decision. The personal circumstances of the victims or any other information tending to establish
or compromise their identities will likewise be withheld.

4 Records, pp. 39-40.

5 Id. at 58, 86, 157-162.

6 Id. at 157-172.

7Rollo, pp. 66-67.

8 Id. at 102. (Emphasis in the original)

9 Id. at 3-27.

10 Id. at 10.

11 Id. at 241-242.

12 Id. at 292, 298.

13Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. CA, G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010, 618
SCRA 181, 184.

14 Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010, 635
SCRA 637, 645.

15 M. GUBAT, THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 481 (3rd

ed. 2009).

16 Id. at 481-482.

17 Goodland Company, Inc. v. Co and Chan, G.R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA
692, 701.

18 255 Phil. 851 (1989).

19People v. Santiago, supra, at 861-862. (Emphasis ours)

20Bautista v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521, 534.

21 323 Phil. 596 (1996).

22Rollo, pp. 272-301.

23Merciales v. CA, 429 Phil. 70, 79 (2002).

24 Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 323.

25People v. CA, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012.

26Yu v. Reyes Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.

27Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in Chemplex (Phils.), Inc. v.
Hon. Pamatian, 156 Phil. 408, 457 (1974).

28Rollo, pp. 72-78.

29 Id. at 38-41.

30 Id. at 46-48.

31 Id. at 42-43.

32Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, 504 Phil. 242, 249 (2005).

33 Id.

34People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 245, 255.

35People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 712 (1999).

36 People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 453 (2001).

37Rollo, p. 55.

38 Id.

39 Rollo, pp. 49-53.

40 Id. at 58-59.

41 Id. at 57-58.

42People v. Alcober, G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 479, 488.

43Timbal v. CA, 423 Phil. 617, 623 (2001).

44People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 761, 772.

45People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004).

46Rollo, p. 48.

47Id. at 40-41.

48Id. at 60.

49People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 553.

50People v. Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 335, 349.

51Valbueco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 57, 77.

52 People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 412, 421.

53People v. Apattad, supra note 50, at 350.

54People v. Soriano, 146 Phil. 585 (1970).

55 Id. at 589. (Emphasis ours)

56People v. Zabala, 456 Phil. 237, 243.

57 People v. Baluya, 430 Phil. 349. 363 (2002).

58People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).

59People v. Buenviaje, 408 Philo. 342, 346 (2001).

60People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698. 714 (2003).

61 People v. Balya, supra note 57.

62People v. Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 185, 192.

63 People v. Ramos, 467 Phil 376, 389 (2004).

64 People v. Baluya, supra note 57, at 364.

65 Chempex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, supra note 27.

66Rollo, p. 63.

67 410 Phil. 283, 291 (2001).

68Rollo, p. 62.

69 People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 722-723 (1968).

70People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 527.

71People v. Jabonera, supra note 67. (Emphasis ourts)

72 588 Phil. 937 (2008).

73People v. Dela Torre, supra, at 943. (Citations omitted)

74Rollo, p. 81.

75Supra note 44.

76 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 13.

77 Supra note 15, at 90.

78Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:

xxxx

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;

xxxx

79Section 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.

80People v. Lucena, 408 Phil. 172, 191 (2001).

81Supra note 15, at 91; citing Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 9th ed., p. 271.

82Supra note 4.

83 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Section 3.

84 Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. 3.

85 Revised Penal Code, Art. 64 (2).

86 People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.

87 Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL
UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

88People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011.

89People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009.

Nos. 173

People of the Philippines Vs. Julie Grace K. Villanueva

G.R. No. 163662. February 25, 2015
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/163662.pdf)

Nos. 174

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department

fo
Public
Works
and
Highways
G.R. No. 211666. February 25, 2015
a. Concurring
J. Leonen
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/211666.pdf)

Opinion

Nos. 175
G.R. No. 215630, March 09, 2015 - METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS BEEGUARDS CORPORATION) AND MS. MILAGROS T.
CHAN, Petitioners, v. ALBERTO N. HILONGO, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 215630, March 09, 2015

METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN AS

BEEGUARDS CORPORATION) AND MS. MILAGROS T. CHAN, Petitioners, v. ALBERTO
N. HILONGO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated July 22, 2014 and Resolution2 dated
November 18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 134501.

The facts follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In his Decision3 dated April 30, 2010 in NLRC NCR-10-14411-09, entitled Alberto Hilongo v.
Bee Guards Corp./Milagros Chan, the Labor Arbiter ruled that herein respondent Alberto N.
Hilongo was illegally dismissed, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding the dismissal of complainant
[Hilongo] as illegal and ordering the respondents [herein petitioners] to pay complainant
[Hilongo] his backwages from the date of dismissal to the date of this decision and separation

pay of one month pay per year of service, plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees as all hereunder
computed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Backwages:

A. Basic Salary

9/5/09 4/30/09 (sic) = 7.83

P382 x 26 x 7.83
P77,767.56

B. 13th Month Pay

P77,767.56/12
6,480.63

C. Service Incentive Leave

1,246.27
P85,494.46

II. Separation Pay

10/25/01 4/30/10 = 7 yrs.

P 69,524.00
P382 x 26 x 7 years
P155,018.46

III. 10% Attorneys fees

15,501.85

P170,520.31
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter in its Decision5 dated September 30, 2010 and Resolution dated November 23,
2010.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Aggrieved, Hilongo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
117891.7 In its Decision8 dated September 7, 2012, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and
reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision dated April 30, 2010.9 Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution10 dated March 26, 2013. Petitioners no
longer appealed to this Court.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hilongo then filed a motion for entry of judgment and a motion for clarification of
Decision/Resolution praying that the CAs March 26, 2013 Resolution be clarified and
interpreted to include the amount of the award as stated in the Labor Arbiters Decision dated
April 30, 2010 and additional award computed from May 1, 2010 to March 26, 2013, or the date
the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Resolution13 dated June 11, 2013, the CA granted the motion for entry of judgment and
noted Hilongos motion for clarification of Decision/Resolution. The CA held that when an
appellate court affirms the Labor Arbiters ruling, it is understood that awards due to the illegally
dismissed employee shall be recomputed in order to account for the period of time that has
lapsed from the rendition of the Labor Arbiters decision up to its finality. The CA quoted this
Courts ruling in Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals,14 and
Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation15:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that under the terms of the decision under
execution, no essential change is made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary
consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A
re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part
of the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this

provision that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs
continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The
re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not
constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal
dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is
affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.16
After the corresponding entry of judgment was issued on June 11, 2013, the case was remanded
to the Labor Arbiter. On July 9, 2013, respondent Hilongo filed a motion for issuance of writ of
execution alleging that the June 11, 2013 CA Resolution had confirmed that the amount of
P170,520.31 awarded by the Labor Arbiter is not sufficient, and that there is a need to compute
additional monetary awards reckoned from May 1, 2010 up to April 26, 2013 or the date Hilongo
presumed as the date of finality of the decision.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In an Order18 dated October 29, 2013, the Labor Arbiter directed the issuance of a writ of
execution and ruled that the award of P170,520.31 as stated in the Labor Arbiters Decision dated
April 30, 2010 prevails.

Hilongo filed a petition for extraordinary remedy before the NLRC which dismissed the petition
in its Decision19 dated November 29, 2013. The NLRC also denied Hilongos motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution20 dated January 16, 2014.

Hence, Hilongo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

In the assailed Decision dated July 22, 2014, the CA granted Hilongos petition and set aside the
NLRC Decision dated November 29, 2013 and Resolution dated January 16, 2014. The CA
ordered the Labor Arbiter to re-compute Hilongos monetary awards, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 29, 2013 and Resolution dated January 16, 2014 of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, Second Division, in NLRC LER N[o]. 11-322-13/NLRC LAC N[o]. 07001-485-10 (NLRC NCR-10-14411-09) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the RE-COMPUTATION of the total
monetary benefits due to petitioner [Hilongo]. The Labor Arbiter is further DIRECTED to
incorporate the following in the re-computation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Additional backwages and separation pay from May 1, 2010 to June 11, 2013, or the date
when the April 30, 2010 Decision of Labor Arbiter Macam became final and
executory;chanrobleslaw

(2) Interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards, computed from
June 11, 2013 to June 30, 2013 and six percent x x x (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until
their full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.21
The CA held that it is already settled that the computation of the monetary awards due to the
illegally dismissed employee must continue to run until the final termination of the case on
appeal. The CA ruled that the Labor Arbiter should have been guided by the CA Resolution dated
June 11, 2013 which had clarified that a re-computation of Hilongos award is necessary.22 The
CA also ruled that the re-computation of the monetary awards is a necessary consequence that
flows from the nature of the illegality of Hilongos dismissal. The CA further noted that since the
Labor Arbiters Decision dated April 30, 2010 had ordered the payment of separation pay, in lieu
of reinstatement, the finality of said decision on June 11, 2013 effectively declares that Hilongos
employment relationship with petitioners has ended on said date. Hence, separation pay and back
wages must be computed up to that point to account for the time the illegally dismissed
employee should have been paid his salary and benefit
entitlements.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, this petition.

The issue for our consideration is whether the CA erred in ordering the re-computation of
Hilongos monetary awards.

We rule in the negative.

The issue is not novel. In Nacar v. Gallery Frames,24 we have held

that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence that
flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared by the Labor Arbiter in that decision.
A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a
part of the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on
this provision that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the
reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor
Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision
does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The
illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal
is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final
judgments.cralawred
Nacar reiterated the Courts ruling in the earlier cases of Session Delights and Gonzales.

We thus cannot agree with petitioners contention that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable.25 The re-computation of the consequences of illegal
dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the
final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of
monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.

Likewise without merit is petitioners contention that [i]t may very well be argued that the
NLRCs final decision reversing the Labor Arbiter is in fact the final decision that effectively
declared the employment relationship between Hilongo and [petitioners] as ended on which date
the computation of the separation pay and backwages awarded by the Labor Arbiter ultimately
ceased.26 We note that the CA, in its Decision dated September 7, 2012, had reversed the
NLRC Decision dated September 30, 2010 and Resolution dated November 23, 2010, and
reinstated the Labor Arbiters Decision dated April 30, 2010. Thus, petitioners cannot claim that
the NLRC decision which was set aside with finality is the NLRCs final decision and the
final decision that effectively declared the employment relationship between the parties as
ended.

Said CA Decision dated September 7, 2012 became final and executory on April 26, 2013.27
Thus, the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter which ordered the payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement, effectively ended the employment relationship of the parties on
April 26, 2013, the date the CA decision became final. Since the Labor Arbiters computation of
Hilongos monetary award was up to the date of his April 30, 2010 Decision only, the CA
properly decreed the computation of additional back wages and separation pay.

However, the CA incorrectly concluded that the April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
became final on June 11, 2013,28 contrary to its own finding that it became final and executory
on April 26, 2013.29 This led to its erroneous computation of the additional back wages and
separation pay of Hilongo, as well as reckoning the date of the 12% legal interest. Following the
teaching of Nacar v. Gallery Frames30 that the computation of the monetary consequences (back
wages and separation pay) of the illegal dismissal decision should be reckoned from its finality,
the additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo should be computed from May 1, 2010
to April 26, 2013. Further, the payment of legal interest of 12% per annum should also be from
April 26, 2013 up to June 30, 2013. Thereafter, in accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Monetary Boards Circular No. 799,31 series of 2013, the legal interest computed from July 1,
2013 until the monetary awards were fully satisfied will be 6% per annum.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision
dated July 22, 2014 and Resolution dated November 18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 134501. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated July 22, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134501 shall read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 29, 2013 and Resolution dated January 16, 2014 of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, Second Division, in NLRC LER N[o]. 11-322-13/NLRC LAC N[o]. 07001-485-10 (NLRC NCR-10-14411-09) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the RE-COMPUTATION of the total
monetary benefits due to petitioner [Hilongo]. The Labor Arbiter is further DIRECTED to
incorporate the following in the re-computation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Additional backwages and separation pay from May 1, 2010 to April 26, 2013, or the date
when the April 30, 2010 Decision of Labor Arbiter Macam became final and
executory;chanrobleslaw

(2) Interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards, computed from
April 26, 2013 to June 30, 2013 and six percent x x x (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until
their full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 38-48. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices
Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Melchor Q.C. Sadang concurring.

2 Id. at 50-53.

3 Id. at 59-67. Penned by Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam.

4 Id. at 66-67.

5 Id. at 69-76.

6 Id. at 39, 77.

7 Id. at 39.

8 Id. at 79-91.

9 Id. at 90.

10 Id. at 93-95.

11 Id. at 40.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 101-104.

14 625 Phil. 612, 629 (2010).

15 G.R. No. 198423, October 23, 2012, 684 SCRA 344, 356.

16Rollo, p. 103.

17 Id. at 40.

18 Id. at 106-111.

19 Id. at 115-123.

20 Id. at 125-127.

21 Id. at 47.

22 Id. at 42.

23 Id. at 45.

24 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 452.

25Rollo, p. 18.

26 Id. at 26. Emphasis omitted.

27 Id. at 101.

28 Id. at 45. Page 8 of the July 22, 2014 Decision.

29 Id. at 101.

30 Supra note 24, at 453.

31 Salient portions of the circular provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
be six percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.

This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.

Nos. 176
A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015 - YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND
ELITO P. ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES , Complainants,

v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi
(respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of
Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who
are not parties to the case.

Factual Antecedents

On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision2 in a consolidated labor case3 against
M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses Mercado), the
fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, M.A.

Mercado Construction and Maximo and Aida Mercado to reinstate the complainants to their
former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and to pay jointly and severally, their full
backwages from October 28, 2000 up to the date of this decision plus ten (10%) percent
attorneys fees of the total monetary award. The Research and Information Unit of this Office is
hereby directed to compute complainants[] monetary award which shall form part of this
decision. The complaint for damages is dismissed. The complaint against Shoemart, Inc., is
likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 4
The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under the name
and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure to
post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision.
Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an
Alias Writ of Execution.5 They claimed that they could hardly collect the judgment award from
M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc.
They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc.
and all its incorporators/stockholders6 as additional entity/personalities against which the writ of
execution shall be enforced. In an Order7 dated February 10, 2006, respondent granted the
motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an Amended
Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to
P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By way of special
appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its stockholders who are the
complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and
Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash8 the Amended Alias Writ of Execution,
contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In
an Order9 dated March 13, 2006, however, respondent denied the Urgent Motion to Quash.
Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment, which we referred to
the IBP on March 4, 2007 for investigation, report and recommendation.10

IBPs Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation11 dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was adopted and approved with
modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12, 2011 Resolution, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres, et al. vs. Atty.
Salimathar V. Nambi

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, considering respondent[s] contumacious disregard of the lawful Order of Supreme
Court and the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for his failure to appear despite due
notices, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.12(Emphasis in the original).

Issue

Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Our Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our discussion should
be limited only on the issue of whether respondent acted in gross ignorance of the law when he
granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution; when he issued an Amended Alias Writ
of Execution to enforce the monetary judgment against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators; and when he denied complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. As a rule, for one to
be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that
the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with
malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. As such, our discussion should be focused
primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as to amount to
malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud and dishonesty. On the other hand, we need not delve into the
issue of whether there is an apparent misapplication of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction when respondent issued the Amended Alias Writ of Execution. For one, it is

outside the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover, the issue of whether the doctrine
of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of an appeal brought by
complainants before the National Labor Relations Commission and eventually to the Court of
Appeals.13 We perused the records of the case particularly respondents Order14 dated March
13, 2006 denying complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that respondents
ruling was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based on his personal
assessment of the facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A.
Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are doing business under the name and style of M.A.
Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc. where
individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to the argument of the
complainants that the incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida
Mercado as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The incorporators
listed have similar family names of the Mercados and the Andreses and common address at Gen.
Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy St., Quezon City, and Maximo A. Mercado is the biggest
stockholder. Aside from the Articles of Incorporation, complainants also submitted a Letter of
Intent/Notice To Proceed where respondents, despite their representation that they have already
ceased their business operation, are still continuing their business operation. The documents
submitted by the complainants were corroborated by certification issued by Maggie T. Jao, AVPAssistant Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an amount of
P3,291,300.00 representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that was garnished
belong to M.A. Mercado Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida Mercado and/or
M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or Gertrudes Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A.
Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore, enough reason to conclude that
respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein are one and the
same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud the complainants and to
consequently evade payment of judgment award. x x x As respondents are duly notified and
aware of the execution proceedings, the argument of denial of due process is untenable.15
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondents conclusion had some bases and
was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or
arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or
bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above, we are not here to judge in this present
administrative proceeding whether respondents ratiocination on the application of the piercing
of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is to decide whether respondents error was so
gross as to amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot be
said, by any stretch of imagination, that respondents error, if any, was so gross or that he was
actuated by malice when he issued the above orders. His conclusion was reached after an
examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the arguments raised
by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted

efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold that respondent
should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation
of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial
officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the possibility of being
administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this would
not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole. Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada
v. Judge Banzon,16viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption,
malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge may not be
held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases. Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision
he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be
infallible in his judgment.17
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law. However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately
disregarded the Courts and IBPs orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the
Courts June 7, 2006 Resolution18 directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the
mandatory conference before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice.19 Neither
did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of
the court are not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly
and completely.20 He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal
profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities. x x x
His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes
and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the
court.21 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)

Considering that this appears to be respondents first infraction, we find it proper to impose on
him the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for obstinately
and unjustifiably refusing to obey lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt
with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and noted in Atty. Nambis record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 1-20.

2 Id. at 22-27.
3 Docketed as NLRC-NCR-CASE Nos. 00-11-05852-00 and 00-04-02006-01, entitled Allan
Langgam, Romulo Piquero, Chito Daclitan, Chande Tejero, Ruthilio Cabilino, Tito Langgam,
Ronald Langgam, Michael Cabilino, Fabian Gamurot, Cornillo Bustamante, Rafael Sacil, Allan
Bugtac, Freddie Baylon, Joel Simbajon, Jolito Amahit, Albert Amores, Lito Luay, Romy
Ragandayan, Allan Biglang-awa, Alvin Biglang-awa, Carlos Tanyongon, Rodel Mananon, Allan
Calvez, Afr[e]do Bayog Lito Tois, Arnel Daclitan, Rey Cabatingan, Jesus Traya, Frisco Piquero,
Jose Salvador, Albert Juanerio, Danilo Talampay, Freddie Balinas, Vidal Radaza, Eduardo
Manalansan, Jungie Balinas, Daniel S. Radaza, Cristobal Quemiel, Jun Simbahon, Judy Cerujano
and Celestino Rabusa v. M. A. Mercado Construction, et al.
4Rollo, p. 27.
5 Id. at 41-42.

6 There are five (5) incorporators of M. A. Blocks Work Inc. as appearing in its Articles of
Incorporation, id. at 45-49. They are: (1) Maximo A. Mercado; (2) Gertrudes Casilda A.
Mercado; (3) Yolanda A. Andres; (4) Minette A. Mercado; and (5) Elito P. Andres.
7Rollo, pp. 53-56.
8 Id. at 61-74.
9 Id. at 160-164.
10 See minute resolution of even date, id. at 207.
11 Id. at 224-229.
12 Id. at 223.
13 Id. at 161.
14 Id. at 160-164.
15 Id. at 161-163.
16 592 Phil. 229 (2008).
17 Id. at 233-234.
18Rollo, p. 203.
19 Id. at 218.
20Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, 611 Phil. 179, 187 (2009).
21 Id.

Nos. 177

Swire Realty Development Corporation

G.R. No. 207133. March 9, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=199)

Vs.

Jayne

Yu

Nos. 178

Norma V. Javate Vs. Spouses Renato J. Tiotuico and Lerma

C.
Tiotuico
G.R. No. 187606. March 9, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=198)

Nos. 179
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 - DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY.
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY.

KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr.
Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig
(Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid1960s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch
after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed.
It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila,
which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant;
that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to
marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained
a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her
that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to
their marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar
Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the
divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their
son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by
filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have
to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she
came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her

once his impediment is removed. Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo
requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the
annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently
seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25,
2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was
incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and
that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then
consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to
separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a
property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may
provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing
an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted
that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984.
Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23,
1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr.
Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July
1984 in the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous
marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her
and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their
home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship
with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law
firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not
reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his
firm in January 2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty.
Catindigs romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he
was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty.
Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August

29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the
case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed
the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents
Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued
a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for
gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindigs act of marrying
Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a
grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment.
His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and
personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondents bigamous marriage and his
proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching
professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the
community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets
of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a
prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable
institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty.
Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence in support of the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr.
Perezs uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner
gave credence to Dr. Perez testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never
concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had
always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindigs motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would
warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this
case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner
and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is
more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must
be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed
or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.35 Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of

disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs
own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only
corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist Church
in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started
pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and
four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart
due to Gomez serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved
their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican
Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted
with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away
a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court
in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both
Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot
marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The
foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral
values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical

conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding
any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez
knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal
strategies in order to render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez.
Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he
resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their
son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first
marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty.
Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in
itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Courts finding
of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.37 In
various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery
out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited
a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.
Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that
he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted.
Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction
against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence
to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that
was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to
Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers,
the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the
latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it
does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all,
only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not
prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers
Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., no part respondent ca finding was collegue in faculty.
Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 1-23.

2 Id. at 2.

3 Id. at 35.

4 Id. at 2-3.

5 Id. at 3-4.

6 Id. at 4.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 4-5.

9 Id. at 43.

10 Id. at 44.

11 Id. at 16-18.

12 Id. at 18.

13 Id. at 62.

14 Id. at 75-83; 86-99.

15 Id. at 75-83.

16 Id. at 76.

17 Id. at 76-77.

18 Id. at 77-78.

19 Id. at 78.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 78-79.

22 Id. at 90.

23 Id. at 116-117.

24 Id. at 176-177.

25 Id. at 454-468.

26 Id. at 469-479.

27 Id. at 480-500.

28 Id. at 571-593.

29 Id. at 587-588.

30 Id. at 569-570.

31 Id. at 594-610.

32 Id. at 627.

33 590 Phil. 270 (2008).

34 Id. at 276. See also Cordon v. Balicanta, 439 Phil. 95, 115-116 (2002).

35Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329, 335 (2004).

36See Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 358 (2010).

37See Cordova v. Cordova, 259 Phil. 278 (1989).

38See Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336 (1999); Narag v. Atty. Narag, 353 Phil. 643, 663
(1998); Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., 213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).

39See Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 372.

Nos. 180
G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014 - SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS,
NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, AND VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO,
Petitioners, v. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, Respondent.; G.R. NO. 187916 - JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M.
ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA, RAFAEL P. BORROMEO JOCELYN DAWISASUNCION, MINORS MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN,
RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR PARENTS
RICHARD AND MARITES TARAN, MINORS CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS,
CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, AND CRISTEN AIDAN C. RAMOS REPRESENTED
AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER DONNA C. RAMOS, MINORS JAZMIN SYLLITA T.
VILA AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER
MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO, Petitioners, v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE MAYOR
FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T. LIM, JESUS
FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA, VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN C. NIETO,
ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO, EDWARD VP MACEDA,
RODERICK D. VALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR, SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA,
LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F. RIVERA,[1] DANILO VICTOR H.
LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M.
DIONISO, JR. AND ERICK IAN O. NIEVA, Respondents.; CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC.,
PETRON CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
Intervenors.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, AND

VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, Petitioners, v. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 187916

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA,

RAFAEL P. BORROMEO JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, MINORS MARIAN REGINA B.
TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN, RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN, REPRESENTED
AND JOINED BY THEIR PARENTS RICHARD AND MARITES TARAN, MINORS
CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS, CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, AND CRISTEN
AIDAN C. RAMOS REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER DONNA C.
RAMOS, MINORS JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV,
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY THEIR MOTHER MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO,
Petitioners, v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO,
COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T. LIM, JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA,
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN C. NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO,
RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO, EDWARD VP MACEDA, RODERICK D. VALBUENA,
JOSEFINA M. SISCAR, SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO,
CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F. RIVERA,1 DANILO VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO
G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M. DIONISO, JR. AND ERICK IAN O.
NIEVA, Respondents.

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS SHELL

PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Intervenors.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Challenged in these consolidated petitions2 is the validity of Ordinance No. 81873 entitled AN
ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,
BY CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE
(1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Manila (Sangguniang Panlungsod) on 14 May 2009.

The creation of a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted
the prohibition against owners and operators of businesses, including herein intervenors Chevron
Philippines, Inc. (Chevron), Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), and Petron

Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the oil companies, from operating in the
designated commercial zone an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 80274
entitled AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF
LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, PNR RAILROAD TRACK IN
THE EAST, BEATA ST. IN THE SOUTH, PALUMPONG ST. IN THE SOUTHWEST AND
ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE WEST, PNR RAILROAD IN THE NORTHWEST AREA,
ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE NORTHEAST, PASIG RIVER IN THE SOUTHEAST
AND DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE SOUTHWEST, THE AREA OF PUNTA, STA. ANA
BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER, MARCELINO OBRERO ST., MAYO 28 ST. AND THE
F. MANALO STREET FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO COMMERCIAL I, and Ordinance No.
81195 entitled AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND
USE PLAN AND ZONING REGULATIONS OF 2006 AND PROVIDING FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT
THERETO.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Parties

Petitioners allege the parties respective capacity to sue and be sued, viz:
Petitioners
Residence in Manila Suing capacity aside from being residents of Manila/other
personal circumstances
G.R. No. 187836
SJS Officer Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara)Not mentioned in the petition; holding office in
Ermita, Manila
Manila taxpayer;
One of the petitioners in SJS v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052);*
Pesident of ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST with members who are residents of the City of
Manila
SJS Officer Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao (Cabigao)
in SJS v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052)

Pandacan

One of the petitioners

* The allegation is inaccurate. SJS Officer Alcantara is actually one of the counsels for petitioner
SJS in G.R. No. 156052. The petitioners in that case are the SJS itself, Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon (Tumbokon).

G.R. No. 187916

Former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza) San Andres

Former Mayor of Manila;

Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

Bienvinido M. AbanteSta. Ana
Representatives

Citizen and taxpayer;member of the House of

Ma. Lourdes M. Isip-Garcia San Miguel

Rafael P. Borromeo

Paco

Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion

Incumbent City Councilor of the City of Manila

Incumbent City Councilor of the City of Manila

Sta. Mesa

Incumbent City Councilor of the City of Manila

Minors Marian Regina B. Taran, Macalia Ricci B. Taran, Richard Kenneth B. Taran, represented
and joined by their parents Richard and Marites Taran
Paco Citizens, real estate owners
and taxpayers
Minors Czarina Alysandra C. Ramos, Cezarah Adrianna C. Ramos, and Cristen Aidan C. Ramos
represented and joined by their mother Donna c. Ramos
Tondo Citizens, real estate owners
and taxpayers
Minors Jasmin Syllita T. Vila and Antonio T. Cruz IV, represented and joined by their mother
Maureen C. Tolentino Sta. Ana
Citizens, real estate owners and taxpayers
Respondents Sued in their capacity as

G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916

Former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) Incumbent Mayor of Manila at the time of the filing
of the present petitions
Respondents Sued in their capacity as

G.R. No. 187916

Vice-Mayor Francisco Domagoso (Vice-Mayor Domagoso) Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of

the City Council of Manila
Arlene Woo Koa

Principal author of City Ordinance No. 8187

Moises T. Lim, Jesus Fajardo, Louisito N. Chua, Victoriano A. Melendez, John Marvin Nieto,
Rolando M. Valeriano, Raymondo R. Yupangco, Edward VP Maceda, Roderick D. Valbuena,
Josefina M. Siscar, Phillip H. Lacuna, Luciano M. Veloso, Carlo V. Lopez, Ernesto F. Rivera,6
Danilo Victor H. Lacuna, Jr., Ernesto G. Isip, Honey H. Lacuna-Pangan, Ernesto M. Dionisio, Jr.,
Erick Ian O. Nieva Personal and official capacities as councilors who voted and approved
City Ordinance No. 8187
The following intervenors, all of which are corporations organized under Philippine laws,
intervened:7
Intervenors

Nature of Business

Chevron Philippines, Inc. (CHEVRON)

products in the Philippines since 1922

importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (SHELL)

manufacturing, refining, importing,
distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines
Petron Corporation (PETRON)
manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and
marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines
They claim that their rights with respect to the oil depots in Pandacan would be directly affected
by the outcome of these cases.chanrobleslaw

The Antecedents

These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.8
(hereinafter referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1) that the ordinance
subject thereof Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of the inhabitants of Manila;9 (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3)
that it is not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119.10 Declaring that it is constitutional and valid,11
the Court accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a specific directive on the
relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals.12chanrobleslaw

Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein
petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains provisions contrary
to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the
right to a healthful and balanced environment are also included.

For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we again trace the history of the Pandacan oil
terminals, as well as the intervening events prior to the reclassification of the land use from
Industrial II to Commercial I under Ordinance No. 8027 until the creation of Medium Industrial
Zone and Heavy Industrial Zone pursuant to Ordinance No. 8187.

History of the Pandacan

Oil Terminals

We quote the following from the Resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 156052:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the Pasig
[R]iver. At the turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the
industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging
industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it
was classified as an industrial zone. Among its early industrial settlers were the oil companies. x
xx

On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. x x x
[I]n their zealous attempt to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took
control of the Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to
deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon. The U.S. Army burned
unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the
events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were
set on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. For one week longer, the open city blazed
a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by night.
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of depots and
service stations inoperative.

After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The
three major oil companies resumed the operation of their depots. But the district was no longer a
sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community.
Today, Pandacan has become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people,
majority of whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from numerous industrial installations,
there are also small businesses, churches, restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences
situated there. Malacaang Palace, the official residence of the President of the Philippines and
the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers away. There is a private school near the
Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers. More than
15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these facilities. A
university with a student population of about 25,000 is located directly across the depot on the
banks of the Pasig [R]iver.

The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies distribution terminals and depot
facilities. The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas,
respectively, are connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer underground
pipeline system. Petrons refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot.
The terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements
of Metro Manila, 50% of Luzons consumption and 35% nationwide. Fuel can also be
transported through barges along the Pasig [R]iver or tank trucks via the South Luzon
Expressway.13 (Citations omitted)
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
dated 12 October 2001 between the oil companies
and the Department of Energy (DOE)

On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE entered into a MOA14 in light of recent
international developments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and government
landmarks,15 potential new security risks relating to the Pandacan oil terminals and the impact
on the surrounding community which may be affected,16 and to address the perceived risks
posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals,
consistent with the principle of sustainable development.17 The stakeholders acknowledged that
there is a need for a comprehensive study to address the economic, social, environmental and
security concerns with the end in view of formulating a Master Plan to address and minimize the
potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the

Pandacan oil terminals without adversely affecting the security and reliability of supply and
distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon, and the interests of
consumers and users of such petroleum products in those areas.18chanrobleslaw

The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027

against the continued stay of the oil depots

The MOA, however, was short-lived.

On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor
Atienza) now one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 802719 reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining
areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.

The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification were given six
months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to stop the operation of their
businesses.

Nevertheless, the oil companies were granted an extension of until 30 April 2003 within which to
comply with the Ordinance pursuant to the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)20 dated 26 June 2002 between the City of Manila
and the Department of Energy (DOE), on the one hand, and the oil companies, on the other,
where the parties agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable
and practicable option21 and committed to adopt specific measures22 consistent with the said
objective;

(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which ratified the
26 June 2002 MOU but limited the extension of the period within which to comply to six months
from 25 July 2002; and

(3) Resolution No. 13 dated 30 January 200324 of the Sanguniang Panlungsod, which extended
the validity of Resolution No. 97 to 30 April 2003, authorized then Mayor Atienza to issue
special business permits to the oil companies, and called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052):

The filing of an action for mandamus
before the Supreme Court
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027

In the interim, an original action for mandamus entitled Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.
docketed as G.R. No. 15605225 was filed on 4 December 2002 by Tumbokon and herein
petitioners SJS and Cabigao against then Mayor Atienza. The petitioners sought to compel
former Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and cause the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.26chanrobleslaw

Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction,
and status quo order in favor of the oil companies

Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of G.R. No. 156052, and before the expiration of the
validity of Resolution No. 13, the oil companies filed the following actions before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila: (1) an action for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application
for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction by
Chevron; (2) a petition for prohibition and mandamus also for the annulment of the Ordinance
with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory

injunction by Shell; and (3) a petition assailing the validity of the Ordinance with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) by
Petron.27chanrobleslaw

Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in
favor of Chevron and Shell on 19 May 2003. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo
order on 4 August 2004.28chanrobleslaw

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8119

defining the Manila land use plan
and zoning regulations

On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled An Ordinance
Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and
Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto.29chanrobleslaw

Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) Article IV, Sec. 730 enumerating the existing zones or districts in the City of Manila;

(b) Article V, Sec. 2331 designating the Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD); and

(c) the repealing clause, which reads:

SEC. 84. Repealing Clause. All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of
this Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the
effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired.32
7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052;
The mayor has the mandatory legal duty

to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order

the removal of the Pandacan terminals

On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition for mandamus, and directed then respondent
Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.33chanrobleslaw

Confined to the resolution of the following issues raised by the petitioners, to wit:
1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza] has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.34
the Court declared:
x x x [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. x x x

xxxx

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the
subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. x x x

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing
that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila
from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.35
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional

The oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, filed their
motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the 7 March 2007 Decision. During the
oral arguments, the parties submitted to the power of the Court to rule on the constitutionality
and validity of the assailed Ordinance despite the pendency of the cases in the
RTC.36chanrobleslaw

On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the motions for leave to intervene of the oil companies
and the Republic of the Philippines but denied their respective motions for reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, x x x

We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
In coordination with the appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is
hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present
site.37
13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119

The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No.
8119. On this score, the Court ratiocinated:

For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two
ordinances. There is no conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, Section 23, designated it
as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). In its Annex C which defined the
zone boundaries, the Pandacan area was shown to be within the High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD). x x x [B]oth ordinances actually have a common
objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No.
8027) or mixed residential commercial (Ordinance No. 8119)

xxxx

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area described
therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general
law as it covers the entire city of Manila.cralawred

xxxx

x x x The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative
intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a
special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in the
Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No.
8027.38
Filing of a draft Resolution amending
Ordinance No. 8027 effectively allowing
the oil depots to stay in the Pandacan area;
Manifestation and Motion to forestall
the passing of the new Ordinance
filed in G.R. No. 156052

On 5 March 2009, respondent then Councilor Arlene W. Koa, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a draft resolution entitled An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 8119 Otherwise
Known as The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 by
Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for its
Enforcement.39 Initially numbered as Draft Ordinance No. 7177, this was later renumbered as
Ordinance No. 8187, the assailed Ordinance in these instant petitions.

Considering that the provisions thereof run contrary to Ordinance No. 8027, the petitioners in
G.R. No. 156052 filed a Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila from
further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027; [and] b) Transfer the monitoring
of the enforcement of the Resolution of the Honorable Court on this case dated 13 February 2008
from Branch 39, Manila Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court.40chanrobleslaw

28 April 2009 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Second Motion for Reconsideration
denied with finality; succeeding motions
likewise denied or otherwise noted
without action

On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the Manifestation and Motion, the Court denied with
finality the second motion for reconsideration dated 27 February 2008 of the oil companies.41 It
further ruled that no further pleadings shall be entertained in the case.42chanrobleslaw

Succeeding motions were thus denied and/or noted without action. And, after the Very Urgent
Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 and to
Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do So filed on 19 May 2009 was denied on 2 June 2009
for being moot,43 all pleadings pertaining to the earlier motion against the drafting of an
ordinance to amend Ordinance No. 8027 were noted without action.44chanrobleslaw

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187

allowing the continued stay of the oil depots

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who
succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
8187.45chanrobleslaw

The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027,
Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent
therewith46 thereby allowing, once again, the operation of Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and
Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments and Highly Pollutive/NonHazardous[,] Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,] NonPollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments within the newly created Medium
Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) in the Pandacan area.

Thus, where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone
(I-1), Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy
Industrial Zone (I-3), where petroleum refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly
allowed.

Hence these petitions.chanrobleslaw

The Petitions

G.R. No. 187836

To support their petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the
petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS) officers allege that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power because the
measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the people within the
contemplation of the following provisions of law:

a)
Article III, Section 18 (kk)47 of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise known as the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila, which provides that the Municipal Board shall have the legislative power
to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper;
b)
Section 1648 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local Government Code, which defines
the scope of the general welfare clause;
2. The conditions at the time the Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No.
156052 exist to this date;

3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding that the
conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of the Ordinance remain the same, the
Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of
the Philippines;49 and

4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines on the duty of the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people50
and protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.51chanrobleslaw

Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of Manila be declared null and void, and
that respondent, and all persons acting under him, be prohibited from enforcing the same.

G.R. No. 187916

The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with other
residents and taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health of the
people and the right to a healthful and balanced environment under Sections 15 and 16 of the
Constitution.

Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of the following health and
environment-related municipal laws, and international conventions and treaties to which the
Philippines is a state party:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Municipal Laws

(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
Philippine Clean Air Act;

(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);

(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); and

(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a state party

a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that [e]veryone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person;

b. Articles 6,56 2457 and 2758 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, summarized by the
petitioners in the following manner:
1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

2. human right to the highest attainable standard of health[;]

3. the human right to ecologically sustainable development[;]

4. the human right to an adequate standard of living, including access to safe food and water[;]

5. the human right of the child to live in an environment appropriate for physical and mental
development[; and]

6. the human right to full and equal participation for all persons in environmental decisionmaking and development planning, and in shaping decisions and policies affecting ones
community, at the local, national and international levels.59
Petitioners likewise posit that the title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. According to them,
Ordinance No. 8027 was never mentioned in the title and the body of the new ordinance in
violation of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that every bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific procedure outlined in Ordinance No. 8119 that
should be observed when amending the zoning ordinance. This is provided for under Section 81
thereof, which reads:
SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance. The proposed amendments to the Zoning
Ordinance as reviewed and evaluated by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
shall be submitted to the City Council for approval of the majority of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod members. The amendments shall be acceptable and eventually approved:
PROVIDED, That there is sufficient evidence and justification for such proposal; PROVIDED
FURTHER, That such proposal is consistent with the development goals, planning objectives,
and strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said amendments shall take effect
immediately upon approval or after thirty (30) days from application.
Petitioners thus pray that:
1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to the Court [E]n Banc, and setting (sic) the
case for oral argument;

2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
respondents from publishing and posting Manila City Ordinance No. 8187 and/or posting of
Manila City Ordinance No. 8187; and/or taking any steps to implementing (sic) and/or enforce
the same and after due hearing, the temporary restraining order be converted to a permanent
injunction;

3. x x x Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void for being repugnant to the
Constitution and existing municipal laws and international covenants;

4. x x x the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing and/or implementing Manila City
Ordinance No. 8187;

5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from issuing any permits (business
or otherwise) to all industries whose allowable uses are anchored under the provisions of Manila
Ordinance No. 8187; and

6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to comply with the Order of
the Honorable Court in G.R. 156052 dated February 13, 2008.60
The Respondents Position
on the Consolidated Petitions

Respondent former Mayor Lim

In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer, attacks the
petitioners lack of legal standing to sue. He likewise points out that the petitioners failed to
observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he expounds on the following
arguments:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
to enact zoning ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8119 without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as
prescribed under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and Development
Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance No.
8119, especially when the action actually originated from the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself; (2)
the Sangguniang Panlungsod may, in the later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the
zoning ordinance sought to be modified; and (3) the provision repealing Section 23 of Ordinance
No. 8119 is not violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that
every bill must embrace only one subject and that such shall be expressed in the title.

On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the
assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general
welfare clause and public policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the
Constitution, municipal laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to
overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.

Respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso

and the City Councilors who voted
in favor of the assailed ordinance

On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the respondents several chances to submit their
Memorandum,62 they, through the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, prayed that the
Court dispense with the filing thereof.

In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered a position essentially similar to those

proffered by former Mayor Lim.chanrobleslaw

The Intervenors Position

on the Consolidated Petitions

On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the petitions based on
alleged procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete requisites of judicial review, violation
of the principle of hierarchy of courts, improper remedy, submission of a defective verification
and certification against forum shopping, and forum shopping.

As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among others, that the assailed ordinance is
constitutional and valid; that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in the best position to determine
the needs of its constituents; that it is a valid exercise of legislative power; that it does not violate
health and environment-related provisions of the Constitution, laws, and international
conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots are not likely
targets of terrorists; that the scaling down of the operations in Pandacan pursuant to the MOU
has been followed; and that the people are safe in view of the safety measures installed in the
Pandacan terminals.

Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30 November 2010,64 Petron informed the Court that it
will cease [the] operation of its petroleum product storage facilities65 in the Pandacan oil
terminal not later than January 2016 on account of the following:

2.01 Environmental issues, many of which are unfounded, continually crop up and tarnish the
Companys image.

2.02. The location of its Pandacan terminal is continually threatened, and made uncertain
preventing long-term planning, by the changing local government composition. Indeed, the
relevant zoning ordinances have been amended three (3) times, and their validity subjected to
litigation.66
Intervening Events

On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting the submission of the Memorandum of
respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which composition had already substantially changed,
enacted Ordinance No. 828367 entitled AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF
ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM
REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO
HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD).

The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed ordinance to exclude the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone.

Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of the industries operating within the Industrial
Zone. However, the oil companies, whose oil depots are located in the High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given until the end of January 2016 within which
to relocate their terminals.

Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor, did not support the amendment.
Maintaining that the removal of the oil depots was prejudicial to public welfare, and, on account
of the pending cases in the Supreme Court, he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 on 11 September
2012.68chanrobleslaw

On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a Manifestation informing this Court that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod voted to override the veto, and that he, in turn, returned it again with
his veto. He likewise directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod to append his written reasons for his
veto of the Ordinance, so that the same will be forwarded to the President for his consideration in
the event that his veto is overridden again.69chanrobleslaw

On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar Manifestation.70chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed the new ordinance, Atty. Luch R. Gempis,
Jr. (Atty. Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, writing on behalf of respondents
Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors of Manila who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, finally complied with this Courts Resolution dated 17 July 2012 reiterating its earlier
directives71 to submit the said respondents Memorandum.

In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent Manifestation72 dated 13 September 2012, Atty.

Gempis explained that it was not his intention to show disrespect to this Court or to delay or
prejudice the disposition of the cases.

According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-Mayor and the City
Councilors only to attest that the pleading was personally signed by the respondents. He clarified
that he was not designated as the legal counsel of the respondents as, in fact, he was of the
impression that, pursuant to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local Government Code,73 it is the City
Legal Officer who is authorized to represent the local government unit or any official thereof in a
litigation. It was for the same reason that he thought that the filing of a Memorandum may
already be dispensed with when the City Legal Officer filed its own on 8 February 2010. He
further explained that the Ordinance subject of these cases was passed during the 7th Council
(2007-2010); that the composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had already changed after the
2010 elections; and that steps were already taken to amend the ordinance again. Hence, he was in
a dilemma as to the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time he received the Courts
Resolution of 31 May 2011.

Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing of the required memorandum
in view of the passing of Ordinance No. 8283.chanrobleslaw

Issue

The petitioners arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in G. R. No. 156052
declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after finding that the presence of the oil
terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life and security of the people of Manila. From thence,
the petitioners enumerated constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international treaties
and conventions on health and environment protection allegedly violated by the enactment of the
assailed Ordinance to support their position.

The resolution of the present controversy is, thus, confined to the determination of whether or
not the enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in
the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.chanrobleslaw

Our Ruling

We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar as the presence
of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.chanrobleslaw

We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the oil companies.

At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already pronounced
that the matter of whether or not the oil depots should remain in the Pandacan area is of
transcendental importance to the residents of Manila.74chanrobleslaw

We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the past, and take
cognizance of the cases75 if only to determine if the acts complained of are no longer within the
bounds of the Constitution and the laws in place.76chanrobleslaw

Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this Courts discretion to waive one or some
procedural requirements if only to remove any impediment to address and resolve the serious
constitutional question77 raised in these petitions of transcendental importance, the same having
far-reaching implications insofar as the safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila, and
even its neighboring communities, are concerned.

Proper Remedy

Respondents and intervenors argue that the petitions should be outrightly dismissed for failure on
the part of the petitioners to properly apply related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of
Court, and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy
available to them.

To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 6578 of the Rules of Court to assail the
validity and constitutionality of the Ordinance.

there is no appeal, or any plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law

Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.79chanrobleslaw

Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought recourse before the first and second level
courts under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,80 which govern the enforcement
or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations.81 Petron
additionally submits that the most adequate remedy available to petitioners is to have the assailed
ordinance repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local referendum may
be had. And, assuming that there were laws violated, the petitioners may file an action for each
alleged violation of law against the particular individuals that transgressed the law.

It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the intervenors prove to be inadequate
to resolve the present controversies in their entirety owing to the intricacies of the circumstances
herein prevailing.

The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule
I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement
or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not
limited to the following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;

xxxx

(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;

xxxx

(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural
resources.82 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of
violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that would
support the other position of the petitioners the protection of the right to life, security and
safety.

Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was specifically intended to
meet the following objectives:
SEC. 3. Objectives.The objectives of these Rules are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a)
To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(b)
To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of environmental
rights and duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and
international agreements;
(c)
To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective enforcement of
remedies and redress for violation of environmental laws; and
(d)
To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments in
environmental cases.83
Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these Rules.

Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider that these petitions are already a sequel to
G.R. No. 156052, and that there are some issues herein raised that the remedies available at the
level of the Sangguniang Panlungsod could not address. Neither could the filing of an individual
action for each law violated be harmonized with the essence of a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy.

From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners direct recourse to this Court
when, pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.84
Thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question. (Emphasis supplied)
To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor
of Manila,85 where the petitioners sought the nullification of the mayors executive order and the
councils ordinance concerning certain functions of the petitioners that are vested in them by law.
There, the Court held:
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides: x x x

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.87

Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a
petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching implications and
transcendental issues that need to be resolved,88 as in these present petitions.

On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the petitions should have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a
special civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance
warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.89 In the case of Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,90 the Court ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition,
the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance
with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
persons aggrieved thereby

As to who may file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, Petron posits that
petitioners are not among the persons aggrieved contemplated under Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.

Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as citizens, taxpayers, or legislators, lack the legal
standing to assail the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8187. It further claims that
petitioners failed to show that they have suffered any injury and/or threatened injury as a result
of the act complained of.91chanrobleslaw

Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be considered taxpayers suit, for then, there should
be a claim that public funds were illegally disbursed and that petitioners have sufficient interest
concerning the prevention of illegal expenditure of public money.92 In G.R. No. 187916, Shell

maintains that the petitioners failed to show their personal interest in the case and/or to establish
that they may represent the general sentiments of the constituents of the City of Manila so as to
be treated as a class suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not numerous and representative enough
for the petition to be treated as a class suit. As to the city councilors who joined the petitioners in
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187, Shell posits that they cannot invoke the ruling in
Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,93 where the Court held that legislators may question the
constitutionality of a statute, if and when it infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators,
because of the absence of the allegation that the assailed ordinance indeed infringes upon their
prerogatives.

Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position supported by a number of cases on the concept
of locus standi,94 the direct injury test,95 an outline of the stringent requirements of legal
standing when suing as a citizen,96 as a taxpayer,97 as a legislator and in cases where class suits
are filed in behalf of all citizens.98chanrobleslaw

Their arguments are misplaced.

In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public right,
and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of
the city. Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the
ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on
Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of
Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are
interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need
not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest
in the enforcement of the citys ordinances.99 x x x (Citations omitted)

No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right. Necessarily,
the people who are interested in the nullification of such an ordinance are themselves the real
parties in interest, for which reason, they are no longer required to show any specific interest
therein. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer Alcantara,
has been recognized by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in connection
with the same subject matter herein considered. The rest of the petitioners are residents of
Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in the prohibition proceedings against the
enforcement of the assailed ordinance.

In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services,
Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM),100 involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition to permanently enjoin PSALM
from selling the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources
Corporation (K-Water), the Court ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. x x x This Court,
however, has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.

There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one
of paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro
Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric
power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the
resolution of legal issues in a petition to stop its implementation.101 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is indisputably a
right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of Manila, have
the required personal interest to seek relief from this Court to protect such right.

in excess of its or his jurisdiction,

or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the petitioners to establish the facts with certainty
that would show that the acts of the respondents fall within the parameters of the grave abuse of
discretion clause settled by jurisprudence, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [G]rave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.102

It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in these instant cases of transcendental importance in
view of the Courts pronouncement, in Magallona v. Ermita.103 There it held that the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes,
notwithstanding the following defects:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict
observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot
issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its
constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of

certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and
indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional import x x x carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of
procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.104
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Requisites of judicial review

For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the following requisites shall concur: (1) the
existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) a plea that judicial review be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.105chanrobleslaw

Only the first two requisites are put in issue in these cases.

On the matter of the existence of a legal controversy, we reject the contention that the petitions
consist of bare allegations based on speculations, surmises, conjectures and hypothetical
grounds.

The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and constitutional and ordered its implementation.
With the passing of the new ordinance containing the contrary provisions, it cannot be any
clearer that here lies an actual case or controversy for judicial review. The allegation on this,
alone, is sufficient for the purpose.

The second requisite has already been exhaustively discussed.

Proof of identification required in the notarization

of the verification and certification against forum

shopping in G.R. No. 187916

At the bottom of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping of the petition in
G.R. No. 187916 is the statement of the notary public to the effect that the affiant, in his presence
and after presenting an integrally competent proof of identification with signature and
photograph,106 signed the document under oath.

Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code,107 which provides that an individual
acknowledging any document before a notary public shall present his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC), Chevron posits that the petitioners failure to present his CTC rendered the petition
fatally defective warranting the outright dismissal of the petition.

We disagree.

The verification and certification against forum shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4
and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be verified, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading if it lacks a proper verification while Section 5 requires that the certification to be
executed by the plaintiff or principal party be under oath.

These sections, in turn, should be read together with Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice.

Section 6108 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise provides that any competent evidence of
identity specified under Section 12 thereof may now be presented before the notary public, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase competent evidence of identity refers
to the identification of an individual based on:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a)
at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to passport, drivers license, Professional
Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal
ID, voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card,
Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certification from the
National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b)
x x x.109

Forum shopping

Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836 violated the rule against forum shopping
allegedly because all the elements thereof are present in relation to G.R. No. 156052, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions

According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052 and the officers of SJS in
G.R. No. 187836 are clearly the same. Moreover, both actions implead the incumbent mayor of
the City of Manila as respondent. Both then respondent Mayor Atienza in G.R. No. 156052 and
respondent former Mayor Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their capacity as Manila mayor.

2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same fact(s)

Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners assert the same rights to health and to a balanced
and healthful ecology relative to the fate of the Pandacan terminal, and seek essentially the same
reliefs, that is, the removal of the oil depots from the present site.

3. the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other

Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila
from further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027 x x x (Manifestation and
Motion) and Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft
Ordinance No. 7177 [now Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite Him for Contempt if He Would Do
So (Urgent Motion) both in G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the possibility that the Court
would have rendered conflicting rulings on cases involving the same facts, parties, issues and
reliefs prayed for.110chanrobleslaw

We are not persuaded.

In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos,111 the Court expounded on the nature of forum shopping.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The established rule is that for forum shopping to
exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances
and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. x x x112 (Citations omitted)

It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed, not to secure a judgment adverse to
the first decision, but, precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots from the
Pandacan area.

As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners Manifestation and Urgent Motion in G.R. No.
156052, which were both incidental to the enforcement of the decision favorable to them brought
about by the intervening events after the judgment had become final and executory, and which
involve the same Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the filing of the instant
petitions is not barred by res judicata.

In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos involving the re-filing of a complaint, which
had been earlier dismissed without qualification that the dismissal was with prejudice, and which
had not been decided on the merits, the Court declared that such re-filing did not amount to
forum shopping. It ratiocinated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective complaints in both Civil Case No. 951387 and Civil Case No. 96-0225 are similarly worded, and are identical in all relevant details,
including typographical errors, except for the additional allegations in support of respondents
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 95-1387. It is similarly not
disputed that both actions involve the same transactions; same essential facts and circumstances;
and raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.cralawred

xxxx

x x x The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20
November 1995, dismissing Civil Case No. 95-1387 was an unqualified dismissal. More
significantly, its dismissal was not based on grounds under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section
1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which dismissal shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim as crystallized in Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to
dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same
action or claim.

From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

xxxx

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds.

Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause. Res judicata exists when the following elements are present: (a) the former

judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) and there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.113
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the said Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and
refused to act on the succeeding pleadings, for being moot.114 Clearly, the merits of the motion
were not considered by the Court. The following disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v.
Spouses Caraos is further enlightening:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387 does not constitute res judicata to
sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in Civil Case No. 96-0225. As earlier underscored, the
dismissal was one without prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on the merits. It bears
reiterating that a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision
on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the
dismissed action had not been commenced.115 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping in the instant cases, we need not discuss
in detail the elements of forum shopping.chanrobleslaw

II

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city116 subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed
by another ordinance.117 These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court
upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the

Ordinance,118 and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027,
provided that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by
the courts.119 In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the Sanguniang
Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents120 that the removal
of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.121chanrobleslaw

Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the same subject matter to
justify the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance?

We answer in the negative.

We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter subject of these
petitions. In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary.
Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.

In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was
passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous
members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat, and
pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots
until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim stood
his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.

In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents.122chanrobleslaw

Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent of detailing the
steps123 he took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if only to show his honest intention to
make the right decision.

The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations
of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ
to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the
matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or
political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the general welfare of
the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the
council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.

Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on
the matter, favoring the citys economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for
this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific
right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals
that there is truly no such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned.

If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara124 by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary
mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.chanrobleslaw

III

The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support to their position that Manila is now safe
despite the presence of the oil terminals remain ineffective. These have not completely removed
the threat to the lives of the inhabitants of Manila.

In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a
guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There,
the Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with

the concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;125 and a lawful method the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively
ends the continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan.126chanrobleslaw

In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal
has never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks;127 that the petitions were based on
unfounded fears and mere conjectures;128 and that the possibility that it would be picked by the
terrorists is nil given the security measures installed thereat.129chanrobleslaw

The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the safety of the people even
with the presence of the Pandacan Terminals. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron, continues to enhance the safety and
security features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and product spill prevention measures
in accordance with the local standards set by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among others, and
with the international standards of the American Petroleum Industry (API) and the National
Fire Prevention and Safety Association (NFPSA); that since 1914, the oil depots had not
experienced any incident beyond the ordinary risks and expectations130 of the residents of
Manila; and that it received a passing grade on the safety measures they installed in the facilities
from the representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an ocular inspection on 22 May
2009; and

2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the City of Manila and the DOE, on the one
hand, and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties thereto conceded and acknowledged
that the scale-down option for the Pandacan Terminal operations is the best alternative to the
relocation of the terminals, Shell enumerates the steps taken to scale down its operations.

As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has already decommissioned
twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for Shell alone, its LPG Spheres, which it claims
is the only product that may cause explosion, was part of those decommissioned, thereby
allegedly removing the danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and linear/green parks were
likewise created to separate the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shells portion of the

oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped with the latest technology to ensure air-quality control
and water-quality control, and to prevent and cope with possible oil spills with a crisis
management plan in place in the event that an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell claims that the
recommendations of EQE International in its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which
it says is one of the leading independent risk assessment providers in the world and largest risk
management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with; and that, on its own initiative, it
adopted additional measures for the purpose, for which reason, the individual risk level
resulting from any incident occurring from the Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty
(20) times lower compared to the individual risk level of an average working or domestic
environment.131chanrobleslaw

We are not persuaded.

The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is
imminent. It remains so convinced.

Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots
where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether
or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated area. Surely,
any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise,
would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within and among the neighboring
communities but certainly mass deaths and injuries.

With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan Terminals, which the oil
companies continue to insist to have been validated and recognized by the MOU, the Court, in
G.R. No. 156052, has already put this issue to rest. It specifically declared that even assuming
that the terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying
the MOU gave it full force and effect only until 30 April 2003.133chanrobleslaw

The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to convince the Court that
the dangers posed by the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already been
completely removed.

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter
how remote it is as perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to life to be dependent
on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations
where the very life of not just an individual but of residents of big neighborhoods is at
stake.chanrobleslaw

IV

It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in
and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187,
compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.

In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay
of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case
of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1)
the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile
products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2)
the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3)
it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacaang Palace; and
(4)
in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or
wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long
as it (sic) there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore
became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to
respondent:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was
perceived to be impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is
actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful
day became the impetus for a public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of
terrorism continued [such] that it became imperative for governments to take measures to combat
their effects.

xxxx

Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027.
Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed
their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny
and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors warnings of
doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.134

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains
a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason
to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer
put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of the issues.

Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the assailed ordinance.
Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the
constituents general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights
to life, security and safety of the people.

In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand
to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail.135

We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R. No. 156052:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and
14,000 liters of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of
the Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the
vicinity of the incident. Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to
211 million liters [or whatever is left of the 26 tanks] of petroleum products in the terminal
complex will blow up?136

As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA
with the DOE obliging themselves to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include the preparation of a
Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government
support essential for the relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and
right of way acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social
acceptability which shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.

such that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals,
they cannot feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.137

On the matter of the details of the relocation, the Court gave the oil companies the following
time frames for compliance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors
Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall,
within a non-extendible period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 39, the comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared.
The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict enforcement of this
resolution.138

The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No. 156052 which became final on 23 April
2009. Five years have passed, since then. The years of non-compliance may be excused by the
swing of local legislative leads. We now stay the sway and begin a final count.

A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within a specific time-frame shall, therefore, be

observed in the relocation of the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall be given a fresh
non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to submit to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule. The
relocation, in turn, shall be completed not later than six months from the date of their
submission.

Finally, let it be underscored that after the last Manifestation filed by Shell informing this Court
that respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 for the second time, and was
anticipating its referral to the President for the latters consideration, nothing was heard from any
of the parties until the present petitions as to the status of the approval or disapproval of the said
ordinance. As it is, the fate of the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on this final disposition
of these cases.chanrobleslaw

VI

On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to immediately comply with the directives of this
Court to file the Memorandum for the Vice-Mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of
the assailed Ordinance, the records do not bear proof that he received a copy of any of the
resolutions pertaining to the filing of the Memorandum.

A narration of the events from his end would show, however, that he was aware of the directive
issued in 2009 when he stated that when the City Legal Officer filed its Memorandum dated 8
February 2010, [he] thought the filing of a Memorandum for the other respondent city officials
could be dispensed with.139 There was also a categorical admission that he received the later
Resolution of 31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a Memorandum defending the position
of respondents vice-mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of Ordinance No. 8187 in
view of the on-going drafting of Ordinance No. 8283, which would change the position of the
Sanggunian, if subsequently approved.

The reasons he submitted are not impressed with merit.

That he was not officially designated as the counsel for the vice-mayor and the city councilors is
beside the point. As an officer of the court, he cannot feign ignorance of the fact that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
promptly and completely.140 As early as 2009, he should have immediately responded and filed
a Manifestation and therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice-mayor and the
city councilors. And, even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was the first directive he
personally received, he had no valid excuse for disregarding the same. Worse, the Court had to
issue a show cause order before he finally heeded.

Atty. Gempis should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes and of upholding the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer
effectively.141chanrobleslaw

In Sibulo v. Ilagan,142 which involves a lawyers repeated failure to comply with the directives
of the Court, the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was reduced
from suspension to reprimand and a warning. The Court
ratiocinated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the administrative charge against him
and is being taken to task for his intransigence and lack of respect, the Court finds that the
penalty of suspension would not be warranted under the circumstances.cralawred

xxxx

To the Courts mind, a reprimand and a warning are sufficient sanctions for respondents
disrespectful actuations directed against the Court and the IBP. The imposition of these sanctions
in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of disciplinary case,
which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice
by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the
court.143

We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in this case and opt to be lenient even as we
reiterate the objective of protecting the dispensation of justice. We deem it sufficient to remind
Atty. Gempis to be more mindful of his duty as a lawyer towards the Court.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil
Terminals.

The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187. In coordination with the appropriate government agencies and
the parties herein involved, he is further ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil
terminals out of the Pandacan area.

As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of
forty-five (45) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than
six (6) months from the date the required documents are submitted. The presiding judge of
Branch 39 shall monitor the strict enforcement of this Decision.

For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his duties towards the Court and WARNED that a
repetition of an act similar to that here committed shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, Chief Justice, join J. Leonen in his Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., no part one of the counsels is my former law firm.
Brion, J., on leave.

Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Jardeleza, J., No part. Intervenor part former employer group.

Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,
Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

1 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop respondent Ernesto
Rivera as a party-respondent on the ground that he actually voted against the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148149).

2Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. I, pp. 3-20. Petition (for Prohibition) filed on 1 June 2009; rollo
in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 11-115. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari
(with Application for an Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order) filed on 5 June 2009. Id.
at 116. Resolution dated 9 June 2009 consolidating G.R. No. 187916 with G.R. No. 187836.

3 Approved by former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim on 28 May 2009. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I,
pp. 70-75. Annex A of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.

4 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 28 November 2001. Id. at 76-77. Annex B
of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.

5 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza on 16 June 2006. Id. at 78-115. Annex C of the
Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.

6 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop respondent Ernesto
Rivera as a party-respondent on the ground that he actually voted against the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148149).

7Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. III, pp. 917-1065, Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Petron
on 1 December 2009; pp. 1234-1409, Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Comment-in-Intervention filed by Shell on 15 December 2009; rollo in G.R. No.
187916, Vol. II, pp. 367-373, Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Consolidated
Comment in Intervention filed by Chevron on 25 November 2009.

8 546 Phil. 485 (2007). Decision and Resolution 568 Phil. 658 (2008).

9 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 703 (2008).

10 Id. at 684.

11 Id. at 699.

12 Id. at 723.

13 Id. at 673-676.

14Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 428-432. Annex 1 of the Urgent Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.

The MOA reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x xx

1. Immediately upon the execution of this Agreement, CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL shall
jointly undertake a comprehensive and comparative study of the various alternatives to minimize
the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to
the Pandacan oil terminals and to respond to such risks and hazards to the satisfaction of the
relevant stakeholders. The study shall include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to
determine the scope and timing of the feasible relocation of the Pandacan oil terminals and all
associated facilities and infrastructure including government support essential for the relocation
such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way acquisition,
resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which shall be
based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.

The study and Master Plan shall also take into full consideration (i) the integrity, reliability and
security of supply and distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon
as well as the interest of consumers and users of such petroleum products; (ii) the impact of
relocation on the other depots/terminals similarly situated in other parts of the country; (iii) the
security, safety and welfare of the inhabitants around the current site and those of the proposed
sites; and (iv) the incremental investment, operating and other related costs for the proposed
relocation.

The study and Masterplan shall be completed within twelve (12) months from the date of
execution of this Agreement.

2. The DOE shall participate in the presentation of the study and Master Plan by, among others,
providing the policy framework and recommending the necessary infrastructure, fiscal and nonfiscal, investment incentives and other support measures as enumerated in paragraph 1 above
including the promotion of appropriate legislative proposals, coordination with other government
agencies, identification of the necessary governmental resources and the provision of other
measures that would facilitate the attainment of objectives of this Agreement.

3. Subject to paragraphs 1 & 2 hereof, the Master Plan shall be implemented in phases to be
completed within a period of no more than five (5) years from the date of execution of this
Agreement; provided, that the commencement of the first phase shall occur within 2003.

4. The relocation of the Pandacan liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), facilities of CALTEX,
PETRON and SHELL shall form part of the first phase of relocation.cralawred

xxxx

15 Id. at 429.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 76.

The Ordinance reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ORDINANCE NO. 8027

AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF LAND

BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, x x x FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO
COMMERCIAL I

Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, THAT:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public
safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining
areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the northeast,
Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana
bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.cralawred

xxxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no
longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the
date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.

20Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 434-440. Annex 2 of the Consolidated Comment in
Intervention.

21 Id. at 435.

22 Id. at 435-436.

The oil companies undertook to do the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon
signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall
include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT

(28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. x x x

Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES
shall establish joint operations and management, including the operation of common, integrated
and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical, safety,
environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of
the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated
areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and
conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.

Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned
therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the
surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.

The City of Manila and DOE, on the other hand, tasked themselves
to:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate
action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.

Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this
MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal
requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down
program.

Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES compliance with
the provisions of this MOU.

Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer
and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into
these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.

23 Id. at 580-581. Annex 6 of the Consolidated Comment in Intervention.

24 Id. at 582.

25Supra note 8.

26 Id. at 490.

27Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 671.

28 Id.

29Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 78-115. Annex C of the Urgent Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.

30 Id. at 79-80.

SEC. 7. Division into Zones or Districts To effectively carry out the provisions of this
Ordinance, the City of Manila is hereby divided into the following zones or districts as shown in
the Official Zoning Maps.

A. General Residential Zone:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)

B. Commercial Zones:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. Medium Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C-2/MXD)

3. High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C-3/MXD)

C. Industrial Zone:

4. Light Industrial Zone (I-1)

D. Institutional Zones:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

5. General Institutional Zone (INS-G)

6. University Cluster Zone (INS-U)

E. Public Open Space Zones:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

7. General Public Open Space Zone (POS-GEN)

7.a Parks and Plazas (POS-PP)

7.b Playground and Sports Field/Recreation Zone (POS-PSR)

8. Cemetery Zone (POS-CEM)

F. Others

9. Utility Zone (UTL)

10. Water Zone (WTR)

11. Overlay Zones:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

11.1 Histo-Cultural Heritage Overlay Zone (O-HCH)

11.2 Planned Unit Development Overlay Zone (O-PUD)

11.3 Buffer Overlay Zone (O-BUF) (Emphasis supplied)

31 Id. at 92.

SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). O-PUD
Zones are identified specific sites in the City of Manila wherein the project site is
comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in
planning/design, building siting, complementarily of building types and land uses, usable open
spaces and the preservation of significant natural land features, pursuant to regulations specified
for each particular PUD. Enumerated below are identified PUD:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area

xxxx

Enumerated below are the allowable uses:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located

2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are located shall, in all instances
be complied with

3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the development controls
and regulations specified for each PUD as provided for each PUD as provided for by the
masterplan of respective PUDs. (Emphasis supplied)

32 Id. at 114.

33Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr. supra note 8 at 494.

34 Id. at 490-491.

35 Id. at 493-494.

36Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 673.

37 Id. at 723.

38 Id. at 1792-1793.

39Rollo in G.R. No. 156052, pp. 1793. Manifestation and Motion filed on 18 March 2009.

40 Id. at 1792 -1803.

41 Id. at 1813-1816. Resolution dated 28 April 2009.

42 Id. at 1816.

43 Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1844-1845. Resolution dated 2 June 2009.

44 Id. (no proper pagination, should be p. 1846). Resolution dated 9 June 2009 with respect to
the City Legal Offices Motion to Excuse from Filing Comment (on Petitioners Manifestation
and Motion and on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Cite the Members of the City Council in
Direct Contempt of Court), and the Comment. Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 18801881). Resolution dated 23 June 2009 with respect to the Reply to the Comment filed by the
counsel for the petitioners.

45Rollo, in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 70-74.

The Ordinance reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ORDINANCE NO. 8187

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE

MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,
BY CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE
(1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT.

Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled,

THAT:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SECTION 1. Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 is hereby amended by creating a Medium Industrial Zone
(1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) to read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Use Regulations in Medium Industrial Zone (1-2)

The Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) shall be for Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous
manufacturing and processing establishments. Enumerated below are the allowable
uses:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. Pollutive/Hazardous Industries

1. Manufacture and canning of ham

2. Poultry processing and canning

3. Large-scale manufacture of ice cream

4. Corn Mill/Rice Mill

5. Chocolate and Cocoa Factory

6. Candy Factory

7. Chewing Gum Factory

8. Peanuts and other nuts factory

9. Other chocolate and confectionary products

10. Manufacture of flavoring extracts

11. Manufacture of food products n.e.c (vinegar, vetsin)

12. Manufacture of fish meal

13. Oyster shell grading

14. Manufacture of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations

15. Manufacture of stationary, art goods, cut stone and marble products

16. Manufacture of abrasive products

17. Manufacture of miscellaneous non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.

18. Manufacture of cutlery, except table flatware

19. Manufacture of hand tools

20. Manufacture of general hardware

21. Manufacture of miscellaneous cutlery hand tools and general hardware n.e.c.

22. Manufacture of household metal furniture

23. Manufacture of office, store and restaurant metal furniture

24. Manufacture of metal blinds, screens and shades

25. Manufacture of miscellaneous furniture and fixture primarily of metal n.e.c.

26. Manufacture of fabricated structural iron and steel

27. Manufacture of architectural and ornamental metal works

28. Manufacture of boiler, tanks and other structural sheet metal works

29. Manufacture of other structural products n.e.c.

30. Manufacture of metal cans, boxes and containers

31. Manufacture of stamped coated and engraved metal products

32. Manufacture of fabricated wire and cable

33. Manufacture of heating, cooking and lighting equipment except electrical

34. Metal sheet works generally of manual operation

35. Manufacture of other fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment n.e.c.

36. Manufacture or assembly of agricultural machinery and equipment

37. Native plow and harrow factory

38. Repair of agricultural machinery

39. Manufacture or assembly of service industry machines

40. Manufacture or assembly of elevators or escalators

41. Manufacture or assembly of sewing machines

42. Manufacture or assembly of cooking ranges

43. Manufacture or assembly of water pumps

44. Refrigeration industry

45. Manufacture or assembly of other machinery and equipment except electrical n.e.c.

46. Manufacture and repair of electrical apparatus

47. Manufacture and repair of electrical cables and wires

48. Manufacture of cables and wires

49. Manufacture of other electrical industrial machinery and apparatus n.e.c.

50. Manufacture or assembly of electric equipment such as radio, television, tape, tape recorders
and stereo

51. Manufacture or assembly of radio and television transmitting, signaling and detection
equipment

52. Manufacture or assembly of telephone and telegraphic equipment

53. Manufacture of other electronic equipment and apparatus n.e.c.

54. Manufacture of industrial and commercial electrical appliances

55. Manufacture of household cooking, heating and laundry appliances

56. Manufacture of other electrical appliances n.e.c.

57. Manufacture of electrical lamp fixtures

b. Pollutive/Hazardous (sic) Industries

1. Flour Mill

2. Cassava Flour Mill

3. Manufacturing of coffee

4. Manufacturing of unprepared animal feeds, other grain milling n.e.c.

5. Production prepared feed for animals

6. Cigar and cigarette Factory

7. Curing and redrying tobacco leaves

8. Miscellaneous processing tobacco leaves n.e.c.

9. Weaving hemp textile

10. Jute spinning and weaving

11. Miscellaneous spinning and weaving mills n.e.c.

12. Hosiery mill

13. Underwear and outwear knitting mills

14. Fabric knitting mills

15. Miscellaneous knitting mills n.e.c.

16. Manufacture of mats and mattings

17. Manufacture of carpets and rugs

18. Manufacture of cordage, rope and twine

19. Manufacture of related products from abaca, sisal, henequen, hemp, cotton, paper, etc.

20. Manufacture of linoleum and other surface coverings

21. Manufacture of machines for leather and leather products

22. Manufacture of construction machinery

23. Manufacture of machines for clay, stove and glass industries

24. Manufacture, assembly, repair, rebuilding of miscellaneous special industrial machinery and
equipment n.e.c.

25. Manufacture of dry cells, storage battery and other batteries

26. Boat building and repairing

27. Ship repairing industry, dock yards, dry dock, shipways

28. Miscellaneous shipbuilding and repairing n.e.c.

29. Manufacture of locomotive and parts

30. Manufacture of railroads and street cars

31. Manufacture of assembly of automobiles, cars, buses, trucks and trailers

32. Manufacture of wood furniture including upholstered

33. Manufacture of rattan furniture including upholstered

34. Manufacture of box beds and mattresses

2. Use Regulations in Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3)

The Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) shall be for highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous;

Pollutive/Hazardous; Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; Non-Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments.
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous Industries

1. Meat processing, curing, preserving except processing of ham, bacon, sausage and chicharon

2. Milk processing plants (manufacturing filled, reconstituted or recombined milk, condensed or

evaporated)

3. Butter and cheese processing plants

4. Natural fluid milk processing (pasteurizing, homogenizing, vitaminizing bottling of natural

animal milk and cream related products)

5. Other dairy products n.e.c.

6. Canning and preserving of fruits and fruit juices

7. Canning and preserving of vegetables and vegetable juices

8. Canning and preserving of vegetable sauces

9. Miscellaneous canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables, n.e.c.

10. Fish canning

11. Patis factory

12. Bagoong factory

13. Processing, preserving and canning of fish and other seafoods, n.e.c.

14. Manufacture of dessicated coconut

15. Manufacture of starch and its by-products

16. Manufacture of wines from juices of local fruits

17. Manufacture of malt and malt liquors

18. Manufacture of soft drinks carbonated water

19. Manufacture of instant beverages and syrups

20. Other non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.c.

21. Other slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat products, n.e.c.

b. Highly Pollutive/Hazardous Industries

1. Vegetable oil mills, including coconut oil

2. Manufacturing of refined cooking oil and margarine

3. Manufacture of fish, marine and other animal oils

4. Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats, n.e.c.

5. Sugar cane milling (centrifugal refined)

6. Sugar refining

7. Muscovado Sugar Mill

8. Distilled, rectified and blended liquors, n.e.c.

9. Cotton textile mill

10. Ramie textile mill

11. Rayon and other man-made fiber textile mill

12. Bleaching and drying mills

13. Manufacture of narrow fabrics

14. Tanneries and leather finishing plants

15. Pulp mills

16. Paper and paperboard mills

17. Manufacture of fiberboard

18. Manufacture of inorganic salts and compounds

19. Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations

20. Manufacture of hydraulic cement

21. Manufacture of lime and lime kilns

22. Manufacture of plaster

23. Products of blast furnace, steel works and rolling mills

24. Product of iron and steel foundries

25. Manufacture of smelted and refined non-ferrous metals

26. Manufacture of rolled, drawn or astruded non-ferrous metals

27. Manufacture of non-ferrous foundry products

c. Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries

1. Manufacture of industrial alcohols

2. Other basic industrial chemicals

3. Manufacture of fertilizers

4. Manufacture of pesticides

5. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made fibers except glass

6. Petroleum refineries and oil depots

7. Manufacture of reclaimed, blended and compound petroleum products

8. Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal

d. Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries

1. Manufacture of paints

2. Manufacture of varnishes, shellac and stains

3. Manufacture of paint removers

4. Manufacture of other paint products

5. Manufacture of matches

6. Manufacture of tires and inner tubes

7. Manufacture of processed natural rubber not in rubber plantations

8. Manufacture of miscellaneous rubber products, n.e.c.

e. Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries

1. Manufacture of compressed and liquefied gases

SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the operation of which are
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone.

The City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall prepare an amended Zoning Map and
Zoning Boundaries which shall be submitted to the City Council for review.

SEC. 3. The Zoning Fees shall be P10/sq. m. of total floor area for MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL
ZONE (1-2) and P10/sq. m. of total floor area for HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3).

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 and all
other Ordinances or provisions therein inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.

SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in accordance with law.cralawred

x x x x.

46 Id. at 74.

Sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 8187 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 and all
other Ordinances or porvisions therein inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified accordingly.

47 Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and
to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed to two hundred pesos fine
or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

48 SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

49 Article 8, Civil Code.

50 Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

51 Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

52 SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. - Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following

rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their
enjoyment:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[a] The right to breathe clean air;

[b] The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principles of sustainable
development;

[c] The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of
environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process;

[d] The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies,
plans and programs projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and
public health;

[e] The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity,
undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of
pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous
substances;

[f] The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights
effectively under this Act;

[g] The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of
environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area,
and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and

[h] The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the
adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

53 SEC. 12. Ambient Air Quality Guideline Values and Standards.- The Department, in
coordination with other concerned agencies, shall review and or revise and publish annually a list
of hazardous air pollutants with corresponding ambient guideline values and/or standard
necessary to protect health and safety, and general welfare. The initial list and values of the
hazardous air pollutants shall be as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a) For National Ambient Air Quality Guideline for Criteria

Pollutants:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Short Term a

Pollutants
g/Ncm
ppm
Averaging Time
g/Ncm
ppm
Averaging Time

Long Term b

Suspended
Particulate
Matterc-TSP
230d
24 hours
90
---1 yeare
-PM-10
150f
24 hours
60
---1 yeare
Sulfur Dioxidec
180
0.07
24 hours
80
0.03
1 year
Nitrogen Dioxide
150
0.08

24 hours
---------Photochemical Oxidants
140
0.07
1 hour
---------As Ozone
60
0.03
8 hours
---------Carbon Monoxide
35mg/Ncm
30
1 hour
----------

10mg/Ncm
9
8 hours
Leadg 1.5

----

3 monthsg

1.0

----

1 year

a Maximum limits represented by ninety-eight percentile (98%) values not to be exceed more
than once a year.

b Arithmetic mean

c SO2 and Suspended Particulate matter are sampled once every six days when using the manual
methods. A minimum of twelve sampling days per quarter of forty-eight sampling days each year
is required for these methods. Daily sampling may be done in the future once continuous
analyzers are procured and become available.

d Limits for Total Suspended Particulate Matter with mass median diameter less than 25-50 um.

e Annual Geometric Mean

f Provisional limits for Suspended Particulate Matter with mass median diameter less than 10
microns and below until sufficient monitoring data are gathered to base a proper guideline.

g Evaluation of this guideline is carried out for 24-hour averaging time and averaged over three
moving calendar months. The monitored average value for any three months shall not exceed the
guideline value.

b) For National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Source Specific Air Pollutants from Industrial
Sources/Operations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pollutants1
Concentration2
Averaging time (min.)
Method of Analysis/ Measurement3

/Ncm
ppm
1. Ammonia
200
0.28
30
Nesselerization/ Indo Phenol
2. Carbon Disulfide
30
0.01
30
Tischer Method
3. Chlorine and Chlorine Compounds expressed as Cl2
100

0.03
5
Methyl Orange
4. Formaldehyde
50
0.04
30
Chromotropic acid Method or MBTH Colorimetric Method
5. Hydrogen Chloride
200100
0.13
30
Volhard Titration with Iodine Solution
6. Hydrogen Sulfide
100
0.07
30
Methylene Blue
7. Lead
20
30
AASc
8. Nitrogen Dioxide
375,260
0.20,0.14

30,60
Greiss- Saltzman
9. Phenol
100
0.03
30
4-Aminoantiphyrine
10. Sulfur Dioxide
470, 340
0.18, 0.13
30,60
Colorimetric-Pararosaniline
11. Suspended Particulate
Matter-TSP
300
---60
Gravimetric

1 Pertinent ambient standards for Antimony, Arsenic, Cadmium, Asbestos, Nitric Acid and
Sulfuric Acid Mists in the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations may be considered as guides in
determining compliance.

2 Ninety-eight percentile (98%) values of 30-minute sampling measured at 250C and one
atmosphere pressure.

3 Other equivalent methods approved by the Department may be used.

The basis in setting up the ambient air quality guideline values and standards shall reflect, among
others, the latest scientific knowledge including information on:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a) Variable, including atmospheric conditions, which of themselves or in combination with other

factors may alter the effects on public health or welfare of such air pollutant;

b) The other types of air pollutants which may interact with such pollutant to produce an adverse
effect on public health or welfare; and

c) The kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be
expected from presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.

The Department shall base such ambient air quality standards on World Health Organization
(WHO) standards, but shall not be limited to nor be less stringent than such standards.

54 SEC. 19. Pollution From Stationary Sources.- The Department shall, within two (2) years
from the effectivity of this Act, and every two (2) years thereafter, review, or as the need
therefore arises, revise and publish emission standards, to further improve the emission standards
for stationary sources of air pollution. Such emission standards shall be based on mass rate of
emission for all stationary source of air pollution based on internationally accepted standards, but
not be limited to, nor be less stringent than such standards and with the standards set forth in this
section. The standards, whichever is applicable, shall be the limit on the acceptable level of
pollutants emitted from a stationary source for the protection of the publics health and welfare.

With respect to any trade, industry, process and fuel-burning equipment or industrial plant
emitting air pollutants, the concentration at the point of emission shall not exceed the following
limits:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pollutants
Standard Applicable to Source
Maximum Permissible Limits (mg/Ncm)
Method of Analysisa

1. Antimony and Its compounds

any source
10 as Sb
AASb
2. Arsenic and its compounds
Any source
10 as As
AASb
3. Cadmium and its compounds
Any source
10 as Cd
AASb
4. Carbon Monoxide
Any industrial Source
500 as CO
Orsat analysis

5. Copper and its Compounds

Any industrial source
100 ax Cu
AASb
6. Hydrofluoric Acids and Fluoride compounds
Any source other than the manufacture of Aluminum from Alumina
50 as HF
Titration with Ammonium Thiocyanate
7. Hydrogen Sulfide
i) Geothermal Power Plants
c.d
Cadmium Sulfide Method

ii) Geothermal Exploration and well-testing

e

iii) Any source other than (i) and (ii)

7 as H2S
Cadmium Sulfide Method
8. Lead
Any trade, industry or process
10 as Pb
AASb
9. Mercury
Any Source

5 as elemental Hg
AASb/Cold-Vapor Technique or Hg Analyzer
10. Nickel and its compounds, except Nickel Carbonyl f
Any source
20 as Ni
AASb
11. NOx
i) Manufacture of Nitric Acid
2,000 as acid and NOx and calculated as NO2
Phenol-disulfonic acid Method

ii) Fuel burning steam generators

Phenol-disulfonic acid Method

Existing Source
1,500 as NO2

New Source

Coal-Fired
1,000 as NO2

Oil-Fired
500 as NO2

iii) Any source other than (i) adn (ii)

Phenol-disulfonic acid Method

Existing Source
1000 as NO2

New Source
500 as NO2
12. Phosphorus Pentoxideg
Any source
200 as P2O5
Spectrophotometry
13. Zinc and its Compounds
Any source
100 as Zn
AASb

a Other equivalent methods approved by the Department may be used.

b Atomic Absorption Specttrophotometry

c All new geothermal power plants starting construction by 01 January 1995 shall control HsS
emissions to not more than 150 g/GMW-Hr

d All existing geothermal power plants shall control HsS emissions to not more than 200
g/GMW-Hr within 5 years from the date of effectivity of these revised regulations.

e Best practicable control technology for air emissions and liquid discharges. Compliance with
air and water quality standards is required.

f Emission limit of Nickel Carbonyl shall not exceed 0.5 mg/Ncm.

g Provisional Guideline

Provided, That the maximum limits in mg/ncm particulates in said sources shall
be:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Fuel Burning Equipment

a) Urban or Industrial Area

150 mg/Ncm

b) Other Area 200 mg/Ncm

2. Cement Plants (Kilns, etc.) 150 mg/Ncm
3. Smelting Furnaces 150 mg/Ncm
4. Other Stationary Sourcesa 200 mg/Ncm

a Other Stationary Sources means a trade, process, industrial plant, or fuel burning equipment
other than thermal power plants, industrial boilers, cement plants, incinerators and smelting
furnaces.

Provided, further, That the maximum limits for sulfur oxides in said sources shall
be:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Existing Sources

(i) Manufacture of Sulfuric Acid and Sulf(on)ation Process 2.0gm.Ncm as SO3

(ii) Fuel burning Equipment 1.5gm.Ncm as SO2
(iii) Other Stationary Sourcesa

1.0gm.Ncm as SO3

(2) New Sources

(i) Manufacture of Sulfuric Acid and Sulf(on)ation Process 1.5 gm.Ncm as SO3
(ii) Fuel Burning Equipment 0.7 gm.Ncm as SO2
(iii) Other Stationary Sourcesa

0.2 gm.Ncm as SO3

a Other Stationary Sources refer to existing and new stationary sources other than those caused
by the manufacture of sulfuric acid and sulfonation process, fuel burning equipment and
incineration.

For stationary sources of pollution not specifically included in the immediately preceding
paragraph, the following emission standards shall not be exceeded in the exhaust
gas:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I. Daily And Half Hourly Average Values

Daily Average Values

Half Hourly Average Values

Total dust
10 mg/m3
30 mg/m3
Gaseous and vaporous organic substances, expressed as total organic carbon
10 mg/m3
20 mg/m3
Hydrogen chloride (HCl)
10 mg/m3
60 mg/m3
Hydrogen fluoride (HF)
1 mg/m3
4 mg/m3
Sulfur dioxide (SO2)
50 mg/m3
200 mg/m3
Nitrogen monoxide (NO) and Nitrogen dioxide (NO2), expressed as nitrogen dioxide for
incineration plants with a capacity exceeding 3 tonnes per hour
200 mg/m3
400 mg/m3
Nitrogen monoxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), expressed as nitrogen dioxide for
incineration plants with a capacity of 3 tonnes per hour or less
300 mg/m3

Ammonia
10 mg/m3
20 mg/m3

II. All the Average Values Over the Sample Period of a Minimum of 4 and Maximum of 8 Hours.

Cadmium and its compounds, expressed as cadmium (Cd)

total 0.05
Thallium and its compounds, expressed as thallium (Tl)
mg/m3
Mercury and its Compounds, expressed as mercury (Hg)
0.05 mg/m3
Antimony and its compounds, expressed as antimony (Sb)

Arsenic and its compounds, expressed as arsenic (As)

total 0.5 mg/m3
Lead and its compounds, expressed as lead ( Pb)

Chromium and its compounds, expressed as chromium (Cr)

Cobalt and its compounds, expressed as cobalt (Co)

Copper and its compounds, expressed as copper (Cu)

Manganese and its compounds, expressed as manganese (Mn)

Nickel and its compounds, expressed as nickel (Ni)

Vanadium and its compounds, expressed as vanadium (V)

Tin and its compounds, expressed as tin (Sn)

These average values cover also gaseous and the vapor forms of the relevant heavy metal
emission as well as their compounds: Provided, That the emission of dioxins and furans into the
air shall be reduced by the most progressive techniques: Provided, further, That all average of
dioxin and furans measured over the sample period of a minimum of 5 hours and maximum of 8
hours must not exceed the limit value of 0.1 nanogram/m3.

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of this Act, the Department shall prepare a detailed action plan setting the
emission standards or standards of performance for any stationary source the procedure for
testing emissions for each type of pollutant, and the procedure for enforcement of said standards.

Existing industries, which are proven to exceed emission rates established by the Department in
consultation with stakeholders, after a thorough, credible and transparent measurement process
shall be allowed a grace period of eighteen (18) months for the establishment of an
environmental management system and the installation of an appropriate air pollution control
device : Provided, That an extension of not more than twelve (12) months may be allowed by the
Department on meritorious grounds.

55 SEC. 30. Ozone-Depleting Substances.- Consistent with the terms and conditions of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and other international
agreements and protocols to which the Philippines is a signatory, the Department shall phase out
ozone-depleting substances.

Within sixty (60) days after the enactment of this Act, the Department shall publish a list of
substances which are known to cause harmful effects on the stratospheric ozone layer.

56chanrobleslaw

Article 6

1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.

2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the
child.

57chanrobleslaw

Article 24

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States
Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health
care services.

2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take
appropriate measures:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;

(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with
emphasis on the development of primary health care;

(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care,
through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the provision of
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and
risks of environmental pollution;

(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers;

(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, have
access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition,
the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of
accidents;

(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and
services.

3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.

4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present article. In this
regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.

58

Article 27

1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.

2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure,
within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's
development.

3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take
appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right
and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with
regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.

4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the
child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within
the State Party and from abroad. In particular, where the person having financial responsibility
for the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the
accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the
making of other appropriate arrangements.

59Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 44. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Certiorari.

60 Id. at 58-59.

61Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1846-1926.

62 Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I (no proper pagination,
should be 319-320; 15 June 2010, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31 August
2010, rollo in G.R. No. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2002-2003; 31 May 2011, rollo in G.R. No.
187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348; and 17 July 2012, rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 27462747.

63Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 282-300.

64 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 2128-2132.

65 Id. at 2129.

66 Id.

67 Id., Vol. V, pp. 2661-2662.

The new Ordinance reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ORDINANCE NO. 8283

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY

RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS
ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD)

Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled,

THAT:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be amended to read as

follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the operation of which are
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone except the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located, which shall be classified as High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD).

SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil depots, the operation of which are
no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period until the end of January
2016 within which to relocate the operation of their businesses.

SEC. 3. The City Planning and Development Office shall prepare an amended zoning map and
zoning boundaries which shall be submitted to the City Council for review.

SEC. 4. All ordinances or provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance
are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.

SEC. 5. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in accordance with
law.

This Ordinance was finally enacted by the City Council of Manila on August 28, 2012.

PRESIDED BY:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

FRANCISCO Isko Moreno DOMAGOSO

Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
City Council, Manila

68 Id. at 2662.

The bottom portion of Ordinance No. 8283 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

BY HIS HONOR, THE MAYOR ON 11 Sept. 2012,

I veto this Ordinance for being prejudicial to public welfare and in view of the pending cases in
the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916)

69 Id. at 2516-2518.

70 Id. at 2526-2534.

71 Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I (no proper pagination,
should be 319-320); 15 June 2010, rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31 August
2010, rollo in G.R. No. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2002-2003; 31 May 2011, rollo in G.R. No.
187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348; and 17 July 2012, rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 27462747.

72Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2495-2503.

73 SECTION 481. Qualifications, Term Powers and Duties. x x x

xxxx

(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the
office for legal services and shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxx

(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer
shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the
local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in
actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may
be employed to represent the adverse party;

74 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 679.

In that case, the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [The DOE] seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of the members of the
public who stand to suffer if the Pandacan Terminals operations are discontinued. x x x Suffice it
to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and considering the transcendental
importance of this case, we will also allow DOEs intervention. (Emphasis supplied)

75 Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848, 880 (1997) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R.
No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 134 further citing the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

76 Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 274 Phil. 323, 335 (1991) citing
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Hon. Tan, 246 Phil. 380, 385
(1988).

77 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 798 (1989).

78 Sections 1 to 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.cralawred

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.cralawred

xxxx

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

79 Id.

80 Resolution dated 13 April 2010 in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.

81 Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

82 Id.

83 Sec. 3, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

84Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2202-2203. Memorandum of Shell citing Ortega v.
Quezon City Government, 506 Phil. 373 (2005).

85 465 Phil. 529 (2004).

86 Id. at 541 citing Philnabank Employees Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16
November 1993, 227 SCRA 804, 811.

87 Id. at 542 citing Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 698 (1997); Macasiano v.
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243.

88 Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 638 citing Del Mar v.
Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil 307 (2000) and Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461
(1998).

89 Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil. 307 (2000); Sen. Jaworski v. Phil.
Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375, 384 (2004).

90 Sen. Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).

91Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2100. Memorandum of Chevron.

Chevron relied on the ruling in Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Hon. Romulo, 489 Phil.
710, 718 (2005) where the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

92 Id.at 2222. Memorandum of Shell citing Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357,
28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283 and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171 (1995)

93 522 Phil. 705 (2006).

94 Id. at 1859 citing Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

95 Id. citing Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385 (2004).

96Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1858-1859 citing Francisco v. House of
Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

97 Id.; Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283.

98 Id.; Id. at 1863 citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

99 Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 492-493.

100 G.R. No. 192088, 9 October 2012, 682 SCRA 602.

101 Id. at 633-634.

102Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, p. 2144-2145. Memorandum of Petron citing Aduan v.
Chong, G.R. No. 172796, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 508; see also Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546
(1997); Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12 (2002); D.M. Consunji v. Esguerra, 328 Phil.
1168 (1996); and Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 592 (1991) citing Carson
v. Judge Pantanosas, Jr., 259 Phil. 628 (1989).

103 G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011, 655 SCRA 476.

104 Id. at 487-488.

105 IBP v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632 (2000) citing Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888, 19 August 1994, 235 SCRA 506
citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4
December 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369 (1980); and
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

106Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 62. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Certiorari.

107Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2097.

Sec. 163. Presentation of Community Tax Certificate on Certain Occassions. (a) When an
individiual subject to the community tax acknowledges any document before a notary public,
takes the oath of office upon election or appointment to any position in the government service;
receives any license, certificate, or permit from any public authority; pays any tax or fee;
receives any money from any public fund; transacts other official business; or receives any salary
or wage from any person or corporation, it shall be the duty of any person, officer or corporation
with whom such transaction is made or business done or from whom any salary or wage is
received to reequire such individual to exhibit the community tax certificate. x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring in the Memorandum of Chevron)

108 Sec. 6. Jurat. - Jurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is
personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; (c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document.

109 As amended by Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

110Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2216.

111 550 Phil. 98 (2007).

112 Id. at 107.

113 Id. at 108-110.

114Rollo in G.R. No. 156052 (no proper pagination, should be p. 1844). Resolution dated 2 June
2009.

115 Supra note 110 at 110-111.

116 Section 458(a)(2)(viii), Local Government Code.

117 Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992, 212 SCRA 739, 747.

118 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. applying Section 458(a)(2)(viii) of the Local
Government Code.

119 Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 493 citing supra note 116.

120 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 703.

121 Id. at 702.

122Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 296. Comment of respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso
and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance.

123 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1852-1857. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.

Former Mayor Lim narrated that when he received the draft Ordinance for his approval, he did
not readily act upon it but took the time to seriously study the pros and cons of enacting the
Ordinance; that he issued Executive Order No. 18 creating an ad hoc panel to conduct a study
thereon; that the Assistant City Treasurer of Manila submitted to him a list of properties that
would be affected by the proposed ordinance and the real property taxes they paid from 2007 to
2009; that he conducted a stakeholders consultative meeting composed of some Cabinet
Secretaries and other officials, including the Joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines; that Engr. Rodolfo H. Catu (Engr. Catu), Officer in Charge of the City Planning and
Development Office, together with the ad hoc panel earlier created, conducted an ocular
inspection of the Pandacan Terminal, and submitted a favorable recommendation; that he also
sought guidance from His Eminence, Gaudencio Cardinal Rosales; that he received a profile of
the safety and security features installed at the Pandacan oil depots from Shell; that he likewise
personally conducted an ocular inspection where he was assured by then President Arroyo and
her cabinet secretaries, who happened to visit the site on the same day, that they interpose no
objection to the proposed ordinance; and that the European Chamber of Commerce expressed
support to the ordinance. It was only then that he made a decision to approve the Ordinance.

124 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

125 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9.

126 Id. at 704-707.

127Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2103-2104. Memorandum of Chevron; rollo in G.R.
No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 2220-2225. Memorandum of Petron.

128 Id. at 1883. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.

129 Id. at 2285-2310. Memorandum of Shell.

130 Id. at 2112. Memorandum of Chevron. Emphasis supplied.

131 Id. at 2280. Memorandum of Shell.

132 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 702-703.

133 Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 494.

134 Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 702-720.

135 Id. at 720.

136 Id. at 722-723.

137 Id. at 721.

138 Id. at 723.

139Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, p. 2496. Compliance/Explanation with Urgent

Manifestation of Atty. Gempis, Jr.

140 Gone v. Atty. Macario Ga, A.C. No. 7771, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 243, 250.

141 Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 204 (2004) citing Canons 1, 7, and 11, Code of Professional
Responsibility.

142 Id.

143 Id. at 204-205 citing Dr. Gamilla v. Atty. Mario, Jr., 447 Phil. 419 (2003).

Nos. 181

PO1 Jose B. Caspe Vs. Atty.

A.C. No. 10679. March 10, 2015

Aquilino

(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=203)

A.

Mejica

Nos. 182
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015 - ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA
BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA,

Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada3 suspending Atty. Lozada for
violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a
final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and
let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07
entitled Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al., where complainant was one of
the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and
her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before
Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant
submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007
and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and
cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended
from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which
suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint
against him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal
dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto

Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her
husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his
reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 &
1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from
the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead
that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING

We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist
from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that
Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her
husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and crossexamination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose
that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007
were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least,
Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada
appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated
in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension, she,
therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to
inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she
can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband
whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first
and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a
helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty.
Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not

representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her
penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga,16 citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from
the practice of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this court's previous
order of suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her
husband as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession.
While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative
principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less
severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of

violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of
the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so
that we can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary
Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 1-5

2 Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

3Rollo, pp. 7-29.

4Id. at 27-28. (Emphasis in the original).

5Id. at 14-29

6Id. at 30-38.

7Id. at 39-322.

8Id. at 323.

9Id. at 329-335.

10Id. at 332 .

11Id. at 339.

12Id. at 772-775.

13 See Lingan v. Atty. Calubaquib, et al., A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014

14Id.

15 Emphasis ours.

16 A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014.

17 A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA I, 7.

18Arma v. Atty. Montevilla, 581 Phil. 1, 8 (2008).

19Supra note 2.

Nos. 183
A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015 - SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO,
Complainants, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP,
Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015

SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO, Complainants, v. ATTY.

FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Rogelio Amatorio and Aida
Amatorio (Aida) (complainants) against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and Whelma SitonYap (respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the respondents employed deceit to obtain
favorable judgments, specifically by failing to inform the trial court that there was already an
out-of-court settlement between them and maliciously manifesting that their counsel, Atty. Justo
Paras (Atty. Paras) was suspended from the practice of law.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection cases,
particularly, Civil Case No. 2000-319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were filed against

them by the respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued the complainants to
compel them to pay their indebtedness of P18,000.00, which was evidenced by a promissory
note. After they filed their answer to the complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to
strike out the same and to declare them in default on the ground that the said pleading was
prepared by a lawyer suspended from the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The
motion was however denied.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents sued the complainants to collect
the amount of P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off the record
for the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its
filing.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an out-of-court
settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents law office. She appealed for the
respondents consideration and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of
installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered her
first payment of P20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a
written document with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if
they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001 in
the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they will
be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents assurance, the
complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, they were surprised to receive
copies of the decisions of the trial court in the two civil cases filed by the respondents, declaring
them in default for non-appearance in the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the
amount of their indebtedness and damages. The decision however did not mention the out-ofcourt settlement between the parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering
installment payments to the respondents upon the latters assurance that they will disregard the
decision of the trial court since they already had an out-of-court settlement before the rendition
of said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact issued said writ.4
This prompted them to seek legal advice to address their predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V.
Carriaga who, after learning of the factual milieu of their case, told them that they have a good
ground to file a disbarment case against the respondents. He, however, declined to handle the
case himself as he disclosed that his wife is a relative of the respondents. Instead, he referred the
complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after his
suspension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their counsel. Initially,
Atty. Paras refused to handle their case as he revealed that the personal animosity between him
and the respondents may invite unwelcome repercussions. Even then, the complainants insisted
to retain his services as their counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case
against the respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were
allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan. They
received threats of physical harm and Aidas continued employment as a public school teacher
was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around their house.
When they refused to yield to the respondents intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of
charges against them, to wit: (1) an administrative case against Aida for failure to pay the same
debts subject of this case; and (2) a criminal case for perjury against the complainants. To
alleviate their situation, they filed a Joint-Affidavit,7 seeking the assistance of this Court to warn
the respondents and to stop them from employing deplorable acts upon them.

In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for Disbarment dated March 14, 2003,
the respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable judgments in Civil
Case Nos. 2000-319 and 2000-321. They admitted that they agreed to an out-of-court settlement,
through the intercession of Rosa Yap Paras, estranged wife of Atty. Paras, but denied that the
complainants ever tendered any installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras merely
employed cajolery in order to entice the complainants to file the instant case to retaliate against
them. They asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the respondents served as counsel
for his former wife, who previously filed the administrative case for immorality, abandonment of
family, and falsification and use of falsified documents which resulted to his
suspension.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents asserted that Atty. Paras clearly defied
the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and filed an answer on their
behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice of law. They alleged that he
appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his
suspension.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Report and Recommendation10 dated June 23,
2005, which pertinently states as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately neglected, at the
very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely mislead or
confuse the civil courts in Dumaguete City. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and
the authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 21, 2001 which bore his signature
and written in a Yap Law Office letterhead. Such documentary evidence supports the theory of
the Complainants that there was indeed an out-of-court settlement prior to the pre-trial hearings
and that they were most likely assured that these cases would be dismissed. Their absence during
the pre-trial hearings evidently resulted to decisions adverse to them. Moreover, the Motions for
the Writ of Execution did not fail to mention the existence of partial payments and the prior
agreement which, if disclosed, would have led the court not to issue such writs. Since
Respondent Francisco Yaps signature appear in all the Acknowledgement Receipts and in all
Motions filed in the civil courts, he alone should be penalized. On the other hand, Respondent
Whelma Siton Yap should not be penalized in the absence of any evidence of her participation in
such conduct. x x x.

All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent Francisco Yap should be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. At the same time, the Counter Petition for
Disbarment filed by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo Paras, which appears to be VERY
meritorious, be given due course in another proceeding with utmost dispatch.11
Upon review of the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, the IBP
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December 17, 2005,
disposing thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for deliberately neglecting, offering inaccurate allegations to purposely mislead or confuse
the courts, Atty. Francisco D. Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months. Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap is exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her
participation in such conduct; however Respondents are Warned for indirectly misleading the
Commission.13
On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Petition for
Review.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,15 terminating the services of Atty.
Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the reason that they can no longer
afford the services of a private counsel.

Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial Affidavit,16 disclaiming
knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on their
behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment case against the respondents. They
claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not explained to
them in a dialect which they understood. They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a
disbarment case against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to
settle and pay their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents,
but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the cases which
eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them. They claimed that Atty. Paras told
them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial conference to settle matters with the
respondents and the court but he did not show up on the scheduled date. They also asseverated
that most of the statements contained in the complaint for disbarment were false and that they
wished to withdraw the said complaint.

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XIX-2011-172,17 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVII-2005-159
dated 17 December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the
admission of the complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007 proved that the
disbarment case filed against them was just fabricated by Atty. Paras. They pointed out the
complainants statement that they were just made to sign the complaint for disbarment by Atty.
Paras to retaliate against them for having filed a case against him for falsification of documents
which sent him to prison for some time.

On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the IBP, expressing disappointment over
the fact that the IBP Board of Governors did not dismiss the disbarment case against Francisco.
The letter pertinently stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the disbarment case against ATTY.
FRANCISCO DY YAP was NOT DISMISSED. The reason is that we have submitted our
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT relating the facts and circumstances wherein the said disbarment
complaint was prepared by our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS consisting of
fabrications and not on facts. It was upon the machination and instigation of ATTY. JUSTO
PARAS, that the simple collection case of P94,000.00 more or less, became a multifaceted case
in several forums.20 (Emphasis in the original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action.

The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the complainants filed a Motion to Admit Judicial
Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint,21 reiterating their claim that the
filing of the disbarment was a product of Atty. Paras maneuverings and that the allegations
against the respondents stated therein were false.

After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court finds no compelling reason to
deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
primarily on the basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007, wherein the complainants
cleared them of the charges of misconduct and turned the blame on their own counsel, Atty.
Paras, for allegedly having made up the allegations in the disbarment complaint. When the IBP
Board of Governors sustained the imposition of suspension to Francisco, the complainants
themselves submitted a motion to admit the said judicial affidavit to this Court, together with a
motion to dismiss and withdraw complaint.

The question now is whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the
truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for
disbarment necessarily results to Franciscos absolution. The answer is in the negative.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal
profession.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the bar by
informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their professional and private
lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility of the legal profession, to breed
honest and principled lawyers and prune the association of the unworthy.

It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants change of heart
by refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for
disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the
lawyer not only hurts the clients cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal
profession itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be
disciplined notwithstanding the complainants pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as
there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so
warrant.23 It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of
an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.

This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred
the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. The power to discipline lawyers
who are officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and withdrawal of the charges.
This is as it should be, especially when we consider that the law profession and its exercise is
one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not
instituted to protect and promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the
profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against the
respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle matters
amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants
forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct
committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to
withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their
claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the
basis thereof.

To be clear, [i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum
of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.25 In the present case, it was clearly established that Francisco received
P20,000.00 as initial payment from the complainants in compliance with the terms of their outof-court settlement for the payment of the latters outstanding obligations. The amount was duly
received and acknowledged by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper with the letterhead of
his own law office, a fact he did not deny. While the respondents deny that they told the
complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case anymore and that they will be the one to
inform the trial court of the settlement, they did not bring the said agreement to the attention of
the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the settlement of the parties, rendered a judgment by
default against the complainants. The respondents even filed a motion for execution of the
decision but still did not inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement between them and
the complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this supervening event to the trial court,
hence, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.cralawred
The complainants belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the allegations
stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot stand
against the clear and preponderant evidence they earlier presented. It is inexplicable how the
complainants could now claim that the respondents were blameless when the records tell
otherwise. That they were simply duped by Atty. Paras into signing the numerous pleadings he
filed on their behalf is hardly believable considering that Aida is well-lettered, being a public
school teacher. They also do not claim that they were prevented from reading the contents of the
pleadings or that their signatures were simply forged. At any rate, while it may be true that Atty.

Paras fabricated some of the facts stated in the disbarment complaint, these matters are trivial
and do not relate to the facts material to the charge of misconduct against Francisco. What
clearly appears is that the facts material to the violation committed by Francisco are wellestablished notwithstanding Atty. Paras supposed fabrication of some insignificant particulars.

WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon receipt of
this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator which shall circulate the same in all courts in the country, and spread
upon the personal records of the respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

1Rollo, p. 421.

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 Id. at 80-81.

5 Id. at 83.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 82-85.

8 Id. at 422-423.

9 Id. at 423-424.

10 Id. at 420-437.

11 Id. at 436-437.

12 Id. at 418-419.

13 Id. at 418.

14 Id. at 213-292.

15 Id. at 53-54.

16 Id. at 57-65.

17 Id. at 416-417.

18 Id. at 416.

19 Id. at 438-439.

20 Id. at 438.

21 Id. at 898-906.

22San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Atty. Romanillos, 499 Phil. 99, 107 (2005).

23Go v. Candoy, 128 Phil. 461, 465 (1967).

24Munar v. Flores, 207 Phil. 390, 393 (1983).

25Cruz v. Atty. Centron, 484 Phil. 671, 675 (2004).

Nos. 184
G.R. No. 195661, March 11, 2015 - UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V CHINA JOY,
SAMSUN SHIPPING LTD., AND INTER-ASIA MARINE TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioners, v.
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195661, March 11, 2015

UNKNOWN OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V CHINA JOY, SAMSUN SHIPPING LTD., AND
INTER-ASIA MARINE TRANSPORT, INC., Petitioners, v. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.,
Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

The instant petition for review on certiorari1 assails the Decision2 dated November 10, 2010 and
Resolution3 dated February 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93164.
The CA reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated January 30, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, in Civil Case No. 99-93067, which dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence the complaint for damages5 filed by herein respondent Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI)
against Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V China Joy (shipowner),6 Samsun Shipping Ltd.
(Samsun) and Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc. (Inter-Asia) (petitioners).

The CA aptly summed up the facts of the case as follows:

On 25 January 1997, the cargo ship M/V China Joy (the Vessel) arrived at the Mariveles Grain
Terminal Wharf, operated by plaintiff [ATI].

According to the Berth Term Grain Bills of Lading, the Vessel carried soybean meal that had
been shipped by ContiQuincyBunge L.L.C[.] (ContiQuincyBunge), an exporter of soybean meal
and related products, in favor of several consignees in the Philippines.

Under the Charter Party Agreement over M/V China Joy, ContiQuincyBunge represented itself
as the Charterer of the Vessel, with San Miguel Foods, Inc. as Co-Charterer, and defendant
[Samsun] represented itself as the Agent of the Shipowners. Samsun is a foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines.

On 3 February 1997[,] ATI used its Siwertell Unloader No. 2 to unload the soybean meal from
the Vessels Hold No. 2. The Siwertell Unloader is a pneumatic vacubator that uses compressed
gas to vertically move heavy bulk grain from within the hatch of the ship in order to unload it off
the ship.

The unloading operations were suddenly halted when the head of Unloader No. 2 hit a flat lowcarbon or mild steel bar measuring around 8 to 10 inches in length, 4 inches in width, and 1
inch in thickness that was in the middle of the mass of soybean meal. The flat steel bar lodged
itself between the vertical screws of Unloader No. 2, causing portions of screw numbers 2 and 3
to crack and be sheared off under the torsional load.

According to the quotation of BMH Marine AB Sweden, the sole manufacturer of Siwertell
unloaders, the replacement cost of each screw is US$12,395.00 or US$24,790.00 for the 2
screws plus freight. The labor cost to remove and re-assemble the screws is estimated at
US$2,000.00.

On 4 February 1997, ATI sent a Note of Protest to the Master of the Vessel for the damages
sustained by its unloading equipment as a result of encountering the flat steel bar among the
soybean meal. However, the Vessels Master wrote a note on the Protest stating that it is not
responsible for the damage because the metal piece came from the cargo and not from the vessel
itself.

On 5 March 1997, ATI sent a claim to defendant [Inter-Asia] for the amount of US$37,185.00
plus US$2,000.00 labor cost representing the damages sustained by its unloading equipment.

Inter-Asia rejected ATIs claim for the alleged reason that it is not the Shipowners Agent. InterAsia informed ATI that its principal is Samsun. Moreover, according to Inter-Asia, the owner of
the Vessel is Trans-Pacific Shipping Co., c/o Lasco Shipping Company. Inter-Asia, however,
offered to relay ATIs claim to Trans-Pacific through Samsun.

As previously noted, the Charter Party Agreement states Samsun to be the Agent of the
Shipowners, but since Samsun is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, it transacted its business through Inter-Asia. Hence, Inter-Asia is the Agent of the
Agent of the Shipowners.

When negotiations for settlement failed, ATI filed the instant Complaint for Damages against
Samsun, Inter-Asia and the Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V China Joy on 9 March 1999.

In the joint Answer, Inter-Asia reiterated that it is not the Agent of the Shipowners. Defendants
further averred that the soybean meal was shipped on board the M/V China Joy under a FreeIn-and-Out-Stowed-and-Trimmed (FIOST) Clause, which supposedly means that the
Shipper/Charterer itself (ContiQuincyBunge LLC) loaded the cargo on board the Vessel, and the
latter and her complement had no participation therein except to provide the use of the Vessels
gear. Similarly, under the FIOST clause, the discharge of the cargo was to be done by the
consignees designated personnel without any participation of the Vessel and her complement.

Defendants argued that since the metal foreign object was found in the middle of the cargo, it
could not have come from the bottom of the hatch because the hatch had been inspected and
found clean prior to loading. Defendants further averred that neither could the metal bar have
been part of the Vessel that had broken off and fallen into the hatch because tests conducted on
the metal piece revealed that said metal bar was not part of the Vessel.

Defendants concluded that the metal bar could only have been already co-mingled with the
soybean meal upon loading by ContiQuincyBunge at loadport, and, therefore, defendants are not
liable for the damages sustained by the unloader of ATI.7 (Citations omitted)

Rulings of the RTC and CA

On January 30, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing ATIs complaint for insufficiency
of evidence. The RTC explained that while the damage to ATIs Siwertell Unloader No. 2 was
proven, [t]he Court is at a quandary as to who caused the piece of metal to [co-mingle] with the
shipment.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ATI thereafter filed an appeal,10 which the CA granted through the herein assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which partially states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, x x x. Defendants-appellees are found jointly and
severally liable to [ATI] for the amount of US$30,300.00 with interest thereon at 6% per annum
from the filing of the Complaint on 9 March 1999 until the judgment becomes final and
executory. Thereafter, an interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed until the amount is
fully and actually paid.

SO ORDERED.11
The CA explained its ruling, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.

xxxx

We find the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be appropriate in the case at bar.

First. Since the cargo to be unloaded was free-flowing soybean meal in bulk, ATI correctly used
a pneumatic vacubator unloader to extract the soybean meal from the holds. Under normal
unloading procedures of bulk grain, it is not expected that a metal foreign object would be
among the grain to be unloaded. x x x.

Such an accident does not occur in the ordinary course of things, unless the loading of the
soybean meal at loadport was mismanaged in some way that allowed a metal foreign object to be
co-mingled with the soybean meal cargo.

Second. The damage to the vertical screws of ATIs unloader was caused by the presence of the
metal bar among the soybean meal in Hold No. 2 of the ship: an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the shipowner.

x x x According to defendants, the vessel and her complement had no participation in the
loading and discharge of said bulk cargo except to provide use of the vessels gear.

Defendants argument is neither accurate nor meritorious. In the first place, the terms of the
Charter Party in this case was not Free-In-and-Out-Stowed-and-Trimmed [FIOST] but Free-Inand-Spout-Trimmed-and-Free-Out [FISTFO].

xxxx

x x x [I]t appears that the FIOST clause in a Charter Party Agreement speaks of who is to bear
the cost or expense of loading, spout trimming and unloading the cargo. Free In and Out means
that the shipowner is free from such expenses. This becomes clearer when the FIOST clause is
stipulated as an adjunct to the terms of payment of the freight rate.

xxxx

Being a provision for the apportionment of expense (as an exclusion from the rate of freight to be
paid), the interpretation of the FIOST clause should not be extended to mean an apportionment
of liability, unless specified in clear and unambiguous terms.

While there are instances where a Charter Party Agreement clearly states that the Charterer will
be liable to third parties for damages caused by its cargo (as in the case of spills of petroleum oil
cargo, or of damage to third parties caused by toxic cargo), there is no such provision in this
case. Therefore, liability or non-liability for such damage cannot be presumed from the FIOST
clause alone, and the Charter Party Agreement must be closely scrutinized for the parties
intention on liability.

Clause 22 of the Charter Party Agreement states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At loadport, the stevedores[,] although arranged by charterers, shippers, or their agents[, are] to
be under the direction and control of the Master. All claims for damage allegedly caused by
stevedores [are] to be settled between stevedores and Owners. Charterers shall render assistance
to Owners to settle such damage in case of need.
x x x Clause 22 clearly states that loading shall be done under the direction and control of the
Master. Hence, if the metal bar that damaged ATIs unloader was inadvertently mixed into the
soybean meal during loading, by express provision of the Charter Party Agreement, the cost of
the damage should be borne by the shipowner because the loading was done under the
supervision and control of the Master of the Vessel.

Hence, not only did defendants have presumed exclusive control of the Vessel during the loading
of the soybean meal by reason of them being the owners or agents of the owners thereof, they
also had actual exclusive control thereof by express stipulation in the Charter Party Agreement
that the loading of the cargo shall be under the direction and control of the Master of the Vessel.

This is as it should be, considering that the charter in this case is a contract of affreightment by
which the owner of a ship lets the whole or part of her to a merchant or other person for the
conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. The
Supreme Court has held that if the charter is a contract of affreightment, the rights and the
responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is free from liability to third
persons in respect of the ship.

Third. There is neither allegation nor evidence in the record that ATIs negligence contributed to
the damage of its unloader.

All 3 requisites of res ipsa loquitur being present, the presumption or inference arises that
defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to ATIs unloader. The burden of
evidence shifted to defendants to prove otherwise. Th[e] defendants failed to do so.

xxxx

Defendants testimonial evidence consisted of the sole testimony of the former Operations
Manager of Inter-Asia, who x x x on cross-examination, x x x admitted that he was not present at
the loading of the cargo and, therefore, did not actually see that the soybean meal was free of any
foreign metal object.

Defendants evidence, which heavily relies on (1) their erroneous interpretation of the FIOST
clause in the Charter Party Agreement; (2) the Masters unsupported allegation written on the
Note of Protest that the metal bar did not come from the vessel; and (3) their witness dubious
interpretation that the notation loaded clean on the Berth Term[ ]Grain Bills of Lading means
that the soybean meal had no foreign material included therein, does not present a satisfactory
answer to the question: How did the metal bar get co-mingled with the soybean meal, and what
did the Master of the Vessel do to prevent such an occurrence? x x x.

By their failure to explain the circumstances that attended the accident, when knowledge of such
circumstances is accessible only to them, defendants failed to overcome the prima facie
presumption that the accident arose from or was caused by their negligence or want of care.

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. x x x.

xxxx

The prima facie evidence of defendants negligence, being unexplained and uncontroverted, is
sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed. Hence, the negligence of the Master of the Vessel
is conclusively presumed to be the proximate cause of the damage sustained by ATIs unloader.
Moreover, since the Masters liability is ultimately that of the shipowner because he is the
representative of the shipowner, the shipowner and its agents are solidarily liable to pay ATI the
amount of damages actually proved.

Articles 587 and 590 under Book III of the Code of Commerce provide for the liability of the
shipowner and its agents for acts of the Master or Captain, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons
which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the
vessel; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipment
and the freight it may have earned during the voyage.

Art. 590. The co-owners of the vessel shall be civilly liable in the proportion of their interests in
the common fund for the results of the acts of the captain referred to in Art. 587.12 (Citations
omitted, italics and emphasis in the original, and underscoring ours)
Anent the amount of the herein petitioners solidary liability, the CA found that only
US$30,300.00 of ATIs claim is supported by evidence. The quotation submitted by the
manufacturer of Siwertell unloaders indicated that (a) the replacement cost for the two damaged
screws is US$24,790.00, (b) freight cost is US$3,510.00, and (c) labor cost in removing and reassembling the screws is US$2,000.00.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA, however, found no grounds to award attorneys fees in ATIs favor lest it be
tantamount to imposing a premium on ones right to litigate.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA, which denied the same
through the Resolution issued on February 14, 2011.

Issues

The instant petition raises the questions of whether or not the CA erred in (a) applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and (b) rejecting the argument that the petitioners had no
participation in the loading and discharge of the bulk cargo except to provide use of the vessels
gear.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In support thereof, the petitioners emphasize that the foreign metal object was found in the
middle of the cargo. Hence, it is logical to conclude that the metal came in with the cargo and
could not have fallen off from some appurtenance of the vessel before or after loading.16 The
petitioners likewise claim that because of the Free-In-and-Out Clause under which the cargo was
carried, the charterer chose who were to effect the loading, unloading and discharge of the goods,
which tasks were performed without the participation of the vessel and its complement.17
Besides, notwithstanding Clause 22 of the Charter Party Agreement, the Master of the Vessels
control is figurative and pertains merely to the maintenance of the vessels seaworthiness, and
not to acts of covert negligence which could have been committed without even the charterers
own knowledge.18 Further, while it is true that in a contract of affreightment, the charterer is free
from liability to third persons in respect of the ship, in the instant petition, the offending factor
which caused the damage was not the vessel, but the cargo itself, thus, the liability should instead
rest upon the cargo owner, who was not even impleaded as a party to the case.19 The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur hence finds application herein but in support of the petitioners lack of
culpability since they possessed neither the knowledge nor the opportunity of ascertaining the
presence of the foreign metal object lodged in the middle of the soybean meal
cargo.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Comment,21 ATI contends that the law does not distinguish between covert and
evident negligence in determining whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.22 An
unusual event occurred because proper care was not observed. The event took place in Hold No.
2 of M/V China Joy, which was within the shipowners exclusive control. There is likewise no
evidence of ATIs negligence, which could have contributed to the damage of its own unloader.
Besides, ATI did not witness the loading of the soybean meal cargo into M/V China Joy at the
Port of New Orleans, United States of America. Hence, ATI cannot furnish direct evidence on
whether or not the hold or hatch containing the cargo was inspected and found clean prior to
loading, and sealed thereafter.

ATI also asserts that the petitioners presented no evidence conclusively proving that the foreign
metal object was indeed in the middle and not at the top or bottom of the soybean meal cargo.
Moreover, the petitioners only witness, Alejandro Gilhang, the former Operations Manager of

Inter-Asia, admitted that he was not present during the loading, thus, he could not have seen if
the cargo was free of any foreign metal object.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ATI likewise points out that the petitioners have not explicitly quoted in verbatim any provision
in the Charter Party Agreement, which the latter invoke to vaguely argue that the loading of the
cargo pertains exclusively to the charterer. Therefore, the petitioners have nary a legal basis for
their assertion that the shipowner has no liability insofar as the loading operations are concerned.
Besides, even if such provision in fact exists, ATI is not privy to the Charter Party
Agreement.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners are liable to ATI for the damage sustained by
the latters unloader. However, the Court finds the petitioners liability to be based on quasidelict and not on a contract of carriage. The Court likewise deems it proper to modify the rate of
interests on the amount of damages imposed by the CA upon the petitioners.

The Court notes that the shipowner and shipowners agent, Samsun, are all juridical entities not
registered and not doing business in the Philippines. It was the charterers agent, Inter-Asia, a
duly-registered domestic corporation, which had filed the instant petition for itself and on behalf
of the shipowner and Samsun.25 In the course of the proceedings too, none of the parties had
raised issues anent the validity of the service of summons and the courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners.

The petitioners present two issues for the Courts resolution, to wit: (a) the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar; and (b) who participated and should thus assume
liability for the loading of the soybean meal cargo.

In its Decision dated January 30, 2009, the RTC declared that while ATI indeed sustained
damages to its unloader, liability therefor cannot, however, be established with certainty.

In the assailed decision, the CA, on the other hand, discussed in detail why and how the three
requisites to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are found to be attendant in the
case at bar. First, the co-mingling of the two foreign metal objects with the soybean meal cargo
and the consequent damage to ATIs unloader is an accident which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someones negligence. Second, the foreign metal objects were found in the
vessels Hold No. 2, which is within the exclusive control of the petitioners. Third, records do
not show that ATIs negligence had in any way contributed to the damage caused to its unloader.

The Court agrees with the CA anent ATIs entitlement to the payment of damages from the
petitioners and the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, the Court finds as
misplaced the CAs application of the laws on maritime commerce and contracts of carriage for
reasons discussed below.

There is no contract of carriage between the petitioners and ATI.

There is no contract of carriage between ATI, on one hand, and the shipowner, Samsun,
ContiQuincyBunge L.L.C., and Inter-Asia, on the other. It likewise bears stressing that the
subject of the complaint, from which the instant petition arose, is not the damage caused to the
cargo, but to the equipment of an arrastre operator. Further, ATIs contractual relation is not with
the petitioners, but with the consignee and with the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).

In Delgado Brothers, Inc. v. Home Insurance Company and Court of Appeals,26 the Court
discusses the functions of an arrastre operator, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under this provision, petitioners functions as arrastre operator are (1) to receive, handle, care
for, and deliver all merchandise imported and exported, upon or passing over Governmentowned wharves and piers in the Port of Manila, (2) as well as to record or cheek all merchandise
which may be delivered to said port at shipside, and in general[,] (3) to furnish light and water
services and other incidental services in order to undertake its arrastre service. Note that there is
nothing in those functions which relate to the trade and business of navigation x x x, nor to the
use or operation of vessels x x x. Both as to the nature of the functions and the place of their
performance (upon wharves and piers shipside), petitioners services are clearly not maritime. As
we held in the Macondray case, they are no different from those of a depositary or
warehouseman. Granting, arguendo, that petitioners arrastre service depends on, assists, or
furthers maritime transportation x x x, it may be deemed merely incidental to its aforementioned

functions as arrastre operator and does not, thereby, make petitioners arrastre service maritime
in character.27 (Citations omitted, italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring ours)
The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or
between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ships tackle. Being the custodian
of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operators duty is to take good care of the
goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their
possession.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The legal relationship between an arrastre operator and a consignee is akin to that between a
warehouseman and a depositor. As to both the nature of the functions and the place of their
performance, an arrastre operators services are clearly not maritime in
character.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Insurance Company of North America v. Asian Terminals, Inc.,30 the Court explained that the
liabilities of the arrastre operator for losses and damages are set forth in the contract for cargo
handling services it had executed with the PPA. Corollarily then, the rights of an arrastre operator
to be paid for damages it sustains from handling cargoes do not likewise spring from contracts of
carriage.

However, in the instant petition, the contending parties make no references at all to any
provisions in the contract for cargo handling services ATI had executed with the PPA.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply.

Notwithstanding the above, the petitioners cannot evade liability for the damage caused to ATIs
unloader in view of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, which pertinently provides as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.cralawred

In Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.,31 the Court explained that to establish a
plaintiffs right to recovery for quasi-delicts, three elements must exist, to wit: (a) damages to the
plaintiff; (b) negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Negligence, on the other hand, is defined as the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby another suffers
injury.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case under consideration, the parties do not dispute the facts of damage upon ATIs
unloader, and of such damage being the consequence of someones negligence. However, the
petitioners deny liability claiming that it was not established with reasonable certainty whose
negligence had caused the co-mingling of the metal bars with the soybean meal cargo. The
Court, on this matter, agrees with the CAs disquisition that the petitioners should be held jointly
and severally liable to ATI. ATI cannot be faulted for its lack of direct access to evidence
determinative as to who among the shipowner, Samsun, ContiQuincyBunge and Inter-Asia
should assume liability. The CA had exhaustively discussed why the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies. The metal bars which caused damage to ATIs unloader was found co-mingled with the
cargo inside Hold No. 2 of the ship, which was then within the exclusive control of the
petitioners. Thus, the presumption that it was the petitioners collective negligence, which caused
the damage, stands. This is, however, without prejudice to the petitioners rights to seek
reimbursements among themselves from the party whose negligence primarily caused the
damage.

A modification of the interests imposed on the damages awarded is in order.

Anent the interests imposed by the CA upon the damages to be paid to ATI, modification of the
same is in order.

In Nacar v. Gallery Frames,34 the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under
Title XVIII on Damages of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on

the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except
when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
x x x x.35 (Citation omitted, emphasis and italics in the original, and underscoring ours)
The Court agrees with the CA that as regards ATIs claim, only the amount of US$30,300.00 is
duly supported by evidence. However, in view of Nacar, the said amount shall be subject to legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this Resolution,

the date when the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained, until full satisfaction thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 10, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 93164 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioners, Unknown Owner of the
Vessel M/V China Joy, Samsun Shipping Ltd. and Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., are hereby
ordered to pay the respondent, Asian Terminals, Inc., actual and compensatory damages in the
amount of US$30,300.00, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned
from the finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary
Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 9-19.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid
and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring; id. at 23-42.

3 Id. at 44.

4 Issued by Judge Gregorio B. Clemea, Jr.; id. at 193-200.

5 Id. at 46-50.

6 Subsequently identified as Trans-Pacific Shipping Company, with address at 3200 N.W. Yeon
Avenue, Portland, Oregon, United States of America, id. at 92.

7 Id. at 23-27.

8 Id. at 193-200.

9 Id. at 199.

10 Id. at 203-237.

11 Id. at 41.

12 Id. at 29-40.

13 Id. at 40.

14 Id. at 41.

15 Id. at 12.

16 Id. at 14.

17 Id. at 15.

18 Id. at 15-16.

19 Id. at 16-17.

20 Id. at 16.

21 Id. at 259-271.

22 Id. at 264.

23 Id. at 268.

24 Id. at 269.

25 Id. at 10.

26 111 Phil. 452 (1961).

27 Id. at 457.

28Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013, 702
SCRA 88, 115.

29International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Co., Inc.,
377 Phil. 1082, 1090 (1999).

30 G.R. No. 180784, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 226.

31 16 Phil. 8 (1910).

32 Id. at 15.

33United States v. Barias, 23 Phil. 434, 437 (1912).

34 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.

35 Id. at 457-458.

Nos. 185

Spouses Chin Kong Wong Choi and Ana O. Chua Vs. United
Coconut
Planters
Bank
G.R. No. 207747. March 11, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=200)

Nos. 186

Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales Vs. Maila Clemen F. Serrano

G.R. No. 175433. March 11, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=208)

Nos. 187

Cargill Philippines, Inc. Vs. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue
G.R. No. 203774. March 11, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=204)

Nos. 188

St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. Vs. Maria Theresa V.

Sanchez
G.R. No. 212054. March 11, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=206)

Nos. 189

Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc., et al. Vs. Mauricio G.

Picar,
Jr.
G.R. No. 209383. March 11, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=201)

Nos. 190

Lim Teck Chuan Vs. Serafin Uy and Leopolda Cecilio, Lim

Sing
Chan
@
Henry
Lim
G.R. No. 155701. March 11, 2015
(http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=210)

Nos. 191

Ma. Elena R. Divinagracia as Administratrix of the Estate of

the Late Santiago C. Divinagracia Vs. Coronacion Parilla, et
al.
G.R. No. 196750. March 11, 2015
(http://source.gosupra.com/docs/decision/58117)

Nos. 192
G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015 - ONOFRE V. MONTERO, EDGARDO N. ESTRAERO,
RENING P. PADRE, GABRIEL A. MADERA, HERMINIO T. TACLA, NELSON C. VILORIA,
DEMETRIO Q. PAJARILLO, ALFREDO R. AGANON, REYNALDO AVILA, ALBERT T.
RUIZ, NESTOR Y. YAGO, HARTY M. TUPASI, AGUSTIN R. AVILA, JR. OR MARCOS R.
AVILA, BONIFACIO B. GAANO, JOSELITO D. CUENTA, JONAS P. ESTILONG,
DOMINADOR C. CANARIA, GENARO C. RONDARIS, HERARDO M. DULAY,
FRANKLIN A. RAVINA, JR., AND RUBEN C. CABELLO, Petitioners, v. TIMES
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., AND SANTIAGO RONDARIS, MENCORP TRANSPORT
SYSTEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R. MENDOZA AND REYNALDO MENDOZA, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015

ONOFRE V. MONTERO, EDGARDO N. ESTRAERO, RENING P. PADRE, GABRIEL A.

MADERA, HERMINIO T. TACLA, NELSON C. VILORIA, DEMETRIO Q. PAJARILLO,
ALFREDO R. AGANON, REYNALDO AVILA, ALBERT T. RUIZ, NESTOR Y. YAGO,
HARTY M. TUPASI, AGUSTIN R. AVILA, JR. OR MARCOS R. AVILA, BONIFACIO B.
GAANO, JOSELITO D. CUENTA, JONAS P. ESTILONG, DOMINADOR C. CANARIA,
GENARO C. RONDARIS, HERARDO M. DULAY, FRANKLIN A. RAVINA, JR., AND
RUBEN C. CABELLO, Petitioners, v. TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., AND
SANTIAGO RONDARIS, MENCORP TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R.
MENDOZA AND REYNALDO MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This appeal by petition for review1 seeks to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated August 28,
2009 and Resolution3 dated December 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP

No. 106260, which affirmed the Decision4dated March 31, 2008 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 046325-05 (08), and its Resolution5 dated September 5,
2008, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The NLRC decision vacated and set
aside the Decision6 dated June 29, 2005 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) on the ground that the
consolidated complaints for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and money claims have
already prescribed.

The Facts

Respondent Times Transportation Co., Inc., (TTCI) is a company engaged in the business of land
transportation for passengers and goods serving the Ilocos Region to Metro Manila route. TTCI
employed the herein 21 petitioners as bus drivers, conductors, mechanics, welders, security
guards and utility personnel, namely: Onofre V. Montero (Montero), Edgardo N. Estraero
(Estraero), Rening P. Padre (Padre), Gabriel A. Madera (Madera), Herminio T. Tacla, Nelson C.
Viloria, Demetrio Q. Pajarillo (Pajarillo), Alfredo R. Aganon (Aganon), Reynaldo Avila (Avila),
Albert T. Ruiz, Nestor Y. Yago (Yago), Harty M. Tupasi (Tupasi), Agustin R. Avila, Jr. (Avila,
Jr.), Bonifacio B. Gaano (Gaano), Joselito D. Cuenta (Cuenta), Jonas P. Estilong (Estilong),
Dominador C. Canaria (Canaria), Genaro C. Rondaris (Genaro), Herardo M. Dulay (Dulay),
Franklin A. Ravina, Jr. (Ravina), and Ruben C. Cabello (Cabello)
(petitioners).7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1995, the rank-and-file employees of TTCI formed a union named as Times
Employees Union (TEU) which was later certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit
within TTCI.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In March 1997, members of TEU went on strike; but when former Labor Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisimbing assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified the same for compulsory
arbitration, a return-to-work Order dated March 10, 1997 was issued which ended the strike and
enjoined the parties from committing any other act that may intensify the
situation.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 23, 1997, TTCI Board of Directors approved a resolution confirming the authority
given to respondent Santiago Rondaris (Santiago), TTCI President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors, to gradually dispose the assets of the TTCI as a result of its unabated increase of the

cost of operations and losses for the last two years. TTCI also adopted a company-wide
retrenchment program, which will take effect on October 1, 1997, where Santiago was given the
authority to determine the number of excess employees who would be the subject of
retrenchment.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The sale of 25 buses of TTCI, as well as the Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation
of the buses, were likewise approved and subsequently transferred to respondent Mencorp
Transport Systems, Inc., (MENCORP) by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated December 12, 1997.
Thereafter, several union members received notices that they were being retrenched effective 30
days from September 16, 1997.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For a second time, on October 17, 1997, TEU declared a strike against TTCI, but the latter
merely reiterated the earlier return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary. For disregarding the
said return-to-work order, Santiago issued two notices of termination dated October 26, 199712
terminating some 106 workers and a revised list dated November 24, 199713 increasing the
number of dismissed employees to 119, for participating in the illegal
strike.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 4, 1997, Santiago served to the Department of Labor and Employment Regional
Office I a notice that TTCI would be closing its operations due to heavy business
losses.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On May 14, 1998, petitioners Estraero, Pajarillo, Padre, Avila, Avila, Jr., Tupasi, Cuenta, Dulay,
Yago, and Aganon filed several complaints against TTCI and MENCORP before the NLRC. The
complaints were thereafter consolidated under the case entitled Malana v. TTCI docketed as
NLRC RAB-I-01-1007.16 However, this case was withdrawn on March 4, 1999 upon motion by
the TEUs counsel which was given due course on March 22,
1999.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Four years later, several complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal with money
claims, damages and attorneys fees were filed against TTCI, Santiago, MENCORP and its
General Manager Virginia Mendoza, including the latters husband Reynaldo Mendoza
(collectively called the respondents), before the LA from June to July 2002.18 Accordingly, these
complaints were consolidated.

In response, TTCI asserted that the petitioners cause of action had already been barred by
prescription because the complaints were filed only in June 2002 or after almost five years from
the date of their dismissal. MENCORP, on the other hand, raised the defense of lack of
employer-employee relationship since it never engaged the services of the petitioners when TTCI
sold to them its buses and the Certificates of Public Convenience.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 9, 2005, the LA rendered a Decision dismissing the petitioners claim for unfair labor
practice and money claims on the ground of prescription. However, with regard to the issue of
illegal dismissal, only the complaints of Montero, Ravina, Cabello, Genaro, Madera, Gaano,
Arsenio Donato and Estilong were dismissed for having been barred by
prescription.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The LA found that petitioners Estraero, Pajarillo, Aganon, Padre, Dulay, Cuenta, Canaria, Yago,
Avila and Avila, Jr. were illegally dismissed and were awarded their separation pay and
backwages. According to the LA, the complaints of these 10 petitioners were timely filed in June
2002 because the eight-month period during which their cases were pending should be excluded
from the four-year prescriptive period.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Disagreeing with the LA decision, all parties interposed an appeal before the NLRC. However,
said appeals have both been denied for non-perfection, particularly for failure of the petitioners
to verify their appeal, and for failure of the respondent to post the required cash or surety bond.
In a Decision22 dated March 31, 2008, the NLRC vacated and set aside the findings of the LA,
upon finding that the petitioners complaints had already been barred by prescription. The
dispositive part of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
VACATED and SET ASIDE, and the complaints dismissed on ground of prescription.

SO ORDERED.23
The NLRC observed that the LA had ignored the rule on prescription, and chose to be selective
in awarding relief to the 10 complainants by stating in his decision that the period during which
the labor cases were pending should be deducted from the period of prescription. According to
the NLRC:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We have thoroughly examined the records and find no justification for the [LA] to rule that the
pendency of the cases has worked in favor of the complainants to whom he awarded separation
pay and backwages. The [LA] has not at all indicated in his decision when the eight (8)[-]month
period of pendency he alluded to commenced and when it ended. As a matter of fact, these cases
took almost three (3) years from filing of the complaints to the rendition of the appealed
decision.24
The NLRC added that the application of the principle of prescription should not be done on a
selective basis, especially when the dates of accrual of the causes of action and the filing of the
complaints readily show that prescription has set in.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration26 dated May 16, 2008, but it was denied.27
Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari28 before the CA.

On August 28, 2009, the CA Decision dismissed the petition.29 In sustaining the NLRC decision,
the appellate court ratiocinated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here, the illegal dismissal case was filed only in June 2002 or for more than four (4) years and
seven (7) months from the time petitioners received the notices of their dismissal in November
and October 1997. Clearly, the four-year prescriptive period has already elapsed.

Moreover, there is likewise no merit in petitioners contention that the period when they filed a
complaint on May 14, 1998 but withdrawn on March 30, 1998 should be excluded from the
computation of the four-year prescriptive [period] for illegal dismissal cases. The prescriptive
period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been filed at all.
This was clarified in the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation vs. Panganiban,
where the Supreme Court held that although the commencement of an action stops the running of
the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff
leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all. x
x x.30
Aggrieved by the foregoing disquisition, the petitioners moved for reconsideration31 but it was
denied by the CA.32 Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue

The main issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners complaints for illegal dismissal have
already prescribed.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

It should be emphasized at the outset that as a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this
applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the
NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the [LA] and if supported by substantial
evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the
NLRC and the [LA] are contradictory, as in the present case, this Court may delve into the
records and examine for itself the questioned findings.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nevertheless, the Court has thoroughly reviewed the records in this case and finds that the NLRC
did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its decision in favor of the respondents. The CA acted in accord with the evidence on
record and case law when it dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed decision and
resolution of the NLRC.

In the case at bar, October 26, 1997 and November 24, 1997 appear on record to be the dates
when the petitioners employment were terminated by TTCI. The antecedent facts that gave rise
to the petitioners dismissal from employment are not disputed in this case. There is no question
about the fact that the petitioners complaints for unfair labor practice and money claims have
already prescribed. The petitioners however argue that their complaints for illegal dismissal were
duly filed within the four-year prescriptive period since the period during which their cases were
pending should be deducted from the period of prescription. On the other hand, the respondents
insist that said complaints have already prescribed. Hence, the pivotal question in resolving the
issues hinges on the resolution of whether the period during which the petitioners cases were
pending should be excluded from the period of prescription.

Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of
livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of ones dismissal from employment
constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, as
contemplated under Article 114635 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four
years.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but
withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year
prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that the
prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has been
filed at all. The applicability of Article 115537of the Civil Code in labor cases was upheld in the
case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban38 where the Court held that
although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the
same position as though no action had been commenced at all.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly the
same position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The withdrawal of their complaint
effectively erased the tolling of the reglementary period.

A prudent review of the antecedents of the claim reveals that it has in fact prescribed due to the
petitioners withdrawal of their labor case docketed as NLRC RAB-I-01-1007.40 Hence, while
the filing of the said case could have interrupted the running of the four-year prescriptive period,
the voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners effectively cancelled the tolling of the prescriptive
period within which to file their illegal dismissal case, leaving them in exactly the same position
as though no labor case had been filed at all. The running of the four-year prescriptive period not
having been interrupted by the filing of NLRC RAB-I-01-1007, the petitioners cause of action
had already prescribed in four years after their cessation of employment on October 26, 1997 and
November 24, 1997. Consequently, when the petitioners filed their complaint for illegal
dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and damages in 2002, their claim, clearly, had
already been barred by prescription.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sadly, the petitioners have no one but themselves to blame for their own predicament. By their
own allegations in their respective complaints, they have barred their remedy and extinguished

their right of action. Although the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and
the protection of the working class, it does not necessary follow that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights. Out of concern
for the less privileged in life, this Court, has more often than not inclined, to uphold the cause of
the worker in his conflict with the employer. Such leaning, however, does not blind the Court to
the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and doctrine.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated December 11, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106260 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Del Castillo,* Villarama, Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.cralawlawlibrary
Endnotes:

* Additional Member per Raffle dated January 12, 2015 vice Associate Justice Diosdado M.
Peralta.

1Rollo, pp. 9-27.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Portia AlioHormachuelos and Fernanda Lampas Peralta concurring; id. at 31-44.

3 Id. at 45-46.

4 Penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III, with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C.

Javier and Commissioner Tito F. Genilo concurring; id. at 197-208.

5 Id. at 215-217.

6 Issued by Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando; id. at 121-142.

7 Id. at 32.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 32-33.

10 Id. at 51.

11 Id. at 33.

12 Id. at 285-287.

13 Id. at 288-290.

14 Id. at 33-34.

15 Id. at 34.

16 Id.

17 Id. at 130.

18 Id. at 202.

a. June 13, 2002 by Montero, Estraero, Padre, Madera, Herminio Tacla, Nelson C. Viloria,
Pajarillo, Aganon, Avila, Albert T. Ruiz, Yago, Tupasi, Avila, Jr., and Gaano

b. June 14, 2002 by Cuenta

c. June 18, 2002 by Danilo T. Donato and Estilong

d. June 24, 2002 by Canaria and Genaro

e. June 26, 2002 by Dulay

f. July 10, 2002 by Ravina

g. July 24, 2002 by Cabello

19 Id. at 35-36.

20 Id. at 36.

21 Id. at 36-37.

22 Id. at 197-208.

23 Id. at 207.

24 Id. at 206.

25 Id. at 207.

26 Id. at 209-214.

27 Id. at 215-217.

28 Id. at 218-232.

29 Id. at 31-44.

30 Id. at 42-43.

31 Id. at 47-50.

32 Id. at 45-46.

33 Id. at 9-27.

34Victory Liner, Inc. v. Race, 548 Phil. 282, 293 (2007).

35Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four

years:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.

xxxx

36Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 229 Phil. 279, 289 (1986).

37Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when
there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

38 543 Phil. 371 (2007).

39 Id. at 378.

40Rollo, p. 130.

41 Supra note 38, at 379.

42Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. Pingol, G.R. No. 182622,
September 8, 2010, 630 SCRA 413, 423-424.cralawred