Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
| 2D 2012|
Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land
and was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos,
herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered.
FACTS:
A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the
disputed property in this case. Said land was originally owned
by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a
period of 15 years to the Spouses David and Consuelo with
RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting
as caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of
the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he owned was
divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots
inherited was sold to the Spouses ABALOS, here. The other lot
was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not
completely (only of the lot). The lots in question were
subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses Abalos.
The courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners
thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so
filed cases against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in
possession of the land claiming rights of Security of Tenure
as a tenant of the land.
ISSUE:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively
eject the possessor thereof?
RULING/RATIO:
No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. A judgment of
ownership does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to
OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include possession.
This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is
occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural
tenant. The court says allegedly due to the fact that there
is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of
ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest by final
judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be
resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects the rights of
agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the
lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership yields
to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since
the rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending
litigation in the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of
the land until final judgment of said court unless Sorianos
occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.
2. RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a
portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of
all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is
not in the adverse possession of another.
FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of
land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on supposition that the premises
consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can
be established as provided by law. When the claim of the
citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director
of Forestry should subm,it to the court convincing proof that
the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the
Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title
to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract
of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
3. SOMODIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Accion interdictal (forcible entry and unlawful detainer)
are not remedies to obtain ovenwership of a certain
property rather they are remedies to determine who has a
better right to possess the property subject of dispute.
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determines the actual title to an estate. The MTC and RTCs
decision are deemed reinstated.
4. LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession, however, possession is
not gained by mere nominal CLAIM.
FACTS:
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of
land, containing an area of around 24,000,000 hectares. He
presents Exhibit L as proof of his possession over the land.
Exhibit L is a certified copy of an application. This application
states that Lasams predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag,
has owned the land since time immemorial. However, the
property described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only
and the property sought to be registered is 24,000,000
hectares.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property? (only issue in ejectment cases)
HELD:
First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid
application because the identity o the land was not clearly
established.
RULING:
Anyone who can prove prior possession de facto (physical
possession) may recover such possession even from the owner
himself. This is true regardless of the character of a partys
possession provided he has in his favor priority of time
entitling him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Accrdg. to Art. 531 of NCC, possession is acquired by material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. Somodio then
enjoyed priority of possession because Purisima entered the
lot only in 1983 which is later than Somodios possession fo
the property.
In addition, Somodios possession over the property is not
synonymous with his right of ownership over the same.
Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
(3)
RULING:
(1) Yes, there was a valid trial.
The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not
intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did
not present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for
the accused to be convicted).
But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively
participated with the criminal case. And both parties, during
the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective evidences in
the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The agreement was
reduced into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court.
Being bound by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in
the day to challenge its contents.
(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven.
The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the
following:
a)
The personal property is received in trust,
on commission, for administration, or any
other circumstances, with the duty return.
b)
There is a conversion/diversion of such
property or denial that he received it.
c)
Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of
another
d)
There is demand for such property
The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the
tranferee both material and juridical possession of the
personal property. Juridical possession means the transferee
has a right over the thing which he may even set up against
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the owner.The possession of the accused of the money had no
juridical possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is
akin to that of a bank teller. And possession of a bank teller
is possession of the bank. she was a mere custodian.
*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but
double jeopardy is already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER payment
to the teller is a payment to the bank, he is a mere
custodian. AGENT he can assert his independent,
autonomous right to retain money, even against the owner.
6. PO LAM V. CA
A buyer cannot be considered in bad faith when the notice
of lis pendens was already being ordered cancelled at the
time of purchase.
FACTS:
This is a ruling on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Po Lam spouses.
The case stems from a controversy regarding two lots
situated in Legazpi, Albay, which the spouses purchased from
Lim Kok Chiong. The lots were the subject of litigation
between Lim and his brother Felix. The latter sought an
action to annul the sale by Lim to Legazpi Avenue Hardware
because it was alleged that Lim included his brothers share
in the lot. During the pendency of the case, Felix sought the
annotation of notice of lis pendence on the TCTs of the 2
lots. The trial court found that Lim was the absolute owner of
the lots and upheld the sale, also, the court ordered the
cancellation of notice of lis pendence on the titles. One of
the notices was cancelled but the other was not acted upon.
Felix appealed, however the CA maintained the ruling of the
trial court and ordered the cancellation of the other TCT.
Subsequently, Legazpi Avenue Hardware sold the lots to the
spouses Po Lam, which they later leased to Jose Lee. Felix
then impleaded the spoused Po Lam in the continuing civil
case between him and his brother. After the expiration of his
lease, Jose Lee refused to pay Po Lam and instead said he
would deposit the payment to Felix. The Po Lam spouses filed
an action with the trial court in Legazpi, which declared
them the lawful owners of the lots. The RTC and CA
sustained, but the SC through Justice Purisima reversed
stating that the Po Lam spouses were vendees in bad faith
because they knew of the notice of lis pendence annotated
on the TCTs.
Hence this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are buyers in good faith
HELD:
Yes. In granting the motion for reconsideration, Justice Melo
wrote that even though there was notice of lis pendence on
one of the titles, there was already a previous ruling by the
trial court and later the CA, which upheld the validity of the
sale between Lim and Legazpi Avenue Hardware, and
ordering the cancellation of the TCTs. In the order of
cancellation, it was recalled that Felix never moved for
reinstatement of the notices. Petitioner spouses cannot be
considered in bad faith because there was an existing order
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purchaser is not required to explore further. An exception to
this is when the mortgagee or purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or lack of title on the part of the vendor or that he
was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire furher. In this case, petitioner knows full well
that Solid is engaged in selling subdivision lots. Therefore, as
founded on jurisprudence, it should have taken necessary
precautions to ascertain any flaw. Moreover, the uniform
practice of financing institutions is to investigate, examine,
and assess real property offered as security. State is
therefore not a mortgagee in good faith.
8. DBP V. CA
A mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may
be the basis of good faith.
FACTS:
Spouses Piedas are registered owners of a parcel of land in
Capiz, which they mortgaged to DBP to secure the loan
(P20,000) they obtained from the latter. Piedas eventually
defaulted, prompting DBP to extra-judicially foreclose and
take possession of such property. The Ministry of Justice,
then, opined through its Opinion No. 92 (78) that lands
covered by P.D. No. 27, to which the subject property was
included, may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings.
The Piedas, then, sought to redeem such property (with
P10,000 as downpayment) but was denied as the land was
allegedly tenanted. They then sought the cancellation of the
title and specific performance, stating that DBP acted in bad
faith when it took possession of the property andcaused the
consolidation of its title in spite of the fact that the 5-year
redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to
redeem was within the redemption period.
ISSUE:W/N DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of
the property
RULING: NO.
DBPs act of consolidating its title and taking possession of
the property after the expiration of the redemption period
was in accordance with Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, which states
that if no redemption of a foreclosed property is made within
one year, the purchaser (DBP) is entitled as a matter of right
to consolidate and to possess the property. In addition to
this, it was in consonance with Sec. 4 of the mortgage
contract between DBP and the Piedas where they agreed the
appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold
possession of the mortgaged property in case of foreclosure.
In fact, without DBPs act of consolidating its title, the
Piedas would not be able to assert their right to repurchase
the property within 5 years, which would begin to run after
the expiration of the one-year period. Thus, its acts cannot
be tainted with bad faith nor did it impair Piedas right to
repurchase.
It may also be argued that P.D. No. 27 was already in effect
when DBP foreclosed the property. However, the legal
propriety of the foreclosure of the land was questioned only
after Opinion No. 92 (78) was issued, which happened almost
2 months after DBP consolidated its title to the property. By
law and jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may properly be the basis of good faith.
| 2D 2012|
9. SAN MIGUEL V CA
| 2D 2012|
contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and
asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase the lots for
11 million bucks.
Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited
with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand withholding) payment
for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after
Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution, Equatorial
demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable
compensation for the Mayfairs continued use of the
subject premises after its lease contracts expired.
Remember that Mayfair was still occupying the premises
during all this hullabaloo.
ISSUE: w/n Equatorial was the owner of the subject property
and could thus enjoy the fruits and rentals.
HELD:NO.
Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to
Equatorial since there was failure to deliver the property to
the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was
even rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that
belonged to the owner of the property producing it by right
of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time
of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission
by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property
during that period.
We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, one of
the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the
other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer
acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him in any of
the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. This right is
transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or
delivery. There is delivery if and when the thing sold is
placed in the control and possession of the vendee.
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is
nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery
of property or title, and transfer of control or custody to the
buyer.
Possession was never acquired by the petitioner. It therefore
had no rights to rent.