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AMPIL) 8th week

A person may be declared the owner of a property but he
may not be entitled to possession.The exercise of the
rights of ownership is subject to limitations that may be
imposed by law. Although declared to be the lawful
owner, such owner cannot automatically evict the physical
possessor of the land unless it has been determined that
no rights of the possessor will be violated by such eviction.

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Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land
and was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos,
herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title

A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the
disputed property in this case. Said land was originally owned
by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a
period of 15 years to the Spouses David and Consuelo with
RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting
as caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of
the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he owned was
divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots
inherited was sold to the Spouses ABALOS, here. The other lot
was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not
completely (only of the lot). The lots in question were
subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses Abalos.
The courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners
thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so
filed cases against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in
possession of the land claiming rights of Security of Tenure
as a tenant of the land.

Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not

acquired a good title from the Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first
parcel of land is forest land.

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively
eject the possessor thereof?

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he

has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of
the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment.

No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. A judgment of
ownership does not necessarily include possession as a
necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to
OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include possession.
This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is
occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural
tenant. The court says allegedly due to the fact that there
is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of
ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest by final
judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be
resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects the rights of
agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the
lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership yields
to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since
the rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending
litigation in the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of
the land until final judgment of said court unless Sorianos
occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a
portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of
all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is
not in the adverse possession of another.
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of
land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal

It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to

the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of
ISSUE: W/N the actual occupancy of a part of the land
described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to
give title to the entire tract of land?
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a
portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all
is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in
the adverse possession of another.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on supposition that the premises
consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can
be established as provided by law. When the claim of the
citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director
of Forestry should subm,it to the court convincing proof that
the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the
Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title
to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract
of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
Accion interdictal (forcible entry and unlawful detainer)
are not remedies to obtain ovenwership of a certain
property rather they are remedies to determine who has a
better right to possess the property subject of dispute.


Note: What is important in ejectment cases is the issue of
who is entitled to the physical or material possession of a
property and not the question of ownership.
Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a Transfer
of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mangubat, the possession of
a residential lot located at General Santos City. Nicanor
Somodio, petitioner, contributed one-half of the purchase
price. Mabugat then executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly
recognizing the right of Somodio over undivided portion of
the lot.
Somodio and Mabugat partitioned the property into two
portions, with the former taking the western part. After the
partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and planted
thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees, and other fruit bearing
He also began construction of a structure with a dimension of
22 by 18 feet on his lot. Due to his work, he was transferred
to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and left the unfinished
structure to the care of his uncle. Somodio allowed Ayco,
respondent to transfer his hut to petitioners lot.

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determines the actual title to an estate. The MTC and RTCs
decision are deemed reinstated.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession, however, possession is
not gained by mere nominal CLAIM.
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of
land, containing an area of around 24,000,000 hectares. He
presents Exhibit L as proof of his possession over the land.
Exhibit L is a certified copy of an application. This application
states that Lasams predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag,
has owned the land since time immemorial. However, the
property described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only
and the property sought to be registered is 24,000,000

Somodio demanded Ayco to vacate the premises but to no

avail. He then filed an action for unlawful detainer with
damages before the MTC. Another respondent, Purisima
entered the land and constructed a house thereon. Somodio
then filed a complaint for forcible entry against the latter.

Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land

which is the same parcel described in another Exhibit K.
Apparently, the surveyor of the land delineated the property
based on what the possessor at that time pointed out to him;
he based his study mostly on hearsay. According to the
applicant, before his occupation of the land, only about 2
hectares were cultivated. But then, they justified this by
invoking the doctrine of constructive possession (That a
person in possession of the land does not have to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession)

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Somodio finding that

Purisima built a house almost on the spot where Somodios
unfinished house stood through stealth and strategy. The
MTC also held that Somodio was the actual possessor of the
lot in question.

Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on the

ground that
a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration
b) that the land sought to be registered is public land.

The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. CA on the other

hand, dismissed petition of Somodio and held that the latter
did not clearly and conclusively established physical, prior
possession over the lot.

ISSUE: Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the

required possession during the time prescribed by law? Is he
entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of land considering that
the area possessed is only 2 hectares?

Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property? (only issue in ejectment cases)

First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid
application because the identity o the land was not clearly

Anyone who can prove prior possession de facto (physical
possession) may recover such possession even from the owner
himself. This is true regardless of the character of a partys
possession provided he has in his favor priority of time
entitling him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Accrdg. to Art. 531 of NCC, possession is acquired by material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. Somodio then
enjoyed priority of possession because Purisima entered the
lot only in 1983 which is later than Somodios possession fo
the property.
In addition, Somodios possession over the property is not
synonymous with his right of ownership over the same.
Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never

Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have

possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is lacking in
certainty as to the portion occupied and the extent thereof.
Although the counsel invokes the doctrine of constructive
possession, the said application is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that
among these qualifications is one particularly relating to the
size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion
of land actually in possession of the claimant. While,
therefore, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession,
possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The mere
planting of a sign or a symbol of possession cannot justify a
Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of


5. CHUA-BURCE V. CA (possession by a bank teller is
possession of the bank itself; mere custodian)
Judicial possession gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner. [ESTAFA: juridical and material possession.]
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested
FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical
bundle count of cash inside the vault, which should total to
P4 million. They found out that there was a shortage of
P150,000. After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and
NBI, the reports concluded that Cristeta Chua-Burce, Cash
Custodian, was primary responsible for the shortage. Unable
to explain the shortage, the services of the accused was
Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were
charged with the crime of estafa. A civil case was also
instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal
case due to a prejudicial question. It was first granted but
denied by the CA. The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases continued.
The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa. CIVIL
CASE also found her liable for the shortage of P150,000. She
appealed both rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the
two TC rulings. Hence this case.

W/N there was a valid trial

W/N the elements of estafa were proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

(1) Yes, there was a valid trial.
The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not
intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did
not present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for
the accused to be convicted).
But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively
participated with the criminal case. And both parties, during
the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective evidences in
the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The agreement was
reduced into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court.
Being bound by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in
the day to challenge its contents.
(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven.
The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the
The personal property is received in trust,
on commission, for administration, or any
other circumstances, with the duty return.
There is a conversion/diversion of such
property or denial that he received it.
Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of
There is demand for such property
The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the
tranferee both material and juridical possession of the
personal property. Juridical possession means the transferee
has a right over the thing which he may even set up against

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the owner.The possession of the accused of the money had no
juridical possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is
akin to that of a bank teller. And possession of a bank teller
is possession of the bank. she was a mere custodian.
*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but
double jeopardy is already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER payment
to the teller is a payment to the bank, he is a mere
custodian. AGENT he can assert his independent,
autonomous right to retain money, even against the owner.
A buyer cannot be considered in bad faith when the notice
of lis pendens was already being ordered cancelled at the
time of purchase.
This is a ruling on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Po Lam spouses.
The case stems from a controversy regarding two lots
situated in Legazpi, Albay, which the spouses purchased from
Lim Kok Chiong. The lots were the subject of litigation
between Lim and his brother Felix. The latter sought an
action to annul the sale by Lim to Legazpi Avenue Hardware
because it was alleged that Lim included his brothers share
in the lot. During the pendency of the case, Felix sought the
annotation of notice of lis pendence on the TCTs of the 2
lots. The trial court found that Lim was the absolute owner of
the lots and upheld the sale, also, the court ordered the
cancellation of notice of lis pendence on the titles. One of
the notices was cancelled but the other was not acted upon.
Felix appealed, however the CA maintained the ruling of the
trial court and ordered the cancellation of the other TCT.
Subsequently, Legazpi Avenue Hardware sold the lots to the
spouses Po Lam, which they later leased to Jose Lee. Felix
then impleaded the spoused Po Lam in the continuing civil
case between him and his brother. After the expiration of his
lease, Jose Lee refused to pay Po Lam and instead said he
would deposit the payment to Felix. The Po Lam spouses filed
an action with the trial court in Legazpi, which declared
them the lawful owners of the lots. The RTC and CA
sustained, but the SC through Justice Purisima reversed
stating that the Po Lam spouses were vendees in bad faith
because they knew of the notice of lis pendence annotated
on the TCTs.
Hence this motion for reconsideration.
W/N petitioners are buyers in good faith
Yes. In granting the motion for reconsideration, Justice Melo
wrote that even though there was notice of lis pendence on
one of the titles, there was already a previous ruling by the
trial court and later the CA, which upheld the validity of the
sale between Lim and Legazpi Avenue Hardware, and
ordering the cancellation of the TCTs. In the order of
cancellation, it was recalled that Felix never moved for
reinstatement of the notices. Petitioner spouses cannot be
considered in bad faith because there was an existing order


of cancellation annotated on the TCT. Such a view, which the
SC former held, was erroneous and defied the purpose of the
doctrine of lis pendence. The doctrine is based on public
policy and necessity.
A mortgagee who has foreclosed property is not
considered in good faith when such mortgagee has or is
expected to have knowledge of any defect in the title; a
prior buyer in good faith, although merely under a
contract to sell, is preferred over a mortgagee since if the
original owner delivered title, he would not anymore be
able to mortgage the thing.
A contrcat to sell was executed between spouses Canuto and
Oreta, and Solid Homes. The sale involved a parcel of land
(511 sq. m.). Upon signing of the contract, Oreta made
payment with the agreement that the balance shall be paid in
installments. Meanwhile. Solid Homes executed several
mortgages in favor of State Investment over its subdivided
parcels of land, including the subject of land of the
mentioned contract to sell. Such mortgage was foreclosed
upon failure of Solid to comply with its obligations.
Thereafter, Solid through a MOA, negotiated for the
deferment of consolidation of ownership over the foreclosed
properties. It further committed itself to redeem the
Spouses Canuto after a few years filed a complaint before the
HLURB against Solid and State for failure on the part of Solid
to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale as well as to
deliver title to property subject of the contract to sell
despite full payment. Solid alleged that its obligations under
the contract have become so difficult for performance. Solid
, in effect, asked to be partially released from its obligations
by delivering another parcel of land in substitution to the
subject of the sale. State, on the other hand averred that
unless Solid pays the redemtion price, it has a right to hold
on to the foreclosed properties. However, HLURB ordered
State to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
complainants and deliver the title to the land. Solid was then
ordered to pay State the portion of the loan which
corresponds to the value of the lot. this judgment was
sutained by the Board of Commissioners, Office of the
President, and Court of Appeals.
(1) W/N spuses Oreta's unregistered rights are superior over
State's registered mortgage over the property
(2) W/N State has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens
(1) State's registered mortgage right over the property is
inferior to that of respondents' unregistered right. The
unrecorded sale is preferred for the reason that if the original
owner (Solid) had parted with the ownership of the thing
sold, he would no longer have the free disposal of it and
would not be able to mortgage it. Registration of the
mortgage is not important since it is understood to be
without prejudice to the rights of third persons.

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purchaser is not required to explore further. An exception to
this is when the mortgagee or purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or lack of title on the part of the vendor or that he
was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire furher. In this case, petitioner knows full well
that Solid is engaged in selling subdivision lots. Therefore, as
founded on jurisprudence, it should have taken necessary
precautions to ascertain any flaw. Moreover, the uniform
practice of financing institutions is to investigate, examine,
and assess real property offered as security. State is
therefore not a mortgagee in good faith.
8. DBP V. CA
A mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may
be the basis of good faith.
Spouses Piedas are registered owners of a parcel of land in
Capiz, which they mortgaged to DBP to secure the loan
(P20,000) they obtained from the latter. Piedas eventually
defaulted, prompting DBP to extra-judicially foreclose and
take possession of such property. The Ministry of Justice,
then, opined through its Opinion No. 92 (78) that lands
covered by P.D. No. 27, to which the subject property was
included, may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings.
The Piedas, then, sought to redeem such property (with
P10,000 as downpayment) but was denied as the land was
allegedly tenanted. They then sought the cancellation of the
title and specific performance, stating that DBP acted in bad
faith when it took possession of the property andcaused the
consolidation of its title in spite of the fact that the 5-year
redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to
redeem was within the redemption period.
ISSUE:W/N DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of
the property
DBPs act of consolidating its title and taking possession of
the property after the expiration of the redemption period
was in accordance with Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, which states
that if no redemption of a foreclosed property is made within
one year, the purchaser (DBP) is entitled as a matter of right
to consolidate and to possess the property. In addition to
this, it was in consonance with Sec. 4 of the mortgage
contract between DBP and the Piedas where they agreed the
appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold
possession of the mortgaged property in case of foreclosure.
In fact, without DBPs act of consolidating its title, the
Piedas would not be able to assert their right to repurchase
the property within 5 years, which would begin to run after
the expiration of the one-year period. Thus, its acts cannot
be tainted with bad faith nor did it impair Piedas right to
It may also be argued that P.D. No. 27 was already in effect
when DBP foreclosed the property. However, the legal
propriety of the foreclosure of the land was questioned only
after Opinion No. 92 (78) was issued, which happened almost
2 months after DBP consolidated its title to the property. By
law and jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may properly be the basis of good faith.

(2) As a general rule, where there is nothing in the title to

indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership thereof, the


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Art. 526 of NCC states that a possessor in good faith is one

who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it. Moreover, Art.
527 of NCC provides good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor
rests the burden of proof. Thus, it is incumbent on the
Piedas to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title
(nullity of the foreclosure), but this they failed to do.

Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public

land for 30 years transforms public land into private land
without the need of judicial or other sanction. Such open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the
disputed properties for more than 30 years must, however,
be conclusively established. This proof is necessary to avoid
the erroneous validation of crazy claims of possession over
the property in dispute.


In this case, SMC's claim that its predecessor-in-interest had

open, exclusive and undisputed possession of said Lot for
more than thirty years is anchored on certain documentary
and testimonial evidence. Its documentary evidence consist
of tax declaration and tax receipts

To convert public into private land by means of open,

continuous and exclusive possession, it is necessary to
provide strong evidence beyond mere tax declarations and
tax receipts. Corroboration of the facts by witnesses will
On December 23, 1975, petitioner SMC purchased from
Silverio Perez a 14,531 sqm lot of land located in Batangas, in
consideration for about a hundred grand. (Mr. Perez allegedly
held the land for 30 years, converting the said land from
public alienable land to private land. Its on this ground that
SMC claims it can validly purchase said land from Perez)
On February 21,1977, SMC claimed ownership in fee simple. It
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas an
application for its registration under the Land Registration
The Solicitor General opposed the application for registration
contending that SMC's claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of a Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of
by the applicant as the six-month period from February 16,
1976 prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 892 had elapsed;
that the parcel of land in question is part of the public
domain, and that SMC, being a private corporation, is
disqualified under Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution
from holding alienable lands of the public domain.
During initial hearing on October 12, 197 7, the Court, upon
motion of SMC and there being no opposition to the
application except that of the SolGen, issued an order of
general default. SMC was allowed to submit evidence to
establish jurisdictional facts.
On December 12, 1977, the RTC adjudicated the property in
favor of SMC.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA
reversed the decision of the lower court and declared the
parcel of land involved as public domain.
SMC contested that the Court of Appeals' failed to hold that
"prescription is a mode of acquiring title or ownership of land
and that the title thus acquired is registrable.

Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of

ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. They
are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Tax declarations
only become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired
by prescription, a mode of acquisition of ownership relied
upon by petitioner in this case, when accompanied by proof
of actual possession.
None are present. The land is still public land.
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It
is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two
2-storey buildings at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, and
covered by TCT No. 18529.
On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease
with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20 years. The lease covered a
portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey
building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which
respondent used as Maxim Theater.
Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a
second Lease with Carmelo for another portion of the latters
property this time, a part of the second floor of the twostorey building, and two store spaces on the ground floor. In
that space, Mayfair put up another movie house known as
Miramar Theater. The Contract of Lease was likewise for a
period of 20 years.
Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first
refusal to purchase the subject properties. Sadly, on July 30,
1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties
were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc.
for eleven million smackers, without their first being offered
to Mayfair.

ISSUE: w/n SMC validly acquired the land from Perez

The land is still public domain. Perez, the Seller, failed to
proved that he acquired the land by prescription.
What is key here is whether the evidence presented by the
petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that SMC and its
predecessor-in-interest had a registrable right over the Lot.

As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial,

Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and
damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and Equatorial. Tsk tsk.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition
questioning the CA decision. What happened is that the


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contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and
asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase the lots for
11 million bucks.
Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited
with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand withholding) payment
for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after
Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution, Equatorial
demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable
compensation for the Mayfairs continued use of the
subject premises after its lease contracts expired.
Remember that Mayfair was still occupying the premises
during all this hullabaloo.
ISSUE: w/n Equatorial was the owner of the subject property
and could thus enjoy the fruits and rentals.
Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to
Equatorial since there was failure to deliver the property to
the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was
even rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that
belonged to the owner of the property producing it by right
of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time
of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission
by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property
during that period.
We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, one of
the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the
other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer
acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him in any of
the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. This right is
transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or
delivery. There is delivery if and when the thing sold is
placed in the control and possession of the vendee.
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is
nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery
of property or title, and transfer of control or custody to the
Possession was never acquired by the petitioner. It therefore
had no rights to rent.