PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY.

AMPIL) 9th week

Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Bleza Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|

1. VDA. DE BORROMEO v POGOY

NOTE (important in subject matter but wasnt really given
emphasis in the case)

sell, mortgage, hypothecate or encumber the property so

long as it requires the purchase or mortgage creditors to
respect the terms of the lease contract; provided further that
lessee shall be duly informed about lessors plan to sell the
property (herein referred to as leasehold rights). After the
expiration of the lease contract, the lessors sold the property
to respondent Star Group Resources and Development Inc.
Thereafter, the respondent filed against the petitioner, who
stayed despite the expiration of their lease contract, for
unlawful detainer. The lessees refused to concede and even
impugned the right of the respondent to eject them.
Petitioners filed a case in the RTC to enforce their leasehold
and pre-emptive rights, which include the declaration of the
sale null and void, their right of redemption, and to recover
their two-month deposits against the respondent in the
dispute premises. Subsequently they filed a motion to dismiss
the ejectment case because of the case they filed with RTC.

Special Civil Actions; Forcible entry and detainer prescribes in

one year counted from demand to vacate the premises
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to stop respondent Judge Pogoy from taking
cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to
refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the
building which was leased to herein petitioner Petra Vda. De
Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five
days of the month. On August 28, 1982, Atty Ricardo Reyes,
administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a letter
demanding that she pay the overde rentals corresponding to
the period from March to September (1982), and thereafter
vacate the premises. Petitioner failed to do so, thus the
respondent instituted an ejectment case against the former.
Petitioner moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. She
points out that the parties are from the same cities and as
such they must refer the dispute to the barangay Court or
Lupon before going through the judicial courts. Respondents
defense was that it was danger of prescribing under the
statute of limitations. The motion was dismissed thus this
case.

ISSUE:
W/N an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a
lessee grounded on the expiration of the latters lease should
be suspended by an action filed in the RTC by the defendant
lesse on the claim that he is entitled to a right of preemption
of the premises in question and wishes to have said right
judicially enforced?
RULING:
NO. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed
in the RTC based on tenants claim that his right of
preemption was violated. The underlying reasons for the this
were that the actions in the RTC did not involve physical or
de facto possession, and on not a few occasions, that the
case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the
former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the
ejectment action and there resolved

ISSUES: W/N it was indeed in danger of prescribing?

(The one relevant to subject matter)
W/N going through Lupon was necessary?
(Core issue)
RULING: NO to both.
The defense of Atty Reyes regarding the statute of limitations
is unacceptable because the case was filed on September 16,
1982, less than a month before the letter of demand was
served. Forcible entry and detainer prescribes in one year
counted from demand to vacate the premises and the law
only required 60 days upon which the parties should try to
reconcile in Lupon; Respondent had more than 9 months left
even if reconciliation failed.

It has also been decided in a long line of cases that cases

wherein ownership (possession de jure) is the issue does
not a bar or suspend ejectment cases (which tackles
possession de facto.)
The Court however stressed that when in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.
The MTC nevertheless have the undoubted competence to
resolve the issue of ownership x x only to determine the
issue of possession

However, PD No. 1508, wherein it is required to go through

Lupon first before going to courts only applies to
individuals. In this case, Ricardo reyes is a mere nominal
party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito
Borromeo thus it is inapplicable to them.

3. SEMIRA v CA
When the issue of possession cannot be decided
independently of the question of ownership in an action for
forcible entry, any pronouncement made affecting ownership
is merely provisional and does not bar an action between the
same parties involving title to the land.

2. WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. v CA

It has also been decided in a long line of cases that cases
wherein ownership (possession de jure) is the issue does not a
bar or suspend ejectment cases (which tackles possession de
facto.)

FACTS :
Ms. Gutierez sold to Respondent Buenaventura An an 822sqm
lot specifically designated by boundaries. Respondent then
proceeded to occupy said lot within the boundaries.

FACTS:
Petitioners were lessees of a commercial building and
bodegas owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R.
Locsin, Lourdes C Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L.
Jarantilla. In their lease contract, there was a reservation of
right clause stating that the lessor reserves the rights to

Mr. Buenaventura got lucky with money and expanded. He

subsequently purchased an adjacent lot with the size of 8,606
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and another of 11,000 sqm. Not much later on, he then sold
the original 822sqm lot to his nephew, Mr. Ramirez. The Deed
indicated the same boundaries designated in the original sale
from Gutierez to Buenaventura. Mr. Ramirez proceeded to
occupy the lot according to the boundaries stated.

4. WONG V. CARPIO
Possession in good faith ceases once defects in title are made
know to the possessor by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery by the owner; interruption takes place upon service
of summons.

Seven years passed and Mr. Ramirez sold the 822 sqm lot to
Mr. Semira according to the stated boundaries for a lump sum
of P20,000. At this point, Mr Semira discovered that the
actual size delimited by the boundaries was not 822sqm, but
rather, 2200sqm. What a bonanza! Mr. Semira gleefully
entered the lot according to its stated boundaries and built a
rice mill.

FACTS:
Mr. Giger sold to Plaintiff Mr. Mercado a piece of property for
the price of P3,500 under the terms of a pacto de retro.
Mr.Mercado paid land taxes and planted coconut trees but
failed to erect signs of occupancy, nor did he establish a hut.
He spent much of his time away at his place of business
where he ran a store. He visited the land occasionally only to
make copra. Other than this, the place resembled a ghost
town.

Someone wasnt pleased. Mr. Buenaventura, who occupied

the adjacent lots, didnt look to kindly upon the
encroachment. He filed forcible entry, claiming that Mr.
Semira forcibly occupied an additional 1,377 sqm. He asserts
that Mr. Semira purchased an 822sqm lot, not a 2200sqm lot.
The case went to court and during the pendancy of
proceedings, Mr. Buenaventura obtained an OCT for the two
lots surrounding that of Mr. Semira.

Mr Wong happened to chance upon the land, and finding no

one occupying the same, purchased the property from Mr.
Giger. Thereupon, he obtained a TCT, established a hut,
populated the place with laborers and fenced the property.
Mr. Mercado returned to the property and was dismayed to
find his land occupied. He had the incident blottered and
filed for forcible entry against Mr. Wong. He also demanded
rentals. Unfortunately, the MTC ruled in favor of Mr. Wong,
stating that the latter was in open, actual, prior and
continuous possession. On appeal, the CFI reversed and ruled
for Mr. Mercado stating that he had taken possession of the
property much earlier and that Mr. Wong is the actual
intruder. Mr. Wong took the case to the CA which ruled
against him.

The MTC dismissed the forcible entry case against Mr Semira,

stating that it had no jurisdiction to try cases on the issue of
ownership. The RTC reversed and ruled for Buenaventura. CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: w/n Mr. Semira rightfully owned 2200sqm of land
designated by boundaries and not the 822sqm erroneously
stated on the Deed. (this is a boundary vs area quandary)
HELD:
Mr. Semira is entitled to 2200sqm designated by the
boundary.

(interesting note: Wong says Mercado was a mere laborer who

was tolerated to gather fruits. How thick faced is that?)

It is clear that the original 822sqm lot was once owned by

respondent Buenaventura; and that he sold same to his
nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of
P2,500.00. The "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" incorporated
both the estimated area and the definite boundaries of the
land; and, that private respondent's nephew in turn sold the
lot to petitioner in 1979 with the very same boundaries
mentioned in the deed of sale executed in his favor by his
uncle Buenaventura An.

ISSUE: w/n Mercado was the real owner

HELD:Yes.
Art. 135 provides that possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact
that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper
acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right."
The law and jurisprudence indicate that the execution of a
sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the
contrary . But theres a catch. Even if there exists the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the purchased thing when
such tenancy and enjoyment is opposed by another. In this
case, delivery has not been effected.

Petitioner Semira claims that owns the entire 2,200 square

meters since it is the size of the lot he purchased as
established boundaries. On the other hand, respondent
Buenaventura insists that he only sold 822.5 square meters,
therefore, his nephew Ramirez could not have transferred a
bigger area to petitioner.
The SC sustained Mr. Semira as well as the MCTCs decision.
When land is sold for a lump sum and not on a per unit of
measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the
contract determine the effects and scope of the sale, not the
area thereof. Hence, the Vendor Ramirez is obligated to
deliver all the land included within the boundaries, regardless
of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than
that recited in the deed. The court stressed the point
especially when the area is described in the vernacular as
"humigit kumulang," that is, more or less.

It is crystal clear that possession passed from William Giger

to Mercado by virtue of the first sale. This being the case, ,
the later sale in favor of thick-faced Wong failed to pass
the possession of the property because there is an
impediment the possession exercised by respondent
Mercado.
Possession cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.

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Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the

present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).

6. LIM KIEH TONG V. CA

Furthermore, Wong cannot claim good faith to deny Mercado

due rentals. The moment he received the complaint of
forcible entry and summons, he should have been aware of
defects in his title. He owes rentals from that point onwards.

FACTS:
Private Respondent and his family resided in room of a
building owned by Petitioner until the former transferred to
their new residence. However, Respondent retained
possession of the room to keep his important belongings. At
one point, when Respondent wanted to go to his room, he
found that his key was no longer compatible with the doors
lock, that is, the lock was changed. He asked from Petitioner
the new key but having failed, he filed a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction plus damages with the MTC. Petitioner
countered that since the action is one for specific
performance, the action should have been filed with the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N the action is one for specific performance or forcible
entry and detainer.

Any person deprived of possession of any land or building

may file an action for forcible entry and detainer against
the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession
from him. This relief is not only avaible to landlord, lessor
but to lessee and tenant as well within one year from such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

5. JAVIER V. VERIDIANO II
A final judgment on forcible entry or detainer is NOT a bar
against to an action for determination of ownership. A
judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is
conclusive only as to possession, not ownership. It is not a
bar against an action for determination of ownership.
FACTS:
Petitioner bought a land
on a subdivision by filing a
Miscellaneous Sales Application. Pending the approval of the
sale, Ben Babol entered a portion adjacent to the land being
bought by Petitioner. Petitioner claims that the occupied
land by Babol is part of his land so he filed a forcible entry
case. However, the trial court found Petitioner wrong and so
sustained the possession of Babol. Later on, Babol would sell
this portion to private Respondent. In the meantime, the
application was approved and a TCT was delivered to
Petitioner. This motivated the Petitioner to demand the land
again, this time from Respondent, and this time on the basis
of ownership. He filed a complaint for quieting of title and
recovery of possession. Respondent countered that the first
case on forcible entry constituted res judicata against the
second complaint.

RULING:
The suit is actually one for forcible entry and detainer.
Respondent remained in possession of the property but
Petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving
him of the right of egress and ingress through the door of the
building and the room. Any person deprived of possession of
any land or building may file an action for forcible entry and
detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or
withholding possession from him. This relief is not only
avaible to landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well
within one year from such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession.
7. PENAS v. CA|CALAYCAY, 233 SCRA 744

ISSUE:
W/N the first case on forcible entry was res judicata against
the second case on quieting of title

Unlawful detainer: 1 year prescription should be counted

from the LAST letter of demand to vacate.
FACTS:
Spouses Penas leased to Calaycay a certain property in
Quezon City. The original written contract was on a month to
month basis and for P110.00 per month. The price was
continuously increased until it reached P2000.00 per month.

RULING:
No! Once again, for res judicata to arise, four requisites must
concur: Final judgment, Court with competent jurisdiction,
judgment based on merits, identity of parties and cause of
action.

In a letter of January 18, 1990, Penas notified Calaycay that

effective March 1990, they were terminating the written
month to month lease contract as they were no longer
interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter
to vacate the premises in question on or before February 28,
1990. In the same letter, Penas opted to allow the defendant
to continue occupying the leased premises provided he will
agree to execute a new lease contract for a period of one (1)
year at an increased monthly rental P2500.00, plus two (2)
months deposit and, further, gave the Calaycay up to
February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for
unlawful detainer shall ensue. Penas later finally reduced the
monthly rental to P2000.00.

The Court said that in the two cases, there were identity of
parties because Respondent, having acquired the contested
land by sale and tradition, is a successor in interest.
However, there was no identity of the causes of action. In
forcible entry, the only issue is prior possession and not
ownership. In accion reivindicatoria, the issue is the
ownership. The Court held that the second case was actually
an accion reivindicatoria as Petitioner set up title for herself,
prayed that Respondent to be ejected and that she be
declared the owner. Thus a final judgment on forcible entry
or detainer is NOT a bar against to an action for
determination of ownership.

Calaycay did not vacate but instead consigned the monthly

rents in a bank.
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On August 10, 1992, Penas sent another letter to the

defendant to vacate and demanded back rentals, which
Calaycay failed to satisfy.

HELD: No. P
etitioner's complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally
speaking such action falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for
ejectment requires a consideration of the rights of a buyer on
installment basis of real property. Indeed private respondent
claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop
paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the
owner or developer of his decision to do so because of
petitioner's alleged failure to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and
within the time for complying with the same. The case thus
involves a determination of the rights and obligations of
parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957, Private
respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for
unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.

On September 25, 1992, Penas filed an action for unlawful

detainer. MTC dismissed the case for being filed more than 1
year after the unlawful occupation. RTC and CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the case for unlawful detainer was filed in time?
HELD: Yes. The established rule that the one (1) year period
provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should
be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate, the
reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.
The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the
increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the
demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot
be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary
demand is first made.
The demand was made on 10 August 1992, followed by the
action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992. Hence it
was filed within 1 year from the beginning of the unlawful
possession.

This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer

arising from the failure of the lessee to pay the rents, comply
with the conditions of a lease agreement or vacate the
premises after the expiration of the lease. Since the
determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the
HLURB, the question of the right of petitioner must be
determined by the agency.
As to the counterclaim, Pursuant to Rule 6, 8 a party may
file a counterclaim only if the court has jurisdiction to
entertain the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim cannot be
filed.

8. FRANCEL REALTY v. CA|SYCIP, 252 SCRA 127

9. AZARCON V. EUSEBIO

Where an action for unlawful detainer is based on P.D. 957

(defective construction), HLURD, not the MTC, has
jurisdiction.

A person who is in possession and who is being ordered to

leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending
harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest.

FACTS:
Francel alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to
Sycip a property in Cavite, for P451,000.00. The Contract to
Sell provides that in case of default in the payment of two or
more installments, the whole obligation will become due and
demandable and the seller will then be entitled to rescind
the contract and take possession of the property; the buyer
will vacate the premises without the necessity of any court
action and the downpayment will be treated as earnest
money or as rental for the use of the premises. Francel
alleged that Sycip failed to pay the monthly amortization of
P9,303.00 since October 30, 1990 despite demands to update
his payments and to vacate the premises, the latest of which
was the demand made in the letter dated September 26,
1992, so Francel filed in the MTC an action for unlawful
detainer and award for costs and damages.

FACTS:
Victor Eusebio et al. had a dispute over the possession of a
certain parcel of public land in the year 1954. Eusebio had
filed a lease application for a parcel of containing an area of
about 349 hectares. A portion thereof was occupied by.
Azarcon and his companions, under a homestead application.
The conflict between the lessee and the homesteaders was
investigated by the Director of Lands and again by the
Secretary of Agriculture and natural Resources.
Before the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint
in the CFI of Nueva Ecija, alleging that he had acquired a big
parcel of land, 349 hectares in area, by lease from the
Bureau of Lands (lease application No. V-79) and that while
he was in possession thereof, defendants occupied a portion.
He prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the six
hectares occupied by them and pay damages.

Sycip, on the other hand filed a motion o dismiss the case on

the ground that he stopped paying because the townhouse
sold to him was of defective construction; that in fact a case
for unsound real estate business practice is pending in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Azarcon answered the complaint alleging that he is in actual

possession of a portion of 24 hectares since 1941 by virtue of
a homestead application. He contends that the lease
application of Euseboo was subsequent to his homestead
application. He had occupied the land since 1941 with
interruption during the war and again in 1950 up to the time
of the filing of the action. He prayed that the action be
dismissed.

MTC granted the dismissal on the ground that it had no

jurisdiction and that the case was cognizable by the HLURB.
RTC affirmed. CA reversed.
ISSUE: W/N MTC had jurisdiction?
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The trial court found for Eusebio. Pending the CA case, a writ
of execution was issued. In spite of the receipt by the Aznar
of the notice of the writ of execution of which commanded
defendants "to forthwith remove from said premises and that
plaintiff have restitution of the same," defendants-appellants
nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then
pending harvest.

survived by her husband and their children. On August 8,

1961, Mangulon and his daughter, Paula sold a portion of
9,230 square meters of their homestead to private
respondent, Petra Sandoval in consideration of the sum of
P2,340.00. Petitioners title to the land was borrowed by
private respondent so that the latter could have the sale
annotated thereon.
She was given the title so that the sale could be annotated.
Thereafter, Calagan offered to repurchase the land but
Sandoval didn't agreed. She continuously refused and was
only willing to comply if Calagan would reimburse the value
of the house constructed on the parcel of land. This
prompted petitioners to file an action for reconveyance, on
which the trial court ruled in their favor, given that they pay
for the value of the house built on good faith by Sandoval.

ISSUE: w/n Aznar acted in bad faith

HELD:
While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the
defendant-appellant to move out from the premises, it did
not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing
thereon. Under the law a person who is in possession and who
is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products
thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the
net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil
Code.

CFI ordered the Heirs of Calagan to pay Sandoval the the

value of the house constructed in good faith. The heirs
argue that only necessary expenses are subject to
reimbursement. House constructed on a coconut land is not
necessary. It is only useful.

ART. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should
be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a
right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part
of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of the
possession.

ISSUE: w/n as the heirs must reimburse Sandoval for the

house
HELD:
Under Article 1616, the vendor a retro cannot avail himself of
the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee the
price of the sale, the expenses of the contract and other
legitimate payments, and the necessary and useful expenses
made on the thing sold.

As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the

defendants-appellants from gathering the pending fruits,
which fruits were the result of their possession and
cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the defendantsappellants committed an act which is clear violation of the
courts' order. Besides, the defendants-appellants had
presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion
to set aside the said order of execution, and this motion to
stay execution was granted. Defendants furthermore
presented a bond in accordance with the order of the court
and had it approved by the CFI. It was perhaps in expectation
of this resolution of the court setting aside the order of
execution that defendants-appellants may have felt justified
in entering the land and harvesting the fruits existing
thereon.

[There can be no question but that the house which private

respondent constructed is a useful expense, defined as that which
increases the value or augments the income of the property, as
contrasted to a necessary expense which is incurred for the
preservation of the thing.]

However, Article 1616 should be read with Article 456 and

457.
Applying Article 547, the homesteader desiring to repurchase
should be given the option to require the vendee a retro to
remove the useful improvements on the land subject of the
sale a retro, which option is not granted the vendor a retro
under Article 1616. Under the latter Article, the vendor a
retro must pay for the useful improvements introduced by
the vendee a retro, otherwise, the latter may retain
possession of the property until reimbursement is made.

Again the order of the court setting aside its order to stay
execution was issued in the belief that the defendantsappellants had not presented before the CFI of Nueva Ecija
and which said court actually approved). Their act in
harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but
was not expressly prohibited by the court's order, and was
even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the
execution.

To allow a vendee a retro of a homestead, however, the right

of retention until payment of useful expenses is made by the
redemptioner would be to render nugatory the right of
repurchase granted by law to a homesteader because all a
vendee a retro can do to prevent repurchase is to build
something on the homestead beyond the capacity to pay of
the homesteader who seeks to repurchase. Such a situation
should not be allowed to pass.

10. CALAGAN V. CFI OF DAVAO

There can be no question but that the HOUSE which
private respondent constructed is a useful expense,
defined as that which increases the value or augments
the income of the property, as contrasted to a necessary
expense which is incurred for the preservation of the
thing.

It is obvious that the heirs of Calagan are not exercising the

option to refund the amount of the expenses incurred by
private respondent for the house that the latter built as
provided for in Article 546.

FACTS:
Calagan and his wife Takura was granted a homestead
application over a parcel of land. Takura died and was
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[Note that Sandoval, as the vendee a retro, may remove her

house since this can be done without damage to the principal
thing - land]

The contention of Bulahanan re common law principle that

the one who has made the happening of fraud possible
through misplaced confidence must suffer the consequence
cannot be applied since there is an express provision covering
the case.

In other words, since the heirs didn't exercise the option to

refund the amount of the expenses incurred by Sandoval for
the house he built, and not to pay the increase in value
acquired by the land by reason of such expenses Sandoval
may remove her house since this can be done without
damage. The heirs should not, as opined by the trial Court,
be made to refund the value of that house to Sandoval.

12. AZNAR v. YAPDIANGCO

True owner has a better right than a buyer in good faith
to possession of a stolen good.

11. CRUZ v. PAHATI

FACTS
Teodoro Santos advertised the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500
in a newspaper. On L. De Dios went to the house of Teodoro
and talked to his son Ireneo Santos and said that his uncle
Vicente Marella is interested in buying the said car.

The common law principle that the one who has made the
happening of fraud possible through misplaced confidence
must suffer the consequence cannot be applied since
there is an express provision covering the case.

The next day, Ireneo went to the house of Marella and they
agreed to the price of P14,700 on the understanding that it
will be paid after the car has been registered in the latters
name.

Article 559, a statutory provision, prevails over a common

law principle.
FACTS
Jesusito Belizo is a second hand car dealer who sold an
automobile (not indicated what type) to plaintiff Jose Cruz.
After a year, Belizo offered to sell the sell the same car to a
certain buyer. Plaintiff agreed and since the certificate of
registration was missing, Cruz made a letter addressed to the
Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for the issuance
of a new certificate.

A deed of sale was executed and the registration was

changed to the name of Marella. Ireneo went to Marella to
get the payment and deliver the car who informed him that
he is P2,000 short of the money and that they need to go to
his sister to get it. Ireneo, together with De Dios and an
unidentified man went to a house.

Cruz gave the letter to Belizo to be submitted to the said

office and he gave the car as well on the latters pretext that
he was going to show it to a prospective buyer. The letter
was falsified, making it appear that a deed of sale was
executed in favor of Belizo, who then got a certificate of
registration on his name.

Once inside, De Dios asked Ireneo to wait in the sale. After

waiting in vain, he went down and discovered that the car
was gone.
Marella was able to sell the car to plaintiff-appellant Jose
Aznar and while attending to registration, the car was seized
by Phil. Constabulary due to the report of the incident.

Belizo was able to sell the car to respondent Bulahan who

later sold it to Pahati, but the sale was cancelled so the car
went back to Bulahan.

ISSUE: Between the two parties, who has the better right?
HELD: Teodoro Santos has the better right. Marella did not
have any title to the property under litigation because the
same was never delivered to him. He may have the contract
but he never acquired valid title. Although the keys to the car
may have been given to the unidentified companion, it may
be done only because that companion took them to the place
where the sister of Marella was supposed to live. The car was
evidently stolen and that the buyer did not acquire any valid
title thereto.

ISSUE: Between two innocent and parties in good faith, who

has a better right over the property?
HELD
Cruz, the original owner has the better right for it cannot
be disputed that plaintiff had been illegally deprived through
ingenious schemes by Belizo and that Art 559 and 1505 are
applicable in this situation.

12. AZNAR VS. YAPDIANGCO (2nd digest)

1.
Art 559 clearly indicates that the one who has lost
any movable or has been lawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same and the
only defense is if the other party has acquired it in good faith
and at a public sale.
2.
Art 1505 clearly says that in cases where a sale is
made not by owner and was made without authority, the
buyer acquires no better right than that of the seller unless
the owner is estopped.

A person unlawfully deprived of his possession of his

personal property has a better right to the possession
thereof as against a buyer in GF and for value from a
seller who had no title thereto (stolen).
FACTS:
Teodoro Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the
sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. A certain L. De Dios, claiming to
be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the Santos residence
to answer the ad. However, Teodoro was out during this call
and only the latters son, Irineo received and talked with De
Dios. The latter told the young Santos that he had come in

Moreover, if Bulahan had been more diligent, he could have

seen that the letter had an erased portion which couldve
aroused his suspicion and made him conscious on making
inquiries which he failed to do.
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behalf of his uncle, Marella, who was interested to buy the

advertised car.

sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing

the price paid therefor. Under Article 559, the rule is to the
effect that if the owner has lost the thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not
only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from the third
person who may have acquired it in good faith from such
finder, thief or robber.

Teodoro instructed his son Irineo to see Marella the following

day at a given address in Manila. At the meeting, Marella
agreed to buy the car for P14,700.00 on the understanding
that the price would be paid only after the car had been
registered in his name. A deed of sale for the car was
executed in Marellas favor. The parties to the contract
thereafter proceeded to the Motor Vehicles Office in QC
where the registration of the car in Marellas name was
effected. Up to that stage of the transaction, the purchase
price had not been paid.

Article 1506 provides: Where the seller of goods has a

voidable title thereto, but his title has not been voided at the
time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods,
provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without
notice of the sellers defect of title. Under the provision, it
is essential that the seller should have a voidable title at
least. It is very clearly inapplicable where the seller had no
title at all.

Teodoro gave the papers to his son and instructed him not to
part with them until Marella shall have given the full payment
for the car. Irineo then went to the house of De Dios to
demand payment. Marella said that the amount he had on
hand then was short by some P2,000.00 and begged off to be
allowed to secure the shortage from a sister supposedly living
somewhere in Manila also.

There is no adequate evidence on record as to whether Irineo

Santos voluntarily delivered the key to the car to the
unidentified person who went with him and L. De Dios to the
place in Azcarraga where a sister of Marella allegedly lived.
But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the delivery
contemplated by Article 712 of the Civil Code. For then, it
would be indisputable that he turned it over to the
unidentified companion only so that he may drive Irineo
Santos and De Dios to the said place in Azcarraga and not vest
the title to the said vehicle to him as agent of Vicente
Marella. Article 712 above contemplates that the act be
coupled with the intent of delivering the thing.

Thereafter, he ordered De Dios to go to the said sister and

suggested that Irineo to go with him. At the same time, he
requested for the registration papers and the deed of sale
from Ireneo on the pretext that he would like to show them
to his lawyers. Trusting the good faith of Marella, Ireneo
handed over the same to the latter and thereupon, in the
company of De Dios and another unidentified person,
proceeded to the alleged house of Marellas sister. At a place
in Azcarraga, Irineo and De Dios alighted from the car and
entered a house, while their unidentified companion
remained in the car. Once inside, De Dios asked Irineo to wait
at the sala while he went inside a room. That was the last
that Ireneo saw of him. For, after a considerable length of
time waiting in vain for De Dios to return, Ireneo went down
to discover the car was gone. When he inquired about the
sister, he was told that no such name lived or was even
known therein.

Article 559 establishes two exceptions to the general rule of

irrevindicability to wit: when the owner (1) has lost the thing,
or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases,
the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner,
who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except
when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
13. DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS/ GUEVARA (2nd
digest)
(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of
any movable may recover the same from the possessor except
when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it and it has
been obtained by the latter in good faith at a public sale
wherein the former needs to reimburse the latter of the price
paid.

Ireneo rushed back to De Dios house only to find closed and

empty. He reported the matter to his father who promptly
advised the police authorities. That very same day, Marella
was able to sell the car to Aznar, for P15,000.00. Aznar
acquired the said car from Marella in good faith, for a
valuable consideration and without notice of the defect
appertaining to the vendors title. While the car was thus in
the possession of Aznar and while he was attending to its
registration in his name, agents of the Philippine
Constabulary seized and confiscated the same in consequence
of the report to them by Teodoro that the said car was
unlawfully taken from him.

:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the

possession at a public sale.
FACTS:
Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold
mounting, 2.05 diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills. Sometime in
February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house. Luckily,
on October 1953 (barely a year after), she found it at a
restaurant, La Bulakena, on the finger of the restaurant
owner, Consuelo De Garcia.

ISSUE: Who has a better right to the possession of the

disputed automobile?
HELD: Teodoro (owner)
Article 559 of the New Civil Code which provides: The
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public

Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained

to her how she had lost it. When the ring was handed to her
by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time around,
she brought her husband and Rebullida, the person whom she
bought the ring from, to verify the identity of the ring.
Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens
and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it was the
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very ring that he had sold to the Guevaras. After that,

Guevara sent a written request for the ring, but De Garcia did
not deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of
seizure, De Garica likewise refused to deliver the ring.

4. Weight of the diamonds:

5. substituted diamond = 2.57 cts.
6. lost diamond (guevaras) = 2.05 cts
7. Ruling of the CA = return the ring or pay P1,000 and
costs, P1,000 (attys fees) & P1,000 as exemplary
damages

According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare

who got it from another Miss who in turn got it from the
owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however, was
nowhere to be found. She boarded three months at the first
buyers house but left a week after her landlady bought the
ring. The first buyer did not even know Aling Petrings last
name nor her forwarding address.

14. DIZON V. SUNTAY

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not
estopped from recovering possession. Where the owner
delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but
the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is
not stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value.

She says her possession is equivalent to title.

FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued
at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison entered into a transaction
wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita
received the ring and issued a receipt. After some time,
Lourdes made demands for the return of the ring but the
latter refused to comply. When Lourdes insisted on the
return, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the
receipt of the pledge and she found out that 3 days after the
ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison,
the niece of Claritas husband in connivance with Clarita with
the pawnshop of Dominador Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes then
filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the
return of the ring pledged but refused to return the ring thus
the case filed by Lourdes.

[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at

the time it was purchased and at the time it was found, but
this was because De Guevara substituted the diamondsolitaire with a heavier stone.]
The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA
reversed in favor of the owner, Guevara. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE: Who has a better right?
RULING: Guevara (owner)
Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article
establishes two exceptions to the general rule of
irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2)
has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the
possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who
may recover it without paying any indemnity. THE ONLY
EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a
public sale.

The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have

possession of the ring during the pendency of the case. The
CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on
appeal. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to
possession of the ring

There is no merit in the contention that De Garcias

possession is in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to
defeat the owners claim. Possession in good faith does not
really amount to title for the reason that there is a period for
acquisitive prescription for movable through uninterrupted
possession of 4 years.

HELD: NO
It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the
controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states that
the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing
the price paid therefor.

The title of the possessor in good faith is not that of

ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to
serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. This, one who
has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
Besides, De Garcias title, if any, was weak. Her source,
Aling Petring, was dubious. She did not make a comment
when Rebullida examined the ring nor did she answer
Guevaras letter asserting ownership of it. Her testimony was
weak!

Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a

right to recover it from the current possessor. Dizon is
engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence
would require him to inquire whether or not an individual
who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The
principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was
no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of
resisting opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame
and should be the last to complain if the right of the true
owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other facts [in case he asks]:

1. Subject matter = 1 diamond ring 18 cts. white gold
mounting, with 1 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and 4
brills 0.10 cts. total weight.
2. Mr. Rebullidas experience in the jewelry business = 30
years
3. Mrs. Garcia = owner of La Bulakea restaurant

Other issues raised:

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Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and

natural justice.
For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or
omission by the party who is sought to be bound.
A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to
the prejudice of another.

16. LEDESMA v CA
FACTS:
Citiwide sold 2 cars to a certain Jojo Consunji evidenced by 2
invoices. Upon delivery of the cars, Jojo paid with a
Managers Check (PhP101,000.00). When Citiwide deposited
the check, it was dishonored for being tampered. Amount was
changed from 101.00 to 101,000.00.

Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

Interpretation of the unlawfully deprived in Art. 559 of the
CC. It is understood to include all cases where there has been
no valid transmission of ownership. If our legislature intended
interpretation to be that of the French Code, it certainly
would have adopted and used a narrower term than the broad
language of Art. 559 (formerly 464) and the accepted
meaning in accordance with our jurisprudence.

Citiwide reported the crime to the Phil. Constabulary where

he found that Consunji was actually Armando Suarez, a
professional criminal.
One car was found abandoned, while the other was
discovered to be in the possession of Jaime Ledesma, who
claims to have purchased the car in good faith from the
registered owner, evidenced by the LTO Registration.

15. EDCA PUBLISHING v SANTOS

RTC ordered the car to remain in the possession of Ledesma.

Possession of movable property acquired in GF is

equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a
receipt.

CA overruled RTC, stating that Citiwide was unlawfully

deprived of property through false pretenses amounting to
fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of
the property?

FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose
Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which was agreed to
be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently
delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid
with a personal check.

HELD: No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of

sale. Failure to pay by Suarez through the subsequent
dishonor of the check did not render the contract of sale
void. Ownership was already transferred by the delivery of
the cars to Suarez.

Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who
asked for verification, and was then showed the invoice for
the books.

17. CHUA KAI V. KAPUNAN, 104 PHIL 110

Possession of chattels in GF is
ordered by the proper court to
owner who was unlawfully
presumptive owner is entitled
holding of the thing.

EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of

books even before his check cleared. Upon investigation,
EDCA found that he wasnt the person he claimed to be (Dean
in DLSU). EDCA had the police capture Cruz, as well as seize
the books from Santos. Santos demanded the return of the
books. RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.

equivalent to title until

restore the thing to the
deprived thereof. The
to the enjoyment and

FACTS:
Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware 700 galvanized
iron sheets and round iron bars. He issued as payment a check
drawn against Security Bank. Soto then sold the sheets, some
of them to Chua Hai. Meanwhile, the check issued for
payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. This
prompted the hardware store to file a case of estafa against
Soto and prayed for the return of the sheets. This was
opposed by Chua on the part of the sheets he purchased.
Notwithstanding this opposition, the court ordered for its
return.

ISSUE: Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived

of the property?
HELD: No.
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the
identity of the seller. When she was showed the invoice, she
reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.
With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully
deprived of the property by mere failure of consideration.
There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was
even substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of
payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to
unlawful taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz,
ownership of the books already transferred to him.

ISSUE: W/N Chua has the right to retain possession?

HELD: Yes.
To deprive Chua, who was in good faith, of the possession of
the sheets, may it be temporarily or permanently, is in
violation of the rule laid down in Article 559. Possession of
chattels in good faith is equivalent to title, until ordered by
the proper court to restore the thing to the owner who was
illegally derpived thereof. Until such decree is issued, the
possessor as presumptive owner is entitled to the enjoyment
and holding of the thing. Further, the hardware store or Ong
was not unlawfully deprived of the sheets. There was a

Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the

contract of sale void does not amount to unlawful
deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract
of sale so the proper remedy is specific performance)

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perfected contract of sale between it and Soto. There was

delivery, by virtue of which, Soto was able to acquire title
over the sheets and bars. The failure of the buyer to pay the
purchase price doesn't automatically revest ownership to the
seller until the contract of sale has been first rescinded or
resolved. Hence, until the contract between Soto and Ong has
been set aside by the competent court, the validity of Chuas
possession cannot be disputed and his right to possession
thereof should be respected.

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