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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY.

AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
REMEMBER:

those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the


petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If at all, the
petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property
was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they
could have presented their claims in the intestate
proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if
none was instituted.

The transfer of the right to dispose is the determining factor in


ascertaining whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
GUIDE TO ANALYZING VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY (=VOID) OF
DONATIONS:

The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement


between the parties and that respondents Jane did not even
expect to be compensated.

Gratuitous/SIMPLE OR ONEROUS?

2. JUTIC v CA
A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to
prove donation; and most certainly not the form required by
law in donations. (Same as previous case)

MORTIS CAUSE OR INTER VIVOS?

PERFECTED OR NOT

FACTS:
The properties of Arsenio Seville, who had no wife or children,
here are under dispute which includes 2 parcels of agricultural
land. Petitioners herein are heirs of Melquiades Seville who
was one of the siblings of the deceased Arsenio Seville.
Respondents are other heirs claiming rightful ownership over
the properties. The petitioners claim that the 2 parcels of land
with improvements thereon was donated to their father in an
affidavit executed by Arsenio Seville to Melquindes Seville. It
stated that the latter was the only one to who the former
intended (note: this is only a manifest intention or desire
similar to the previous case- the last part of the document says
That I make this affidavit to amek manifest my intention and
desire as to the way the above mentioned property...) to
inherit all his properties.

(notice of acceptance)

CAPACITY of Parties:
If both capacitated MOVABLE OR IMMOVABLE property?
PROPER FORM followed? INOFFICIOUS or not?

1. ALDABA v CA
A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to
prove donation; and most certainly not the form required by
law in donations.

ISSUES: W/N there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to


Melquiades Seville?
RULING: NO.
A close reading of the letter reveals that it is not a donation
inters vivos or motis causa but a mere declaration of an
intention and a desire. The fact that the property was
mortgage by Arsenio with the knowledge of the Melquiades
shows that ownership has not yet transferred. Also when
Arsenio died, payments to the loan for which the property was
mortgaged stopped and was not continued by the petitioners.
It was even foreclosed but was later on redeemed by one of
Arsenios brothers, Zoilo, who is also one of the respondents.

FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this
case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father
and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took
care of her until her death. Belen had presumptive heirs her
surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar
Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the
death of Belen, the respondents asked the petitioners to leave
the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted an
ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really
intended to donate the property to them as evidence by the
note written by Belen to them which reads, Huag kayong
umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan
ay sa inyo. They also argue that the property was for
compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000.
The respondents contend that the letter no way proves a
donation.

Petitioners has a rightful claim over the property based on the


fact that they are heirs of Arsenio but not because of the
alleged affidavit executed in favour of Melquidas.
Also it is worth noting that the signed affidavit is a forgery
because Arsenio Sevile was illiterate during his lifetime. He
could not write his name and only affixed his thumbmak in the
REM mentioned earlier.

ISSUE: W/N there was a disposition of property by Belen in


favour of the petitioners?

3. HOWARD v. PADILLA

RULING: NO
For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient
conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of
a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at
most, as indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial
document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during

Donations must conform with the formalities set by law.


FACTS: Marie Howard is the widow of the donor. The donated
propert was conjugal in nature. The CA ruled that the donation
was inter vivos, not mortis causa. As such it is valid and
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
irrevocable. It is valid, however, only up to the extent of the
share of the donor in the property.

Thereafter, Auroras able secretary presented the Deed to the


Registrar for the purpose of canceling the original title and
obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three
donees.

ISSUE: Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?


HELD: The donation is mortis causa which takes effect upon
the death of the donor. Therefore, the donation not having
conformed with the formalities of the law, the same is void.

A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached


the donees; Aurora retained the document and maintained
possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.

4. PUIG v. PENAFLORIDA
The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land
to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Simultaneously with
alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation.
She asserted that the donation took the nature of mortis causa
and was therefore revocable anytime. She further averred that
the same failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore
was nullity.

The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the


property during her lifetime in the deed does not indicate
that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but that the
donor merely reserves power to destroy the donation at any
time.
FACTS:
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo,
without forced heirs, leaving certain properties in the City and
province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews
and nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino
Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston Magbanua.
Besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial
deeds of donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTIS CAUSA,
was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her niece,
Estela Magbanua. The deceased executed another deed of
donation, also entitled "ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS
CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela Magbanua
Peaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land

Auroras grandchildren found their grandmas reversal vexing.


They insisted that the Deed was one intervivos and therefore
irrevocable. The RTC adjudicated and found for the
grandchildren.
Aurora took the case to the CA but, alas, kicked the bucket
during proceedings.
The Spouses Sicad who were in possession of the property
took Auroras her place in the litigation. Sadly, the CA
reaffirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: w/n the Donation took the nature of one Intervivos

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al.,


insist that the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose
of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December
28, 1949 indicates that title had passed to the donee in her
lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be
superfluous.

HELD: No. The donation is mortis causa.


The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never
intended the donation to take effect within her lifetime. First,
she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her
death. Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale of the
property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to
possess the property as well as the fruits and authorized such
enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained the
certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the
Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of ownership.

ISSUE: Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?


HELD: The Court in its decision took to account not only the
foregoing circumstance but also the fact that the deceased
expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one
of donation mortis causa, and further forbade the registration
of the deed until after her death.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to


be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the
parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon
its execution.

The power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy


the donation at any time, and that it meant that the transfer
is not binding on the grantor until her death made it
impossible to channel the property elsewhere.

The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it


stipulated that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated
properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal
of the donor, during her lifetime; and that, without the
knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties
could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale,
mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible.

5. SICAD V. CA
The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its
language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by
the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds


form the donee that right to dispose of the donated property
during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.

FACTS:
Capiz, Dec 1979:
Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of her
heart, drew up a Deed in favor of her darling grandkids
Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed
bore the title Deed of Donation Intervivos.

Because of Auroras actions, nothing was transferred by the


deed of donation in question to her grandchildren. They did
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
not get possession of the property donated. They did not
acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of
dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not
acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue
to them only after ten years from Auroras death. Moreover,
they never saw what the certificate of title looked like.

The deed of donation makes it clear that all rents, proceeds,


fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive
benefit and disposal of the donor, Margartia David, during her
lifetime and that, without the knowledge consent of the
donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any
way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way
possible, thus making the donees just as paper owners of the
properties.

These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the


donation in question was a donation mortis causa, envisioning
a transfer of ownership only after the donor knocks on
Heavens door.

The court then concluded that the donation in question is a


donation mortis causa, because the combined effect of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of
donation and of the above-quoted clauses thereof could not
have taken effect before the death of Margarita David.
According to the terms of the deed, the most essential
elements of ownership the right to dispose of the donated
properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits,
possession remained with Margarita David during her
lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita
David's death.

6. DAVID V SISON
When the donor maintains the essential rights of ownership
over the property during his lifetime, the donation is mortis
causa.
FACTS:
Manila, 1943:
The Administrator of deceased Ms. David was ordered by the
court to pay the lawyer of deceased the amount of P18,000 for
legal services rendered. The lawyer, on the other hand,
wanted about P81,000. (chaching!!!) which was equivalent to
5% of the inventoried estate. Administrator thought that too
high and said hed be happy to pay P3,000.

While the donation in question is a donation mortis causa, the


court declined to rule that the donated properties should be
included in the inventory of the estate and should follow the
same proceedings as if they were not donated at all.
The court then awarded the lawyer P10,000 instead of the
P81,000 he craved.

Both parties based their claims on the central issue of the


donation by Ms. David. If the donation was mortis causa, then
the donation should be inventoried with the estate and
therefore the lawyer can get his lofty demand. Should the
donation have been intervivos, then the donation wouldnt be
inventoried and therefore the administrator can pay the lower
sum contended.

7. MAGLASANG V. HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, 383


SCRA 6
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.

The lower court analyzed a few paragraphs of the deed (in


tagalog) and concluded that the deed partook of the nature
mortis causa.

FACTS:
On February 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of
her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of
Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." Four (4) other deeds
of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita
Cabatingan on January 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner
Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land;(b) Nicolas
Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land; and (c) Merly S.
Cabatingan, a portion of land.These deeds of donation contain
similar provisions, to wit:

"Na and naturang "donor," Margarita David y Puato,


alang-alang sa malaki niyang pagtigin, pagligap at
pagmamahal sa mga nabanguit na "donees" Narcisa de
la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, sa pamamagitan
nang kasulatang ito, malayang ibinigay at
ipinagkakaloob sa mga naturang Narcisa de la Fuente
at Priscila de la Fuente, at sa kanilang mga
tagapagmana, "albacea" at "Administradores", sa
habang panahon, ang kanyang mga titulo, interes at
participacion sa mag sumusunod na ari-arian na
pawang malines sa lahat nang mga pananagutan:
(Rec. on Appeal, pp. 209, 210.)

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of


the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby,
by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation,
unto the DONEE the above-described property, together
with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon,
to become effective upon the death of the DONOR;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further
force and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)

Datapwa't ang lahat nang mga tubo at pakinabangan


nang nagbibigay o "donor" na si Margarita David y
Puato hanggang siya ay hindi binabawian nang buhay
nang maykapal; at ang mga pinagbibigyan na si
Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente ay hindi
maaaring maipagbili, maisangal, a maipagpalit o sa
ano pa man paraan, kung walang kaalaman at
pahintulot nang naturang Margarita David y Puato.

On May 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.


Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents (Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan) filed an action for
Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations

ISSUE: w/n the Deed of Donation is Mortis Causa


HELD: Yes.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds
of donation executed. Heirs allege, inter alia, that petitioners,
fraudulently caused the donations and that the documents are
void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code
regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that
these are donations mortis causa.

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a


notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
(n)
8. BONSATO V. CA|UTEA, 95 Phil 481

RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not
following the requisite forms.

If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves


for himself during his lifetime the owners share of the
fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act
to be irrevocable, it is not a donation mortis causa, but
a conveyance inter vivos.

ISSUE: W/N the donation was mortis causa?


HELD: Mortis Causa.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;

FACTS:
Josefa Utea and other heirs of deceased Domingo Bonsato and
Andrea Nacario filed a complaint to annul the donations of
several parcels of land made by Domingo Bonsato in favor of
Juan and Felipe Bonsato. The donations were embodied in two
Notarial deeds which the Josefa Utea and the heirs allege
were obtained thru fraudulent inducement.

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by


the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
And

In the Notarial deeds, the donor reserved for himself a portion


of the fruits of the properties and expressed that after the
death of the donor, the aforesaid donation shall become
effective.
CFI ruled that the donation was inter vivos therefor valid. CA
ruled it was mortis causa therefor invalid for not following the
required formalities.
ISSUE: W/N the donation was inter vivos?

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should


survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis
causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary
rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase
"to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of
no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to
transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during
her lifetime.

HELD: Inter Vivos. If the donation conveys the ownership and


only reserves for himself during his lifetime the owners share
of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the
act to be irrevocable, it is not a donation mortis causa, but
a conveyance inter vivos.
The solemnities required for a donation inter vivos are those
prescribed by Art. 749 of the Civil Code. But only half of the
property conveyed shall be valid since the property is conjugal
and only Domingo made the conveyance without any consent
from Andrea.
Note: Many portions of the case are in Spanish.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with


the following requisites:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

9. ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ
All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed
together in case of conflicting statements in order to
determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name


and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on
the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence
of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of
Donation in favor of their children, Olimpia, Angel and Andrea
Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with
reservations on certain lots, to their children and daughters-inlaw and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate
the same to 3rd persons while the couple are still alive and
that they shall continue to administer the same until their
death. The donees manifested their acceptance in the same
deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed
of donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the siblings

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the


witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
each a portion of Lot 2377-A. When Severa died, Andrea
sued Angel to have the lots 2377-A and 2502 partitioned.
Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia, moved
to intervene claiming 1/3 portion of Lot 2502.

which was granted and she registered the donation and was
issued a new TCT in her name.
Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Ofelias TCT
which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of
possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint
decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and
void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.

The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa
because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass
to the donees during the donors lifetime but was transmitted
to the donees only upon the death of the donors. It,
however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since it was an
extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed to the SC,
Andrea contending that it is a donation inter vivos while
Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa.

ISSUES
(1) W/N the probate has jurisdiction to exclude
properties donated to Ursula
(2) W/N the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a
donation inter vivos

ISSUE: W/N the donation is a donation inter vivos or mortis


causa

RULING
(1) YES
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that
it was without prejudice to the final determination in
a separate action. It is well-settled that although a
probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties, it can determine whether or not the
properties should be included in the inventory to be
administered. Such determination is not conclusive
and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action.

RULING: Donation inter vivos


The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect
during the lifetime of the donors as provided in Art. 729. It
was stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by
the donors to the donees, the latter are donating
wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien
and debt. Likewise, it was accepted by the donees which is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa
are never accepted during the donors lifetime.
The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot
sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple is still alive implies
that the ownership already passed.

(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa it
has been held that dispositions in a deed of donation do
not depend on the title or term used in the deed of
donation. It is the body of the document which should be
considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to


themselves the administration, ownership and rights over the
properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean
that ownership will pass only after their death. This refers to
the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and what the
donors reserved to themselves by means of that clause was the
management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following


characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or
the transferor retains ownership over the property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the
transferee

10. REYES V. MOSQUEDA


The nature of the disposition made is the determinative
factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis
causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of


ownership was immediate and independent of the death of the
donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved
sufficient properties for himself to maintain him for life
confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership
immediately after execution of the deed of donation.

FACTS
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister
Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters, herein
petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed
Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the
administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a motion
to exclude some properties included alleging that these were
donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was
granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination
in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC
then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from enforcing the order.

11. GESTOPA V CA
Acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Donations mortis cause, being in the form of a will, are not
required to be accepted by the donee during the donors
lifetime.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was


also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter vivos in favor
of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the
donation. When she reached the age of majority, she had the
donation registered but found out that the certificate of title
was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title

FACTS
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of
land, they executed a donation mortis causa in favor of
respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to
amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
such properties. Years later, they executed another donation,
this time inter vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of
respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land
during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or
dispose the properties donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold
2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and
eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition
to quiet title, stating that she had already become the owner
of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners,
but CA reversed.

their rights to recover the possession and ownership over the


property since they immediately filed the action when the
municipality passed the resolution, reverting the ownership of
land to the donors. However, a sale being a consensual
contract, it can be perfected upon meeting of the minds, and
completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of
sale. Even when Trinidad was not the owner when the sale was
perfected, tradition through delivery is only important upon
the consummation stage. Such transfer of ownership through
actual or constructive delivery only happened when the lands
reverted back to petitioners. Art 1434 is applicable, stating
that seller's "title passes by operation if law to the buyer," and
therefore making the sale valid. The donated lots cannot be
considered outside the commerce of man, since nowhere in
the law states that properties owned by municipality would be
as such.

ISSUE: Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis


causa
RULING
It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the
difference between the two donations, and that they needed
to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a
different application to a donation mortis causa. Also, the
court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses
donated the parcels of land out of love and affection, a clear
indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the reservation of a
lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for
maintenance that shows the intention to part with their six
lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of
donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it
cannot be revoked, except for officiousness or ingratitude,
which the spouses failed to invoke.

13. LAGAZO V. CA I CABANLIT

Acceptance if the donation is indispensable. Its


absence (in an authentic form for immovables) make a
donation null and void.
Note: The donation, following the theory of
cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only
upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance
by the donee."

12. QUIJADA V CA

FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action seeking to recover from defendant a
parcel of land which the former claims to have acquired from
his grandmother by donation. Respondent on the other hand,
put up the defense that when the alleged donation was
executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of
Assignment (allegedly executed before the Deed of Donation
to Plaintiff) from a transferee (the former agent) of
petitioners grandmother. Defendant also claims that
petitioner failed to accept the donation whether in the same
deed of donation or in a separate instrument rendering the
donation null and void. Petitioner defends that the donation in
any case was onerous as he wsd the one who paid the lands
amortization.

When a person donates land to another on a condition. The


condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a
suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
FACTS
Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad Quijada.
Trinidad and her siblings executed a deed of donation of a
two-hectare lot in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon
(Agusan del Sur), exclusively for the purpose of constructing
the proposed provincial high school. However, possession
remained with Trinidad. She subsequently sold the two
hectares on two separate occasions to Regalado Mondejar,
who sold it to different persons. Eventually, the Municipality,
failing to construct the high school, reverted ownership to the
donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and
recovery of possession and ownership. RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the donation is simple or onerous.


RULING:
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality
(no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which
is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Article 733 of the Civil
Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.

ISSUE: Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive


condition or a resolutory condition
*Whether the sale was valid
RULING:
When the donation was accepted, the ownership was
transferred to the school, only subject to a condition that a
school must be constructed over the lot. Since ownership was
transferred, and failure to fulfill the condition reverts the
ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.

We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even


conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price
of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was
not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated:

(Not really a discussion in Property)


When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to Mondejar, she was
not the owner of the land. Petitioners also did not sleep on

That...the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives, by way


of donation unto said DONEE...the above described real
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
property, together with all the buildings and improvements
found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and
charges whatsoever;

myself that there is no one to whom I will deliver


this land except to him as he will be the one
responsible for me in the event that I will die and
also for all other things needed and necessary for
me...
I, DOMINGO MELAD, declare the truth that I
have delivered my residential lot to Felix Danguilan
because he will be the one to take care of
SHELTERING me or bury me when I die...

The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the


power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of
petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts
necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations.
As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the
Civil Code are applicable:

Respondent attacked the alleged donations on the ground that


that they were donations of real property and as such should
have been effected through a public instrument.

Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the


donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of
the donor and the donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public instrument,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must satisfy.

ISSUE: W/N the donation was valid


RULING:
It is our view, considering the language of the two
instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the
properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent
contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was
moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the
conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were
given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take
care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his
burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of
the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be
effected through a public instrument. The case at bar comes
squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De
Mesa, where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in
question was made for a valuable consideration,
since the donors made it conditional upon the donees'
bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the
death and burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a
condition and obligation. Therefore, in order to
determine whether or not said donation is valid and
effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that,
as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law
requires and is valid and effective, although not
recorded in a public instrument.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation


and in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.
The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319,
Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee."
14. DANGUILAN V. IAC I MELAD
An onerous donations is not covered by Article 749. There
is no need for a public instrument. A private document is
enough to make an onerous donation valid.

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for
recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed
she had purchased from Domingo Melad, the original owner,
and were now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant. In
his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation and averred
that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in
open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired
them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943 by donation.

The private respondent argues that as there was no


equivalence between the value of the lands donated and the
services for which they were being exchanged, the two
transactions should be considered pure or gratuitous donations
of real rights, hence, they should have been effected through
a public instrument and not mere private writings. However,
no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that
the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.

For his part, the Petitioner testified that he was the husband
of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and his wife Juana
Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had
no children of their own. He and his wife lived with the couple
in their house on the residential lot and helped Domingo with
the cultivation of the farm. Domingo Melad signed in a private
instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and in
another private instrument in which he also gave him the
residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would
take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death.
I, DOMINGO MELAD do hereby declare in
this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix Danguilan,
my agricultural land...that I hereby declare and bind

As to the claim of Respondent that there was a deed of sale,


assuming that the sale was valid, there was no trasnfer of
ownership because the land was never delivered to
Respondent. It is true that the same article declares that the
execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery
of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order
that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of
tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the
sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not
enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and
the right of possession. There is no dispute that it is the
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 15th week Imperial Sia Plazo Noel De Los Santos Antonio Cimagala Bedural | 2D 2012|
petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual
possession of the litigated properties.
15. REPUBLIC v. GUZMAN

acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the


property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell
the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to
show that he indeed accept the donation.

Three essential elements of a donation:


1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor
2. Increase in the patrimony of the donee
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi
It is also required that the donation be made in a public
document and that its acceptance be made in the same
deed of donation or in a separate public document, which
has to be recorded as well.

However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the


repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid
repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her
share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate,
dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By
virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in
their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the
concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force
and effect. Helen still owns of the property.

FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son
of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and
Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died
leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of
several parcels of land in Bulacan.

16. CAGAOAN V. CAGAOAN


An ordinary donee of a land who causes the donation to be
recorded in the Mortgage Law Register in bad faith or with
notice of the rights of an adverse claimant requires no
additional rights against such claimant through the
inscription in the registry.

In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial


Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to
themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a
year after.

Remember: 1544 applies


1. First registrant in GF
2. First possessor in GF

In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning,


transferring and conveying her share of the properties to
David. But since it was not registered, she executed another
Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.

FACTS:
Eugenio and Felix Cagaoan are sons of Gregorio Cagaoan. In
1915, Gregorio executed a deed of gift of 4 parcels of land in
Pangasinan in favor of Felix (without delivery of actual
possession) and in 1918 in favor of Eugenio (who immediately
took possession) over a parcel of land, which is the same as
parcel no. 4 in the deed of gift in favor of Felix.

In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with


documents showing that Davids ownership of of the estate
was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only
allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The
only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property
are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a naturalborn citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it
contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were
really donations inter vivos.

Immediately, Eugenio took possession of the land donated, but


failed to have the donation recorded with the RD. However,
Felixs deed was registered in 1919 and took possession of
Parcel Nos. 1, 2 and 3 since 1915. He has never had possession
of Parcel No. 4.

Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that


of Davids interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA
affirmed.

After Eugenio had taken possession, Felix had caused his title
to be recorded in the Mortgage Law Register, having full notice
of the donation made to Eugenio.

ISSUE: W/N there was a donation inter vivos


HELD: NO.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of
the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the
(1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2)
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helens (3) intention to perform an act of liberality
in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2
Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son
certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a
waiver and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It
is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her
rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, not a
donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.

Eugenio instituted an action to declare him the owner of the


parcel of land donated to him and to set aside the donation in
favor of Felix on the ground of fraud. RTC ruled in favor of
Felix ordered Eugenio to surrender possession of the land to
him.
ISSUE: Who owns the parcel of land in dispute?
HELD: EUGENIO.
It clearly appears the Felix had full notice of the Eugenios
claim to the land before he had his deed of gift recorded with
the RD. Thus, he may not be considered a third person within
the meaning of Art. 34 of the Mortgage Law, and his position
was in no wise improved by the inscription of his document.
Eugenio, having first taken possession in good faith, must
therefore be considered to have a better right to the land in
question

Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper


form and registration to make the donation valid is lacking.
The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his
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