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PROPERTY

BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ


LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
STANDARD OIL vs. JARANILLO
(immovable Beron)
Petitioners seek for the registration of the chattel mortgage over a parcel of land together with the
building on it. The parcel of land and building were leased by de la rosa who later on conveyed
these properties by mortgage to petitioner.
Petitioners went to respondent to register the mortgage but such was denied on the ground that
the properties are real and therefore in violation chattel mortgage law which requires personal
property.
SC : Register of Deeds has a ministerial duty to register instrument upon payment of proper fees.
There is no provision in law which confers judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature
of any document. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, it merely acts as notice.
Property may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. Parties to a contract
may, by agreement, treat as personal real properties.
If the mortgaged property is real, chattel mortgage is deemed ineffective as to third parties.
RICARDO PRESBITERO vs, FERNANDEZ
(Immovable Calinisan)
Facts:
1) ESPERIDION Presbitero failed to furnish Nava the value of the properties under litigation.
2) Presbitero was ordered by the lower court to pay Nava to settle his debts.
3) Nava's counsel still tried to settle this case with Presbitero, out of court. But to no avail.
4) Thereafter, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the sugar quotas allotted to the plantation
and adhered to the Ma-ao Mill District and registered in the name of Presbitero as the original
plantation owner.
5) The sheriff was not able to present for registration thererof to the Registry of Deeds.
6) The court then ordered Presbitero to segregate the portion of Lot 608 pertaining to Nava from
the mass of properties belonging to the defendant within a period to expire on August 1960.
7) Bottomline, Presbitero did not meet his obligations, and the auction sale was scheduled.
8) Presbitero died after.
9) RICARDO Presbitero, the estate administrator, then petitioned that the sheriff desist in holding
the auction sale on the ground that the levy on the sugar quotas was invalid because the notice
thereof was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Issue: W/N the sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties.
Held:
1) They are real properties.
2) Legal bases:
a) The Sugar Limitation Law
xxx attaching to the land xxx (p 631)
b) RA 1825
xxx to be an improvement attaching to the land xxx (p 631)
c) EO # 873
"plantation" xxx to which is attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar.
3) Under the express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are accessories to the land,
and cannot have independent existence away from a plantation.
4) Since the levy is invalid for non-compliance with law, xxx the levy amount to no levy at all.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
BISCERRA v TENEZA
(immovable - Fernandez)
Facts:
-A house allegedly owned by the Bicerras was forcibly demolished by the Tenezas who claim
ownership of the same.
-The materials, after the house was dismantled, were brought to the custody of the Barrio
Lieutenant.
-Bicerras filed an action before the CFI of Abra praying that they be declared owners of the house
and that damages be awarded to them. CFI dismissed on the ground that jurisdiction belongs to
the Justice of the Peace courts.
Issue:
Does the action involve title to real property which makes it cognizable by the CFI?
Or does jurisdiction belong to the Justice of the Peace courts as there is no real property
involved?
Held:
Jurisdiction is within the Justice of the Peace Courts as there is no real property litigated. A house
is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. But
once a house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such and its character of being immovable
likewise ceases.
BERKENKOTTER VS. CU UNJIENG E HIJOS (immovable - Delgado)
Facts: Appellant Berkenkotter appeals the judgement to CFI of Manila. Mabalacat Sugar
Company obtained a loan from Cu Unjieng e Hijos. The loan was then secured by a first
mortgage constituted on two parcels of land with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill,
steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part the necessary
complement of said sugar-cane mill. Shortly after obtaining a loan, Mabalacat decided to increase
its capacity by buying additional machinery and equipment. To carry out this plan, the president of
Mabalacat, Mr. Green, proposed to Mr. Berkenkotter to advance the necessary amount for the
purchase of the effects with the promise that it would be reimbursed after Mabalacat obtains
another loan to from Cu Unjieng. Mr. Green furnished the amount adding to its existing credit in
Mabalacat amounting to 47 thousand (unpaid salary and loan). Machinery and equipment were
bought. Mabalacat obtained another 75,000 Php loan from Cu Unjieng and offered the machinery
and equipment as added security.
Appelllant contends that installation of machinery and equipment claimed by him was not
permanent in character aas much as Mr. Green in proposing to him to advance money said that
when their new loan to Cu Unjieng ends in futility, the machinery and equipment will be security.
Thus Mr. Green binds himself not to mortgage it or encumber to anyone until he is reimbursed.
Issue: W/N lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment as
improvement incorporated with the sugar central are subject to the deed of mortgage executed in
favor of Cu Unjieng.
Held: Yes. It is a well established rule that the mortgage on real properties includes the
improvements of the same. The Civil Code gives the character of real propertyto machinery,
liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use
in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly
adaptedto meet the requirements of such trade and industry.
Installation or machinery and equipment converted them into real property by reason of their
purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
because, as essential and principal elements of sugar central, without them sugar central would
be unable to function or carry the industrial purpose for which it is established.
Leung Yee vs. F.L. String Machinery Co. and William
(del Socorro)
Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo
(immovable - Legaspi)
Facts
Davao Sawmill operated a sawmill on a land belonging to another person.
On the land, the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it.
The machines were placed and mounted on foundations of cement.
The contract of lease between Davao Sawmill and the owner of the property provides that
"on the expiration of the period agreed upon...all the improvements and buildings
erected by the (lessee) shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the (lessor)...
Provided... that the machineries and accessories are not included in the
improvements which will pass to the (lessor)
There was another action wherein Davao Light&Power Co. was the plaintiff and Davao Sawill
the defendant. Davao Light & Power Co. won thus a writ of execution was issued and the
machineries in the sawmill were levied upon.
contentions
Davao sawmill: real property consists of "constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil" (art.
334 par. 1)
Castillo and Davao Light&Power: real property consists of machinery ...intended by the
owner of any building or land... for use in connection with any industry or trade bring carried
on therein". (art. 334 par. 5) The machinery in this case was intended by the lessee for use in
a building on the land by the owner to be returned to the lessee on the expiration of the lease
TC: properties are personal in nature, after winning the bid, Davao Light&Power may take
possession of the machinery levied upon
Issue
w/n the machinery mounted on foundations of cement was personal property
Ruling
the machinery is personal property
The characterization of the property as chattels by Davao sawmill is indicative of their
intention to classify it as personal property.
Davao Sawmill also has on a number of occassions treated the machinery as personal
property and executed chattel mortgages thereon.
The lessee placed the machinery in a building erected on a land belonging to another with the
understanding that it was not included in the improvements which would pass from lessee to
lessor.
Machinery which is a movable in its nature becomes immobilized only when placed in a plant
by the owner of the property but not so when placed by the tenant.
People's Bank and Trust Co. (Bank) vs. Dahican Lumber Company (DALCO) (immovable Lopez)
Facts:
- DALCO buys Dahican Lumber concession from Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila
(Atlantic). To develop the concession, they obtained various loans from the Bank. They also
acquired certain loans from foreign banks throught the help of Dahican American Lumber Corp.
(DAMCO), one of its stockholders.
- Both transactions above are secured by a mortgage over the same five pieces of land owned by
DALCO. The mortgage had a stipulation that all equipment and machinery acquired after the
institution of the mortgage will be included in the same.
- After the execution of the mortgage, DALCO buys several new equipment to relace the old ones

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
they have. In connection with these purchases, Connell Bros. Company appeared in the books of
DALCO as its general purchasing agent.
- Prior to the maturity of the mortgages, DALCO issues a resolution rescinding the purchase
agreements with Connell and DAMCO but the latter refuse to do so.
- Atlantic and the Bank then files foreclosure proceedings in the lower court after DALCO did not
push through with the rescission of the contract with Connell.
- Upon motion of the parties, the court orders that the equipment of DALCO be sold. This
amounted to Php 175,000.
- After due trial, the court issues its resolution ordering that DALCO pay its liabilities with the
Bank, Atlantic, DAMCO and Connell. Also, the court held that the 175k should be divided to the
previously mentioned four companies.
Issue:
- W/n the properties acquired after the mortgage are covered by the said mortgages.
- W/n the mortgages are binding even if they are not registered in accordance with the Chattel
Mortgage Law.
Held:
- The mortgages are clear that all equipment acquired after the execution of the mortgage would
be covered by the said mortgage.
- The mortgages are binding, there was no need to register them according to chattel mortgage
laws because the equipment are real property and not personal. The equipment were
immobilized by the fact that they were placed by the owner in the plant with the intention of using
them to meet the needs of the lumber company. (Art. 415 (5)).
- (side issue) The 175k should be given to the Bank and Atlantic. DAMCO and Connell did not
have a superior lien on the equipment. There was no clear proof that they were the providers of
the equipment to DALCO. DAMCO was actually a stockholder and Connell was a general agent
of DALCO, thus, it is doubtful that they really are the suppliers of the equipment for DALCO.
- (side issue) The action was not filed prematurely. Included in the aforementioned resolution of
DALCO was a statement that the company was insolvent and that the company did not anymore
expect any funds to come their way in the future. This statement authorized the Bank and
Atlantic to file the action to foreclose the mortgage.
Board of Assessment vs. Meralco (Art 415 paragraph 5 Mendiola)
Facts: A franchise was granted to Charles Swift in accordance with Act. 484 (which allowed the
Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchise to utilities). Meralco became the transferee
and owner of the franchise.
Meralco has constructed 40 steel towers (the lines coming from a Laguna hydroelectric plant) within Quezon City, on land belonging to it. City Assessor (Board of
Assessors) declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax
Declaration.
Despite appeal by Meralco, the Board of Assessment Appeals required
respondent to pay the as real property tax on the said steel towers. Meralco paid under
protest, and filed a petition for review in the CTA. CTA ordered the cancellation of the said
tax declarations. The CTA said that the poles are exempted according to part 11
paragraph 9 of Meralcos franchise, and that they were personal properties not subject to
real property tax. Board of Assessment appealed to the SC.
Issue: Are the poles personal property?
Are they subject to real property tax?
Held:

The word "poles should not be given a restrictive interpretation. In many American
cases, poles are described not merely as cylindrical in form but may be in any from (e.g.
towers) as long as they are used to carry the transmission or conveyance lines. Since the
towers (not pole-like in appearance) of Meralco are used for the conveyance of electric

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
current from the source to its consumers, it therefore falls within the jurisprudential
definition of poles. Thus, the towers of Meralco, even if they are not pole-like in form, are
within the exemption granted by its franchise.
Granting that the steel towers are not embraced within the term poles, they are
still not taxable because they do not fall under any of the categories in Art. 415.
They are not included in Par. 1 because poles do not constitute buildings or
constructions adhered to the soil. They are not included in Par. 3 because they are not
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking
the material of the object to which they are attached (they are fastened only with bolts
that can be unscrewed). These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph
5, for they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if
they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not
engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports or towers are
constructed.
Prudential Bank vs. Panis
(immovable Rivas)
- On Nov. 19 71, spouses Magcale secured a loan for the sum of 70,00 from Prudential
Bank.
- A deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed in favor of the bank as a security for the
loan.
- Included in the Real Estate Mortgage are the building and the lot on which building is
erected. A rider is also contained at the bottom of the reversed side of the document
which states that the Magcales filed a Miscellaneous Sale Application over the lot.
- Secretary of Agriculture issued Miscellaneous Sale Patent over the parcel of land on April
24 73.
- On May 2 73, a second loan was asked by the Magcales from Prudential for the sum of
20,000 with another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties previously
mortgaged.
- Mortgage was foreclosed and sale of the property was made because of Magcales
failure to pay its obligation
- RTC declared that the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid Real Estate Mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the
land belonging to another.
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- In the enumeration of properties under Art. 415, it is obvious that the inclusion of building
is separate and distinct from land, in said provision of law it can only mean that a building
is by itself an immovable object.
- Thus, while it is true that a mortgaged land necessarily includes, in the absence of
stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would still be
considered a Real Estate Mortgage for the building would still be considered real property
even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.
- The first Real Estate Mortgage was executed before the issuance of the final patent and
before the government was divested of its title to the land, an event which takes effect
only on the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration in the Office of
the Register of Deeds. Mortgage executed by Magcale on his own building which was
erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intent valid.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
-

As to the second mortgage over the same property, it is evident that such mortgage was
executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title. It is
declared null and void for it falls squarely under the prohibition stated on Public Land Act
and RA 730.
Machinery & Engineerin Supplies, Inc. v. CA, et al (immovableSarenas)
Facts:
Petitioners won a previous case for replevin.
To satisfy judgment, the machines that were sold to respondents on the first case were
ordered seized.
The local sheriffs office went to their factory. They were stopped by the factory owner
saying that the machines cannot be dismantled without destroying the factory itself.
Nagmatigas tong mga sheriff at sinabi nila na our duty is merely ministerial aba, mga
loko to ah. Tinuloy pa rin nila ang pagbabaklas ng mga makina that resulted in damages
to many parts of the factory.
So siyempre nagreklamo sila. Sabi ng judge sa sheriff loko kayo ah, ibalik niyo yung
mga machinery the way that you found them. Repair all damages
Gago talaga tong mga sheriff eh, tinambak lang yung mga machinery sa labas ng factory
without reinstalling them. The petitioner was then asked to provide for laborers,
equipment and expenses para ibalik yung mga machinery.
Reklamo naman tong mga petitioners. Ito yung case at hand natin. Sabi ng petitioners na
grave abuse of discretion ang lower court ordering them to provide everything needed to
return the stuff that the sheriffs took.
Sabi naman ng trial court eh gago naman pala kayo eh. Sabi nga naming na pwede
niyong kunin balik yung mga stuff pero that doesnt mean na sisirain niyo yung factory.
Considered immovable na kasi yung stuff. Inaffirm naman to ng CA.
Issue:
Ano ba talaga ang mga kagamitan, movable or immovable?
Held:

The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land,


particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in such a way they could not be
separated without breaking the material or deterioration of the object
Said stuff were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said
immovable and tended directly to meet the needs of industry.
They were already immovable property pursuant to 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil
Code.
Real property are not subject to replevin.

Sibal vs. Valdez

(Beron)

US vs. TAMBUNTING (Calinisan)


Facts:
A) Manuel Tambunting and his wife occupied the upper floor of a house in Manila.
B) Previously, the Manila Gas Company had previously installed an apparatus for the
delivery of gas on both the upper and lower floors, consisting of piping and a gas meter.
C) The gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter when it vacated.
D) Tambunting inserted a tube where the meter once was, and connected a rubber pipe
between the said tube and his gas appliances.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
E) This continued for 2 months.
F) This was discovered by the agent of the gas company. Tambunting admits his act of
connecting his gas appliance to the tube, but denies actually inserting the tube.
Issue:
W/N Tambunting is guilty of theft. (RC note: lacerny was used in this case)
Held:
A) Guilty of theft.
B) Similar to theft of electricity.
C) The clandestine substraction and appropriation of gas, without the consent of the owner,
et animo lucrandi, constitutes theft.
Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Lacson Ledesma

(Delgado)

Hernandez vs. Albano


personal property
Lloyd
Facts: Respondent Delfin Albano filed a complaint against petitioner Jaime Hernandez,
then the Secretary of Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for violation of Article 216 of the RPC (possession of prohibited interest by public officer) for
petitioners shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva
Caceres, DMG, Inc., and University of Nueva Caceres; and the claim that said corporations
obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during petitioner's
incumbency as presiding officer thereof.
Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the crime charged. His
claim is that except for his holdings in Manila's University of the East the Manila Fiscals are
powerless to investigate him. His reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of
prohibited interests in corporations domiciled in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres,
University of Nueva Caceres and Bicol Electric Co.) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG, Inc.); and
that the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such shares."
Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy,
"Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are unlike other
classes of personal property in that the property right of shares of stock can only
be exercised or enforced where the corporation is organized and has its place of
business and can exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation,
and this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the corporation
itself."
Issue: Whether or not the fiscals have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained
of.
Held: Yes. Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime
or an essential ingredient thereof took place, the Manila Fiscals have jurisdiction to investigate
the violation complained of.
The case sited is not applicable here. It speaks of property right to shares of stock which
can only be enforced in the corporation's domicile. In the case at bar, the charges are not directed
against the corporations. Not mere ownership of or title to shares is involved. Possession of
prohibited interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. As necessary an
ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department Secretary of Finance. So

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
also, the fact that while head of department and
chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations
aforesaid which secured the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual
capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
So, if the suit is directed not against the corporation itself but involves the commission of
a crime one element w/c may be the ownership of shares of stock the domicile of the
corporation is not an important factor, as long as any other element of the crime is committed in
the place where the criminal case is brought.
Heirs of Proceso Bautista v Barza
(Art 419
FERNANDEZ)
Facts: (ginawa ko nang detailed yung facts kasi parang detailed sya sa recits)
1 Proceso Bautista applied for a fishpond permit over a 30 ha parcel of marshy public land in
1946. This application, however, was rejected in 1948 because the area applied for was
needed for firewood production.
2 Ester Barza also filed a fishpond application (14.85 ha) in 1948. This was approved.
3 It was found that the areas being applied for by Bautista and Barza were overlapping.
4 However, the land which was applied for by Bautista have been greatly developed due to
the introduction of certain improvements by Bautista.
5 Because of the approval of Barzas application, and the denial of Bautistas, and because of
improvements made by Bautista in the area, an administrative case occurred between
them. Director of Fisheries ruled in favor of Barza but requires reimbursement to Bautista
for the improvements thereon.
6 But Bautista did not agree with the appraisal made by the Dir. of Fisheries, and
consequently, with the amount to reimbursed to him by Barza. An appeal was made but
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied such appeal.
7 After a reappraisal Barza then agreed to the amount to be reimbursed. This was consigned
with the Justice of the Peace. But Bautista refused to accept the same.
8 After seven years, the Barzas filed an action for recovery of possession of the fishpond
area. During this time Proceso Bautista is already dead so his heirs represented him.
9 RTC Bautista on the ground that Barzas did not acquire a vested right over the area since
they did not pay the reimbursement of the value of the improvements. It also ruled that the
consignation was also invalid.
10 CA reversed. It gave great weight to the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture on
Barzas right over the area.
Issue:
10 Do the Barzas have a rightful claim over the fishpond area notwithstanding the failure to
reimburse the Bautistas? Can they rightfully seek the enforcement of the decision of the
Director of Fisheries and Secretary of Agriculture?
Held:
11 First and foremost, the area in question is, at the outset, a public land. Being such,
neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell,
or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
purposes, fishpond leases, etc. This, however, was changed when the area was opened for
fishpond purposes giving way to the grant of Barzas application.
12 Even if Bautista was ahead of Barza in the possession of the area, he did not have the
right over the same land and until there is a release by the Bureau of Fisheries, any
application is ineffective as there would be no disposable land to speak of.
13 The function of administering and disposing of lands of the public domain in the manner
prescribed by law is not entrusted to the court but to executive officialsin this case, it is
under the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. His discretion must be respected

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
absent a proof of abuse.
14 Nevertheless, Barza is ordered to reimburse Bautista for the improvements in the
fishpond area.
Republic vs. Vda de Castillo

(Legaspi)

Mendoza vs. Navarette (Lopez)


Facts:
1 Petitioner, Domingo Mendoza, owns of a particular land. He acquired such part of the
land via an extra-judicial settlement of the land belonging to the intestate estate of his
deceased father, Teodoro. Two new tax declarations were issued as replacement for the
old one of Teodoro.
2 The other was given to Eugenia Aquino, the second wife of Teodoro (hindi nanay ni
Domingo). Subsequently, Eugenia sells her portion to the respondent, Maria Mendoza
Navarette (sister of Domingo who waived her share in the lot during the extra-judicial
settlement).
3 Leoncio Navarette, husband of Maria, files for an application for Free Patent and caused
the said whole lot to be titled and declared in his name (done in 1974).
4 Petitioner filed a case for annulment of title in 1985. Respondent files a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of prescription. RTC dismissed said motion because of Art. 494 of NCC
(no prescription between co-owners).
5 CA reverses the said decision saying that there was prescription.
Issue:
5 W/n prescription has set in and barred this action by petitioners.
Held:
6 No prescription, jurisprudence dictates that a free patent issued over a private land is null
and void. The government cannot distribute property which does not belong to them as
public domain. Thus, the action to annul a free patent which is void ab initio does not
prescribe.
7 The petitioners open, public, adverse and exclusive possession of the land which was
fraudulently included in the free patent gives the petitioner a cause of action for quieting
of title, which is imprescriptible in favor of a person in possession of the property.
Government vs. Cabangis
(Rivas)
Facts:

land in question used to belong to the predecessors of Cabangis

from 1986 to 1901, the land began to wear away due to the actions of the waves of
Manila Bay until it bacame completely submerged in the water until 1912.

government decided to deposit sand and silttaken from the bed of the estuaryon the low
land which were completely covered with water, thereby slowly and gradually forming the
lots, the subject matter of this case.

CFI held that the land in question belong to Cabangis and registered land in the latter's
name
Issue:

who owns the land?


Held:

land became a part of the public domain


shores are part of public domain as stated in Article 1 of the Laws of Water.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

SHORES - space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide.


as the sea advances, the private properties are permanently invaded by the waves abd
they become part of the shore or beach. thye then pass to the public domain, but the
owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from
their new nature, it is a de facto case of EMINENT DOMAIN.
Article 5 of the Law of Waters states "lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of
works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with the
proper permission, shall become property of the party constructing such works, unless
otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
the predecessord of Cabangis could have protected their land by building a retaining wall,
with the consent of the ompetent authorities in 1986 when the land began to wear away.
because land was cinsidered public domain, no private person could acquire title thereto
except in the form and manner established by law.

Vda. de Villongco v. Moreno (Sarenas)


Facts:
1 RA 2056: provides for the prohibition and removal of dams, dikes or any other works in
public waters. Section 2 provides for the exemptions.
2 Senator de la Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
against several fishbond owners in Macabebe, Pampanga, among whom is the peitioner.
The complaint charges that petitioner has appropriated some portions of the coastal
waters and converted it into fishponds
3 An investigation was conducted under the authority of the Secretary. As a defense,
plaintiff is saying that the contended area is covred by a TCT. The investigation found that
it is not part of the TCT and is therefore still public property. Plaintiff was ordered to
remove their fishpond works and other constructions. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
4 Petitioner filed case before CFI against the Secretary arguing that RA 2056 is null and
void for giving the Secretary the power to decide as to what encroaches public waters
and that he acted beyond his jurisdiction.
5 CFI: petitioner falls within the exception under Section 2. (1) that the fishpond was
constructed in good faith before the area was proclaimed as communal fishing ground (2)
said constructions do not impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream.
Decision of Secretary reversed.
Issue:
1 W/N the petitioner falls within the exception provided for under Section 2
Held:
2
3

No, petitioner does not fall within the exception.


The area included in the dikes of the petitioner was not part of the land titled to her. The
area is navigable waters and is part of the Manila Bay Area and commonly used by boats
and fishermen. The area is therefore public property, not susceptible to appropriation by
any private individual, not only because it belongs to the State but also because it is used
as a waterway.
Only those works constructed on communal fishing grounds are exempted under Section
2; constructions on coastal waters or public waterways are not subject to the exception.

Natividad vs. Gonzalo

(Beron)

Sanchez v. Municipality of Asingan, Pangasinan Art. 421 Sarenas


Facts:

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

The lot in contention is a strip of land between the municipal school and provincial road.
This lot is owned by the municipality.
Petitioners, with the consent of the municipality, put up temporary stores and light
buildings. They also paid rent to the municipality.
When the local administration changed after an election, an ordinance was passed
saying that the lot will be converted to a parking lot and widening of the school. So the
petitioners were asked to vacate the property.
Petitioners filed for prohibition and an alternative prayer, that if they be ejected, the rents
paid by them be returned.
Trial court dismissed petition and ordered them to vacate premises.

Issue:
W/N petitioners should be reimbursed the amount representing rent paid.
Held:
No, they are not entitled to reimbursement
In the case of Rojas v. Municipality, the people that were ejected were entitled to
reimbursement because the property in that case was devoted for public use and as such
is outside the commerce of man. It could not have in any circumstance have been the
object of a valid contract of lease.
But in this case, the land is patrimonial in character. The implied agreement of lease with
them was not null and void but merely terminable.
Municipality of Oas vs. Roa
(Beron)
Facts:
Plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it
was a part of the public square of the said town. Defendant alleged that is was his.
Certain Resolutions adopted by the Principalia of the pueblo reciting the same fact (that the land
had always been part of the public square) were presented as evidence. Defendant Roa signed
this resolution.
Defendant on his part claims that it has been sold by Jose Castillo
Issue:
Was the property in question a part of the public square of the town of Oas
Held:
The Resolutions signed by Roa are competent evidence against him.
There is no evidence of any adverse occupation of this land for 30 years; consequently the
extraordinary period of prescription does not apply. Defendant cannot rely upon ordinary
prescription of 10 years because he is not a holder on good faith, for he knew and acknowledged
thru the resolution the ownership of pueblo.
As early as 1812, the land had been used by the municipality for other purposes as that of a
public square. It therefore has ceased to be property used by public and had become part of
bienes patrimoniales.
As to the ownership, the court has declared the land as owned by Oas. The building thereon was
declared as co-owned by Roa subject to purchase of the Municipality of Oas.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v Hon. Bercilles (Calinisan)
Facts:
A) The City council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces
St., Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road, it not being included in the City
Development Plan.
B) Another resolution authorized the acting city mayor to sell the land through a public
bidding.
C) A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Cebu Oxygen for P11T.
D) Cebu Oxygen sought to register the said parcel of land.
E) The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the
ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public
use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside of the commerce of
man.
Issue:
A) W/N Cebu Oxygens land is part of the public domain and therefore should not be
registered to said company.
Held:
A) It was patrimonial property, thus it can be conveyed.
B) The City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.
C) When no longer intended for public use or for public service, it (property) shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the state.
D) Property thuse withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed.
Mun. of Hinunang vs. Dir. Of Lands

(Delgado)

Dacanay vs. Asistio


public streets as property for public use
Lloyd
Facts:
- Caloocan City Mayor Martinez opened as a flea market the street where petitioner Dacanay
lives, pursuant to a city ordinance
- licenses were granted to the vendors
- implementing a policy of cleaning up of streets, Mayor Martinez ordered the demolition of the
stalls on the street
- private respondent stallholders sought prohibition of the demolition
- RTC ordered demolition
- shortly after decision, there was a change in administration
- new City Mayor public respondent Asistio did not pursue the former mayors policy of cleaning
up the streets
- petitioner Dacanay, as a concerned citizen and taxpayer, sought to enforce the RTC by way of
mandamus, although he already filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against Mayor Asistio
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order by Mayor Asistio authorizing the use of the street as a
vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the City Govt are valid
Held: Void E.O. as it contravenes the general law w/c reserves city streets and roads for public
use
- the disputed areas from w/c the market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets
- public streets are property for public use, w/c is outside the commerce of man may not be the
subject of lease or any contract

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
- such lease by the stallholders to the City Govt are void
- the right of the public to use the City Streets may not be bargained away by a contract
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
(Patrimonial property
Fernandez)
Facts:
The Municipality of Zamboanga was converted into a City by virtue of Commonwealth Act
39 (CA 39). Sec 50 of the same Act transfers abandoned properties and buildings to the
City of Zamboanga (for a certain price) upon the transfer of the capital to another place.
Of these properties were the 50 lots with some buildings thereon (devoted to capitol,
school, hospital, leprosarium, etc).
Capital of Zamboanga province was transferred to Dipolog, and then to Molave. Value of
properties to be transferred were fixed.
Province of Zamboanga was divided into two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del
Sur. Assets of the defunct Zamboanga province were divided into two: Norte-54.39%,
Sur-45.61%
Exec Sec issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner
of the properties mentioned in Sec 50 of CA 39 and is entitled to the payment to be given
by Zamboanga city. This revoked the Cabinet resolution conveying lots to Zamobanga
city for P1.00
CIR deducted on Citys Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for payment of properties. But
RA 3039 was enacted and it amended Sec 50 of CA 39that the properties transferred
are now free of charge. CIR ordered to stop deductions in the IRA and to return what was
paid.
Petitioner assails constitutionality of RA 3039 for it allegedly deprives petitioner of
property without just compensation. Petitioner was favored.
Appeal was made
Issue:
Does RA 3039 deprive Zamboanga del Norte of property without just compensation?
Held:
If property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is
public and Congress has absolute control over it. If property is owned in its private and or
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.
Applying principles on the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question
which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. It is enough,
that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like public administration, public
education, public health, etc. Using this classification, RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots
used as a capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites. These 24 lots
are public property.
For the buildings on the lots, it can be assumed that there were erected by the National
Governmenthence Congress may dispose them. But even if provincial funds were used,
buildings were mere accessories to the lands which are public in natureso they follow the
nature of the lands which is public.
For the remaining 26 lots, they are patrimonial in nature as they are utilized for distinctly
governmental purposes. In these lots, plaintiff may collect from defendant. Registration of the lots
is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

Salas vs. Jarencio

(Legaspi)

Viuda de Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo Art. 424 Lopez
Facts:
- Municipality of Iloilo appropriated 2 strips of land owned by petitioner for widening of a
street.
- Petitioner files case in CFI to recover the purchase price for the said lots. CFI rule in her
favor.
- Because of lack of funds, the Municipality failed to pay and several property of theirs
were attached. (2 auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile,
police stations and concrete structures used as markets)
- The Municipality files a motion to dissolve the attachment and declare such as null and
void for being illegal. This was granted by the CFI.
Issue:
- W/n the properties mentioned can be attached by a judgment-debtor of a municipality.
Held:
- SC recognized that the properties of municipalities can be divided to those for public use
and those considered as patrimonial. Art. 424 provides an enumeration of what can be
classified as for public use. SC said that the classification is important because property
of municipalities for public use cannot be levied upon whereas patrimonial property is
susceptible of being attached. (But property held for public purposes is not subject to
execution merely because it is temporarily used for private purposes, although if the
public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution.)
- In cases when a creditor is trying to collect from a municipality and the latter does not
have any other property to be attached, the remedy of the creditor is by way of
mandamus.
Mun. of Paoay vs. Manaois
(Mendiola)
Facts: The municipality of Paoay has for many years leased fishery lots over municipal waters.
Mr. Duque was on of the lessees. However, the municipal council approved a resolution
confiscating the 6 fishery lots leased by Duque because of his failure to comply with the
lease contract.
The fishery lots were subjected to a public bidding. Manaois won the bidding and
paid for rentals for the whole year. However, Duque and his men prevented Manaois from
entering the fishing lots. Manaois filed suit to recover what he paid. The CFI favored
Manaois. CFI ordered the Sheriff to levy on the rentals of Tabije of a fishery lot and the
fishery lots leased to 45 different persons.
The Provincial fiscal opposed the attachment by arguing that these properties are
for public use.
Issue: Are the properties leviable?
Held: The fishery lots are not leviable, but the amount representing the rentals by Tabije may be
attached.
The fishing lots may not be levied, because they do not belong to the
municipality. They may well be regarded as property of the State. What the municipality of
Paoay has is merely a usufruct or right to use the municipal waters.
Not even the usufruct may be levied upon. The municipality is not holding the
usufruct in a permanent manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or allow it to be taken

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
away from it as property through execution. It is merely a grant. Besides, if levy of the
usufruct will be allowed, there will be an anomalous situation where a private person
conducts a public bidding for the use of the lots owned by the State and appropriating the
rentals for his own benefit.
However, the revenue coming from the renting may be levied. The grant was
given by the Legislature to the municipality to bolster its income. But it must be stressed
that this type of revenue source is not available to municipalities without coastal waters
these municipalities fair out even without leasing fishery lots. It goes to prove that such is
not indispensable for the functioning of the governmental functions. This letting out of
municipal waters for fishing purposes is a sort of side-line; in the absence of which, the
municipality can still continue to function,.
Harty vs. Municipality of Victoria
(Rivas)
Facts:
- Harty, the representative of the Catholic Church, filed a case against the Municipality of
Victoria alleging that the parish of the said town is the owner of a parcel of land within the
said municipality known as the plaza.
- He argued that the parish was in continuous possession of the land since 1901 and
parish was unlawfully deprived of its use over the land.
- The municipality on the other hand argued that they were the owners of the land since
1855, way before the parish was extablished.
- RTC: decided in favor of Harty and asked the municipality to vacate the land.
Issue:
- Who is the owner and proprietor of the parcel of land that surrounds the parish church of
the said town, and which is called the public plaza of the same.
Held:
- the municipality of Victoria is the rightful owner of the plaza
- from the conversion of the barrio Canarum into the town of Victoria, the large tract of land
that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a public plaza, destined to
the use of all the residents without any hindrance from the local authorities or the curate
of the town.
- As part of the conversion from a barrio to a town, it is a condition that the town should
have streets and a public plaza with its church and parish house, and also a tribunal
destined for the use of the local authorities.
- It was a custom observed by all towns established administratively in these islands under
the old law that on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for
plazas, commons and special and communal property.
- The contention of Harty that the land was donated by Tanedo, it must be presumed that
the he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the townspeople, since from the creation
of the town up to the present, all the residents have enjoyed the free used of said plaza.
- Plazas are destined to the public use and are not subject to prescription as stated in Art
1936 of the Civil Code.
- Planting of trees and plants of the curate and the gobernadorcillio of the said town does
not mean private ownership but merely an intention to improve the plaza for the benefit if
the people.
Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois
(Sarenas)
Facts:
Paoay has been leasing fishery lots on municipal waters. Francisco Duque leased some
fishery lots offered by Paoay. These lots were later confiscated because Duque has been
in default of payment under the lease agreement.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

Manaois became the subsequent lessee of the lots. But when Manaois tried to enter the
lots in order to catch fish, Duque refused to let them in and was saying that he was still
the lessee.
Manaois complained to Paoay. Paoay tried to request Duque to leave but Duque refused
to budge. So, Manaois brought a case for recovery of sum paid plus damages against
Paoay.
CFI ruled in his favor. In the execution of judgment, sheriff levied (1) rent paid by a certain
Tabije to Paoay and (2) about 40 fishery lots
Paoay objected to the attachment of the properties

Issue:
W/N the fishery lots can be attached to satisfy judgment
Held:

No, the fishery lots are considered properties for public use. They are not subject to levy
and execution.
They are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the
purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties
and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat or destroy said
purpose.
They are regarded as property of the State. What the Municipality of Paoay merely holds
is the right of usufruct. They do not hold it in a permanent manner so as to enable it to
dispose of it or allow it to be executed.
The right or usufruct of Paoay likewise is not subject to execution.
But the rent that was levied may be the subject of execution

Nelayan vs. Nelayan (Beron)


Facts:
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Cecilia Nelayan and the Director of Lands ofr cancellation of title
and reconveyance, alleging that they have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as
owners
Defendants claim that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case for the Director of Lands has
already issued free patent. They further claim that the petitioners failed to allege sufficient facts
of ownership to hold against the defendants
Held:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioners
As to the 1st defense, the court said applying section 38 of Act 496, the petitioner is given 1 year
form date issuance of patent. It was barely 2 months from issuance when complaint was filed
As to the 2nd defense, plaintiffs allegation they have been in continuous possession since time
immemorial is sufficient proof of private ownership. It carries the presumption that it has been a
private property even before Spanish conquest. It has become private property by presumption.
What is lacking is the judicial sanction of title.
Cuaycong v Benedicto (Calinisan)
(RC note: Long case but it really is just a simple story.)
Facts:

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
A) This case concerns the use of 2 (wagon) roads:
1) Nanca-Victorias Road (NV) (this case primarily concerns this road)
2) Dacuman-Toreno Road
B) The haciendas (one of them is Hacienda Toreno) are connected to the provincial road through
the NV.
C) For 30+ years, it has been used by the plaintiffs (no need to memorize the names) to
transport their goods (primarily agricultural) and supplies from the haciendas.
D) Use of the NV has been tolerated by the owners (Benedictos) for many years until 1911,
when they closed it, and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart that passed the road.
E) The plaintiffs wants the road/s opened, alleging it is a public highway.
Issue:
W/N NV is a public highway, and if it is not, is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of
plaintiffs.
Held:
A) There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs predecessors was
based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began
under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was
the mere tolerance or license of the owner of the estates affected.
B) The plaintiffs only had PERMISSIVE USE.
C) Possession is the fundamental basis of (the) prescription.
D) Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
possession under claim of title. It must be adverse.
E) Plaintiffs did not even assert that the road was of public domain, or used by the public, or was
maintained or constructed by public funds.
F) The license to use was essentially revocable.
G) Judgment in favor of Benedicto.
Santos vs. Moreno

(Delgado)

Zobel vs. Mercado


(need for judicial pronouncement - Lloyd)
Facts:
- plaintiff Zobel owned the land in question, w/c is a part of the Hacienda Bigaa, as evidenced by
a titled
- Zobel leased a portion of the land to defendant Mercado for fishing purposes for a yearly rental
of P50.00 per hectare.
- Mercado executed a promissory note in favor of Zobel
- Mercado failed to pay amount in despite demands from Zobel
- Zobel files for recovery of money
Issue: Mercado defenses that the contract of lease entered into between plaintiff and defendant is
null and void because the portion of land involved therein is a fishpond which is part of the public
domain
Held: Valid contract; not part of pub. domain
A. Evidence shows that said portion is covered by the certificate of title issued in favor of Zobel
- if there is any error in the Torrens title of the plaintiff in the sense it included lands
belonging to the government, it is only the government who could properly question that fact
- the government is not a part of this action
B. The fact that defendant was granted an ordinary fishpond permit by the Bureau of Fisheries to
fish in the portion of land in question six years after the execution of the contract of lease, is no
proof that said portion belongs to the government.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
- there is still need of a judicial pronouncement in order to have it excluded from the
torrens title issued to Zobel
C. Estoppel: since defendant entered into a contract of lease with plaintiff over the portion of land
in question and said contract was found by the trial court to be valid and binding, it is clear that
defendant is now prevented from denying the title of Zobel over said portion
- tenants are estopped from disputing title of the landlord and his right to such possession
upon the termination of the lease
VDA DE MEDINA V CRUZ
(Fernandez)
Facts:
Phil Realty has title over lot 6 of Grace Part Subdivision.
Mangahas and Ramos occupied lot without Phil. Realtys consent.
Lot was later sold to Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos moved to annul the sale.
Court ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot. They appealed but were denied.
Salamat vda de Medina purchased from the heirs of Don Mariano Esteban the same
parcel of landlot 6. A deed of Absolute Sale executed in her favor. She later bought 6
houses standing on the land from de Guzman.
Magbanua sought the execution of the decision ordering Mangahas and Ramos to vacate
the property. Pero makulit sila.
So Magbanua sought to have the houses of Ramos and Mangahas demolished. Vda. de
Medina opposed claiming that she is the owner of the said houses.
Medina filed action for recovery of ownership. Judge ordered demolition in lieu of the
decision ordering Mangahas and Ramos to vacate premises.
Medina claims since she is not a party to that case, decision cannot be enforced against
her
Issue:
Can the final and executory decision, ordering Mangahas and Ramos to leave premises, be
enforced against Vda de Medina (considering that she claims ownership over the houses to be
demolished)?
Held:
Lot in question is formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos. The two sold it to the de Guzmans,
and the de Guzmans sold it to petitioner. Though it is true that strangers to a case are not bound
by the judgment rendered by the court, petitioner is privy to the judgment debtors Mangahas and
Ramos by virtue of the sale transactions. Hence, she can be reached by the order of execution
and Writ of Demolition.
Petitioners claim of payment of land tax does not bear conclusive weight in proving ownership
over the lot to which payment was made for. Magbanua is the registered owner, under the
Torrens System, of the lotssuch is given greater credence.
Lunod vs. Meneses

(Legaspi)

Alano vs. Ignacio Art. 433 Lopez


Fact:
1 Manuel Ignacio had three children, namely, Victoriana, Pedro and Antonio. Plaintiffs in
this case are the grandchildren of Victoriana while defendants are the grandchildren of
Pedro.
2 Plaintiffs allege that upon the death of Manuel, Victoriana and Pedro acquired ownership

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

3
4

of 5 parcels of land. Pedro possessed the property as administrator until his death when
he was replaced by his son Estanislao.
Plaintiffs come to the CFI asking for a partition of the said parcels of land.
CFI dismissed the action because it says that there was no proof given that Manuel really
did possess the land and that he intended to divide it among his three children. CFI
found that plaintiffs failed to prove why Pedro was allowed to keep the property from the
time of death of Manuel.

Issue:
4 W/n plaintiffs have a claim on the questioned parcels of land.
Held:
5 SC affirms CFI, the testimony of the witness adduced by the plaintiff (daughter of
Victoriana) to the effect that her father worked on the said land is lacking. It did not clarify
in what capacity was her father working the land (pwede kasing as tenant lang and not as
owner).
6 Assuming that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is prima facie proof of their case,
the same is completely overcome by conclusive evidence of possession as owner
submitted by defendants. There were tax declarations presented. Also, a deed of
mortgage, which proves exercise of ownership, was also presented. All of these
evidence prove that defendants have been in possession of the lands as owner as early
as 1912 so that the possession lasted for 45 years up to the filing of the action in 1957.
Supia vs. Quintero
(Mendiola)
Facts: Ayala filed a complaint of unlawful entry and detainer against Supia and Batioco alleging
that Supia and Batioco had sold to Ayala certain real property with the right to repurchase
within one year. The complaint averred further that during the one-year period, Supia and
Batioco will occupy the property as tenants of Ayala. However, Supia and Batioco failed
to repurchase the property; consequently, the lease was terminated. Now, Ayala contends
that Supia and Batioco are unlawfully withholding possession of the property from Ayala.
As a defense, Supia and Batioco claim that the alleged contract was not of a
sale, but a mortgage. As such, they argue, the Justice of the Peace has not jurisdiction
because his jurisdiction is limited to the determination whether or not there is a valid sale
and that the authority of the Justice of the Peace cannot tread upon the settlement of
ownership (which is the subject matter of the allegation that the contract is that of a
mortgage.)
Issue: Is the Justice of the Peace precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the case of unlawful
entry and detainer because of the allegation by Supia and Batioco that the contract is a
mortgage?
Held: It has been settled that the Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction over an action for forcible
entry and detainer as established in Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They have
been given this jurisdiction, because the court of Justice of the Peace are more accessible
and in a position to afford the promptest remedy. However, it is beyond the authority of
the Justice of the Peace to hear cases involving the question of title.
Despite the foregoing, the Justice of the Peace retains jurisdiction over the action
for forcible entry and detainer, because the averment is a mere statement of the facts
which is not evidence to prove that the action now involves the question of ownership. The
Justice of the Peace may continue to hear the case until the evidence should disclose that
the question involved is one of title.
Dissent by Villa-Real:
Ayala avers that the contract is not a mortgage but a sale and that by failure to
repurchase, Ayala had become the absolute owner of the property. On the other hand,

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
Supia claims that it is a mortgage and that he has paid the amount of indebtedness, and
therefore he is the owner of he property. Clearly, the case has become a question of
ownership. Therefore, the Justice of the Peace no longer has jurisdiction.
Del Valle vs. Mercado (Rivas)
Facts:

Quizon was the real owner of the land who motgaged the said land to Biquid

Del Valle, with the permission of the heirs, redeemed the land by paying Buquid

it is claimed by Del Valle that Mercado, without the approval of Del Valle, took possession
of the land

Mercado: bought land form Julia Quizon

: heirs never consented to Del Valles possession

Julia Del Valle was asked to become a party to the case

RTC: Mercado is the rightful owner of the land


Issue:

W/N the land being claimed by Del Valle is the same land being held by Mercado
Held:

NO!

the property redeemed by del Valle is the same land purchased by Mercado from Julia
Quizon

a person who claimsthe ownership of a real property is in duty bound to clearly identify
the land claimed in accordance with the titles on which he claimshis right of ownership
adn he shall not be permitted to rely on the defects of the defendant's title

evidenced adduced by Del Valle herself does not appear to be the same property
contained in the complaint
Ramcar Inc. v. Garcia Art. 434 Sarenas
*case about evidence, ewan ko how to relate it to property
Facts:
1 Domingo Garcia had 2 of his cars repaired by Ramcar. Total cost for the repair amounted
to P1610.82, which was payable within the first 10 days of the month.
2 Garcia failed to pay this amount and so Ramcar sued him for recovery
3 Garcia is contending that he is not indebted to the plaintiff because the obligation has not
yet become due and demandable for the reason that plaintiff has not complied with
defendants request to correct defects in the repair services.
4 Garcia is also contending that the burden of proving that the repairs were not defective lie
on the petitioner
Issue:
1 Who has better evidence in this case?
Held:
2 The plaintiff in a civil case is called upon only to prove the material allegations in his
complaint constituting his cause of action
3 The cause of action in this case relates to the agreement between the parties that Garcia
will pay once the repairs are done
4 Although appellant made the defense that the repairs were not properly done, he
presented no evidence in support of his contention

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
Dacer vs, Muoz

(Beron)

Facts: In the complaint filed by petitioner, Faustino Llacer and Maria Prollamante were the owners
of a certain parcel of land described in the complaint. They further allege that defendant Munoz
claimed to be the owner of the said parcel of land and that the other defendant (Achaval) though
with the consent of the sons of Llacer, occupied a portion of the land without paying the
corresponding rent. Achaval claimed that said land belong to Munoz, defendant.
In the trial, Munoz presented Exhibit 7, 8 which were deeds executed by Faustino Llacer to all of
the land in question to Antonio Munoz predecessor of defendant Francisco Munoz.
The plaintiff on the other hand claims that defendant could not have obtained the said lands by
virtue of exhibit 7, 8, by the fact that his father had not obtained the subject land until 1881, or
some years after the alleged deed to Antonio Munoz.
Lower court ruled in favor of Llacer.
Issue: W/n Munoz has a valid claim over the land...
Held: YES. The contention of plaintiff is without merit. Granting that father of Llacer did not obtain
a portion of the land until some years after he had sold such land to Munoz, his subsequent
acquisition of the land would have the effect of making his convenyance of the sane to Munoz
valid.
A portion of the land in question which the defendant claims he acquired form Pio Balana in 1877
was transferred to father of Llacer in 1885 by virtue of a note to exhibit 8. Exhibit 8 is a deed
executed and delivered in regular form on the 20th day of April 1877, by Pio Balana to a portion of
the land in question to Antonio Munoz. This transferred all the rights of Pio over the tract of land
to Munoz. The subsequent sale of this portion to father of Llacer in 1885 is therefore without
effect.

Santiago vs. Santos

(Calinisan)

Sembrano vs. Arzaga and Longboy (delgado)


Facts: The action in the lower court is for the recovery of possession of two parcels of land. The
defendants denied allegations and alleged that they were the owners of the lands. On the trial,
the defendants failed to present witnesses and evidence, their counsels motion for extension to
look for witnesses denied. The plaintiffs counsel likewise moved for new trial for the new
evidence gathered but was denied. Plaintiff declared not the owner thereof. It seems that the
lands in this case were not properly identified.
Issue: W/N ocular inspection is necessary.
Held: In practically every case relating to lands which comes to this court by appeal from the
Ilocos provinces, there seems to be difficulty about the identification of the lands in question. It
would be a wise course to adopt by the lower court in case of deficiency of evidence relating to
the identity of land, to make an ocular inspection himself or to appoint a commission for that
purpose in order that the court may know just what lands are in litigation. In actions for the
recovery of the possession of land, the description should be so definite that an officer of the
court, might go into the locality where the land is situated and definitely locate it.
Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon
effect of issuance of decree of registration
lloyd
Facts:
- subject lot already registered in the name of Hermenegildo Nadres
- lot divided into lots 1 and 2 to Clemente Reyes and Anselmo Nadres respectively; lots

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
registered under Torrens System in their names
- Reyes and Nadres possessed the land for many years already
- thereafter, court ordered a decree declaring lands as public lands through a previous cadastral
survey w/c included the subject lots
- petitioners filed a case to annul the decree declaring lands as public lands
Issue: What is the effect of the decree of registration?
Held: it is incontrovertible after the lapse of 1 year from its issuance.
- When once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed
within which that decree may be questioned, the title is perfect and cannot later be questioned it
is incontrovertible.
- When the Court of Land Registration knows the same land has been registered in the name of
two different persons, the court must investigate that fact even without requiring the parties to
show that a fraud had been committed in securing the double registration. When it is established
that the same has been registered in the name of two different persons the title should remain in
the name of the person securing the first registration.
- SC annulled the judgment of the lower court declaring that the lands are public land
NOLAN v JALANDONI (Art 434
- Fernandez)
Facts:
1 Nolan (as administrator of Jabonetas estate) and La Sociedad Lizarraga Hermanos seek
to establish title and recover possession of a parcel of land from Martin Jalandoni (as
administrator of Nicolas Jalandonis estate).
2 Nolan and Hermanos base their claim from a common predecessor-in-interest that rented
said land to Manzano, who later passed it to Nicolas.
3 Jalandoni, on the other hand, claims that Nicolas was in quiet possession of the land until
the latters death. Jalandoni also denies any payment of rent by Nicolas for the land.
4 Nolan and Hermanos relied on oral testimonies to establish payment of rents by
Manzano and Nicolas.
5 Jalandoni presented a deed evidencing sale of land by Manzano to Nicolas.
Issue:
To whom should the land be given?
Held:
Jalandoni. The oral testimonies presented by the Nolan and Hermanos were vague, indefinite
and uncertain. Payments of rental were not conclusively established. Exact dates of payment
were not shown, except on the date where the deed of sale between Manzano and Nicolas was
executed. An excerpt from the deed admitted that Manzano did pay some amounts as rentals
prior to the happening of the sale. However, the same excerpt also established that at the time
the claim of absolute ownership was made, payments were not for rentals but just for the sake of
peace and to avoid litigation. When the land was sold to Nicolas, the land was free from any
encumbrance.
(More importantly) This being an action of ejectment, the burden of proof is upon those seeking to
dispossess the actual occupant. Failure to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, the
contention that Jalandonis 30-year plus occupation of the land was by virtue of a rent, judgment
should be in favor of Jalandoni. Actual possession of real estate for more than thirty years, under
a bona fide claim of ownership, establishes a perfect title, and such a title should not be permitted
to be put in doubt by an allegation that the possession was not held under a claim of ownership,
supported merely by vague, indefinite, and uncertain oral testimony as to payments of rent.
(Note that in the trial court, judgment was based on a previous suitJalandoni v Hermanos

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
whereas it was the burden of Jalandoni to establish title as his claim was based on the deed from
Manzano. In the present suit, Jalandoni is in possession of the land and it is his opponents
burden to show a better right to the land)
Visayan Refining vs. Camus

(Legaspi)

De Knecht vs. Bautista Art. 435 Lopez


Facts:
7 The government, through the Department of Public Works and Communications was
planning to extend EDSA to Roxas Blvd. The initial plan was that said extension was
going to pass through Cuneta Ave. This was subsequently changed to the Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets.
8 Upon learning of the change in plan, petitioner, resident in the said streets, filed a formal
petition to Pres. Marcos, who referred it to the Human Settlements Commission (HSC).
The latter submitted a report that the Department of Public Works should revert back to
the original plan.
9 Despite of the report by the HSC, government still filed a complaint for expropriation in
the CFI. Said court ruled in favor of the government finding that they had the discretion
as to what lands to expropriate.
Issue:
10 W/n the government can choose any private property for expropriation.
Held:
11 SC says that government has the power to choose but such discretion must not be
exercised capriciously. There must always be a valid reason.
12 In this case, SC finds that the change from Cuneta Ave. to the Fernando Rein and Del
Pan Streets were not called for. SC finds it odd that such a sudden change is effected
knowing that surely, several studies have already been conducted as to the original plan.
13 The SC also took note of the report of the HSC which says that the original plan is the
best option taking into consideration the functionality, social impact and cost of both
options.
Republic vs Juan
(Mendiola)
Facts: Juan et al. are the registered owners of 2 adjoining parcels of lands in La Union. The
President authorized the Executive Secretary to expropriate the land to be used as a site
for the La Union Agricultural School. (It appears that before the expropriation proceeding,
the principal of a school offered to purchase the land to no avail Juan wishes to sell at
170k.) The trial court authorized the Republic to occupy and take possession of the land
upon deposit of 100k as the provisional value of the property.
Juan argues that the appropriation was invalid because there was no prior
negotiation to purchase lots or to have them donated to the government as provided by
EO 132. Juan also says that the value of the lots (based on the reports of the
commissioners) is more than that what was determined by the courts.
Issue: Are the contentions of Juan correct?
Held:

The procedures in EO 132 say nothing that these procedures are to be conditions
precedent to the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The EO
was merely intended to govern transactions involving purchase or donation of private
property vis--vis the State. The withdrawal by Juan of the 100k deposit shows the
recognition on their part of the right of the government to expropriate the lots.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
The evaluation in the amount of 300k judicially given by Juan is a declaration and
admission binding on them. In fact, they had already realized a gain of 10k when they
withdrew the 100k deposit [ 100k (50k- original value of the land + 40k- expenses for
leveling and surveying)]. The appraisal of the Provincial Agriculturist, Chief Agriculturist
Appraiser, and DBP Commissioner is extravagant (because they are in the 1M range)
considering that the property was only bought at 50k originally.
(As a matter of fact, Juan should have been bound by his 190k admission,
because that amount is already just and reasonable. )
It could hardly be said that the amount of 300k is unjust. There had already been
an interest of 6% p.a. on the 200k (amounting to 192k) that was not yet withdrawn by
Jose. Adding the amount withdrawn, the balance, and the interest due, Juan us already
entitled to 492k and anything beyond this price is already excessive and unjust to the
State and the taxpayer.
Republic vs. La Orden (Rivas)
Facts:

Government, to ease traffic, offered to buy land of La Orden

RTC: government must pay La Orden 270,000

La Orden agrued that there is no necessity to the proposed expropriation of her land. it
was also suggested by the La Orden that there are less expensive means that can ease
the traffic situation

RTC: agreed with La Orden and held that no expropriation will happen
Issue:

W/N expropriation is necessary


Held:

Private property can only be expropriated after payment of just compensation and when
public good and genuine necessity exists

courts have the power to inquire into the legality of eminent domain and determine the
existence of genuine necessity for expropriation

SC remanded the case back to the RTC for further proceedings


Santos v. Director of Lands Art. 435 Sarenas
Facts:
1 Gabriela Santos is applying for registration of 5 parcels of land in the Province of Rizal
2 Director of Lands is opposing the registration. According to him, parcels A, B and C
should be reduced accordingly because it forms part of the Pasig-Montalban Highway.
3 Added info:
o Petitioner and her ancestors have been in peaceful, continuous possession of
the lands subject of registration
Issue:
1 W/N the petitioners possession of more than 30 years cannot serve as a title for the
acquisition of ownership because the same are public roads or highways
Held:
2 The strips of land never were part of such roads
3 That the strips of land are necessary to give to the highways the required width according
to law, is not a reason which can lawfully prevent the registration of the land because it
has been shown that they were in peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted possession for
more than 30 years
4 What the Director of lands may do is bring the proper action for expropriation

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

Ayala vs. City of Manila

(Beron)

Facts: Ayala applied to the city engineer Dieck, the defendant in this case, for a license to
construct a terreace over the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall if her house
and the edge of a canal (Sibacon creek). The said strip of land belongs to her.
Dieck refused. A similar petition was addressed to the Municipality Board but the same was
denied. The reason for the denial was in order to use it as a wharf or public way so that the
palintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as
the public in general.
Issue: W/n the action of the city engineer is in accord with due process of law...
Held: NO. What the defendants have done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy,
use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when
they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it
with the intention of establishing a public easement.
Art 349, no one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent authority and with
sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been
fulfilled the courts must protect, and eventually restore possession to the injured party.
The court ordered the defendants to immediately issued a license in favor of the plaontiff herein
to construct the terrace.

Arce vs. Genato

(Calinisan)

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (Delgado, J.)


We already discuss this case in Stat.Con. on strict construction on delegated municipal
corporation power and in Consti II under eminent domain)
Facts: City of Manila wants to expropriate land for the extension of Rizal Avenue (parallel toh ng
Quezon Ave. crossing Recto Ave. dulo nito sa Caloocan na). The expropriation was opposed by
the Chinese Community of Manila because it will hit a part of their cemetery. The lower court
nullified the expropriation resolution of the City of Manila hence this appeal.
Issues: W/N the court can examine and take place the findings of the local legislative body on
expropriation. W/N the cemetery is for public use (because if so, cannot be subject for
expropriation).
Held: 1) The exercise of the right of the state of eminent domain, whether directly by the state, or
by its authorized agents, is necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule is that it must
strictly be construed. The Spaniard fully recognized the principle and adequately protected the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the private property of the
individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property
unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and after payment
of the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been
complied with, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its
possession or to restore its 7/20/2005possession to him , as the case may be."
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent
domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but the general authority of municipalities and
entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise such, it must comply with the limitations set
by the authorizing statute. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation
to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
2) It is public as evidenced by the promulgation by the Spanish Governor-General to allocate this
area for the burial of the dead of a certain race.
Judgement of the lower court affirmed.
Dissent (Moir, J.) Necessity for taking ordinarily not judicial question. The legislature, in
providing for the exercise the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for
appropriating private property for a particular improvement or public use, and it may select the
exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of
constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking
the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the
courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for these of the representatives
of the people. Similarly, when the legislature has delegated the power of eminent domain to
municipal or public service corporation or other tribunals or bodies, and has given them discretion
as to when the power is to be called into exercise and to what extent, the court will not inquire into
the necessity or propriety of the taking.
Jose de Luna vs. CA
Mendiola
Facts: De Luna alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of landing Zambales. De Luna claims that
the defendants (Dimaano et. al.) entered the land and began to plow and plant sugar
cane. The defendants allegedly fenced the property with barbed wire. Petitioner prays
that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45
monthly per hectare.
The defendants claim that De Luna is not the owner of the land. The defendants
clam that the owner of the land is Dequina. They claim that Dequina leased to them the
land.
The municipal trial court favored De Luna and ordered the defendants to return
the land to De Luna. However, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA upheld
the RTC.
Issue: W/N
Held:

De Luna wins.
In ejectment cases, it is well established that the only issue to be resolved is who
is entitled to the physical possession of the property or possession de facto, independent
of any claim of ownership. If the petitioner can prove prior possession by him, he may
recover the property even from the true owner. However, when the issue of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the inferior court has the
power to resolve the issue of ownership.
In the case at bar, the court below acted correctly in receiving evidence regarding
the ownership clam by the defendants. However, the lower court erred in saying that the
property is owned by Dequina. First of all, De Luna had already shown that he had prior

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
possession as established by the witnesses. The witnesses attested that they had seen
the delivery of the land to De Lunas mother and that they saw De Luna and his mother
cultivate the land.
Republic vs. Rama
Rivas
Facts:
The issue raised in this case refers to the propriety of awarding necessary expenses to the
alleged possessor in good faith with right of retention until the expenses are paid.
Logronio, in his official capacity as officer-in-charge of the Bohol Reforestation Project of the
Bureau of Forest Development, bulldozed portions of the 2 parcel s of land which he believed to
be forest lands, occupied the same, and planted mulberry and other trees.
Rama commenced a complaint for recovery of possession, ownership and damages against
Logronio alleging that he is the absolute owner and possessor of the 2 parcels of land occupied
by Logronio. Petitioner Republic filed a motion for leave to intervene. The republic alleged that
Logronio's acts were authorized by the government thru Director of Bureau of Forest
Development in connection with the reforestation program of the government.
The trial of this case in the lower court, resulted to the conclusion that free patent covering the
said parcels of land were issued in favor of Rama and the corresponding certificate of titles were
issued as well. But the Office of the District Forester of Tagbiliran sent a letter to Rama informing
him that the certification issued to Rama by the District Forester is revoked on the ground that
after investigation the parcels of land is found to be within the Bohol Reforestation Project.
In view of its findings that the 2 parcels of land are forest lands, the lower court declared as null
and void the Certificate of Title covering the parcels of land and ordered Rama upon being
reimbursed by the Republic in P6,000 for the 1st land and 3,000 for the 2nd, as necessary
expenses.
Republic appealed the lower court's decision insofar as it ordered the Republic to pay Rama for
the necessary expenses with right of retention.
Rama alleged that the Republic has no cause of action and is guilty of estoppel for having caused
the issuance of the certificate of title covering the forest land.
Issue:
W/n the grant of right to reimbursement to Rama was proper..
Held:
NO.
True, government officials caused the issuance of the patent title and the original Torrens title
covering the land in Rama's name. However, the well-entrenched principle is that the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. Considering that the
parcel of land is forest land, the patent and original certificate of title covering the subject parcel
issued to Rama did not confer any validity to his possession or claim of ownership. The titles are
void ab initio.
In effect Rama's possession of the parcel of land from the beginning was fraudulent and illegal.
He was merely a squatter on the parcel. Rama is not a possessor in good faith as defined in art
526 of the civil code. Therefore he is not entitled to necessary expenses with right of retention
until reimbursement.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

Republic vs. CA
Sarenas
Facts:
Sometime in 1928 or 29, Ricardo Ramos filed a homestead application for a 3-hectare
land in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. This was approved, however while the papers were still being
processed war broke out and so he needed to file a new application.
Pending his application, he migrated to Isabela. Here he filed for another homestead
application for a 14-hectare land. It was accepted and approved.
After the 2nd homestead was finalized, the 1st homestead was also finalized.
Ramos later on discovered that there were people living on the 14-hectare land.
Ramos filed for ejectment but he lost. His 2 nd homestead patent was found by the CFI to
be void due to the prohibition on having 2 patents.
On appeal, Ramos won.
Issue:
W/N Ramos can claim ownership over the 14-hectare land that was subject to the 2 nd
homestead patent
Held:

Yes, the 2nd homestead patent is valid


The law does not prohibit a 2nd homestead patent. One who has not yet been issued a
patent for his homestead, may be issued a patent for his previous homestead and
allowed another homestead which, together with the previous homestead does not
exceed 24-hectares.
As regard to the alleged fraud of Ramos (by not disclosing the pending 1 st homestead
and ownership of 88-hectares of friar lands), these were not entered by Ramos himself.
He is illiterate and was only assisted by land officers. So it was the land officers fault.

Rivera vs. Tirona


Beron
Facts:

Rivera was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Pasay

Rivera sold the land to Tirona at the same time leasing the said land from Tirona for 6
months with right to repurchase the same within that period

Rivera continued to be in possession of the said land

Within the period agreed upon, Rivera tried to repurchase the land but Tirona refused

Rivera consigned the amount in court and filed a notice of lis pendens in the office of the
register of deeds

Notice of lis pendens was entered in the day book of the register of deeds

Tirona thereafter sold the land to Lapuz who bought the land upon seeing that the TCT of
the land was free form any encumbrance.

A new TCT was issued in the name of Lapuz who later sold the same land to his mother
Kerr who was also able to transfer the TCT in her name

RTC: ordered Kerr to return the land to Rivera and ordered the register of deeds to
cancel the TCT issued in her name
Issue:

W/N the sale made by Tirona to Lapuz was valid making the sale of Lapuz to Kerr valid
as well

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005

Held:

Sale was void!


One who buys a land from a person who is not the registered owner is not considered a
"subsequent purchaser in faith and is not protected against any encumbrance except
those annotated in the title
Lapuz is a purchaser in bad faith! He relied on the title still in the name of Rivera and
upon the deed of sale executed by Rivera in favor of Tirona which was not annotated in
the TCT. also, Lapuz is aware that Rivera was in possession of the land when he
purchased the same
Also, Kerr was a purchaser in bad faith because she was residing in the same house with
Lapuz when she purchased the land and the sale was made upon the misrepresentation
of Lapuz.
The notice of lis pendens is a sufficient notice to the subsequent purchasers of adverse
claim and that the land is subject to an encumbrance.
It is not necessary that the notice of lis pendens be annotated at the back of the owner's
TCT, such annotation is only necessary in voluntary proceedings

Revilla vs. Galindez


Calinisan
Florencio Gasmena had a portion of land which he
o Mortgaged to Galindez (registered, and a memorandum was entered in the TCT)
o Subsequently sold to Galindez (NOT registered)
Several years after his death, another TCT was issued in the deceased Gasmenas name
covering the same lot. It had no annotation concerning the mortgage, or of the sale.

Gasmenas heirs, having adjudicated the lot to themselves after Gasmenas death, SOLD
the lot again to Revilla and Fajardo (RF). A case of double sale obviously.
RF was able to register his sale, and a TCT was issued to him.
RF wanted to take possession of the lot, but Galindez refused. Hence this case.

Issue:
W/N RF has a better right to the lot.
Held:

NO. GALINDEZ has a better right to the lot.


Remember the rule from sales? Priority is given to the party who first registers the sale.
Problem is, RF was not a buyer in good faith. Thats why they lost.
Where a person buys land not from the registered owner but from one whos rights to the
land has been merely annotated on the certificate of title, he is not considered a
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes certificate of title for value and in
good faith and who is protected against any encumbrance except those noted on said
certificate.

Kasilag vs. Rodriguez


Delgado
Facts.
This case is a dispute on parcel of land in Limay, Bataan. Respondents are the heirs of Ambrosio
who is a grantee of a homestead patent on the land in dispute. Ambrosio borrowed money from
Kasilag and entered into a contract that if the borrower will not be able to pay his debt of P1000,

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
borrower will execute a deed of absolute sale. Later, Ambrosio failed to pay the amount when it
was due but the parties entered into a new agreement that the lender will take possession of the
property and appropriate the fruits to pay the debt. The heirs of Ambrosio wants to recover the
land and annul the agreement since it is contrary to law The Public Land Act which prohibits sale
and encumbrance within 5 years after the granting of the said land. The lower courts nullified the
agreement.
Issue:
W/N the mortgagee is in bad faith?
Held:
NO. The agreement between the parties was transformed into an antichresis with the creditor
possessing the land. But the Supreme Court said that Kasilag is not expected to know every
angle of the law since he is not a lawyer.
"Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which
it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith."
Gross inexcusable negligence may not be a basis of good faith but here the ignorance of the
possessor is excusable since he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements
he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of land. In taking the possession and consenting to receive the fruits, he did not know,
as clearly as the jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of a
contract of antichresis which is prohibited by law.
Dissents
Villareal - Kasilag saw the Patent Decree so he may have read in it the stipulated prohibitions
attached on the certificate, he didn't exercise reasonable diligence to examine
Delgado - Amen I say to the dissent of Justice Villareal. We cannot countenance the position
taken by Kasilag that sheer ignorance of the law will put him in the ambit of good faith possessors
protected by law. IGNORATIO LEGIS MENIMEN NON EXCUSAT. Ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.
It may be said that IGNORATIO FACTIO EXCUSAT or ignorance of the facts excuses; but here
Kasilag is not ignorant on the fact that what mortgaged was awarded to Ambrosio by patent. If we
are to take the less traveled road ventured by Kasilag, it is the same as saying that we all need to
go to the portals of law schools in order to know the
law. The publication of a law is a constructive notice to everyone and we ought not to excuse from
the hammer when it is to fall to violators by saying SORRY BOSING HINDI KO ALAM ANO YANG
COLOR CODING EH MAGKANO BA?
Another observation is that he should be aware that time of the government's massive grant of
patent is to benefit the people to have their own lands. The spirit of CA 141 in granting homestead
patent is to benefit the family, so that members will not be tempted to migrate thereby destroying
the basic core of the society.
I vote to deny the petition of Kasilag and affirm the decision of the CA
Sarmiento vs. Lesaca
Del Socorro
Facts:
- Sarmiento (buyer) bought 2 lands from Lesaca (seller)

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
-

After the sale, buyer tried to possess the land but was prevented by Deloso who claims to
be the owner
Sarmiento asked buyer to either change the lands sold w/ another of the same kind or to
return the price together w/ the expenses; but Lesaca disagreed
Sarmiento filed to rescind the sale for failure of the seller to transfer the possession of the
land

Issue:
- W/N the execution of a deed of sale in a public document is equivalent to delivery of
possession of the lands sold to buyer Sarmiento, this relieving seller Lesaca of her
obligation to place the buyer in the actual possession thereof.
Held:
-

if the sale is executed through a public instrument, the mere execution of the instrument
is equivalent to delivery unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such
instrument
o in this case, there was no contrary stipulation that the vendor did not intend to
deliver outright the possession of the lands to the buyer
o but the seller did not comply w/ his obligation to transfer possession to the seller
because of the refusal of Deloso to surrender the land, under claim of ownership
although the execution of public instrument is equivalent to delivery, this is only true
when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands
of the seller to the buyer
the seller can then rescind the contract because of the sellers failure to deliver the
possession of the lands

Acebedo vs. Abesamis


Fernandez
Facts:
Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several properties in Quezon city and Caloocan
city. These properties have unsettled claims in the form of unpaid taxes.
The heirs of Felix are the parties in this case (so lahat surnamed Acebedo). Herodotus
(incumbent administrator of the estate) and Demosthenes as PETITIONERS. Miguel, et
al. (magaganda pangalan nung iba tingnan niyo) as RESPONDENTS.
While the case was pending before the RTC of QC (sala of Judge Abesamis), the
RESPONDENTS entered into a conditional sale with a certain Yu Hwa Ping (kaya siya
kasama sa kaso). In lieu of this, the selling-heirs filed a Motion for Approval of Sale.
During this time, the selling-heirs already received their proportionate share in the initial
payment of the purchase price.
Administrator Herodotus opposed the motion on the ground that the sale was without his
knowledge, and that he wanted to sell the property himself for the benefit of the estate
(look for highest obtainable price to generate more funds). Nevertheless, administrator
was not able to find a buyer.
Pero mautak si administrator, he filed a criminal complaint against buyer Hwa Ping on the
ground that the formers signature in the deed of conditional sale was forged. And since
ayaw niya talaga pumayag, he filed other actions to have some of the properties
mortgaged.
Parties were called to a conference. In the end, the trial court approved the deed of
conditional sale. This was challenged by petitioner-administrator (kaya Abesamis yung
first name dun sa respondents).
Issue:

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
Whether the RTC, acting as a probate court, can issue an Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale executed by some of the heirs without prior court approval?
Held:
Yes. Jurisprudence provides (Dillena v CA) that the probate court can approve of the sale by the
heirs executed before final adjudication. There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest or participation he may have in the property under administration. And this right is based
on Art 533 of the Civil Codepossession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir
without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent--Where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs.
But the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in
the property held in common.
Cuaycong vs. Benedicto
Calinisan/Legaspi
Facts:
A) This case concerns the use of 2 (wagon) roads:
1) Nanca-Victorias Road (NV) (this case primarily concerns this road)
2) Dacuman-Toreno Road
B) The haciendas (one of them is Hacienda Toreno) are connected to the provincial road through
the NV.
C) For 30+ years, it has been used by the plaintiffs (no need to memorize the names) to
transport their goods (primarily agricultural) and supplies from the haciendas.

D) Use of the NV has been tolerated by the owners (Benedictos) for many years until 1911,
when they closed it, and began charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart that passed the road.
E) The plaintiffs wants the road/s opened, alleging it is a public highway.
Issue:
W/N NV is a public highway, and if it is not, is it subject to a private easement of way in favor of
plaintiffs.
Held:
A) There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs predecessors was
based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began
under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was
the mere tolerance or license of the owner of the estates affected.
B) The plaintiffs only had PERMISSIVE USE.
C) Possession is the fundamental basis of (the) prescription.
D) Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
possession under claim of title. It must be adverse.
E) Plaintiffs did not even assert that the road was of public domain, or used by the public, or was
maintained or constructed by public funds.
F) The license to use was essentially revocable.
G) Judgment in favor of Benedicto.
Bishop of Lipa vs. Mun. of San Jose
Lopez
Facts:
- A parcel of land situated in San Jose, Batangas was placed in the possession of the
parish priest of San Jose, as the representative of the Roman Catholic Church.

PROPERTY
BERON, CALINISAN, DELGADO, DEL SOCORRO, FERNANDEZ
LEGASPI, LOPEZ, MENDIOLA, RIVAS, SARENAS 2C 2005
-

The parish priest possessed the said land for many years, applying the proceeds thereof
to supporting Catholic worship in that town (i.e. Confraternity of the Lady of Consolation).
Because of the revolutions after 1896, the parish priest was forced to abandon the land.
The Municipality of San Jose took advantage of the circumstance and occupied the lands
without the consent of the churchs representatives and without right or title that would
justify their possession.
This action was brought by the Bishop of Lipa to recover said parcel of land.
Lower Court ruled in favor of the bishop.

Issue:
- Who has the right to possess the land?
Held:
-

SC says that the Bishop has the better right. Although it seems that it is the Municipality
which is the current possessor (therefore they should have the better right to possess
based strictly on Art. 538), they actually cannot be said to be in possession since their
possession was acquired clandestinely (based on Art. 537). Thus, they are not actually in
possession because the manner they acquired such custody does not actually affect
possession legally. So, we consider the second criteria which favor the one longer in
possession. This is the Church.
(other reason) The Bishop was able to present two certificates setting forth two
possessory information, which proves their possession. On the other hand, the
Municipality failed to present any evidence as to the legality of their possession of the
land.