The Ethics of Hegel

Author(s): J. Macbride Sterrett

Source: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1892), pp. 176-201
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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176

InternationalYournal of Ethics.
"The good wantpower,but to shed idle tears;
The powerfulgoodnesswant-worse need forthem."

The devil is the princeof this world,and the gods are crucified. That, we sometimes feel,is the summingup of the appearances of history. Wrong is might. Religion,then,is the
faith that this appearance is not the ultimate truth; that
the two great wants-the want of power on the part of goodness, and the want of goodness on the part of power-will
prove in the end to be better abundantlysupplied: the faith,
in short,that the universe has a heart,or that the heart will
findforitselfa universe.* This faithhas, I think,been the soul
of all religions,or, at least, of the religionsof all thoughtful
peoples; but,.most of all, it has been the soul of Christianity.
J. S. MACKENZIE.
(To be concludedin the nextnumber.)

THE ETHICS OF HEGEL

A PLUNGE in medias res is not the currentway in philosophical discussions. The introductoryorientationis too often a
porch out of all proportionto the building. The startis made
withgiving a resumeof Greek thought. Then an easy hop,
skip,and jump bringsus throughearlyChristianthoughtand
scholasticism to modern philosophy. From Descartes to
Kant brings us to what has been consideredthe heartof modern philosophy. But we go on fartherto see that the heart is
greatlychanged; that the centrehas become an all-animating
organic life; that subjectivismhas become objectivismagain,
and that we are in a modernized Greek phase of thought.
Kant, like Socrates, no longer representsany more than a
phase of the larger concrete thoughtof the world. Sevenleague boots would be needed to traversethe distance between
* Cf. Browning's" Epistle fromKarshish:
" So, the All-Greatwere the All-Loving,too
So, throughthe thundercomes a humanvoice
Saying,'0 heartI made, a heartbeats here.'"

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

I77

Kant and Hegel in ethical conceptions. At firstsight there

seems ratherto be a gulf than a bridge forus to cross. But
gulfsand seas, insteadof dividing,now serve to unitethoughts
as well as countries. Continuityin and through diversityis
a regnantconceptionof Hegelian philosophy. Hegel is said
to have burned his bridges behind him. But bridges of
to trace the
thoughtare incombustible,and it is not difficult
continuitythrough diversityof Hegel's ethical conceptions
with those of Kant. The subject-matteritselfwill also reveal continuitywith Greek conceptions. We must make the
transitionfromKant to Hegel as briefas it is great and definite. Formulas are as usefulas they are inadequate,-often
useful because of their inadequateness. The starting-point
of both Kant and Hegel is man. But Kant considers the
subjectiveEgo, while Hegel considersthe objectiveEgo. The
categorical imperativeupon both was the eternal command,
1VC??9 aeavro'y.

of the
in theirconception
chiefly
They differed

whose exegesis theyattempted. With Kant it was the

abstract,subjective self; with Hegel it was the concrete,objective,the completelyethicizedor socialized self Kant lived
and labored under the conceptionsof the eighteenthcentury
rationalism,which held that reason was innate in everyman
as a sum total of clear,fixednotions,while Hegel considered
reason as an immanentimpulseof rationalitythatwas continuously realizingitselfin human experience. They both had
a metaphysicof ethics. But with Kant this was foreverunutterable,with Hegel it had been continuallyutteringitself
in the institutionsof man. With one it was formless,with
the otherit was the continuouslyself-realizingWordthatfrom
the beginning was formative of the moral organism of
humanity. The one looked solely within,the other looked
outwardforthe selfto be studied. With Kant the resinternal
was absolutelysupersensible. With Hegel it was expressed
in definiteand increasinglyadequate formsin the respublic
of the externalworld of man's activity. Hence he makes his
"Philosophy of History" an illustrativeexposition of his
science of ethics. The State in the most concrete sense of
this term is the aeavro' manifestingitselfin temporal condiaeavrov,

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I78

International journal of Ethics.

tions. The historyof the world is thetribunalthroughwhich

man utters the formsof the categorical imperativeheard in
the supersensibleworld. Let us say in brief,then, that the
difference
between Kant and Hegel may be formulatedas the
betweenan abstractand a concreteaeavr'O-'
difference
Hegel never ceased to inveighagainst the vice of abstractness. His whole work consists in startingfrom,criticizing,
and passing beyond various abstract conceptions to a real
concrete in which alone they find their place as organic
phases or members. That which is true relativelyto its correlate is false when abstracted fromits correlate. And both
correlatesare true only when theypass throughthis category
of reciprocityto the organism which they both imply and
demonstrate. The empiricaland the noumenal self; the pure
reason and the practical reason; subjective freedom and
conditioning environment; duty and the good,-these are
some of the elements of ethical man that Kant abstracted
fromtheirorganic process, wherewithto build his airy castle
of morality. Abstractions,every one of them, says Hegel,
who endeavors to lead through them to the-more concrete
view. We may,however,select two termswhich will illustratethe differencebetween Kant and Hegel in ethics,-i.e.,
Moralitiitand Sittliclkeit,both of which are used by the
Germans for what we call morality. The firstdenotes the
moralityof the heartor of the conscience. The latterdenotes
conventionalmorality,or the objectivecustoms thatare recognizedas moral(aOzxd, mores,Sitten). The firstis the individual
conscience,the second is the social conscience. Hegel would
say that there would be no Moralit&twithout Sittlichkeit,
while Kant, with his categorical imperative,would make each
individual an Athanasius contra mundurn. Hegel would say
that therecould be no duty without some objective good as
content for the formal good-will. That is, there can be no
abstract self-realizationby the conscientious man, no goodwill withoutgood manners. To realize himselfthe individual
must do it in the formsof social man, must go beyond himself to be himself. He must erect himselfabove himselfand
expand himselfbeyond himselfin his actualizing of his good-

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

I79

will. Only in the objectiveformsof his stationcan he findhis

duties. Otherwisehis moralityis sure to be peevish,cranky,
and tyrannical,though,as a Simon Stylites,he may writethe
titleof saint beforehis name. Hegel makes most trenchant
criticisms* of Kant's formallaw, showing that as an abstract
universalit can neithersuggest any particularduties nor test
the rightnessof rules otherwisesuggested. It can only be
a voice thunderingin the inner Sinai, " thou shalt," without
power to proceed to decalogic or monologic specificationof
what to do. Only an-objective standardof right can afford
the ground of privatejudgment and renderit otherthanmere.
wilfulness. Pythagoras had this in view when he said that
the best education one could desire forhis son would be to
have him be a citizenof a people with good institutions. On
the otherhand, such good institutionsare impossiblewithout
the elementof Moralitiit. Society does not exist apart from
the individual. It is ratheran organismof organisms,whose
Sittlickkeitexpresses the immanentMoralitlitof its people.
It exists in and through the life of its members. Hegel's
conceptioncombated both an abstract individualismand an
abstractsocietarianism. His ethics are the resultof the oras the
ganically related elementsof Moralilit and Sittlichkeit,
very lifeof the most concrete formof the self or man,-i.e.,
the State. It is the science of this body politic in its movein which also the individual realizes
mentof self-realization,
himself;because its realization is what he must enterinto in
order to be what he ought to be. Further contrasts,however,would be betterexhibitedin the course of an exposition
and criticismof Hegel's own ethical theory. We propose a
brief expositorystatementof Hegel's doctrine.
Hegel's doctrine is found chieflyin his " Philosophie des
Rechts," which is an enlarged exposition of the second part
of his "Philosophie des Geistes." With this goes as an interpretingsequel his " Philosophy of History." We shall also
findadditional exposition of various points in his " Phmenomenologie des Geistes."
* Hegel's Werke,i.
Kant," ii. i86.

313,

referredto by ProfessorCaird, " The Philosophyof

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Internationaljournal of Ethics.

80

I may take it forgrantedthat enough readers of this Journal are not familiarwith Hegel's own work to warranta restatementof his doctrine.
Hegel terms the second part of his "Philosophie des
Geistes" der objectiveGeist,which exhibits the free spiritas it
actually stands or lives as thinkingwill in the world. It is an
exhibitionof spiritas objectifiedin the institutionsof law, the
spiritand the absofamily,and the state,set betweensubjective
lutespirit. Thus his ethics startfromthe naturalconditionof
man and lead on to man in his highest relations,exhibiting
the perfectionof his spiritualcharacter in the realms of art,
religion, and philosophy,-the three media of perfectselfrealizationor of comprehensionof his relationswiththe Absolute Spirit of whom and throughwhom and to whom are all
things. We shall note in our criticism Hegel's apparent
failure to carry ethics up into this sphere of the absolute
spirit.
Hegel's method is always that of beginningwith the most
abstractphase of his topic and followingthroughthe immanentself-criticism
of one abstractphase to another until the
organic idea (Begriff)is reached,which is then seen to be the
real presuppositionthroughoutinstead of being an inductive
result. His truefirstprinciple,his mostconcretestatement,is
scarcely perceptiblein his firstadvances, but it comes more
and more clearlyto lightas the immanentand organic prinand above all the abstractionsthat
ciple that lives in,through,strut dogmatically,aping the real. His order, moreover,is
always the logical one from the abstract universal through
the particularto the universalizedindividual.
Hegel's " Philosophie des Rechts" may be called the doctrineof the will. The will is the man,and ethical man is will
realized in his social institutions. To reach this conception,
however,he startswiththe most abstract conceptionof will,
which he takes as readyto hand. He divides thewhole work,
as usual, into triadicform:*
*

* "GrundlinienderPhilosophiedes Rechts,"Berlin,I821,
ences in thispaper are to thisearlieredition.

33. All therefer-

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The Ethics of Hegel.

i8i

I. The will as immediate,undeveloped potentiality,which

gives the sphere of abstractor formalright.
or subjective individuality,opII. The will self-reflected,
posed to objectivewill. This gives the sphere of Moralitit,
or of conscience contramundum.
III. The will as the unityand truthof these two abstract
phases, the realm of formalfreedomand objective rightrealor the
ized in the world. This gives the realm of Sittlichkeit,
This
man
as
of
will.
realization
as
the
concrete
ethical world,
includes the sphere of (a) the family,(b) civil society,(c) the
state in the most concerete sense of the term,such as Dr.
Mulford construes "the Nation." Under this last he embraces (a) internal polity, (A) external polity, (r) international polity,or the historyof the world,as the realizationof
man in the most cosmopolitansense of the term.
I. The Sphereof AbstractRzght.-Formal freewill is the abstract universal,which demands full sway for itself without
any conscientious motive or conviction. Beginning is made
with this formalwill as a mere potentialityof enteringinto
manifoldrelations. The one possessing such freedomis a
" person." As such a person I have the rightto cast mywill
over everythingand make it mine. It is my rightto do so.
But otherpersons exist. Hence the formulaof abstractright
is, " Be a person, and respect others as persons." Hegel
warns us against putting into this formula all that it would
implyin an ethical,social, or civil state. He is using " person" here only in its most abstract and formal sense of an
individualwill, as yet undeveloped in civil and social relations
(" Philosophie des Rechts," ? 35). Such a person is nowhere
to be found. But the conception results fromthe abstract
conceptionof will. It representsthe firstphase of self-consciousness in which " Ich ist alles," the will sovereign and the
whole " world its oyster." The rightsof the abstract person
are absolute and universal,but utterly unlike the personal
rightsdependentupon and guaranteed by organized society.
Abstract will asserts itselfagainst its limitingenvironment
and lays its hand upon its rights. It thus acquires objective
existence and takes the first step towards actualization.

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InternationalYournal of Ethics.

Things are soulless, will-less,and "the person has the right

to subject all thingsto his will, thus makingthem his" (? 44).
First,the body and its lifeis taken possession of,then other
things. I place my will over a thing and make it an attribute or propertyof me. Thus "property"appears as objectified will. But will involves the furtherright of using or
consumingthingsand of relinquishment. But otherwills do
the same. Hence limitationwhichleads to " contract,"which
is the firstformof a " common will." But this will is yet far
frombeing that of the universalwill of society. Its elements
are accidental and particular,and can give no guarantee of
fulfilment. Fraud, violence, and crime are inevitable. In
" crime"will violates itself,and thus creates its own " punishment." The person gives an eye for an eye, thus negating
his crime. The punishmentis but the reactionupon the person of his own act. It is equally the act of his will and his
own right. But in thisas yet unorganizedand unethicalcondition,where there is no universalwill of societyto mediate
between crime and punishment," vengeance" takes the place
of ethical retribution,and the state of nature becomes an
aggregate of not even semi-domesticatedIshmaelites, or a
war of all against all. Property,contract,and punishment
are seen to be impossiblewithoutthe presence and mediation
of a universalized or ethical will. Death or slavery can be
the only logical issue to abstract will seeking its abstract
rights. With no other elements at work such a state of
nature could never give rise to the institutionof the State.
Some judge more just and universal must be found. The
demand is fora particularwill which can at the same time
will the universal or the " infinitesubjectivityof freedom"
Such a will must reflectupon itself,retire
(?? I03 and i04).
frommere objectivityto the internalforum. This forumis
that of Conscience, or
II. Moralitiit,or AbstractDuty (? io5).-This is the sphere
of " subjective right," for the will, reflecting upon itself,
changes the merelyobjective " person" into a subject (? I04).
Thus freedomreaches a higher ground and person becomes
more personal. The stand-pointnow is the rightof the sub-

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

i83

jective will (? I07).

Hegel shows the process fromthe most
abstract form of this subjectivitythrough the phases of (a)
purpose and responsibility,(b) intentionand welfareto (c)
the good and conscience,where abstract right is translated
into duty and virtueor good-will.
First, it is held that responsibilityis only commensurate
with knowledge. Next, the quality of the will depends upon
the " intention"and its objectiveresults,which are never restrictedto particular selfish ends. They must (thirdly) be
judged according to their universal worth. Hence " the
good" as the reconciliationof the particular subjective will
withthe universalwill, or with the rational. The ideal here
is that of duty for duty's sake. The duty,however,is yet
abstract. No content can be furnishedby itself. The universal element is merely formal,unspecifiedas to content,
giving no answer as to what one's duty is in any situation,
except the grandiloquentone of " do rightthough the heavens
fall." An objective systemof principles and duties,and the
union of the subjective knowledge with them,is plainly impossible on this stand-point(? I37). Hegel, here and elsewhere,makes, as we have said, trenchantcriticismof Kant's
doctrine of duty. This formal law divorces duty from all
interestor desire,a psychological impossibility. It takes no
cognizance of the concrete situation and can suggest no
present duty. It cannot discriminate between particular
actions so as to call one of them a duty. Finally, it must
equally universalize all particular actions, and thus bring
about confusionand collisions. Only in view of the institution of propertyin the state can it say, " Thou shalt not
steal." In the abstract formof Kant it must equally say,
" Thou shalt steal." That is, ifwe abstractall social relations,
which ex hypothesiKant does, we can universalize any particular rule withoutcontradiction. In the realm of the concrete morality of social life, however, we cannot do this.
What will be the resultof such an abstractsubjective conception of duty? Plafnlythe individual must become the lawgiver and thejudge of what is absolute good. He must trust
to his own private judgment withoutthe mediationof exist-

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I84

IlternatioadP journall of .13/1ics.

ing codes of society. He must give a purelysubjective individual determinationof the contentof the loftybut formal
universal. The individualbecomes the measure of the moral
quality of objectiveactions. There is no public source and
standard forthe guidance of privatejudgment. Hegel does
not neglect the importantfunctionof the duty of private
judgment,but is here only showing its capriciousnesswhen
taken out of the concrete relationsof an ethical world. Antinomianismis a logical and historical outcome of such abstractprivatejudgment,which runs riotand plays the tyrant
for lack of an objective concrete social systemof duties. It
is the making of selfa statesmanto representa concretestate
does not yet exist. This elevationof the inthat ex htypothesi
dividual subjectivejudgmentto be the measure and definition
of the universalfinallyresultsin theevil. " The highestsummit of subjectivityassertingitselfas the absolute is the bad."
It is at this abstractstand-pointof the natural(unethicized)
will thatwe findthe originof moralevil (?? I39, I40). Hence
we see that conscience at this stage cannot be true or good
conscience. This abstraction in turn demands as its correlate that which it was called out to correct,-ie., objective
right. In fact,these two abstractionsmust be integratedinto
the concrete ethical substance from which they have really
been abstracted. We are only advancing, prodigal-like,to
the real home of morality,fromwhich we have violentlytorn
ourselves away. We thus reach theethical(sittliche)world.
III. In thisworld of ethical(sittliche)relationsof the family,
civil society,the state,and humanity,the idea of freedomis
realized as a " living good that is powerfulenough to actualHere abstract rightsbecome ethical and
ize itself" (? I42).
authorizedrights,and abstract duty becomes specificand full
of content. Privatejudgmentbecomes relativelyuniversalized,
and the lofty,cold,and colorless imperativebecomes relatively
incarnatedin the heartsof a brotherhoodofmen. In his " Phacnomenologie des Geistes" Hegel traceswitha largerand freer
hand the dialecticof previousstages underthe rubricsof " selfconsciousness"and " reason," and uses thatof " spirit"to designatewhat he, in the " Philosophie des Geistes,"calls realized

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The Ethics of Hegel.

i85

morality(Sittlichkeit). He there uses the term "spirit" as

equivalent to the corporate social " self-consciousness"and
" reason,"which has had the power to createthe ethicalworld
into various grades of which each individual is born, and
throughwhich he takes formand contentin the work of selfrealization,or of becoming a "person" in the truer sense of
the term. The laws of this world are his own laws. He
must fulfilthem to realize himself. He findsthem existing
forhim,as the reason and law of his own specific nature as
man. In fact,man is by naturea social animal. He is only
real as he is social. To be himselfhe must be more than his
own abstractself; to live his own lifehe must live the life of
the body corporate. On one hand, these laws of society appear with even more authoritythan the laws of nature. On
the otherhand, they are not foreignto him,but yield to him
the testimonyof the spiritthat they are his own (?? 146, 147).
In accepting them he is not doing despite to his own individuality,but is accepting the essentialconditionsof its preservationand development. The individualityof a man who,
frominfancy,should sever all relationsto his fellow-menand
grow up " naturally"would be an idiot,-even lower than the
animals with which he mightconsort. Society is really creative of individuality. The enlightenmentand regulationof
the subjective conscience by the laws and duties of one's station clothes its nakedness with the garments of truth and
beauty. The largest altruism demanded by them is essentially the largestpossible egoism. Through it the individual
elevates himselffromcapricious lawlessness into substantial
freedomand personality. Living for others is the highest
formof living forself. Hegel also uses the termsubstanceto
characterizethe ethical tissue into which man is born. The
moral dispositionof the individualconsists in his recognition
of thissubstanceas his own(" Philosophie des Geistes," ? 5 I 5).
Virtue he definesas ethicalpersonality(sittliche
persOnhichkeit),
or the lifeof the individualpermeatedand transformed
by the
and
Here
duties
first
and
ethical substance.
that
rights
exist,
only through reciprocal relation (" Philosophie des Rechts,"
Here the natural man is gradually converted into
? 155).
VOL. I1.-No.

I3

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i86

International-ournal of Etliics.

the ethical man. This ethical substance is an immanentand

determiningprincipleof action which permeates and transformsthe natural man,-acts as a moulding power through
the family,and the social, civil, religious, educational, and
political organizations. These various institutionsof society
are the realized objective formof the ethical substance in the
fruitionof its own being.
Hegel notes threephases of this ethical world,(i) The familyas the primitiveformof this ethical spirit.
(2) Civil society,which results fromthe separationof the
membersof familiesand their being reunitedagain in more
external form for the securityof person and property,in a
realm of merelyformaluniversality.
(3) The State, or the invisible spirit of the nation, developed to an organic realityin the hearts and customs and
genius of its people.
(i) The individual first comes to himself in the family,
whose active principleis love, which transcendsand includes
its membersin its unity. The familyis the firstor instinctive
realizationof the ethical spirit. It exists not by contractbut
by the grace of God. The union of love and trust in this
circle formsits organizing and controllingprinciple,so that
of
in it the individual membersfinda measurable fulfilment
theirown capacities. The family,too, is a process involving,(a) Marriage.
(b) Family property.
(c) The education of childrento maturity,and the separation of its members.
(a) Marriage is a transformedphysical union of male and
by love into a spirfemale. The animal phase is transfigured
itual one. Marriage implies the freeconsentof the two persons to constitutehenceforthone person, to submit to limitations in order to gain fullerself-realization. The husband
is more of a man than the bachelor. Hence it is an ethical
duty of mankindto enterinto and maintainthe marriage relation (? i62). The marriage bond is essentiallya spiritual
relationin which individualssubjugate theirprivateaims and
wishes to the law of at least a dual life, love, and good.

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

187

Hence marriage,too, is more than a contract. For contract

implies that the parties still retain their external independence. Hegel says that Kant's subsumption of marriage
under " contract"is scandalous (? 75). In marriagethe twain
are to become one flesh,one heart, one mind, one person.
Hence the marriage ceremonyshould be one of social and
religious celebration. The cold formalismof mere civil contract before a justice of the peace is utterlyinadequate to
manifestand declare such a spiritual relation. Marriage is
of both ethical and intellectual influenceupon the parties.
They have larger views of life and a common good as
theiraim. Marriage,too, is essentiallymonogamic. This is
one of the absolute principleson which the ethical character
of a social state rests(? i67). Marriage betweenblood-relations is also unethical. The family,as a single personality,
has its externalrealityin its familyproperty.
(b) It is of the essence of familypropertythat it be common
property. This gives property an ethical value which we
could not findfor it under the categoryof "abstract right."
The thoughtof a common good animates all in the acquisition and maintenanceof familypossessions, relativelyovercoming the " miserableaims that end withself."
(c) The education of childrento maturity.
Childrencompletethe familycircle. In and throughthem
the unity of married love comes to external manifestation.
In loving the offspringof their love the parents love each
other anew. The rightsand duties of parents and children
spring out of the common good of the family. Confidence
and obedience are educed in the childrenthat theymay grow
up in love in the familyethos. The slave-like relationof children to parentsamong the Romans was of the most disastrous
influence. The modern world recognizes that children are
potentiallyfree spiritual beings whom the familyis to train
forcitizenshipin a larger ethical sphere. Families multiply,
parents die, and childrengrow up, and we have a multitude
of separate persons again, though of more concreteand ethical contentthan underthecategoryof " abstractright." Here
the elementsof individualismand independenceappear again,

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Internationaljournal of Ethics.

and conflictinginterests. The firstphase of a

with differing
returnto a higherethical unityis in the formof
(2) Civil society,or the realm of armed peace among now
semi-tutoredIshmaelitesbound together,throughtheirwants,
by contractfordefenceagainsteach other.' Hegel declines to
name this otherthan " the state on its externalside," or government. In thisrealmof " particularity,"or,as he elsewhere
calls it, "system of atomism of self-interest"(" Philosophie
des Geistes," ? 523), each privateatomisticperson makes himself an end and uses everythingelse as a means. Law, the
abstractuniversalelementhere is only a mechanicalmeans to
preventinternecinewarfare. It is a task-masterto be eluded
by everymeans,and yet serves the pedagogic purpose of disciplining caprice into formal unity. Absolute individualism
would be civil anarchy. The individual must contract to
limit himselfby some outward formof universalityin order
to exist. Through this he learns that his own good can only
come through the good of all, and comes to recognize that
the concrete state is the good and true for him on earth,
without the immanentlife of which in civil society government could not exist. But to reach this recognition of a
common corporategood as each one's own good, civil society
passes throughthreephases.
(a) The system of wants, including labor, wealth, and
classes of society.
(b) The administrationof justice, including legal rights,
public laws, and courtsof justice.
(c) The sphere of police regulation,in its broadest sense,
and that of incorporatedcompanies under legal sanction.
We cannot followHegel throughhis elaborate treatmentof
these phases, continuouslydemonstratingthat each one presupposes and actuallyrestsupon the largerethicalorganization
of man in the nationor the spiritualstate. Through the maintenance of the sanctityof marriage,and of honor in corporations,civilsocietypasses over intothe Nation,in which all the
previousabstractphases are taken up as organic elements.
(3) The Nation or the invisibleState.
Hegel's loftyand profoundconceptionof the State, as the

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

189

highest realization of the will in its substantial freedom,is

happily too well known to need lengthy exposition. Dr.
Mulford thoroughlyassimilated,appreciated,and Americanized this conceptionof " The Nation" as " a moral organism"
and " a moral personality,"rooted in human nature,which is
rooted in the Divine nature,and of Divine originand sanction; the sphere for the " institution"and " the realizationof
rights and of freedom;" " sovereign" and representativeof
the individual,the family,society,civil rights,and the commonwealth; immanentin and vitalizingall these spheres; "a
temple whose building is of living stones," a body in and
throughwhich alone individualscan get the formand content
of personality; "the work of God in history realizing the
moral order of the world;" " fulfillinghumanity in God;"
"the beginning and the goal of history;" "having an immortallife"and " its consummationin the perfectedkingdom
of the Christ."
With Hegel the State is the ethical idea actualized in progressively more adequate form,the moral life of humanity
throbbing through and integrating all the activity of its
individuals.
" The State is the self-consciousethical(Sittlicke)substance,
the union of the principleof the familyand of pivil society.
In the familythis principleexists as the feelingof love. This
immediatebut essential principle,however,receives the form
of self-consciousuniversalitythrough the second principle,
which containsthe elementsof knowledge and will, or thinking will. Thus the state appears, having forits contentand
absolute aim intelligentsubjectivitydeveloped into rationality."
(" Philosophie des Geistes," ? 535). "The state is the actuality of the substantialwill, the vital union of the particular
interestof its memberswith the relativelyuniversal aims of
man as man. Neitherthe familynor civil societyis commensurate with such realizationof individuals,though in both of
these spheres a beginning is made fromsingle to universal
aims. This larger-the largest earthly-sphere takes up and
fulfilsall narrower ones. The state is universal or public
in the genius or spirit of its
reason, existing unreflectingly

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Igo

Internationaljournal of Ethics.

people, and objectivelyin its customs and institutions. Membership in this moral organismis the highestduty. It is the
ethical substancein whichalone one can be himself. All that
he says about the state can be questioned only by confounding
it, as many modern theoristsdo, with "civil society" as the
mechanical expedient for the securityof private rights and
liberty. Herbert Spencer's conception is essentially only a
more developed formof that of " The Leviathan" of Hobbes.
Rousseau's volont generatealso lacked corporatesovereignty,
because it representedonly an abstractionand contractof particularwills,as a means. The corporatewill, however,is the
primal essential element in Hegel's conception of the state.
It is the true end of man on earth,an end that realizes itself
in and through its self-consciousmembers. The idea of the
state is itselfa process having (a) immediateactualityin the
particularstate,-an independentorganism,with its own constitutionor internalpolity(Staatsrecht); passing (b) into the
relation of one state to other states,-external polity; and
finally(c) appearing as the universal or generic idea as lord
over particularstates. It is thus the fullestearthlymanifestation of man as spirit,actualizing itself in the process of
universalhistory(? 259).
(a) Internalpolity.
The state,as actualized concrete freedom,not only permits
but creates and containsas vital members individual personalities. " The prodigiousstrengthand depthof modernstates
springsfromtheirgivingthe principleof subjectivityor private
personalitythe most extreme and independentdevelopment,
while at the same time reducing this element into substantial unitywith and making it a means for the realizationof
theirown genericend" (? 260).
The principleof theworthof the individual,he says, " marks
the turning-pointin the distinctionof modern and ancient
times. Christianityfirstemphasized this principleand made
it the vital principle of a new formof the world" (? I24).
Hence he must neverbe understoodas slightingthis element
in his larger doctrine of the state, though this appears to
approach very nearly the ancient doctrine,which swamped

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

191

the individual in the state. It is only the inane perversion

of this Christianprinciple of subjectivitythat he criticizes.
Though the state may appear as an external power, it is
really but the rational expression of the corporate will of
individuals. In the state rights and duties are in reciprocal
relation. "This union of duty and right is one of the most
importantnotes of the state and the inner ground of its
strength. The individual in accomplishing his duty finds
self-satisfaction.From his relationto the state theresprings
a right,so thatthe public affairbecomes his own affair"(? 26i).
Through the dispositionand ethosof its people mere government is changed to ethical and substantialself-government,
and is thus the actualization of concrete freedom. The
universal element in the laws and institutionsof the state
are simplythe reflectiveexpression of the ethical spiritof its
people. "They are the reason of the nation,developed and
actualized in particularforms,and thus the steadfastbasis of
the state and of the genial confidenceof its citizens"(? 265).
" The guarantee of a constitution-i.e., the necessity that
the laws be reasonable and their realization secured-lies in
the spiritof the people as a whole,-that is, in their definite
self-consciousnessof its reason (religionbeing this consciousness in its absolute substantiality),
and also in the real organiit
zation conformableto
as a development of that principle.
The constitution presupposes this consciousness of the
national spirit,as this spirit presupposes the constitution.
For the actual spirit has the definiteconsciousness of its
principles only so far as theyare present to it as existing"
(" Philosophie des Geistes," ? 540). The people make their
own constitution.
But religionformsa most importantfactorin the spiritof
a people. Hegel says franklythat religion is the foundation of the state,which " is the Divine will unfoldingitselfin
the actual organizationof a people." Religion has the absolute truth for its content,creating the' most powerful and
loftytemperof a people, and thus affordingthe highest approbationand sovereigntyto the laws of the state. But when
religion degenerates into fanaticism,and tries to make the

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InternationalYournac of Ethics.

state a church-state,it needs to be curbed. Thus church

organizations,like other societies, are subordinate to the
state. Still the religious sentimentof a people is so controlling that it is only "a follyof modern times to alter a
system of corrupt moralityand laws without a change in
religion, to attempta political revolutionwithout a religious
(? 552). The religious faithshould be left free,
reformation"
because the sphere of religion is higherthan that of politics.
But when religion takes the form of separate, dissenting
organizationswithinthe state,they must be subordinated to
the ethical supervision of the state. They cannot be permitted to fosteropinions absolutely alien or opposed to the
constitutionas expressingthe corporategenius of its people,
or to treatthe state as a soulless, Godless mechanism,instead
of an ethical expression of the freedom of God's children.
Modern states base their constitutionson the principle of
freedom. Want of freedomin religion,or an unethicalconception of God, will be found hostile to such constitutions.
Hence Hegel gave the political preferenceto Protestantism,
because it inculcates freedomof thought and of conscience.
The Roman Catholic conscience is priest-bound,while the
Protestantconscience harmonizeswith the principle of free
political life.
" Patriotismis a subjective formof the political disposition
of a people. The objective formis the external organismof
the various public organs of the state,who thinkand will out
loud for the whole social organism. The political constitution is this externalorganizationof the state and the process
of its organic life in relation firstto itself,and secondly to
otherstates" (? 271).
It is not necessary,forour presentpurpose, to give even a
resume of Hegel's exposition of the political state,as the organized and publicly-expressedwill of its people. Its articulate form follows fromthe distinctionof the universal,the
particular,and the individual,and theircombinationin a concrete and living unity. He declares that, as to form,that
of a constitutionalmonarchyis the peculiar achievementof
the modernworld,emphasizing the constitutionaland repre-

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The Ethicsof JIegel.

I93

sentativeelements as well as the monarchicalone. We have

essentiallythe same articulationof the three elements in our
monarchicaldemocracy,and England the same in her democratic monarchy. He was specially favorableto the English
form,in referenceto which he utteredhis well-knownsaying
that the king was " but a dot upon the i." The King or the
President may equally be the mouth-pieceof the personality
of the state,the crown,-or the necessarydot over the i,-of
the whole moral organismof the state. What he says about
laws as the express formsof the content of substantial freedom, of the constitutionas the express will of the people, of
the functionand moral temper of the officersin the whole
departmentof civil (public) service, of suffragebeing restrictedto representativesof definiteinterestsorganizedunder
the commonwealth,of freedomand equality,and of the double
formand worth of public opinion,is admirable. So, too, is
what he says as to (b) internationalpolity. He recognizedthat
any one national spiritis a limited one, that no one state can
be the " terrestrialgod," or realize the full natureof man as
a political animal. Hence he turnsto (c) universalhistoryto
find the law of the developmentof man as man. Here he
gives his interpretationof the autobiographyof humanity,
whose individuals are nations,progressivelyand consciously
realizingthe idea of freedom,and enteringupon theirrightful
heritage. It is thus throughoutan ethical consideration of
universalhistory,an ethical estimationof the course of man's
thoughtsand deeds, underDivine guidance,to the largest and
most rationalformof self-realization.
Beforenotingthe ethical principlesin Hegel's " Philosophy
of History," however, we may turn aside to reflectbriefly
upon the significanceof Hegel's "Ethical World" (Sittlichkeit). It is not merelythe customarybut the vital union of
ethosand pathos. The pathos as active emotion has externalized itselfin customs and institutions,
but does not therefore
cease to act. It continuesto be the active element in the observance of its own customs. This ethicalworld includes the
national manners,customs,laws, and institutionsin which the
freedomand rationalityof the communal spirithas embodied

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InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.

itself. Family, state, school, church, social, scientific,and

of this freespiritof man
literarycircles are all manifestations
are the formsof subThey
self-realization.
for
in its struggle
stantialfreedomwhich exist in some degree in the lowest
form of society. They are conventionallyrecognized forms
of "the good" which alone enables one to specifythe categorical imperative. They are more: they are the self-specificationsof the communal spiritseeking to be good,-the outcome of the Moralitit of the social soul,-the good or moral
mannersspringingfromits relative rationalityand freedom.
Conscience has had some might,and has, to some extent,
formedand ruled the ethicalworld. It has had mightenough
to formdecalogues in all the circles of social activity. The
communityhas an insightor conviction,and organizes it into
and thus makes its freespiritsubstana law or an institution,
tial. The ethical will of any people is thus relativelyselfrealized. It thus enacts itselfand specifieswhat its " common
good" consistsin. The individualasking what good he must
do, findshere his firstdefiniteanswer. He is not put to the
impossibletask of framinga moralityforhimself,but is born
into the obligationof enteringinto,sustaining,and furthering
the moral world into which he is born as a member. His
privatejudgment must thus be based upon a public source
and standard. Hence Hegel says, "The strivingfor a moralityof one's own is futile,and by its very natureimpossible
of attainment; in regardto morality,the saying of the wisest
man of antiquityis the only true one,-to be moral is to live
in accordance with the moral traditions of one's country"
(Hegel's " Werke," vol. i. p. 400). The Indian of any tribe
is a more moral man for being a loyal tribal man than he
would be if he ignoredall tribaland domestic relations. No
absolutelybad (sittenlos) man can exist. Such isolationwould
be instantaneoussuicide. Homer thus ridiculed the idea of
such a being or thing:
" No tribe,nor state,norhome bathhe."

Even the babe in his cradle and Simon on his pillar and
Crusoe on his island have theirsubstantialworththroughpast

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The Ethics of Hegel.

195

or presentrelationto a social tissue. No one any more than

Hamlet creates his own duties. Every one is born into an
objective ethical world. His only task is to realize himself
by fulfillingthese objective duties of his station. But does
this not land us in a Chinese state of immobileconservatism?
Does this not implythat the customaryis the ultimate,that
the existing status of our ethical circle is identicalwith the
ideal, or the " is" withthe " ought to be" ? Certainlythis is
not the doctrineof Hegel as to the progressiveconsciousness
and realizationof freedom. Loyalty to conventionalmorality
is only a prerequisite to reflectiveconscientiousness,which
asks and strives afterbetter formsof social self-realtzation.
Hegel recognizes no finalityin temporal institutions. He
sets or sees the negative dialectic always and everywhereat
and reformingthe ethical world
work criticising,overturning,
in its progress into the absolute spirit,-the realm of art,
religion,and philosophy,in which alone complete self-realization is possible to the human spirit. Here Hegel's doctrine
of the developmentof " the moral Ideal" is in place. This
has been thoroughlyworked out forthe individualin Green's
"Prolegomena to Ethics," and forthe race in Hegel's " Philosophy of History." For the individual,in the lowest stage
of his social (and actual) life,there is a commongood already
realized, into whose inheritancehe enters. Loyalty to this
fostersconscientiousnesswhich leads to reform. Progress,
while an advance upon the customarymorality,is not a product of mere privateconscience,but is the outgrowthof the
ideal embodied in the conventionalforms,which come to be
more and more fulfilledin higherformsand richercontent.
Finality means sterilityin morals as well as in all other
spheres. Hegel gives ample recognitionof this elementof
conscientiousness, or principle of subjective freedom, announced firstby Socrates and given its infiniteworth by
Christ,so as to be reallycreativeof the modernethical world
in distinctionfrom that of the ancient,which mechanically
subjugatedthe individualto the tyrannyof his social environHis ethical world
ment (" Philosophie des Rechts," ? 124).
absorbs and demands the constantactivityof this element of

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i96

InternationalY7ournalof Ethics.

conscientiousness,as the necessarydynamic in the progress

of social man into the consciousness and realizationof freedom. In the course of its activityit passes through many
phases, rationaland irrational. He shows the course of its
own dialecticin his " Phaenomenologiedes Geistes," of which
Dr. Harris has given an excellent expository resume in his
"Hegel's Logic." *
In his " Philosophische Propaedeutic" (Werke, vol. xviii.)
he definesethics as " the science of the human will in relation
of particularwill to the universalor rationalwill" (? i). The
individual acts or determinesitselffromwithin to actualize
itselfin-some of the solicitingformsof action,and hence has
responsibility
(? 8). Duty demands both elements,-the right
deed and the rightintentionor disposition. Moralityis conand demands that the specific
cerned directlywith intention,
deeds be done out of simple regard for duty (? 33). This
moral dispositionis thus essential to his fulfillinghis duties
to himself,his family,the state,and society (? 40). It is this
subjective element of intentionin the performanceof these
duties that constitutes"virtue." Hegel wrote his "Rechts
Philosophie" when this doctrine of subjective freedomwas
being pushed to the limitsof anarchy in all realms of thought
and practice. This doubtless made him emphasize more
stronglythe side of the objective contentof all duty. The
abstract freedom of the " Age of Reason" was producing
revolt against all external authoritiesas a phase of " private
judgment." He recognized the Aufklaerungas a subjective
reaction in the realm of ethical institutions. In his " Phaenomenologie" he traces the course of the individual obeying
implicitlyprescribedformstill blind obedience becomes openeyed insightintotheirrationality. But these laws being found
to be rationaland self-imposed,the individual claims that his
* ProfessorF. H. Bradley has also, I believe, given a thoroughly
unique ex'of
positionof this in his " Ethical Studies," which, however,is. unfortunately
avail onlyto the fewwho happento possess a copy of this" out of print"book.
Many would gladlybuy,borrow,or even steal this desirablevolume. I never
succeeded in morethanstealinga hastyreadingof it some yearsago. It ought
to be reprinted.

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The Ethicsof Hegel.

I97

reason is competentto criticiseall laws and to formulatenew

ones. This leads rapidlyto a revoltagainst established institutions and codes and culminates in a reign of distrustand
terror. This is more fullybrought out in the latter part of
his " Philosophy of History." Hence Hegel emphasized
the suicidal nature of this revolt,and proclaimed anew the
living way of self-realizationthrough the established ethical institutionof state and church. He still maintainedthe
subjectiveelement in his conservativeemphasis upon the establishedmoral order. There must be a consciousness that
the commongood is one's own good and a cordial recognition
of the customaryas the relativelyrational to which one voluntarilyconforms. To know and do those thingswhich the
social communityof which he is a memberdemands must be
done frominsight into theirvalue as self-realizingactivities.
He musttransmutethe customaryinto the personal, making
out of this raw material the elementsof his own formedwill
or character. He must interprethis social environmentso as
to create his imperativeideal. This reflectiveappreciationof
objective formsof moralityis necessaryto make them a moral
person's own duties. They really become his duties,in the
highestsense,throughthis personal recognitionand adoption
of them as forms of self-realization. Absolute inwardness,
making the merelyobjective subjective and personal,is the
very essence of the Reformationprinciple,the proclamation
of which was the unfurlingof the final banner of free spirit.
Hegel insistsupon thiswith utmostemphasis in his " Philosophy of History" (p. 433). In social, political,and religious
relationsthisprivateconscience is ultimate. The acquiescence
in any established order must be ex animo and intelligentin
order to be moral. The dispositionor moraltempercan alone
maintainthe sovereigntyof any ethical institution(" Philosophy of History," p. 468). Conscious effortto realize one's
own conceptionof good he held to be a higherstage of moral
to any customs,however good.
temperthan blind conformity
Only one's own conceptionsmust be rooted and grounded in
and formedout of the social conceptionsabout him. That is,
privatejudgment is ultimate,but its contentis of worth only

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I98

International_ournal of Ethics.

as it has been universalizedbeyond all merelysubjectiveconceits. The individual'smoral ideal is to be developed out of
existing moral realities.
In his " Philosophyof History" he shows how the successive ethical institutionsand ideals are developed forman universal, through nations as individuals. In the progress of
man into the consciousness and realizationof substantialfreedom, the drama of self-educationunder divine teaching proceeds by fixedsteps. The Oriental nations knew that onethe despot-was free. In Greece and Rome individualities
are developed,and some become conscious of theirfreedom.
Finally, with the Germanicworld,under the inspirationof a
reformedChristianity,maturityis reached, and it is known
that all men (man as man) are free. Throughout this drama
of historythereis, however,the guiding hand of Providence.
Nations may fretand toil and advance, rise, ripen,and rot,
but the drama continuesits teleological progresstowards the
attainmentof the spiritualfreedomof man in conscious Godsonship, because of the immanent Providence who always
rules and transcendsall the acts of the drama. Hegel sees one
increasing purpose run through the ages because he sees
God in history. Man proposes and God disposes, making
even the wrathof man to praise him. His guidance is not
arbitraryor artificial,but remains the unchanging condition
of all human endeavor at self-realization.
The visible result,the progressiverealizationof freedomby
man,affordsthe " true theodicy,the justificationof God in history." Such is the triumphantconclusion of his " Philosophy
of History." And this affordsus an answerto a question that
forces itself upon us in studying Hegel's ethics. Does he
carryethics up into the sphere of absolute spirit as he does
art,religion,and philosophy; or does he leave them below
in the objectiveworld? Are theymerely" secular ethics,"or
does he give a metaphysic of ethics which enswathes, permeates, and elevates them to the sphere of absolute spirit?
We answer no and yes. Noo! He did not formallytreatof
the science of absolute ethics (Sittlichkeit). He did not formally develop the science of the metaphysicof ethics. He

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The Ethics of Hegel.

I99

did not formallycarryit over into the realm of absolute spirit

along withart,religion,and philosophy. But neither did he
ever proclaim any formof ethical lifeas ultimate. No state
ever exhaustedthe ethicalcapacityof man. Universalhistory,
too, is seen to be an ever-tendingand never-endingprocess
towardsthe perfectionof man. To know and to be himself
is the constant endeavor of man that Hegel traces in his
" Philosophyof History." But note that it is neverman apart
fromGod that makes any progress. The all-animatingcause
of progressis the immanentdivine spirit,and everystep forward is reallypossible only through this Divine metaphysic
of all knowing and doing. Yes! Hegel throughoutall his
works is laboring to bring this Divine metaphysicsto men's
conscious recognition,in which alone, he maintains,can men
and states find their proper realization (" Philosophie des
Rechts," ? 360).
In his " Phaenomenologie,"Hegel makes the transitionfrom
ethics to religionthroughthe act of forgivenessof the wicked.
This negationof a negation is the mind's majestic act in ascending fromthe sphere of the finiteand relativeto its native
home with absolute spirit. This is the sphere of religion,
where all the discords and failuresof the ethical sphere are
transcendedand transmutedby the spirit's union with God.
Thus the ethicalconsciousness restsupon and is possible only
throughits relationof dependence upon religion as its own
higher form. Ethical man, in his most comprehensiveand
ripest earthlyrelations is not a little god by himself Selfrealizationis impossible even in the widest ethical (Siatlicze)
institutions. Personalitycan only approximate realizationin
conscious relationwiththe Absolute Personality. Thus ethics,
as the science of man, reaches its highestform in Christian
ethics,-that is, in that formand spiritof lifecongruous with
the Christianconceptionof man. " The measureof the stature
of the fulnessof Christ" is the normof man's self-realization.
The Christian." secularizationof morals" means the realization of the kingdomof God on earth. Any lower view really
dehumanizes man in abstractinghim fromall that is most
essential and substantial. The new birth into Christ and his

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200

International7/ournalof Ethics.

kingdom is the absolutely essential condition of a normal

ethical lifeon earth. To live arightone must love aright,for
what one loves he lives. Hence Christianlove is the all-comprehensive activity,which is the conditionof ethical life in
the individual and society. In all ethical (Sittliche)spheres
man is relativelyrealizing himselfunder the "disposing" of
God, however, he himself may " propose." Thus we see
of man in the family,
Hegel findinga relativeself-realization
which is organic to a larger life in society. In the state the
same process goes on, and transitionis made to the largerlife
in " universal history." But universal hisof self-realization
toryagain is seen to manifestthe inadequatenessof attainment,
and becomes organic to the perfectconsummationof man in
the discoveryand adoption of the revealed will of God as the
absolute standardof an ethical life,so that man becomes consciously a child of God and a co-worker with Him. This
insightattained,the process begins of living anew and aright
in all the established ethical institutions,of imbuing the
secular with the divine, of secularizing the divine, of the
maintenance of the kingdom of God on earth through
domestic, social, civil, political, and religious institutions.
The Christianbanneris the final bannerof freespirit,recogwhich
nizing its own work in the so-called secular institutions
All
declares
to be
these
Hegel
and
animates.
creates
it
" nothingelse than religion manifestingitselfin the relations
of the actual world." " The Gospel in the Secular life"expresses in brief Hegel's ultimateconceptionof ethics. " The
spiritfindsthe goal of its struggle,and its harmonizationin
that very sphere which it (as medieval ecclesiasticism)made
the object of its resistance; it findsthatsecular pursuitsare a
spiritualoccupation"(" Philosophy of History,"p. 369).
That whichvitalizesand moralizeseach one of these secular
spheres,that which is theirconstantpresuppositionand lifetheir metaphysic-is the life of God in the mind and heart
of social man, guiding,luring,and impelling him on to selfrealizationin the sustainingenvironmentof spiritual,substantial freedom,-the republicof God. Thus Hegel findsethics
to be not an abstractdecalogue fallingstraightfromheaven,

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A Palnmof Peace from GermanSoil.

201

but rathera slowly-worked-outprocess of the heavenlyin the

earthlysphere. Limit of space precludes the giving of even
drama of this world-process
a faintpictureof the magnificent
of History." Fortuin
"Philosophy
Hegel's
as presented
natelythis work is well translated in " Bohn's Philosophical
Library,"and may be commended to the reader who desires
to see these dry bones of his ethical system clad with all the
beauty and vigor of incarnate,thinkingwill.
j. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

A PALM OF PEACE FROM GERMAN SOIL.

" And theyshall beat theirswords into ploughshares,and their spears into
pruning-hooks:nationshall notliftup sword against nation,neithershall they
learn war any more."
FORTY years ago the pen of a woman played a considerable partin bringingabout the abolitionof slaveryin America.
If, as many of us to-day ferventlywish, as some of us are
sanguine enough to hope, the substitutionof international
courts of arbitrationforthe arbitramentof bloodshed be destined to forma main line of Westernprogressin the twentieth
century,a woman's pen will again be entitledto count among
the forces that have wrought the change. "The hour and
the book" bids fair to apply to " Die Waffennieder!"* as it
applied to "Uncle Tom's Cabin."
Thinkers, moralists, reconstructersof the social fabric,
science, industry,commerce, the irresistiblelogic of the
salient factsof modern life,have all been hard at work on
the task of weakeningin " civilized" man the ingrainedfighting impulses inherited from his rough-hewn forefathers.
"Sappers and miners"of this kind may ply their mattocks
long before the strokes begin perceptiblyto tell. Of a sudden thereare signs thatthe old orderis tottering. Its founda*" Die Waffennieder! Eine Lebensgeschichte"(" Lay down your Arms!
The Storyof a Life"), von Bertha von Suttner. 2 vols. E. Pierson,Dresden
and Leipzig. I891.
VOL.

II.-No.

14

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