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Islamic State seems unlikely to take over the entire region as some of the more
apocalyptic analyses suggested last year. The challenge, therefore, is to limit its spread in
a relatively limited space and then push it back.
The group has had some high-profile recent victories, most notably Ramadi in Iraq and
Palmyra in Syria. Unlike the old al Qaeda, holding territory is central to the groups
reason for existing. If it cannot retain its territory, by its own terms it is a failure.
Mounting hit-and-run attacks, even against the West, would not be enough. Thats why
the Ramadi and Palmyra victories are so important, making up for much larger territorial
losses elsewhere in Iraq.
No nation with the possible exception of Iran has a coherent strategy against
Islamic State. The United States and the West have one strategy for Iraq, and slightly less
than a strategy for Syria. But thats not as stupid as it sounds. Defeating Islamic State in
Iraq would destroy the groups legitimacy, and undermine both its appeal to new recruits
and its ability to intimidate those in the region.
Part of Islamic States stated aim is to dismantle the Iraq-Syria border and carve out a
new territory across the region. Most experts say that letting either country fall apart is
simply so messy that almost no one really wants it. Iraqs primary ethnicities Sunni,
Shiite and Kurd may not like each other, but the country cannot be redrawn into
viable separate entities. Sunnis and Kurds both benefit from oil revenue from the Shiite
south and its not clear that a small Shiite state would be able to protect those
resources.
Two years ago, some analysts suggested that Syria could unravel. But today thats much
less likely. More probable, diplomats quietly say, is a deal whereby someone in
Damascus probably not Bashar al-Assad remains in control of a country with the
same current borders. Few expect that to be quick.
That means that the question of how the Islamic State war ends is really a question about
what a viable post-war Iraq and Syria might look like.
The problem now, says former UK Director Special Forces Graeme Lamb an adviser
to U.S. commanders like Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal is that the Shiite-run Iraqi
government is so dependent on Shiite militia and Iranian support that many Sunni now
fear the departure of Islamic State. They suspect it may simply be followed by brutal
reprisals and savage ethnic domination.
Changing the narrative, Lamb believes, ultimately comes down to creating a roadmap to
a future Iraq in which those groups feel much safer. If Sunni groups see that as a potential
reality, they might be persuaded to turn on Islamic State, just as some did against al
Qaeda during the surge. But that shift requires a very different Iraqi political environment
than exists today.
During the 2007-9 surge, local Sunni leaders were won over by a combination of
promised political reform and their growing frustration with foreign al Qaeda fighters.
Repeating that may be tough. But that does not make it impossible.
In Syria, Western governments lack the kind of understanding they gradually obtained in
Iraq.
Most Western and other officials increasingly believe the high-level deal will be done
elsewhere, probably between Russia and the West and regional powers. That will
probably mean easing Assad aside somehow, perhaps with a deal for immunity from
prosecution.
To win and preserve its caliphate, Islamic State faces huge problems. The history of nonstate groups trying to carve out larger amounts of territory in the face of strong
government opposition is not a happy one. The Tamil Tigers failed last decade. Nigerias
breakaway Biafra failed in the 1960s. The South didnt manage it in the American Civil
War.
There are, of course, a handful of exceptions: Kosovo, Eritrea, South Sudan. But to be
recognized and established, they required a degree of international acceptance and
backing that it is almost impossible to imagine for Islamic State.
The mismatch between a non-state group and its government is enormous. The latter can
call on international financial aid, buy weapons, or rely on intelligence support, advice
and equipment from other governments. Islamic State might be rich in terms of militant
groups, but it is already feeling the squeeze.
In May, Israeli intelligence told foreign reporters that total Islamic State revenues had
dropped from $65 million a month in the middle of last year to some $20 million now.
Oil income in particular had fallen, even as taxes and ransoms rose both potentially
helping alienate the populations now under Islamic State control.
Coalition airstrikes are also having an effect, as will new weapons deliveries. A lack of
anti-tank weapons, experts say, was a major factor in the loss of Ramadi. In the Syrian
Kurdish town of Kobane, the combination of the two held Islamic State back and denied
the group a crucial propaganda victory.
Extra U.S. and allied advisers could also make a difference although too many might
simply be viewed as a renewed foreign occupation.
To be beaten, however, Islamic State has to look as though it is losing. It isnt there yet.
This piece was originally published on Reuters.com on June 19, 2015.
Project for the Study of the 21st Century is a non-national, non-ideological, non-partisan
organization. All opinions are the author's own.