People VS Camba

G.R. No. L-36471

FACTS:

A "Bluebirds Bus" with plate No. 200 was on its usual Guadalupe, Makati, to Quiapo, Manila, and return run on
October 10, 1972. One of those in the bus was Rodrigo Eser, a mechanic, who was tasked to service it.
According to Eser who was seated at the rear, three men boarded the bus under the Quezon bridge in Quiapo
on its return trip to Guadalupe. Near Tejeron street, many of the passengers debarked, including two of the
three men who had boarded under Quezon bridge.
A passenger shouted that his wrist watch had been snatched whereupon Patrolman Reynaldo Gongora who
was in uniform and also a passenger went to the rear of the bus in order to assist the victim of the snatching
but before he could do so the third man who was left behind stabbed Patrolman Gongora. the assailant was
Carlos Camba who was able to escape. It was then about 5:40 p.m.
Camba pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 20, 1972.
After trial, he was sentenced as guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery with assault upon an agent of a person in authority and there being no modifying circumstance to
consider, the Court sentences him to DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased herein, REYNALDO
GONGORA y STA. ANA, the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the latter, the sum of P10,000.00 by way of
moral damages, the sum of P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
In the light of the foregoing, it is useful to note the comment of the court a quo as follows:
It is the observation of the Court that the crime committed is more of robbery with homicide for the reason
that Pat. Reynaldo Gongora was killed while responding to the call for help of a victim of snatching and it has
been held that in case of robbery with homicide, it is not necessary that the person killed is the very victim of
robbery. The person killed may even be one of the robbers (People vs. Carunungan, CA-G.R. 9986-R, October
17, 1957; People vs. Cardon,et al., CA 56 O.G. 3404).
Automatic review of a decision which imposed the death penalty on CARLOS V. CAMBA.

ISSUE:

THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT
THAT WHAT WAS PROVEN WAS A DIFFERENT CRIME NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE OFFENSE CHARGED
NOR DOES THE OFFENSE CHARGED NECESSARILY IN-INCLUDE THE OFFENSE PROVED.

HELD:

A careful scrutiny of the information will readily reveal that the charge against the appellant is robbery with
homicide. This is manifest from the phrase, "while the latter (the deceased) was responding to a robberysnatching case." In fact, the appellant's brief makes the same conclusion; it says, "a close scrutiny of the same
information reveals that the crime committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide."
It should be borned in mind in this connection that the label or caption in the information in respect of the
crime committed is not controlling what matters are the material allegations in the information. Also to be
noted is the correct observation by the court a quo that the evidence proved that the crime committed was
robbery with homicide and that there can be such a crime albeit the person killed was not the robbery victim.
Since the charge in the information is robbery with homicide and the evidence is to the same effect, the
mistake in designating the crime both in the information and in the judgment is not fatal.
The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery but without any other modifying
circumstance. The crime was compounded, according to the trial court, with assault upon an agent of a person
in authority. In this light the appropriate penalty, pursuant to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is death.
If it be held as We do that the crime committed was robbery with homicide, the result will be the same for the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and contempt of public authority will have to be assigned.
The death penalty, however, cannot be imposed on the appellant who was only 20 years old when he
committed the crime for lack of the necessary votes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is modified by reducing the sentence on the appellant to
reclusion perpetua and consolidating the damages in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as
to costs.

Buhat vs CA
265 SCRA 701
Quick Facts: An information for Homicide was filed against Danny Buhat. After arraignment and plea of not guilty, the
Secreatary of Justice granted the appeal and ordered the chief prosecutor to amend the information upgrading the
offense to MURDER and implead additional accused.
Facts:

On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against petitioner
Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe".

The information alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully
attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, "using superior
strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which were x x x the direct x x x cause of his death."

Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the arraignment on the
ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for homicide.

Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion.
Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded "not guilty", trial ensued.

On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yu's appeal meritorious, ordered
the City Prosecutor of Roxas City "to amend the information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead
therein additional accused Herminia Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat."

Amendent information:

"The undersigned assistant City Prosecutor accuses DANNY BUHAT, of Capricho II, Barangay V, Roxas City, Philippines.
HERMINIA ALTAVAS AND OSMEA ALTAVAS both resident' of Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Philippines, of the crime of
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the l6th day of October, 1992, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, the above-named accused, Danny
Buhat armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did and then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously [sic] without justifiable motive and with intent to kill, attack, stab and injure one RAMON
GEORGE YU, while the two other accused held the arms of the latter, thus using superior strength, inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of said Ramon George Yu in such amount as maybe [sic] awarded to them by the court under the provisions
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW."

The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.

In an order,6 dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend information. The denial was
premised on (1) an invocation of the trial court's discretion in disregarding the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as
allegedly held in Crespo vs. Mogul and (2) a conclusion reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest
prosecutor is more persuasive than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having actually conducted the
preliminary investigation "where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigated

The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed a petition for certiorari
assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave to amend information.


COURT OF APPEALS: -allowed the amendment of information from homicide to murder, and the inclusion of
Herminia Altavas and Osmea Altavas as additional accused. (Finding the proposed amendment as nonprejudicial to
petitioner's rights, respondent court granted the petition for certiorari in a decision, dated March 28, 1995.)
Issues:
1.

WON the additional allegation of conspiracy is a substantial amendment. NO

2.
WON the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is such a
substantial amendment that it is disallowed if made after the accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of
homicide.
Held/Ratio: NO
1.

On the additional allegation of conspiracy

The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioner's participation as principal not
having been affected by such amendment

General rule: the allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents accused, which was not
previously included in the original information, is x x x a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the
need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court(people vs Montenegro)

Exception: where an amendment after plea resulting in the inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy and in the
indictment of some other persons in addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment
permissible even after arraignment(people vs. Zulueta)

The aforegoing principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely applies in the present
controversy

Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu whom petitioner is alleged to
have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring,
confederating and helping one another" does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in the
killing.

Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to defend himself as the People
makes a case against him and secures for public protection the punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using
superior strength, a fellow citizen in whose health and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no
tenable basis to decry the amendment in question.

Furthermore, neither may the amendment in question be struck down on the ground that Herminia Altavas,
Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat would be placed in double jeopardy by virtue of said amendment. In the first place,
no first jeopardy can be spoken of insofar as the Altavases are concerned since the first information did not precisely
include them as accused therein. In the second place, the amendment to replace the name, "John Doe" with the name
of Renato Buhat who was found by the Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the arms of the
victim while petitioner was stabbing him,18 is only a formal amendment and one that does not prejudice any of the
accused's rights.

Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused involves merely a matter of form
as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature
of the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does not change the theory of
the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material fact.19 In fact, it is to he expected that the information has
to be amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor

2.

On the amendment of the name of the crime to MURDER.

"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information charging homicide, the
amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible even after
arraignment


In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo,we ruled that the amendment of the information so as to change the crime
charged from homicide to murder, may be made "even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused."

At the outset, the main consideration should be whether or not the accused had already made his plea under
the original information, for this is the index of prejudice to, and the violation of, the rights of the accused.

The question as to whether the changing of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of
murder is a substantial amendment proscribed after the accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide
was, it should be noted, categorically answered in the affirmative by us in the case of Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy.

The said case(Dacuycuy) however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein sustain a contrary
holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
"x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat stabbing the deceased Ramon while his
two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon, thus, 'the Information already alleged superior strength'; and
inflicting mortal wounds which led to the death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).

Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional allegation that the deceased
was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe
and Richard Doe....

If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then to repeat, there is murder

Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not allowing change of designation from
homicide to murder, but then the body of the Information in the Dacuycuy ruling did not allege averments which
qualifies [sic] the offense of murder. The case before us instead is different in that the Information already alleges that
Buhat attacked the deceased while his two other companions held him by the aims, 'using superior strength.' x x x We
would even express the possibility that if supported by evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could still be penalized for
murder even without changing the designation from homicide to murder, precisely because of aforementioned
allegations. The proposed change of the word from homicide to murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should
be prohibited

In the matter of amending a criminal information, what is primarily guarded against is the impairment of the
accused's right to intelligently know the nature of the charge against him. This right has been guaranteed the accused
under all Philippine Constitutions26 and incorporated in Section 1 (b), Rule 115, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical
name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits x x x. That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged.

The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the matter therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence
to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right how the law denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of
that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal x x x. For his full and complete defense he need not know the
name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights.

The real and important question to him is, 'Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?' not, 'Did
you commit a crime named murder?' If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what
the name of the crime is and fixes the penaly therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or
what it is named. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in

no way affect the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the
information.

Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that having already pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, the
amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial
to his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the
original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim "using superior strength." And this particular
allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a killing is technically designated in the information filed
by the public prosecutor.
NOTE:
On another aspect, we find merit in the manifestation of the Solicitor General to the effect that the respondent Court of
Appeals erroneously supposed that petitioner and Renato Buhat are one and the same person, hence the non-inclusion
of Renato Buhat as additional accused in its order allowing the amendment of the information.38 We also agree with
the observation of the Solicitor General that the amended information filed in this case still fails to embody the correct
identity of all of the persons found to be indictable in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Explained the Solicitor
General:
"In its Decision under review, the Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are one
and the same person (CA Decision, 1st par.). This, however, is not correct because Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are,
in fact, brothers. Moreover, it was not Osmea Altavas and his wife Herminia Altavas who held the arms of the victim
while Danny Buhat stabbed him.
Verily, the statement of facts in the Information or Amended Information must conform with the findings of fact in the
preliminary investigation (in this case, as reviewed by the Secretary of Justice) so as to make it jibe with the evidence x
x x to be presented at the trial x x x.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas City is HEREBY
ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information fully in accordance with the findings of fact set forth in the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, dated February 3, 1994, and in disregard of the finding of the Court of Appeals in
its Decision, dated March 28, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 3 55 54 to the effect that "Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are
one and the same person."

Sec.14, Rule 110

Case 14
Teehankee Jr. vs. Madayag et.al
FACTS:
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19,1991 in an information for the crime of frustrated murder.
That on July 13, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati and within its jurisdiction, the accused with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did there and wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack and shoot one Maureen
Navarro Hultman.
But because of timely and able medical assistance to said Maureen Navarro Hultman, it prevented her death.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence.
However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Then, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of the court to file an amended
information and admit said amended information.
In the amended information said Claudio Tehankee Jr., armed with a handgun with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did there and wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman
who was hit in her head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which caused her death.

 Petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack ofa preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge ordered that a plea of not guilty.
Respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence.
Petitioners counsel manifested that he could not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised.
Trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation , after
the prosecution has rested on the original information , may legally and validly admitted.
RULING:
There is an identity of the offense s charged both in the original and the amended information. What is involved here
is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the execution of the same offense
from frustrated to consummated murder.
We hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and the filing of the amended information for
murder is proper.
Instant petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Sec. 15, Rule110

Case 15
UBP and Tomas vs. People G.R. No. 192565
FACTS:

Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC for making a false narration in a
certificate against forum shopping.

That on or about March 13, 2000 in the City of Makati and within the jurisdiction of this honourable court ,
accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires.

Accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with a
prayer for a writ of replevin civil case no.324-00 of Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, that UBP has not commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency.

Accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a wilful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood.

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks (2) complaints for sum of money with a prayer for a
writ of replevin against the spouse Eddie and Elisa Tamondong and a John Doe.

The 1st complaint,Civil case No. 90-0717, was filed before the RTC , branch 109,Pasay City on Apr. 13, 1998.

The 2nd complaint, Civil Case No. 324-000 was filed on Mar. 15, 2000 and ratified to the MeTC, branch 47,
Pasay City .

Both complaint showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.

Tomas filed a Motion to citing 2 grounds

1.
She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was submitted and used and not the MeTC-Makati City.
2.

That the facts charged do not constitute an offense because

a.

the 3rd element of perjury was not alled with particularity.

b.

There was no other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency.

c.
She was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the information make out a
perjury by giving false affidavit.

Metc denied the Motion to quash, rulin that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. Also that the allegations sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.

The MeTC-Makati City denied Tomas for reconsideration.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati
City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in US v. Canet and Illusorio v.Bildner which ruled that
venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

The RTC-Makati reiterated that the criminal action shall be instituted and triedin the court of the municipality
or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Since the subject document, the execution of which was the subject matter charge was subscribed and sworn
to in Manila, then the court of said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action.

The City court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and set aside the case of perjury.

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioners pray to reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the information for perjury against Tomas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC should be in Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or in Pasay City where the Certification was presented to the trial
court.
RULING:

Court denied the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take
cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has jurisdiction to hear and try the case. The reason for this
rule is 2 fold
1.
The jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try
cases involving crimes within its territorial jurisdiction.
2.
Laying the venue in the locus crminisis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial
in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.