18. Riera v.

Palmaroli
Facts:
Juan Pons was a Spanish subject who died in Manila. He was married to Antonia Rierra who, at the time
of Pons death, was residing in Palma de Mallorca. The Consul General for Spain in the Phil Islands
produced a will and asked that it be admitted to probate. Because of the distance of Manila from Palma
de Mallorca and the European War, the widow did not have any news until some time later. When she
found out, she opposed the petition for probate however this was denied on the ground that more than 6
months has elapsed since the order of the court. The will deprives the widow opportunity to oppose the
probate and she alleges that the formalities required by law were not complied with hence the case at bar.
Issue: W/N a rehearing can be ordered it being alleged that the widow was prevented from participating in
the probate of the will and that will was not executed in the formalities required by law
Held: NO!
The SC may have the power to set aside any judgment, order or proceeding under Sec. 113 however
under Sec. 513 this power is limited to granting a new trial upon judgments rendered upon default. The
default intended here can only arise in contentious litigations where a party has been impleaded as a
defendant and served with process but fails to appear or to answer. The proceeding to probate is a will is
not a contentious litigation because nobody is impleaded or served with process. It is a special
proceeding, and although notice of the application is published, nobody is bound to appear and no order
for judgment by default is ever entered.
The action of the court admitting a will to probate has the full effect of a judgment and is entitled to full
faith and credence in other courts. The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered a
proceeding in rem hence binding on all person in interest whether they appear to contest the probate or
not. The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no way involves the intrinsic validity
of its provisions. In the case at bar, if it should appear later upon the distribution of the estate of Juan
Pons that any provision in the will is contrary to law then the law will prevail. The widow can then go to
court at the proper juncture and discuss the question of the validity of the will as it affects her interests
adversely.
21. Intestate Estate of Fr. Aranas
Facts: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church died and executed a Last Will and
Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. The properties of Group C in the last will
and testament stated as follows: The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator
by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the
produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the
produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul.The petitioners
filed a "Motion for the Declaration of Heirs and Partition; and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente
Aranas) and/or for his Permission to Resign, and appointment of His Successor" that the "perpetual
inalienability and administration of the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas,
administered by Vicente Aranas, is null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in setting aside its order dated November 17, 1977 and in not
applying the provisions on Usufruct of the New Civil Code with respect to the properties referred to as
Group "C" in the Last Will and Testament.
Ruling: It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated November 17, 1977
was already final and not subject to correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only
regarding the determination of additional heirs. Such contention is not worthy of credence. Respondents
in their Memorandum allege and it is not disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17, 1977 has
not yet become final because it was received only on January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent
Vicente Aranas and the Motion for Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated

January 17, 1978 was filed by the said respondent within the reglementary period. Besides the validity or
invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions would affect the determination of heirs.
It was also proven conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that he was instituted as a
remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last Will and Testament by way of usufructuary. Likewise the
right of the Roman Catholic Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory
lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from the date of the effectivity of said legacy, was also
established. The instant petition is hereby dismissed.
24. Bugnao vs. Ubag
Issue: Execution of wills; while a number of a contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing
witnesses to will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or a single contradiction as to a
particular incident to which the attention of such witnesses must have been directed, may in certain cases
justify the conclusion that the alleged witnesses were not present, together, at the time when the alleged
will was executed, a mere lapse of memory on the part of these witnesses as to the precise details of an
unimportant incident, to which his attention was not directed, does not necessarily put in doubt the truth
and veracity of the testimony in support of the execution of the will.
Testamentary capacity defined; proof of the existence of all the elements in the following definition of
testamentary capacity, which was frequently been adopted in the U.S , held sufficient to establish the
existence of such capacity in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances: Testamentary
capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at
that time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to
have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute
his property among the objects of his bounty.

Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra, it was declared:

Proof of the existence of all the elements in the following definition of testamentary capacity, which has
frequently been adopted in the United States, held sufficient to establish the existence of such capacity in
the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances: "Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the
testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of this bounty."
Digested case:
BUGNAO vs. UBAG September 18, 1909
HELD: The following requisite must be present for one to be able to be considered as having soundness
of mind or having testamentary capacity:1.Know the nature of the estate to be disposed of
2.The proper objects of his bounty 3.He must know the character of the testamentary act
.It is true that the testimony discloses the fact that the testator at that time of execution of the wi l was
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe attacks of asthma. But all the
evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary
capacity. Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he
has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what it is about and how or to whom he
is disposing of his property.
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES: The second paragraph gives the affirmative definition as made in the case of
Bugnao v. Ibag, 14Phil. 163.Soundness of mind requires: (a) that testator knows the nature of the estate
to be disposed of (character, ownership of what he is giving) (b) that testator knows the

proper objects of his bounty (by persons who for some reason expect to inherit something from him
like his children)(c) that testator knows the character of the testamentary act (that it is really a will, that it
is a disposition mortis causa, that it is essentially revocable)
DIGESTED CASE: TORRES, LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. LOPEZ February 26, 1926
FACTS: It was contended that the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the execution of
the will, he had senile dementia and was under guardianship.
HELD: The testator may have been of advanced years, may have been physically decrepit, may have
been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian, and may have
been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to
form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law
terms testamentary capacity. Only compete senile dementia will result to testamentary incapacity.
SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES: Idem; Effect of infirmity or disease. Neither is physical infirmity or disease
inconsistent with testamentary capacity, although there is no question that evidence of such fact is
admissible on the issue of testamentary capacity. Just as in the case of old age, the usual tests of
testamentary capacity must still have to be applied.31 Thus, it has been held that the fact that the testator,
at the time of the execution of the will, was suffering from the last stages of tuberculosis and asthma,32 or
from paralysis and loss of speech,33or from cholera,34 or from a combination of sleeping sickness,
insomnia, tuberculosis, and diabetes,35 will not affect his testamentary capacity, so long as it cannot be
proved by competent evidence that, at the time when the will was executed, he was no longer in a
position to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act. The same rule can be applied even if, at the time when the will was
being executed, the testator was so sick that it was necessary for somebody else to guide his hand in
order that he could sign it,36 or even if a few months before the execution of the will, the testator, who
was 85 years old, had a stroke of cerebral hemorrhage, with hemiplegia, caused by high blood
pressure.37 On the other hand, it has also been held that the fact that the testator, at the time of the
execution of the will, was already in a comatose or semi-comatose condition, caused by cerebral
hemorrhage,38 or byapoplexy,39 or by diarrhea and gastro-enteritis with complications of miocarditis,40
or by cerebralthrombosis,41 so that nothing around him could cause any impression or reaction, would
certainly destroy his testamentary capacity.