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JapansCurrentNuclearEnergyPolicy

Hirobumi Kayama
AgencyforNaturalResourcesandEnergy,METI
June,2015

Table of Contents

1. Nuclear Energy Policy in New Strategic Energy Plan of Japan


2. Efforts toward Restoration and Reconstruction of Fukushima
3. Existing Light Water Reactors
4. Reconstruction of Safety Culture
5. Promotion of Strategic Development of Technologies and
Human Resources
6. Establishment of Appropriate Business Environment under the
More Competitive Market
7. Contribution to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power and Nuclear
Non-proliferation in the World
1

1. Nuclear Energy Policy in the New Strategic Energy Plan of Japan


Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

Decided by the Cabinet in April, 2014

Introduction
We will do our utmost to achieve the reconstruction and recovery of Fukushima while reflecting on the
pains felt by the people affected by the accident at TEPCOs Fukushima nuclear accident. Needless to
say, that is the starting point for rebuilding Japans energy policy.

1.IssuesrelatedtotheenergysupplydemandstructureinJapan
Concerns over the safety of nuclear power generation and deteriorated public confidence in the
government and operators
Outflow of national wealth and increase in dependency on the Middle East, price of electricity and
greenhouse gas emission in Japan due to higher dependency on fossil fuels
North America's move toward independency of its energy supply by the shale-gas revolution and
widening gap of regional energy prices in the world

2.Basicpolicyregardingmeasuresconcerningenergysupplyanddemand
To pursue "Energy Security", "Economic Efficiency" and "Environment" on the premise of "Safety" as
the basic viewpoint, in consideration of "global viewpoint" and "economic growth
"Multilayered" supply structure where the strength of each energy source is to be maximized by
appropriately offsetting each other's weakness
More "flexible and efficient" energy supply-demand structure where various options are to be prepared
by various suppliers

(Ref.)ChangeofNuclearPowerGenerationOutputinJapan
AftertheGreatEastJapanEarthquakeandTEPCOs FukushimaDaiichiNuclearaccidentin
2011,allnuclearpowerplants(NPPs)areinastateoftemporaryshutdown.
hundredmillionkWh
3500

100%

Thermalpowerratio

90%

3000
80%
2500

70%
60%

2000

50%
1500

40%
30%

1000

Nuclearpowerratio

20%

500
10%
0%

0
1970

1972

1973oilcrisis
(October1973)

1974

1976

1979oilcrisis
(1979)

1978

1980

1982

ThreeMileIsland
accident
(March1979)

1984

1986

1988

Chernobylaccident
(August1986)

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Activationofthe
Malreporting
FrameworkConvention
incidentbyTEPCO
onClimateChange
(August2002)
(March1994)

2004

2006

2008

NiigataChuetsu
Earthquake,temporary
shutdownofTEPCOs
Kashiwazaki Kariwa
NPS(2007~)

2010

2012

TheGreatEastJapan
Earthquake,
TEPCOsFukushima
nuclearaccident
(March2011)

(Ref.)AdverseEffectsduetoShutdownofNPPsaftertheDisaster
(JPY1,000=EUR7.6)

EnergySecurity

Increase in dependency on fossil fuels from overseas


Fuel for 88% of total power generation is imported from overseas. FY2013
Before the Earthquake, it was 61% in FY 2010.
dependency on the Middle EastCrude oil (83), Natural gas (30)
Ratio of renewable energy : About 2.2% of total power generation (where Hydro
power generation is not included) FY2013
Increase in fuel cost (due to increase in thermal power generation)

NationsLife
and
Economy

About 3.4 trillion yenNational burden is about 30 thousand yen/person.)


estimation in FY2014
Increase in price of electricity
An average of about 20% increase from the level before the disaster
monthly price of standard familyTEPCO about 6,300yen about 8,600yen
KEPCO about 6,400yen about 8,200yen
Expenditures for the Feed-in-Tariff system of renewables is about 650 billion
yen/year which corresponds to 2,700yen/year for standard family)FY2014
Increase in greenhouse gas emissions as of FY2013

ClimateChange

The amount of CO2 emissions from general electricity utilities increased by about
110 million tons in FY2013 compared to FY2010. (about 9% of the total Japans
CO2 emission)

(Ref.)ConstitutionofElectricPowerSupplyCorrespondingtoDemand
Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

Nuclear power is an important base-load power source as a low carbon and quasidomestic energy source, contributing to stability of energy supply-demand structure,
on the major premise of ensuring of its safety, because of the perspectives;
i.
superiority in stability of energy supply and efficiency,
ii. low and stable operational cost and
iii. free from GHG emissions during operation.

(Ref.)EvaluationofNuclearPowerGeneration (1) EnergySecurity


Enriched uranium fuel is superior to oil and gas in terms of stable supply because locations
of the uranium mines are relatively diversified.
The energy efficiency of uranium is much better than that of oil, gas and coal, when
generating electricity. In fact, an uranium fuel can burn for about a year without reload, and
thus this can be seen as a more effective strategic stockpile.
In addition, spent nuclear fuel can be recycled by reprocessing. With these reasons, nuclear
energy can be evaluated as a quasi-domestic energy source.
(1)Suppliercountriesbyfuels
100%
90%
80%

Others
VietNam
Indonesia
Russia
Oman
Iraq
Iran

70%

Kuwait

60%

Qatar

UAE

30%
20%
10%
0%

Nigeria
Russia

Others
SouthAfrica
Malawi

Others
Canada
Russia
China

Niger

Indonesia

Brunei

Australia

Indonesia

Uzbekistan

Saudi
Arabia

Oil

DependenceonME83%
DependenceonHolmes80%

MiddleEast

Australi
a

Australia

0.95 million tons:


4.75 LNG ships

LNG

Oil

Coal

2.35 million tons:


11.75 large coal
vessels
DataSource:Nuclear2010byANRE

Canada

(3)DomesticFuelStockpilesbyprivatecompanies

Qatar
Coal

Uranium

DependenceonME30%
DependenceonHolmes25%

Regions

Enriched Uranium

Kazak
hstan

Oman
UAE

LNG

21 tons: 2.1 units of


10-ton truck

1.55 million tons:


7.75 large oil tankers

Malaysia

50%
40%

Others

(2) Fuelforoneyearoperationof1,000MWpowerplant

Datasource:Trade
Statistics2012byMOF
ofJapan

Enriched Uranium

Approx.2years

LNG
Oil

Approx.13days
Approx.67days
NationalStockpile:Approx.85days

NorthAmerica

Europe

Africa

Asia

Otherareas

Coal

Approx.33days

(Ref.)EvaluationofNuclearPowerGeneration(2)EconomicEfficiency
Projected costs of generating electricity (2014 model plant)
Geother Hydropo
mal
wer

Small &
medium Biomass
hydraulic

Nuclear

Coal

LNG

Wind

CapacityFactor
Operation Year

70
40years

70
40years

70
40years

20
20years

83
40years

45
40years

60
40years

GenerationCost
Yen/kWh

.
()

Sensitivityanalysis
Additionalsafetymeasurescostdoubles
Decommissioningcostdoubles
Decommissioningandcompensationcost
increasesby1TYen
Reprocessing and MOXFuel fabricationcost
doubles

Solar
(10kW
more)

87
40years

3010
40years

14
20years

12
20years

70
30years

40
30years

The result of the sensitivity analysis of


the change in fossil fuel price.
Theimpactofthe10%
changeofthefossil
fuelpriceYenkWh

Coal

LNG

Solar
Gas
(lessthan cogener
10kW)
ation

() : Costs without policy related cost

Oil

0.01
2.5

35.0
30.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0

0.03
2.5
2.1

1.6

25.0

1.3
0.3
1.5
3.3
0.6
3.1

0.04
3.0
5.5
1.7
2.1

Nuclear

Coal

0.02

3.4

10.8

12.1

0.6
1.0
LNG

2.8

6.0

1.3

Wind

21.7
21.0

6.0

12.8

5.1

0.2
2.3

5.8

8.5

7.6

4.2
3.0

Hydropower

Small- &

Biomass

Geothermal

mediumhydraulic

2.6~
7.7
3.8~
11.4
Oil

Legend
Policy
related
cost

Yen/kWh

40.0

Oil
cogener
ation

Capacity factor in 2011 calculation


Coal:80LNG:80Oil5010

Sensitivityanalysisofthefossilfuelpricechange

Oil

3.3
3.0
17.9

3.4

Solar

(10kW more)

(less than
10kW)

Deduction of
heat value

24.7~
(7.7~9.3)
30.1

Deduction of
heat value

(6.3~7.0)
15.6~
17.5

Solar

CO2
Fuel

0.03
1.6
23.9

Accident
riskcost

1.7
1.1

2.3
2.2

Gas

Oil

cogeneration cogeneration

Source Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 7th Working Group on Verification of Power Generation, Long-term
Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI

Operation
& manage
ment
Additional
safety
measures
cost
Capital

(Ref.)EvaluationofNuclearPowerGeneration
The cost of nuclear power generation is estimated with consideration not only of costs directly
related to power generation, but also of :
future costs including decommissioning, nuclear fuel cycle, and permanent disposal of
radioactive waste,
accident risk costs including nuclear damage compensation and decontamination,
policy related costs including subsidies for power plant siting and R&D expenses for Monju etc.

Public cost

Nuclear power
generation cost
10.1Yen/kWh
Accidentriskcost 0.3Yen

Policyrelatedcost 1.3Yen

Power generation cost

Nuclearfuelcyclecost 1.5Yen
Additionalsafetymeasurescost 0.6Yen

Operatingand
maintenancecost
3.3Yen

Accidentriskcost(0.3Yen/kWh)

The accident response cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is estimated 12.2Tr. Yen which can be
corrected to 9.1Tr. Yen in consideration of power output of model plant etc.
The lower limit of the estimated value is presented because the damage compensation cost may
increase in the future.

Policyrelatedcost(1.3Yen/kWh)

The cost includes a 345BYen (2014FY) subsidy for power plant siting 130BYen/year and R&D cost for
Monju 130BYen/year etc.

Nuclearfuelcyclecost(1.5Yen/kWh)

Halfofthespentfuelisstoredfor20yearsandreprocessedafterthat,andtheotherhalf isstoredfor45
yearsandreprocessedafterthat.
Thecostcontainsfrontend costs(0.9Yen),backend costs(total:0.6Yen,reprocessing:0.5Yen,highlevel
radioactivewaste0.04Yen.

Costofadditionalsafetymeasures(0.6Yen/kWh)

Add60.1BYenwhichistheestimatedcostforadditionalsafetymeasuresfornewregulation

Operatingandmaintenancecost(3.3Yen/kWh)
Capitalcost 3.1Yen

Employmentcost(2.05BYen/year),repaircost(2.2),overheadcost (8.44BYen/year)

Capitalcost(3.1Yen/kWh)
Capacity: 1.2GW
Operating rate: 70 Discount rate: 3 Buildingcost (0.37MYen/kW440BYen/plant),fixedassettax (1.4),decommissioningcost (71.6BYen)
Operating period of plant: 40 years
Source extracted (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook
Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI

(Ref.)EvaluationofNuclearPowerGeneration(3)environmentaladaptability
Nuclearpowerisawellestablishedlargescalelowcarbonpowersourcewhichdoent emitGHGduring
operation.Itisstillinternationallyconsideredasoneoftheimportantsolutionstotheglobalwarming,
thoughitassumessomechallenges.
Incaseofsubstitutingacoalfiredplant(1GW,capacityfactor80)byanuclearpowerplant,0.4%ofCO2
emission(5.8Mt)outofthetotalemissionofJapancouldbereduced.i.e.,4%reductionby10plants)
LifecycleCO2emissionforeachpowersource

GHG emission andlongtermtarget


Bt-CO2
1,600
1.6

Wind power
Solar power
Geothermal energy
Hydropower
Nuclear power
LNG-fired (combined)
LNG-fired (steam)
Coal-fired
Coal-fired
emission

Fuel (direct)

2010
SourceCRIEPI

Others (indirect)

1,400
1.4
1,200
1.2
1,000
1.0
800
0.8
0.6
600
0.4
400
0.2
200
0

.2

Energy oriented
GHG except CO2
emission

Target after
2020 to be
presented
prior enough
to COP21
(2015)

Energy oriented
CO2 emission
CO2 emission
from utilities

21.8
1990
FY1990

27.6

2005
FY2005

36.2
2012
FY2012

2050
FY2050

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeIPCC WGIIIreport(April2014)
Nuclear energy is a mature lowGHG emission source of baseload power,butitsshareofglobalelectricity
generationhasbeendeclining(since1993).Nuclearenergycouldmakeanincreasingcontributiontolow
carbonenergysupply,butavarietyofbarriersandrisksexist.

TowardthenextconferenceofCOP21,JapansreductiontargetonGHGemissionhasbeendecidedtobe
26%,bythegovernmenttakingJapansenergypolicyanddiscussiononthebestenergymixinto
consideration.

(Ref.)EnergyBestMix TargetLevelonthePremiseofConsideringtheEnergyBestMix
A METIs advisorycommittee on energy best mix set up 3 goals corresponding to 3E on
the premise to secure safety, in order to compile an outlook of 2030 demand & supply
structure of energy in Japan.

SecureSafety

SelfSufficiency
Rate

Source Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply & Demand Outlook
Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources & Energy, METI

Only6%atpresent

GoalforEnergysecurity
Approx.25%,exceedingthelevel
before3.11approx.20%

ElectricityCost
Significantriseinelectricityprice
since 3.11approx.30%upforindustry
approx.20%upforhousehold

SurchargeforFIT;1.3trillionyeninFY2014

Premise

GreenhouseGas
Emission

WorstrecordofCO2 emission* inFY2013,


duetoNPPsshutdownreplacedby
additional thermalpowergeneration
*Originatedfromenergysupply

GoalforEconomic
efficiency
Lowerthecost
lessthanpresent
level
GoalforEnvironment
Internationallycomparable
targetofGreenhousegas
reduction
10

(Ref.)EnergyBestMix OutlookofCompositionofElectricPowerSources
Based on 3 goals presented in the previous page, the current draft is as follows (Nuclear power is 20
22%). The draft is now under the public comment process, and will be officially announced thereafter.
Composition of electricity sources and electricity generationbillion
kWh
2030

2030

Oil

31.5

3%

Coal

281.0

26%

LNG

284.5

27%

Nuclear power

216.8231.7

2022%

Renewableenergy

236.6251.5

2224%

1065.0

100%

Total

Solar

74.9

7.0%

Wind

18.2

1.7%

Geothermal

10.211.3

1.01.1%

Hydropower

93.998.1

8.89.2%

Biomass

39.449.0

3.74.6%

All the numbers are approximately

before 3.11

LNG
27% (approx.)

LNG 27%

Coal
26% (approx.)

Coal 24%

Oil 3% (approx.)
Renewable energy
22~24% (approx.)

2030

Average in the
last 10 years

Nuclear power
20~22% (approx.)

Oil 12%
Renewable
energy 11%
Nuclear
power
27%

Source extracted (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook
Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI

11

2. Efforts toward Restoration and Reconstruction of Fukushima


Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

Efforts towards restoration and reconstruction of Fukushima is a starting point to


rebuild Japanese energy policies.
GOJs playing more proactive roles in the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi
NPPs and the countermeasures for the contaminated water issue (CWI).
GOJs playing more proactive roles in proceeding compensation, decontamination
and operations of intermediate storage facilities.
Conducting necessary studies for the establishment of R&D center for
decommissioning and of industrial cluster for the fabrication/maintenance around
the Fukushima Daiichi site.

12

(Ref.)AssistanceofFukushimaevacueesfrombothaspectsofquickreturnandquicklaunchofnewlife
Number of evacuees from Fukushima
About 157 thousand
About 119thousand
December 2012
Jan 2015

Evacuation order areas of Fukushima Dai-ichi


Nuclear Power Plant (as of October 2014)v

Number of evacuees from the evacuation zone


About 110 thousand
About 73 thousand
December 2012
Jan 2015
Measuresforliftingofevacuationordersandreturn
Measuresforsafetyandremovinganxieties
Reductionofradiationexposure/healthconsultation
Additionalcompensationforreturn
ImprovingenvironmentforreturnbyusingSubsidyforAccelerating
FukushimaReconstruction
Decontamination incollaborationwiththereconstructionandpolicy
measuresafterthedecontaminationwork
Materializationofliftingofevacuationordersthroughdialogueswith
hostmunicipalitiesandlocalresidents
Expansionofassistanceforlaunchingnewlife
Additionalcompensationnecessaryfornewlife
Developingreconstructioncentersinoroutoftheevacuationzone
Consideringhowtoimplementregionalconstructionand
decontaminationworkinlightoffutureperspectivesof
decontaminationbusiness,etc.
Materializationofmidandlongtermvisioninawideareathrough
dialogueswithhostmunicipalitiesandresidents

13

(Ref.)MidandLongTermRoadmaptowardstheDecommissioning
ThecurrentRoadmap wasrevisedinJune,2013.
TheGovernmentofJapanisnowintheprocessoftherevision,takingaccountoftheStrategic
PlanwhichNDFisdeveloping.
December2011

Effortstostabilize
theNPP
Coldshutdownachieved
Achievecoldshutdown
Significantlyreduce
radiationreleases
Fuelremovalfrom
SpentFuelPools

Unit4
Removalwas
complete

Present

November2013

Phase1

Phase2

Perioduptothe
startofthefuel
removalfromthe
spentfuelpool
(within2years)

Preparingforrubbleremoval

Unit2

Dosereductionisunderway

Unit3

Rubbleremoval&dose
reductionisunderway

30to40years
inthefuture

Phase3

Period up to the start of the fuel debris


removal (within 10 years)

Unit 1

Fueldebrisremoval
fromUnit1 3

December2021

Perioduptothe
completionof
decommissioning
measures(30to40
yearsinthefuture)

StepsforSpentFuelRemoval;
RubbleRemoval&DoseReduction
InstallingFuelHandlingMachine
FuelRemoval

Dose reduction, Leakage identification &


Stop leakage

Installation of
fuel debris
removal equipment

Fuel debris
removal

14

(Ref.)CurrentStatusofEachUnitatFukushimaDaiichiNPPs
Unit 1

Hydrogen explosion
Core melt

Hydrogen explosion
Core melt

Unit 3

392

The building cover is


planed to be dismantled
around April 2015, with
sufficient measures to
prevent the scattering of
radioactive materials.

Water

566

Currently, toward the


fuel removal from SPF,
removal of rubbles is
underway.

Unit 2

No hydrogen explosion
Core melt

Unit 4

Hydrogen explosion
No core melt

Water

615

Fuel removal cover

On December 22,
2014, all (1533) fuel
removal from Unit 4
SPF was completed.

15

3. Existing Light Water Reactors


Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

On the premise that safety comes before everything else and that every possible
effort is made to resolve the peoples concerns, judgment as to whether nuclear
power plants meet the new regulatory requirements will be left to the Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA)
In case that the NRA confirms the conformity of nuclear power plants with the new
regulatory requirements ,which are of the most stringent level in the world, GOJ
will follow NRAs judgment and will proceed with the restart of the nuclear power
plants.

16

(Ref.) Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (As of June 16, 2015)


Tomari

Kashiwazaki Kariwa

Ohma

Shika

Higashidori(Tokyo)

Tsuruga

Higashidori(Tohoku)

Onagawa

Mihama

Ohi

Fukushima Daiichi

Takahama

Fukushima Daini

Permitted in Feb. 2015

Genkai

Hamaoka

Ikata

Sendai

Permitted in Sep. 2014

Tokai

Shimane

Decided to be permanent
shutdown in April 2015
(Total 5 Units
Under NRA Review for
basic design and concept
(Total 25 Units
Capacity

Age

Reactor-type

BWR
PWR

ABWR

(Applied Date for NRA Review)


Not Start Operation

17

(Ref.) Outline of processes for restart of NPPs


Safety Reviews and Inspections process of NRA
Review of basic design and
concept (for permission of reactor

Review of detailed
design (for approval of

installment license change)

construction works plan)


Assessment of Operation
management systems, etc.
(for approval of operational
safety programs

Permitted reactors
Date

Reactor

Approved reactors

Applicant

*Notrequiredbythenuclear
Sep.10
SendaiNPS,
Kyusyu Electric
reactorlaw
2014

Unit1 and 2

Power

Feb.12
2015

Takahama NPS,
Unit3and4

KansaiElectric
Power

Date

Reactor

Mar.18
2015

SendaiNPS,
Unit1

May22
2015

SendaiNPS,
Unit2

Local acceptance process

Applicant

Date

Kyusyu
Electric
Power

May 27
2015

Localacceptanceprocess

* No legal requirements

Disaster prevention and evacuation plan


*Not a legal
prerequisites for restart

Preparationandenhancement
ofthedisasterpreventionandevacuationplan

**Based on the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures and the Act on
Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

18

(Ref.)EffortstowardsrestartofSendaiNPPs
1. NRAs Safety Review
KyushuElectricPowersubmitteditsapplicationtomakechangestothereactorinstallment
licenseofSendaiNPSUnit1and2inJuly2013.

Sendai NPP

NRAcompiledadraftevaluationreporton16th July2014whichadmitsthatSendaiNPPs
satisfiesnewregulatoryrequirements.
Afterthepubliccommentprocess(until15th August)andreviewingofthesubmitted
opinions,NRAgrantedapermission(changestothereactorinstallmentlicense)on10th
September2014forthebasicdesignandsafetyfeaturesofSendaiNPPs.Afterthat,NRA
approvedthedetaileddesignandconstructionofSendaiNPSUnit1and2on18th March
2015and22thMay2015,respectively.Andthen,NRAapprovedtheoperation
managementsystemsofSendaiNPSUnit1and2on27thMay2015.
SendaiNPSUnit1and2canberestartedaftercompletingpreserviceinspectionof
operationalsafetyprograms.

18,600pagedocument
wasreviewed&
62reviewmeetings
wereheldfor110
hours

2. Disaster prevention and evacuation plan


Aregionaldisasterpreventionplan(includingevacuationplan)againstnucleardisastershouldbeformulatedbylocal
authoritiesbasedontheBasicActonDisasterControlMeasures.
Althoughformulationofregionaldisasterpreventionplanisnotalegalrequirementforrestart,theplanisimportantto
ensuresafetyoflocalresidents.Thegovernmentsupportslocalauthoritiestomakeasufficientplan.
3. Local Consent of the restart of Sendai NPPs
BoththegovernorofKagoshimaprefectureandMayorofSatsumasendai City,hostingSendaiNPPs,approvedtherestart
oftheNPPs,whichmeansthelocalconsentprocesswascompletedforthosetworeactors.

19

4. Reconstruction of Safety Culture


Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

Nuclear industry as well as GOJ must shed the so-called safety myth, and
pursue the worlds highest level of safety for operations through continuous and
voluntary safety improvement.
The industrial circles, including nuclear operators, need to set up business
schemes to persistently pursue safety and make efforts to foster safety culture
that places top priority on the safety of nuclear facilities.
Each nuclear power operator, with a firm resolve that it will never let another
nuclear accident to happen, should establish an appropriate risk management
system and implement objective and quantitative risk assessments such as
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).

20

(Ref.) Lessons from TEPCOs Fukushima Nuclear Accident


One of the lessons from the TEPCOs Fukushima nuclear accident is that preparation for
unexpected situations was not sufficient.
Government
Independency of the regulatory body was not sufficient
and there was a regulatory capture.
Measures to prevent or deal with severe accidents were
not subject to regulation.
The government had publicly reiterated that nuclear
facilities were safe. That led to a loss of opportunities for
improvement of regulation.
Nuclear operators
They had publicly reiterated that nuclear facilities were
safe because they complied with regulatory requirements.
An unanimous decision-making process among operators
on regulatory issues has discouraged them from
voluntary safety improvements.
A study by TEPCO employees warning of a possible
inundation of 15.7m was not taken seriously by its
executives.
Nuclear vendors
Considerations for their clients, operators, had prevented
them from proposing additional safety installations.

Countermeasures
Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)
independent of the other governmental bodies
was established.
NRAs new regulation covers measures to
prevent or deal with severe accidents.
Conformity to new regulatory requirements
does not mean absolute safety.
Dr. Tanaka, the Chairman of NRA
Challenges

No common understanding of residual


risk with local communities and
residents.
Dependence of operators on venders
and an utility association on safety
issues.
Lack of proper incentives for voluntary
improvement of nuclear safety in the
current regulatory scheme.
21

(Ref.) Challenges of Nuclear Operators

Proper risk management should take root in each utility based on


a firm commitment by top executives to nuclear risk information
Proper communication on residual risk with various stakeholders
such as local residents near NPPs or general citizens should be
established
Thorough site-specific risk assessments should be implemented
On-site operators who have experiences in owners engineering
during construction, and are familiar with detail designs of NPPs
and able to take appropriate actions in case of unexpected
accidents should be properly trained.

22

(Ref.) Proposals for Voluntary and Continuous Improvement of Nuclear Safety


A METIs Advisory Committee published the proposals on what the industrys initiative to
voluntarily improve safety should look like were on 30th of May 2014.
Proposals for Voluntary and Continuous Improvement of Nuclear Safety (May 30, 2014)
Implementation of risk management under an appropriate risk governance framework
Activities required to be implemented based on lessons learned from the accident at TEPCOs Fukushima
Daiichi NPS as the starting point
Implementation of exhaustive and comprehensive risk assessments including lowfrequency events
Reduction of residual risk through strengthening defense in depth
Identifying the accident sequences and cliff edges at each plant, focusing on external events such as earthquakes and
tsunamis, which are particular to Japans geographical conditions, and improving resilience including response to, and
recovery from unexpected incidents that are not properly addressed by the existing ordinary system
Reorganization of research for improving the safety of lightwater reactors that are commercially operated in Japan and
reinforcement of research coordination among organizations at home and abroad

Attitudes especially required to steadily proceed with these activities and have them take root
Creation of an organizational culture with a critical mind and power of imagination concerning residual risks
Swiftly introducing stateoftheart information and opinions from both home and abroad, and making Japans efforts known
overseas
Involvement of external stakeholders
Improving human and intelligence bases across industry
Sharing roadmaps to be constructed by each industrial actor based on the WGs proposals and pursuing for the overall optimization
through constantly monitoring actions based on the roadmaps and continuously revising the roadmaps

23

(Ref.) Establishment of the Nuclear Risk Research Center (NRRC)


Established within the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) on
October 1, 2014.
Utilizing PRA, this center is to perform R&D of safetyenhancing technologies which is
beyond merely fulfilling regulatory requirements and to examine and propose effective
problemsolving measures at individual plant, etc.
The authorities of nuclear safety with strong leadership experience were invited to serve
as the NRRCs executives.
Head: Dr. George Apostolakis (A former member of the U.S. NRC)
Executive Advisor : Dr. Richard A. Meserve (A former Chairman of the U.S. NRC)

24

(Ref.) Proposals on Further Improvement of Voluntary Efforts to Safety Enhancements


A METIs Advisory Committee overhauled how the efforts toward voluntary improvement of
nuclear safety have been conducted by each actor (utility, vendor, scientist, government) based
on the proposals in 2014, and published the proposals on further improvement of voluntary
efforts toward safety enhancements on the 27 of May 2015.
Proposals for further Improvements of Voluntary Efforts for Improvement of Nuclear Safety (May 27, 2015)

Examples of good practices


1. Shikoku Electric Power Co. has participated in the NRRCs research project on seismic level 2 PRA
using the Ikata NPS unit 3 as a model plant of the research.
2. Kansai Electric Power Co. has worked on the development of human resources who are deeply
familiar with its plant design and installation in the case of accident.
3. Tokyo Electric Power Co. has established a council headed by the nuclear divisions manager in
charge of a risk management and the council has been directly reporting to a executive committee
on risk management chaired by the president as necessary.
Major proposals on further improvement of voluntary efforts
1. It is necessary for the electric utilities to utilize PRA for daily risk management including
operation and maintenance of nuclear plants.
2. It is necessary for the electric utilities to implement appropriate risk communication with various
stakeholders presuming the possibility of a severe accident.
3. It is desirable for the nuclear industry to voluntarily set a safety goal in light of accidents at sites
with multiple units such as the TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi NPS.

25

5. Promotion of Strategic Development of Technologies and Human Resources


Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

1. Maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human


resources is imperative for smoothly decommissioning aged nuclear power
plants, which are expected to increase in the future, as well as TEPCOs
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants.
2. Because enhancing the nuclear safety in surrounding countries ensures the
safety of Japan, maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and
human resources which enable Japan contribute to their safety enhancement is
essential.
3. GOJ promotes the development of technologies that contribute to safety
improvement of LWRs including countermeasures against severe accidents and
enhance their reliability and efficiency in order to reduce risks in case of an
accident.
4. Under international cooperation, GOJ also facilitates R&D of nuclear
technologies that serves the safety improvement of nuclear use, such as hightemperature gas-cooled reactors which are expected to be utilized in various
industries including hydrogen production and which has an inherent safety.

26

(Ref.) Basic Policy for Formulation of Light Water Reactor Safety Technology
and Human Resource Roadmap
The draft of the Light Water Reactor Safety Technology and Human Resource Roadmap was
compiled on 27th of May 2015 through the interaction between a METI's advisory committee
and the Atomic Energy Society of Japan.
This roadmap will be reviewed at least once a year.
A structure of formulating the roadmap

Confirm

Working Group on Voluntary


Improvement of Safety,
Technology and Human Resource

Nuclear Energy
Subcommittee

Conceptual image of the roadmap

Share the process of compilation


and revision in an intelligible
manner

Public / Local municipality

Requests compilation of the roadmap


compatible with basic principles of the
Strategic Energy Plan

2020

Share

Present issues from public perspective


Present solutions and the draft of the roadmap

Atomic Energy Society


of Japan

2050

2030

Milestones
An objective at each
milestones

Issue A

Issue B

Issues

Evaluation elements
Get priorities of issues by
utilizing appropriate evaluation
elements

To steadily implement
efforts
forward
autonomous
safety
improvement based on
scientific disciplines and
knowledge
and
to
construct a framework in
which
operators
continuously maintain and
develop technologies and
human resources for LWR
safety while incorporating
international knowledge.

To establish an international
collaborative scheme based
on public confidence in the
framework and efforts toward
autonomous
safety
improvement and to reduce
residual risks by implementing
steady investments needed
for ensuring safety so that
nuclear
power
is
used
appropriately as an important
base-load power source in the
energy
supply-demand
structure.

To
contribute
to
the
international community in
both technologies and human
resources
by
further
pursuing the reduction of the
disadvantages
and
the
enhancement
of
the
advantages regarding the use
of nuclear power so that
nuclear power plays a stable
roles in providing sustainable
energy supply and taking
countermeasures
against
global warming.

Sourcehttp://www.meti.go.jp/committee/sougouenergy/denkijigyou/jishutekianzensei/009_haifu.html, Working Group on Voluntary Improvement of Safety,


Technology and Human Resource, Nuclear Energy Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (The 9th Meeting)

27

6. Establishment of Appropriate Business Environment under the More


Competitive Market
Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

Nuclear operators are also required to


1) maintain high-level nuclear technologies and human resources,
2) smoothly go through decommissioning work, which will increase in the future
3) quickly take the best safety measures in response to regulations reinforced
after the TEPCOs Fukushima nuclear accident and
4) contribute to global warming countermeasures and stable electricity supply
utilizing base-load power sources.
Therefore, GOJ will explore an appropriate business environment in which nuclear
power operators can meet the above challenges even under the more competitive
environment promoted by the electricity system reform, learning lessons from the
overseas examples.

28

(Ref.) Roadmap for Electricity Market Reform in Japan


Historically,utilitieshaverunnuclearbusinessbasedontheguaranteedrecoveryoftheirinvestmentsthrough
regionalmonopolyandregulatedprices (rateofreturnregulation).Bythiselectricitymarketreform,regional
monopolyandregulatedpricesaretobeterminated.
Utilitieswillhavetorunnuclearbusinessesinanenvironmentwheretherecoveryoftheirinvestmentswill
notbeguaranteed.
2nd Reform:PassedinOrdinaryDietin2014
3rd Reform:OrdinaryDietin2015
1) Fullretailcompetition
1) Legalunbundlingof
2) Revisionofapplicableandregulationsassociated
transmission/distribution
withtheabolishmentofGeneralElectricityUtility
sectors
system
2) CodeofConduct
(3rd bill)
1st Step
2nd Step
3rd Step
2015
2015
2016
2018-2020
Establishment of the
Organization for Crossregional Coordination of
Transmission Operators
2015 (approx.):Transition to new regulatory organizations
(OCCTO)

1st Reform:passedinExtraordinaryDietin2013
1) EstablishmentoftheOrganizationforCrossregional
CoordinationofTransmissionOperators(OCCTO)
2) Actionprogramsfor2nd and3rd Reforms etc.
(1st bill)
2013

(2nd bill)
2014

The2nd Bill

The1st Bill

2nd reform
3rd reform

CabinetDecisiononthe
PolicyonElectricity
SystemReform

1st reform

Full retail
competition

Periodof
transitional
arrangementfor
retailtariff

Abolishment
of retail tariff

Legal unbundling of
transmission
/distribution sector

VerificationforElectricityMarketReform
Inadvancingmarketreform,GOJhastoverifytheenforcementstatusofeachbill,theimplementationstatusof
theStrategicEnergyPlanandtheelectricitysupplydemandsituationatfollowingopportunities:beforefull
retailcompetition,beforelegalunbundlingoftransmission/distributionsector,andaftertheenforcement
oflegalunbundling.
Dependingontheoutcomeofeachverification,GOJhastotakenecessarymeasures.
29

7. Contribution to Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Non-proliferation in the World
Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan
GOJ will promote dialogues with the international community on such occasions as meetings of the IAEA, where
information will be promptly and accurately disseminated. As nuclear power generation is expected to be increasingly
used in emerging nations, including Asian nations, it is a responsibility that Japan must fulfill and the world expects it to
fulfill to make proactive contributions to improvement of nuclear safety, peaceful use of nuclear power, nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in the world, by sharing the experiences and lessons learnt from the TEPCO's
Fukushima nuclear accident. It is imperative for Japan to proactively contribute to formulating international standards of
nuclear safety, such as the IAEA standards. Japan will contribute to improvement of nuclear safety in the world by
continuing to share nuclear technologies with our enhanced safety and improved safety culture with other countries
based on the experiences and lessons learnt from the accident, while confirming that a proper consideration is given to
nuclear facilities' safety secured mainly by hosting countries in reference to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the
IAEA safety standards when public finance is offered on providing nuclear power technologies to overseas, including
exports of nuclear power plants.
By making use of its experience as a non-nuclear armed country, Japan will also actively contribute to strengthen
nuclear nonproliferation through reinforcement of the IAEA safeguards and stringent export control and international
nuclear security through actively participating global initiative such as nuclear security summits. In particular, in the
non-proliferation field, it is important to intensify the efforts toward the nuclear non-proliferation by promoting
international collaboration in enhancing proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel, and R&D to strengthen technology of
nuclear forensics, detection and safeguards, etc. Japan will go through these efforts in cooperation with the countries
such as the U.S. and France. GOJ will also set up an integrated implementing body to support development of human
resources, institutional infrastructure and others for countries that will newly introduce nuclear power, through
cooperation with international organizations such as the IAEA.

30

(Ref.) Expectations for Japans Nuclear Technology after Fukushima

Japaniscommittedtosecuringnonproliferationaswellasnuclearsafetyand
securityintheworld byprovidingproventechnologieswithUSallies,given
growinginfluenceofRussiaandChinaintheworldnuclearmarket.
The3rdArmitageNyeReportissuedbyCSISonAugust15,2012(Excerpt)
(i)Apermanentshutdownwillalsostymieresponsibleinternationalnucleardevelopment,
asdevelopingcountrieswillcontinuetobuildnuclearreactors. Chinacouldeventually
emergeasasignificantinternationalvendor. AsChinaplanstojoinRussia,SouthKorea,
andFranceinthemajorleaguesofglobaldevelopmentinciviliannuclearpower,Japan
cannotaffordtofallbehindiftheworldistobenefitfromefficient,reliable,andsafe
reactorsandnuclearservices.
(ii)JapanandtheUnitedStateshavecommonpoliticalandcommercialinterestsin
promotingsafeandreliableciviliannuclearpowerdomesticallyandinternationally.
(iii)Safe,clean,responsiblydevelopedandutilizednuclearpowerconstitutesanessential
elementinJapanscomprehensivesecurity. Inthisregard,U.S.Japancooperationon
nuclearresearchanddevelopmentisessential.
31

(Ref.) Current Situations in the World Nuclear Market


Russias advantage in the field of public financing

1. OECDmemberstatesareobligedtocompeteagainstRussianwiththe
restraintsofpublicfinancingstipulatedintheNuclearSectorUnderstanding
(NSU)ofOECDExportCreditArrangementintheworldnuclearmarket.
2. RussiaandChina,whicharenonOECDmemberstates,haveanadvantagein
promotingnuclearexportintheworldmarketwithbettertermsand
conditionsofpublicfinancing.
Case1:Hungary
Hungarian Government was to start a bidding process for their NPP new construction.
In January 2014, the Hungarian Prime Minister officially and suddenly announced that
Russia was selected as Hungary's exclusive partner for their NPP construction during
his official visit to Russia.
The Hungarian Prime Ministers office web site says that Russian loan for the EUR 1012 billion investment would be provided for a 30-year term which covers 80% of
the total cost.

32

(Ref.) Current Situations in the World Nuclear Market


Russias advantage in the field of public financing
Case2:Finland
Fennovoima (FV), a NPP operator in Finland requested bidders for its reactor project to
procure 100% debt finance.
FV identified Toshiba as a preferred bidder. Toshiba proposed a finance arrangement
from Japanese ECAs (Export Credit Agencies) based on the NSU terms and conditions
(which did not cover full debt portion).
After receiving Toshibas proposal, FV decided to start negotiation with Rosatom.
FV entered into a plant-supply agreement with Rosatom and terminated negotiation
with Toshiba. A FV executive noted that finance was the most important factor as
Rosatom confirmed full debt finance arrangement for the project.
Case3:CzechRepublic
The Operational Vice President of Rosatom Overseas noted that We are ready to
provide anything from a small part of the financing to 100 percent. It is up to the
Czech Republic to decide how much they want.
CEZ, a NPP operator requested U.S. and Japan that they should provide 100% debt
finance as well. US EXIM and JBIC offered a matching with the Russian finance.
33

(Ref.) Current Situations in the World Nuclear Market

Expansion of Chinas presence in the world nuclear market


1.ChinasEffortsforselfsufficientinreactordesignandconstructionCAP1400,Hualong One
China is promoting installation of Generation-III reactor technology and own domestic production.
State Nuclear Power Technology Corp (SNPTC) is now deploying the first four units of Westinghouse
AP1000 (Generation-III plants) in China. SNPTC has also been developing CAP1400, which has
larger-scale based on AP1000 as well as includes more indigenous components at Huaneng's
Shidaowan site.
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) are
working together to develop domestic reactor Hualong One by integrating the technologies of CNNCs
AP1000 and CGNs ACPR1000+. The first Hualong One will be deployed for Fuqing 5&6(CNNC).

2.Chinasentrytothe UKnuclearmarket
China and UK signed a MOU in October 2013. The MOU stipulates the strategic framework for
collaboration on investment, technology, construction and expertise in the field of civilian use of
nuclear energy.
In the same month, EDF officially announced that EDF and Chinese companies(CGN and CNNC)
agreed to jointly invest in Hinkley Point C nuclear power station. The total share of Chinas equity is
expected to be 30-40%.

3.Chinasactivitiesintheworldnuclearmarket
China is strongly promoting nuclear export globally toward such countries as Turkey, Sudan and
Pakistan. Especially in Turkey, according to media sources, SNPTC committed to invest in AP1000
construction project at the third site following Akkuyu and Sinop. In return for the investment, SNPTC will
gain a wider coverage of manufacturing of AP1000 components.
34

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