Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Firoiu Daniela
Universitatea Romno-American, B-dul Expoziiei nr. 1B, Sector 1, Bucureti, Tel. +40-722-953-514,
mail: dana.firoiu@rau.ro
E-
also innovated by offering one-way tickets priced according to efficient yield management techniques based on
simplicity and very restricted conditions.
By the late 1990s, the differences in the airline business models have become clear: traditional scheduled
carriers focused on service delivery offering a network-based product, which could serve well the business
passenger and the affluent leisure and VFR clientele; LCC provided point-to-point flights of basic quality but
priced so low that attracted many leisure and VFR travellers; whereas, charter carriers were sitting somewhere
in-between with a rather uncertain future. This product differentiation framework, however, did not last for long
as the dynamics of competition gave rise to osmotic phenomena: currently, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to distinguish between the three types of carriers. For example, many European traditional scheduled airlines
such as British Airways, Lufthansa, SAS, Iberia and Aer Lingus engaged in a drastic cost-cutting exercise
aiming to replicate many of the features of the LCC model at least in short-haul flights. On the other hand, some
LCC started upgrading their services; EasyJet, for example, serves also primary airports (e.g. Paris Orly) and
offers flexible tickets, while JetBlue in the USA provides leather seats and a live satellite television programme.
Charter carriers decided to radicalise their product according to the LCC prototype albeit in occasionally longerhaul destinations. In some cases, charter carriers setup their own LCC affiliates as shown by the examples of My
Travel Airways and My Travel Lite in Britain and Hapag Lloyd and Hapag Lloyd Express in Germany. As a
result of this osmotic process and the acquisition of a new air travel culture based on knowledge and bargaining,
a clear-cut customer segmentation is also difficult: illustratively, the results of the latest Barclaycard Business
Travel Survey reveal that 70% of business travellers used LCC with satisfaction rates over 95% (Davies, 2005).
Conversely, a recent report by the British Air Transport Users Council stressed the importance of considering
the time of booking a flight as well as the hidden monetary and time transfer costs associated with secondary
airports: interestingly, traditional scheduled carriers can occasionally offer a better-value-for-money than their
low-cost counterparts (AUC, 2003).
Still, the various airline business models retain some differences regarding network structure and airport choice.
In particular, the traditional scheduled airlines aim at adding value to the passenger by offering an extensive
network based on own hub-andspoke services and interlining agreements; its appeal is enhanced by airline
participation in one of the three major strategic alliances (Oneworld, Star Alliance and Sky Team) and the
existence of sophisticated frequent flyer programmes. To deliver these network services, traditional carriers use
primary airports with all necessary facilities. Regional airports play only a minor role in their business model as
the majority of related services act as feeders to major hubs. On the other hand, low cost carriers focus
exclusively on basic point-to-point flights. This does not mean that LCC abstain completely from connecting
traffic: the latter amounts to 30% of Southwests market, while in London Stansted Airport 14% of passengers
engaged in do-it-yourself connections in 2004 (Mosner, 2005). However, LCC are not prepared to offer these
extra services themselves to avoid complication and an increase in their cost base. They choose primarily
secondary regional airports (Orly is one of the few exceptions) and benefit substantially from low airport
charges and station costs. For example, Frankfurt Hahn costs Ryanair 4.25 per departing passenger and there is
no landing fee; in contrast a B737 operator at Frankfurt Main pays 13 per departing passenger and a landing
fee of about 1.75 (Button et al., 2004). In other words, the sustainable competitive advantage of LCC is mainly
derived from the adoption of point-to-point services operating from regional airports. Charter carriers have
always offered point-to-point services and they increasingly fly also from secondary airports.
These different airport choices have important implications for the airline-airport relationship. Traditionally, this
has been characterised as love-and-hate; despite their common future and the complementarity of their
operations, airlines have often accused airports of abusing their market power, while the latter justified any
charge increase on the need to improve and expand a risky and sunk piece of infrastructure. The Ryanair
experience has revealed that secondary airports are prepared not only to charge less but even to offer subsidies
to attract traffic in the context of wider regional economic development. Demand for air transport services is
essentially derived from tourism activities. When all potential destinations are considered, tourism choice is
discrete, i.e. go to place X and not to Y; lower airport charges and direct airline services signify a substantial
improvement in accessibility if the destination is finally chosen, profits from consumption of local hospitality
and other tourism services may more than compensate any losses at the airport level. Similar results hold when
an airport acts as an origin rather than a destination gateway. Enhanced tourism consumption in this case is
substituted by new employment opportunities at the airport and the wider local economy and the subsequent
generation of additional expenditure and income through a multiplier-accelerator process.
As expected, this subsidisation strategy raised adverse reaction from the part of various airlines such as Air
France, which accused Ryanair of benefiting from unfair competition. The issue has reached the European
Commission which, in its recent verdict on Charleroi Airport, espoused partly the rationale behind crosssubsidisation stressing, however, the need for transparency and fair trade: an airport should not offer secret
concessions to specific airlines but adopt a tender-like procedure open to all carriers. The private investor
principle should also be met; in other words, the longer-term financial sustainability and profitability of an
airport as a stand-alone investment should be guaranteed (European Commission, 2004). In this context, it is
essential for an airport to know what type of airlines and passengers are likely to be more beneficial. This is
admittedly a very difficult exercise as the benefits or losses of the airport as such should be compared with the
impact on the business turnover of the wider local tourism activities. Nonetheless, exploring differences in
consumption patterns according to a market segmentation based solely on the choice of airline may be
somewhat bizarre; what matters primarily is demographic and vacation habit criteria (Holloway, 2004).
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Moreover, the private investor principle necessitates focusing on the airport side by providing a break-down in
terms of aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenue.
The emergence of low-cost carriers as a viable business model has revolutionised the airline industry since the
early 1990s. Leisure and VFR passengers in Europe have now a wider choice and are able to discover the
European regions at lower fares than in the past. No matter whether a regional airport operates as an origin or
destination gateway, notable improvements in accessibility can play a significant role in economic and/or
tourism development. Full service carriers and charter airlines can also have a significant if not higher
contribution to both aeronautical and non-aeronautical airport revenue.
Despite the existence victims, LCC are undoubtedly the major fashion in the contemporary airline industry; no
means, however, does this mean that the evolved full service and charter carrier models are necessarily dead!...
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