Sps.

Benitez vs CA
266 SCRA 242 Civil Law Property Accession Natural Owner in Good
Faith; Builder in Bad Faith Right of Pre-emption

Facts: In July 1989, the spouses Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal purchased a
parcel of land adjoining the lot of spouses Rafael and Avelina Benitez. After they
conducted a survey on said land, the spouses Macapagal discovered that the house
of spouses Benitez was already encroaching their property. Macapagal then
demanded in writing for Benitez to vacate. Eventually, an ejectment suit was filed
by Macapagal against Benitez.
The trial court ruled in favor of Macapagal as it found Benitex to be a builder in bad
faith. On appeal, Benitez insists that they are builders in good faith hence he should
be given the option to exercise the right of pre-emption (the right to buy the said
portion of land owned by Macapagal which is being occupied by his [Benitez]
house.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the right of pre-emption may be exercised by a builder in

good faith.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is already a factual finding by the trial court that
Benitez was a builder in bad faith.
Secondly, even assuming that Benitez was a builder in good faith, he cannot
exercise said right of pre-emption. The right of pre-emption or the right to sell is
solely lodged in the owner in good faith as provided for by Article 448 of the Civil
Code. This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner in good faith
because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled
to the ownership of the accessory thing. Otherwise stated, the builder in good faith
has no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs
solely to the landowner in good faith.
How about if the builder is in bad faith, like in this case?
The right is not shifted in favor of the builder in bad faith. And this situation is now
governed by Article 450 of the Civil Code which gives the owner in good faith the
options either:
a. to demand the builder in bad faith to demolish what he built; or

b. to compel the builder in bad faith to pay the price of the land.

G.R. NO. 120303. JULY 24, 1996

GEMINIANO, ET. AL. VS. COURT
OF APPEALS
FACTS:
It appears that subject lot was originally owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina
Amado vda. de Geminiano. On a 12-square-meter portion of
that lot stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners sold to the
private respondents, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter that portion of the
lot occupied by the house. Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a
contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of the lot, including that portion
on which the house stood, in favor of the private respondents for P40.00 per month
for a period of 7 years. The private respondents then introduced additional
improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the
lease contract, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly
rentals. It turned out that the lot in question was the subject of a suit, which
resulted in its acquisition by one Maria Lee in 1972. Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo,
who in turn sold it to the spouses Dionisio. Spouses Dionisio executed a Deed of
Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. The petitioners sent a
letter addressed to private respondent Mary Nicolas demanding that she vacate the
premises and pay the rentals in arrears within twenty days from notice. Upon failure
of the private respondents to heed the demand, the petitioners filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer and damages.

ISSUE: WON Art. 448 is applicable to this case.

HELD: NO.
The private respondents claim they are builders in good faith, hence, Article 448 of
the Civil Code should apply. They rely on the lack of title of the petitioners' mother
at the time of the execution of the contract of lease, as well as the alleged

assurance made by the petitioners that the lot on which the house stood would be
sold to them. But being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their
occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they
cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith. Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where
one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
And even if the petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not make the private
respondents possessors or builders in good faith so as to be covered by the
provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the mere
expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned lot because the alleged promise to
sell was not fulfilled nor its existence even proven.

BRITO V. DIANALA.
FACTS:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B,
formerly known as Lot No. 591-B, originally owned by a certain Esteban
Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are already deceased.
On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Ramon Brito,
Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria
Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora
Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo,
assisted by her husband, Fausto Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Negros Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 12887.
Petitioners wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that
they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia,
Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that
Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia; that
Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death Vicente and Eusebio, as
compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and
their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot
No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that
prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain
Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of

whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of
Esteban and Franciscas children; that they are in open, actual, public and
uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that
their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his coheirs. On November 26, 1986, the trial court issued an Order dismissing without
prejudice respondents Answer-in-Intervention. Civil Case No. 12887 then went to
trial. Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a
Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose
Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita,
Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said agreement
that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother
of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the RTC of Bacolod City rendered a decision
approving the said Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City in the name of Margarita,
Bienvenido and Francisco.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against herein
respondents. Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court, on
August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner
and his co-heirs. RTC dismissed both cases.
Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the portion of the
RTC Joint Orders dismissing their complaint be declared null and void and that the
case be decided on the merits. CA granted the respondents appeal.
ISSUE: W/N respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint
for reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud
allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an
action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four
years, which period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud
HELD: No. There is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject
property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate
action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to
respondents possession of the disputed property, it follows that their
complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more
reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is
one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that
petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud. Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through
fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the
date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title
over the property.

In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of
the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil
Code is applicable. Article 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions
of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by
petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed
their complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear
that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet expired. Respondents are
not guilty of laches simply because they are no longer parties to the case and, as
such, have no personality to assail the said judgment. Respondents act of filing
their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not
constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. Laches is recourse in
equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of
statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual
need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession
thereof. Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property,
prescription does not commence to run against him.
AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004
FACTS:
Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After
the death of Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When Leocadio died,
all his heirs agreed that Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage
and administer the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had
executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely stated that he
was the only heir of Leocadio. It turned out that while Sixto were still alive, he sold a
portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and another portion to Maria Bacong,
Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of
Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions
sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly, petitioners filed a suit against
them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition thereof. The vendees
contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and
petitioners cause of action was barred by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also
contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid sale between Sixto Medrano and the
three purchases considering the fact that it was made without the consent of the
co-owners.

HELD:
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a sale by a co-owner of the
whole property as his will affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale). The provision clearly provides that the sale
or other disposition affects only the sellers share, and the transferee gets only what
corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owner is not null and
void; only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property. It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed
by Sixto in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as the share
of Sixto in the co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may be considered adverse to
strangers may not be considered adverse in so far as co-owners are concerned. A
mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from
the property, the erection of buildings and fences and planting of trees thereon, and
the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not
borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised such acts of
possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of
the other co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been known to the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Tested against these guidelines, the respondents failed to present competent
evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiate the existing coownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano. Respondents reliance on the tax
declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held
on several occasions that tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively prove
title to land. Further, respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto
to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made
known to the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.

REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and GRACIA G. SALVADOR, vs. CA, ALBERTO and

ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al.

G.R. No. 109910 April 5, 1995 | Tiff (sorry its a long digest, its a long case) |
DAVIDE, JR., J.
Parties:

Alipio Yabos 9 children Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia,

Baseliza, Francisca, Maria, and Gaudencia
Pastor Makibalo married to Maria Yabo-Makibalo
Alberto Yabo son of Procopio Yabo; married to Elpia Yabo
Enecia Cristal representative of Gaudencia Yabo
Spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador - strangers to the Yabo family;
assignees of Pastor Makibalo

Facts:
1. Alipio Yabo - owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua,
Cagayan de Oro City. Upon Ailipios death, the land title was transferred upon
his 9 children sometime before or during the WWII.
2. Apr 28 1976 - Pastor Makibalo filed @CFI a complaint, against the spouses
Alberto and Elpia Yabo for "Quieting of Title, Annulment of Documents, and
Damages."
a. Pastor alleged - he owned a total of 8 shares of the subject lots (he
purchased the shares of 7 of Alipio's children and inherited the share of
his wife)
b. That he (Pastor) occupied, cultivated, and possessed continuously,
openly, peacefully, and exclusively the 2 parcels of land.
c. Pastor prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots
in question
3. Oct 8 1976 - grandchildren and great-grandchildren of Alipio filed @same CFI
a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against Pastor
Makibalo, Enecia Cristal, and the spouses Salvador.
a. They alleged - Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 are the common property
of the heirs of Alipio namely, the plaintiffs, defendant Enecia Cristal,
Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share had been sold to Alberto Yabo;
b. Also alleged - after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria
Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the de facto
administrators of the said properties;
c. And that much to their surprise, they discovered that the Salvador
spouses have been harvesting coconuts from the lots, which act as a
cloud on the plaintiffs' title over the lots.
d. They prayed that
(i) they, as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo and Enecia Cristal, be
declared as the owners of the lots;
(ii) the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto
except as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo and
Enecia Cristal;
(iii) the lots be partitioned according to law among the aforementioned
co-owners (Pastor Makibalo and Enecia Cristal); and

(iv) the defendants be made to pay for the value of the fruits they
harvested from the lots and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, expenses of the litigation, and costs of the suit.
4. Dec 1968 - Pastor mortgaged the two lots to the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador. On Sept 26, 1978, Pastor executed a document
denominated as a "Confirmation and Quitclaim" whereby he waived all his
rights, interests, and participation in the lots in favor of the Salvador spouses.
(**see Table at the end for the allegations and proof of the RTC and CA)
5. RTC: Spouses Salvador are the owners of 8 shares, equivalent to 8/9 of Lot
No. 6080, and of 7 shares, equivalent to 7/9 of Lot No. 6180, and therefore,
ordering the partition of Lot 6080 so that the 1/9 alloted to Gaudencia Yabo
will go to her heirs or their assigns, and the remaining 8/9 will go to the
spouses Salvador, as successor of Pastor Makibalo, and the partition of Lot
6180 so that the 7/9 portion which formerly belonged to Baseliza, Victoriano,
Jose, Lope, Maria, Francisca, and Pelagia will go to the spouses; the 1/9 which
formerly belonged to Procopio, will go to Alberto Yabo (Procopios son), and
the remaining 1/9 which formerly belonged to Gaudencia, will go to
Gaudencia's heirs or their assigns.
6. CA: RTC affirmed. Pastor Makibalo and his assigns, the spouses Salvador, are
entitled only to of the 1/9 share of Maria and 3/4 of the 6/9 shares acquired
from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and Francisca. The lower court is
directed if necessary to fully effect the partition, to conduct further hearings
and determine whether Jose Yabo is still alive and who are the children of the
brothers and sisters of Maria. The partition:
(1) 1/9 of Lots 6080 & 6180 to the heirs of Gaudencia or their successors and
assigns;
(2) 1/9 of Lot 6180 to Alberto and his wife Elpia;
(3) 1/9 of Lot 6080 to the heirs of Procopio and their successors and assigns,
including Alberto;
(4) The 1/9 share of Maria in Lots 6080 and 6180 be partitioned: 1/2 for the
surviving spouse Pastor Makibalo (now spouses Salvador) and the other half
for the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria in equal shares;
(5) The remaining 6/9: 1/2 of which is conjugal between Maria and Pastor
Makibalo be partitioned 3/4 for Pastor Makibalo (now spouses Salvador) and
1/4 for the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria in equal shares;
(6) Jose Yabo if he is still alive should participate in the partition as heir of
Maria otherwise he shall be represented by his children.

Issues:
1. Which portion of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the conjugal
assets of the spouses Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo?

2. Whether or not Pastor Makibalo has acquired by prescription the shares of his
other co-heirs or co-owners?
Held:
1. Article 160 NCC - all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Since the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza,
Procopio, and Francisca in Lot No. 6180 and Lot No. 6080 had been purchased
by Pastor during his marriage with Maria, and there is no proof that these
were acquired with his exclusive money, the same are deemed conjugal
properties.
a. Not forming part of the conjugal partnership are: (i) the 1/9 share
inherited by Maria which remained as her exclusive property pursuant
to Article 146 (2) NCC; (ii) the 1/9 share of Gaudencia which was not
sold to Pastor; and (iii) the 1/9 share of Pelagia which was acquired by
Pastor in 1967 or 5 years after the death of his wife and which was
therefore his exclusive property.
b. Upon Maria's death in 1962, the conjugal partnership of gains was
dissolved. Half of the conjugal properties, together with Maria's 1/9
hereditary share in the disputed lots, constituted Maria's estate and
should thus go to her surviving heirs. Under Article 1001 NCC, her heirs
are: (i) her spouse, Pastor Makibalo, who shall be entitled to 1/2 of her
estate, (ii) her brother, Jose, and (iii) the children of her other brothers
and sisters, who shall inherit the other half. There having been no
actual partition of the estate yet, the said heirs became co-owners
thereof by operation of law.
2. NO. Article 494 NCC which provides that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property implies that an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. The
imprescriptibility of the action cannot, however, be invoked when one of the
co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner and for a period
sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
a. Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership requires a continuous,
open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a period of time
fixed by law.
b. Possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be
regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to
all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may
not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere
silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits
from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the
planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve
as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the
other co-owners.
c. In order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must
concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation

amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;

(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence
thereon must be clear and convincing.
d. Records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the
whole estate of his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the Office of
the Register of Deeds as allowed under Section 1 Rule 74 of the RoC, or
that he caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his name or the
cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name and the issuance of
a new one in his own name.
i. The only act which may be deemed as a repudiation by Pastor
of the co-ownership over the lots is his filing on April 28, 1976 of
an action to quiet title. The period of prescription started to run
only from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his coheirs, the private respondents herein, instituted on Oct 8, 1976
an action for partition of the lots. Hence, the adverse possession
by Pastor being for only about 6 months would not vest in him
exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive
prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action
for partition will not lie in favor of Pastor.
e. Since the share of Procopio in the 2 parcels of land was purchased by
Pastor during his marriage with Maria, they became conjugal property,
and half of it formed part of Maria's estate upon her death in 1962.
Accordingly, Pastor's resale in favor of Alberto could only be valid with
respect to Pastor's 1/2 conjugal share and 1/4 hereditary share as heir
of Maria. The remaining 1/4 should go to Pastor's co-heirs, the private
respondents herein.
SC: CA decision affirmed and modified: (a) the former 1/9 share of Pelagia in Lots
No. 6180 and 6080 which she sold to Pastor should be treated as Pastor's exclusive
property which should now pertain to the Spouses Salvador, his successors-ininterest; and (b) the former 1/9 share of Procopio in both lots should be divided as
follows: 3/4 (Pastor's 1/2 conjugal share and 1/4 as his share as Maria's heir) for the
spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and 1/4 (the share of Maria's collateral relatives as
Maria's heirs) for the private respondents, including Alberto and Jose Yabo.
Adlawan v. Adlawan
G.R. No. 161916
DOCTRINE: A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without
necessity of including all the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the
benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
(batasnatin)
FACTS:
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over Lot 7226 and the
house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, registered in
the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located in Cebu. Petitioner averred
that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. In ruling
for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale

validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged

illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The petitioner
further claims that he allowed the respondents to occupy the property out of
respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father who stayed
on the questioned property since birth, provided they would vacate the same should
his need for the property arise. When the petitioner verbally requested respondents
to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting
of title with the RTC.
The respondents argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominadors
acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador
was survived by his wife, Graciana. This means that the petitioner is not the sole
owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by
petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of
Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner
became co-owners of Lot 7226.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment
against his co-owners of lot 7226. -- NO
HELD:
No. The ejectment suit will not prosper as the petitioner filed it for his benefit alone
and not for the benefits of the rest of co owners.
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have
been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the
suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, GIL C. FERNANDEZ and ARMANDO C. FERNANDEZ,
petitioners, vs. Spouses CARLOS and NARCISA TARUN, respondents.
November 14 , 2002; J. Panganiban
Facts:
This case is about a dispute over a An 8,209-square meter fishpond situated at
Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City known as Lot No. 2991 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dagupan
The brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel Fernandez and their uncle,
Armando owned 1/6 of the fishpond. When Armando, who was single died, his
share was distributed to the others so that they owned 1/5 of the fishpond
On June 4, 1967, Antonio Fernandez sold his share of about 547.27 square
meters to the respondents

On June 18, 1967, Demetria Fernandez sold her share of 547.27 square meters
to the respondents
The two sales were registered and annotated on OCT No. 43099
On November 14, 1969, the co-owners of the disputed fishpond and another
fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of
two parcels of registered land with exchange of shares. Antonio, Santiago,
Demetria and Angel were among the parties to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stipulated that the sale of the shares of
Demetria and Antonio to the respondents be recognized and respected. The sold
shares were excluded from the partition.
Angel Fernandez, by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, exchanged his
share on the fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 for the share of the other coowners of the disputed fishpond. The result of this was that Angel and the
respondents became co-owners of the disputed fishpond.
While the respondents were paying already realty taxes on their share of the
disputed fishpond, Angel and later on his heirs were still in possession of the
entire fishpond
The respondents wanted to partition the property but Angel refused. After Angel
died, the respondents wrote the petitioners, being Angels heirs, of their desire
to partition the disputed fishpond but this also was rejected by the petitioners
Respondents filed a suit for partition and damages.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners
Articles 16201 and 16212 of the Civil Code entitled the petitioners to
redeem the property that they had sold to respondents.
The sale was highly iniquitous and void in contravention of Articles 1623 3
of the Civil Code
The CA ruled in favor of the respondents
Since Angel Fernandez was the co-owner of the disputed fishpond at the
time of the sale, he was the one entitled to receive notice and to redeem
the property but he did not choose to exercise that right
The execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was a substantial
compliance with the notice requirement under that law.
It was too late in the day to declare the exchange highly iniquitous, when
Angel Fernandez had not complained about it. As his successors-ininterest, petitioners were bound by the terms of the agreement.

Issue/s:
Are the petitioners entitled to exercise their right of legal redemption?
Is the transaction an equitable mortgage?
Is the deed of extra-judicial partition void and inefficacious?
1
2
3

Held:
No, the petitioners are not entitled to exercise their right of legal redemption.
the right to redeem referred to in Article 1620 applies only when a portion
is sold to a non-co-owner
The respondents became co-owners of the disputed fishpond because
they were sold shares of it by Demetria and Antonio long before
petitioners succeeded Angel.
Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for
reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the
redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or
[an] inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa,
4th. Ed., 317.)
It is intended to minimize co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the
exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the other
owners are sold to a third person (Id., pp. 130-131, per Vasquez, J.)
The petitioners contention that the sales of the shares in the disputed
fishpond to the respondents are void because a notice in writing to the
other co-owners was not sent as required under Article 1625 4 of the Civil
Code is not meritorious. The provision only states that the deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the registry of property without such notice but it
does not make the sale void.
Angel Fernandez is deemed to have been given notice of the sale to
respondents by the execution and signing of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Exchange of Shares. This is in accordance with the doctrine
that the law does not require any specific form of written notice to the
redemptioner
No, the deed of extra-judicial partition is not void and inefficacious.
Petitioners contend that the deed of extra-judicial partition is not void and
inefficacious because Angel stood to lose 5,498.14 square meters. This
contention is untenable
The law will not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or
disastrous agreement they entered into with all the required formalities
and with full awareness of what they were doing. Courts have no power to
relieve them from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because
their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments
Neither the law nor the courts will extricate them from an unwise or
undesirable contract which they entered into with all the required
formalities and with full knowledge of its consequences (Opulencia v.
Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385, 396, July 30, 1998)
Petitioners herein are bound by the extrajudicial partition, because
contracts not only take effect between the parties, but also extend to their
assigns and heirs (Art. 1311, Civil Code; Smith, Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 267 SCRA 530, 538-539, February 6, 1997; Bangayan v. Court of
Appeals, 278 SCRA 379, 385, August 29, 1997)
The petitioners should have filed the proper action to annul the extra
judicial partition if they believed it to be iniquitous.
4

 The extra judicial partition was more beneficial to Angel. By swapping

shares of the other fishpond with shares in the disputed fishpond, his
ownership became contiguous and compact in only one fishpond, instead
of being merely shared with the other co-heirs in two different fishpond.

EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos

184 SCRA 614
DOCTRINE: Possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to
title. There is no need to produce a receipt.
FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these
by telephone, which was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were
subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a
personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and
was then showed the invoice for the books.
EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before
clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had
claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its employ.
Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with the
Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA
then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981.
Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Pea and his sale of 120 of the
books he had ordered from EDCA to Santos.
On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct
5 at the UN Avenue, which forced their way into the store of the private respondents
and threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They
seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a van belonging to EDCA,
and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner.
Protesting this high-handed action, the Santos sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was
issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the
private respondents.
MTC ruled that the ownership of the books of Santos. RTC and CA sustained the
MTCs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property -- NO
HELD:
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller.
When she was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate
seller.

With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
property by mere failure of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of
sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of
payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking,
because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already
transferred to him.
Ledesma v. CA
213 SCRA 195
DOCTRINE: Article 559 cannot be applied when the property was lawfully divested
from the original owner.
FACTS:
September 1977, a person representing himself to be Jojo Consuji purchased
two vehicles from Citywide Motors, Inc.
Jojo used a managers check to pay for the vehicles
The said vehicles were delivered via a contract of sale.
The check was dishonored.
It was discovered that Jojo Consuji was in fact an Armando Suarez, a known
and infamous conman.
One of the vehicles was recovered, abandoned in Quezon City. The other
vehicle was found to be sold to the petitioner.
Ledesma claims that he had acquired the vehicle in good faith and is thus
entitled to the same.
The company filed for replevin and reacquired the vehicle from Ledesma after
payment of a bond.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ledesma and awarded him with possession of the
vehicle plus damages.
The CA ruled in favor of the company.
The company relies on the strength of Article 559 of the Civil Code which
provides that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived
of it, he has a right to recover it not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also
from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief
or robber. The said article establishes two (2) exceptions to the general rule of
irrevendicability (sic), to wit: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has
been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the
thing as against the owner who may recover it without paying any indemnity,
except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
ISSUE:
W/N the private respondent (the company) was unlawfully deprived of the vehicle in
the first place so as to make Article 559 apply. -- NO
HELD:
The company was not unlawfully deprived of the vehicle in question. Therefore, the
petitioner is a buyer in good faith and Article 559 may not apply.
There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private respondent
and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate

of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee even if the said
vendee used a fictitious name and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the
certificate of registration to the vendee Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the
vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to a failure of
consideration which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to
prosecute the impostor for estafa under the Revised Penal Code.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the parties to a contract of sale may
stipulate that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full
payment of the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise,
the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not
yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or
to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation
above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the
buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.