CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

INDIA SRILANKA RELATIONSHIP 1950 TO 1990

POLITICAL SCIENCE
Faculty of Political science Dr. Prof. S.P SINGH

MADHUKAR ANAND
ROLL NO 747
1ST year, 2ND SEMESTER

ACKNOWLEDGEMET

The present project of political science on the INDIA SRILANKA RELATIONSHIP 1950
TO 1990 had been able to get its final shape with the support and help of people from
various quarters. My sincere thanks go to all those persons who gave their precious time to
me. Without the inputs from them the study could not have come to its present state. I am
proud to acknowledge gratitude to my friends who facilitated my meetings with scholars
whom they knew.
With immense pleasure, I express my deepest sense of gratitude to DR. S.P SINGH SIR
Faculty of political science, Chanakya National Law University for helping me in
preparing my project. I am also thankful to the whole Chanakya National Law University
family that provided me all the material I required for the project. Not to forget thanking to
my parents without the co-operation of which completion of this project would not had been
possible.
I have made every effort to acknowledge credits, but I apologies in advance for any
omission that may have inadvertently taken place.
Last but not least I would like to thank Almighty whose blessing helped me to complete the
project.

Madhukar Anand

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:

THE

AIM OF THE PROJECT IS TO PRESENT A DETAILED STUDY OF

RELATIONSHIP FROM 1950 TO 1990

THROUGH THE

INDO-SRILANKA

BOOKS, SUGGESTIONS AND

DIFFERENT WRITINGS AND ARTICLES.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS:

THOUGH

THIS IS AN IMMENSE PROJECT AND PAGES CAN BE WRITTEN OVER THE TOPIC BUT

BECAUSE OF CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

WAS NOT ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE

TOPIC IN GREAT DETAIL.

SOURCES OF DATA:
THE FOLLOWING SECONDARY SOURCES OF DATA HAVE BEEN USED IN THE PROJECT1

ARTICLES

BOOKS

WEBSITES

METHOD OF WRITING :
THE

METHOD OF WRITING FOLLOWED IN THE COURSE OF THIS RESEARCH PAPER IS PRIMARILY

ANALYTICAL.

MODE OF CITATION:
THE

RESEARCHER HAS FOLLOWED A UNIFORM MODE OF CITATION THROUGHOUT THE COURSE

OF THIS RESEARCH PAPER.

TABLE OF CONTEXT

1.

INTRODUCTION

05

2. HYPOTHESIS
.. 06
3. VARIOUS PHASE IN INDIAS POLICY TOWARDS SRILANKA ..
.... 08
4. INDIAS
REACTON

TO

SRILANKA

ETHNIC

CRISIS

.. 11
5. THE

TAMIL

NADU

FACTOR

.. 14
6. INDO

..

SRILANKA

ACCORD

15
7. IPKF

ROLE

IN

ETHNIC

CRISIS

. 18
8. POST

IPKF

TENURE

.. 21
9. INSTRUMENT
OF
POLICY
..
.. 23
10. CONCLUSION
. 28
11. BIBLIOGRAPHY

29

INTRODUCTION

India is Sri Lanka's closest neighbour. The relationship between the two countries is more than
2,500 years old and both sides have built upon a legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and
linguistic intercourse. Relations between the two countries have also matured and diversified
with the passage of time, encompassing all areas of contemporary relevance. The shared cultural
and civilizational heritage of the two countries and the extensive people to people interaction of
their citizens provide the foundation to build a multi-faceted partnership. In recent years, the
relationship has been marked by close contacts at the highest political level, growing trade and
investment, cooperation in the fields of development, education, culture and defence, as well as a
broad understanding on major issues of international interest.
Bilateral relations between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Republic of
India have been generally friendly, but were controversially affected by the Sri Lankan civil
war and by the failure of Indian intervention during the war. India is the only neighbor of Sri
Lanka, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South Asia and
have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean.
Indias policy towards the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has undergone several twists and turns
during the post independence period. From a policy of active involvement during 1983-1990, it
took a handoff policy after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. However, given the
geographical continuity and ethnic affinity India cannot isolate itself from the developments in
the island republic. The recent activities and policies pursued by Pakistan and China is also a

matter of great concern to New Delhi.

Indias long term interests in Sri Lanka will be a political solution which guarantees the safety
and security of all minority groups in the unified country and the removal of extra regional forces
which pose a threat to Indias security environment.

HYPOTHESIS

For the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the also Tamil Diaspora scattered in different parts of the world,
Tamil Nadu is their original homeland. For the Sinhalese India is the closest neighbour whom
they can always lookup towards help and favour. Despite these close relations, Indias policy
towards Sri Lanka has always had a negative impact on bilateral relations. The love - hate
relationship compounded with the fear of a big brotherly attitude had always made Sri Lanka
look at India with suspicion. India, although being in an advantageous state, did little to install
confidence in the southern neighbour. What is more New Delhi antagonised its neighbour by its
short sighted policies.
The ambiguous role played by Central Government in New Delhi and Tamil Nadu Government
towards the protracted ethnic conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese also played a big role
in India burning its hands by its involvement in Sri Lankan issue. While the ethnic crisis is an
emotional issue, Indian policy towards Sri Lanka was also guided more by its strategic interests
due to the location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean.
The Sri Lankan Government should also be given equal credit for contributing towards love
hate relations. Despite her awareness of Indias security concerns, Sri Lanka has always tried to
play a divisive role by inviting external actors in the affairs of Indian Ocean and thus act against
Indias interest. A telling example of this attitude became apparent when Sri Lanka allowed
Pakistani Air Force to refuel during the Bangladeshi war of 1970. Thus Sri Lankas ------ self
interest is also one of the reasons for Indias over arching security concerns especially on the

issue of extra regional presence.

The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, could have been avoided. The India Sri Lanka accord
should have been signed between the Colombo and the tamils and India should have acted as the
guarantee. The Indian forces sent to Sri Lanka became a victim to the hasty and un co-ordinated
policies of India. Having fought against the LTTE on behalf of the Sri Lankan Government the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent out unceremoniously by the Sri Lankan
Government. The Tamils who had welcomed the IPKF with open arms also played their part to
get the IPKF out of Sri Lanka, bringing to an end Indias controversial involvement in Sri Lanka.
The end of Eelam War has opened a new chapter in India Sri Lanka relations. India need not now
be worried about the presence of the third navy (Sea Tigers), Air Force (Air Tigers) and suicide
cadres in the Indian Ocean. But the absence of LTTE does not mean that there is no threat arising
from the Indian Ocean, rather the close relations of Sri Lanka with China and Pakistan has
increased strategic concerns for India. This paper would study the challenges in India - Sri Lanka

relations in a Historical perspective.

Various Phases in Indias Policy towards Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka is as important strategically to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to
China. As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral, India has nothing to worry about but if
there be any danger of the island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India; India
cannot tolerate such a situation endangering her territorial integrity.
A former commander of the Indian Navy
Since the Independence of India in 1947 and Sri Lanka in 1948, both nations have been enjoying
fairly close relations. Security interests and the shared ethnicity of Tamils living in southern
India and in northern and eastern Sri Lanka are the two major factors in India Sri
Lankan relations. During the initial period after British vacating the Indian Ocean region (IOR),
India and Sri Lanka increasingly came to share regional security interests 1. Though India looked
into this issue with strategic concern, Sri Lanka feared India of having a hegemonic attitude
towards her. Majority of the Sri Lankans, whether be it Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim, belong to the
same ethnic stock as Indias population, and cultural affinities extend not only to religion, but
also to language. Tamil being common to Tamil Nadu as well as North and East of Sri Lanka,
and Sinhala being related to the North Indian languages such as Pali, Sanskrit, Hindusthani,
Marathi, Gujerathi and Bengali2. Despite these close relations, Sri Lanka - Indias equations have
always been overshadowed by distrust and mutual suspicion. India Sri Lanka relations can
1

www://countrystudies.us/India/125.htm

2 Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka, A Third World Perspective, Chanakya Publications, (Newdelhi,

1982)

be divided into four phases; first, Nehruvian era, starting from independence of both the nations
until 1970s. Second; During the stewardship of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi,
where India was a forward looking policy of involvement. Third; post Rajiv Gandhi and postIPKF period until the beginning of peace process in 2002. Fourth; the period beginning with
peace process and Eelam War IV, when India was not directly involved, however its influence
was decisive. The end of Eelam War IV has heralded the current phase in India Sri Lanka
relations. The first phase of relationship was devoted to of clearing the colonial baggage and
adherence to the policy of non-alignment. The first issue between India and Sri Lanka related to
the future status of the People of Indian Origin in the island. The first bilateral agreement
between India and Sri Lanka, Nehru Kotelawala Agreement on Persons of Indian Origin in
Ceylon was signed in 1954. This agreement dealt with the problems of illicit immigration and
proposals for granting them citizenship. According to the agreement the persons of Indian Origin
who desired to get Indian citizenship were to be registered under the Indian and Pakistani
(Citizenship) Act, and it was expected to be completed within two years. But not all the persons
of Indian Origin came forward to register. Prime Minister Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranike is a
statement in the Senate said:
The registration of Citizens under the Indian and Pakistan Residents (Citizenship) Act is now

complete. Over 134,000 Indians have been registered as Ceylon Citizens. The Indian High
Commissioner has in the meantime only registered 50,969 persons as Indian Citizens.
9,75,000 persons who did not register under this agreement, were declared by Colombo as
stateless. The process of registration and repatriation to India had to be restarted again under the
Indo Ceylon (Sirimavo Shastri) Agreement of 30th October 1964. Under this agreement out
of a total of 9.75 lakhs stateless persons in 1964, 5.25 lakhs were to be repatriated to India over a
period of 15 years. At the same time, it was agreed Colombo would grant citizenship to 3 lakh
stateless persons. The further status of 1.50 lakhs was to be determined later by negotiations
between the two countries. From the date of pact upto 1st January 1973, 70,621 persons had been
repatriated to India and Sri Lanka had conferred citizenship on 40,268 persons. The problem
became a little more complicated by 30th April 1970, the deadline for applying for Indian
citizenship. When only 4 lakh people had sent their applications for Indian Passport though

India had agreed to take in 5.25 lakh people. While 6.25 lakh applied for Sri Lankan

citizenship as against the quota of 3 lakhs agreed upon in the pact. Because of this India had
to reopen the Indian register for fresh application and Sri Lanka had exceeded it agreed quota. As
difficulty arose over the question of reopening of the registration no definite decisions could be
taken and the solution was left to the Prime Ministers of the two countries who were scheduled
to meet later in the year.
Indra Gandhi visited Sri Lanka on 27th April 1972 on a goodwill visit for 3 days. During this
visit issues pertaining to repatriation of people of Indian origin, Kachchativu and possibilities of
economic cooperation were discussed. This visit of Indra Gandhi was intended to assure Sri
Lanka that India was open to repatriation of the people of Indian Origin and India would not
involve itself in Sri Lankas internal problem, as it has done in Bangladesh. Despite India s
categorical assurance that India has no intent to get involved in Tamil issue to the Tamils move,
the Sinhalese were always suspicious of India intention. It may be mentioned that during this
visit India Gandhi refused to meet the Tamil leader S.J.V Chelvanayakam even though the latter

was keen to meet her.

Indias reaction to the Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis.

In the last week of July 1983, massive ethnic violence broke out in Sri Lanka, with its epicentre
in Colombo. This violence was directed towards Tamil lives and property. India was directly
affected as a result of this violence. The victims of the ethnic holocaust included not only the Sri
Lankan Tamils but also estate workers of Indian origin, Indian nationals both among estate Tamil
and casual visitors and members of Indian High Commission. Many the Indian establishment in
Sri Lanka were also badly gutted in the violence.
The ethnic issue went beyond the Sri Lankan boundary and it threatened India s regional
security as well as ideological sensitivity. Sri Lankan government initially went out of its way to
seek political and military aid from external actors especially USA, UK, China, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Malaysia. Colombo deliberately kept India out of the preview due to the
latters sympathy towards the Sri Lankan Tamils. Mrs. Gandhi in her conversation with President
Jeyewardene on 5th August 1983 strongly disapproved Sri Lanka seeking external military
support3. Despite Indias protest President Jayewardene also launched a diplomatic offensive. He
went to Beijing in May 1984 and extracted promises of military and moral support. Encouraged
by his trip to China, the President undertook a three-nation tour to US, UK and India in June

Ram Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy, Annual Survey: 1973, Sterling Publisher, New Delhi, 1977

1984. In this visit he got little help from both UK and USA, and with India he was more
concerned in asking India not to involve in the Sri Lankan issue.4
Pakistan also came forward to help Sri Lanka during the ethnic crisis. Though initial reports
claim that Sri Lanka sought Pakistans help; the former denied the same, Pakistan granted
Rs.10 million towards relief assistance and military equipment. In addition Sri Lankan Army
Chief visited Pakistan and a Pakistani Naval ship made a goodwill visit to Sri Lanka. This
increased international involvement in Sri Lankas ethnic crisis was perceived by New Delhi as a
threat to Indias security. It was one of the reasons why India got involved in the Sri Lankan
issue.
The official Indian rationale for Indias involvement in the Sri Lankan crises was because
of the influx of the Sri Lankan Tamils to India as refugees. As the civilian administration in
the North and East was completely disrupted due to the armed conflict, thousands of Sri Lankan
Tamils sought refuge in Tamil Nadu5. Mrs. Gandhi in her statements made it clear that she
considered India as a chief mediator and not a mute spectator. Throughout 1983 1990, India
never abandoned its role of being a mediator a protector of the interests of the Tamil minorities in
the island.6 President Jayewardene, during his visit to Delhi in November 1983, on the sidelines
of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, met Mrs. Gandhi for the first time after
the July riots. The meeting with Mrs. Gandhi served to underline the weakness of his position in
negotiating with the Indian government on the resolution of the political crisis in Sri Lanka. He
tentatively accepted the set of proposals embodied in a document, which came to be known as
Annexure C where the framework of a settlement with the Tamil groups was outlined. The
devolution of powers to the Tamil Provinces envisaged in Annexure C was not to the liking of
the Sinhalese. The All Party Conference convened by President Jayewardene became a
tamasha and finally the whole idea was dropped. After the assassination of Mrs. Indra Gandhi,
Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Ministers of India. He made a positive impression on the Sri
4

Rajesh Kadian, Indias Sri Lanka Fiasco, Peacekeepers at war, Vision Books, (New Delhi, 1990)

Gamini Keerawella, Indias Involvement in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis, in eds, Mahinda Werake et al, Security
Dilemma of a Small State, South Asian Publishers (New Delhi, 1995).

K.M. De Silva, Reaping The Whirlwind, Penguin Books (New Delhi, 1998).

Lankan politicians and diplomats who met him during the early months of his office. Among his
first decision was the appointment of Romesh Bhandari, Indias Foreign Secretary and chief
mediator in the place of G. Parathasarathy, a move that was clearly intended to signal new
policies in a more cordial atmosphere.
President Jayewardenes meeting with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi in June 1985,
took place in a greatly improved atmosphere. This was followed by the despatch of Mr. Bhandari
to Colombo for talks with the Sri Lankan President. The talks resulted in a major breakthrough
with the latter being persuaded to let his government begin talks with all militant as well as
moderate Tamil groups engaged in violent confrontations with Sri Lankan security forces. The
increase in the number of spokesmen for the Tamil minority had some predictable consequences,
beginning naturally with a struggle for dominance and a quest for the position of sole
spokesman. The LTTE eventually pushed ahead to a position of dominance largely because of its
strong expanding bases in Jaffna as well as annihilation of political opponents.
Two sets of talks between representatives of the Sri Lankan government and the various Tamil
groups claming to speak on behalf of their ethnic group, took place in July and August 1985 at
Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan. These talks did not yield any positive results, but Mr. Bhandari
used the opportunity they provided to continue negotiations with the Sri Lankan delegation in
New Delhi. These talks were more fruitful. The new agenda for reconciliation yielded a
framework for a realistic devolution of power in Sri Lanka. The draft accord came to be known
in official circles as the Delhi accord of August 1985. One of the most significant features of
this meticulously rafted agreement was that the unit of devolution was to be a province, no
longer a district. Initiated on 30th August 1985 this draft accord became the basis of all future
negotiations between the two governments on Sri Lankas ethnic problems concerning the Tamil
minority. The actual signing of the Accord, which Bhandari hoped would crown his mandatory
efforts, confronted a major obstacle, if not refusal, of the Tamil groups who were represented at
Thimpu to give their consent. Meanwhile the outbursts of ethnic violence, especially in the North
and East of the Island led to clashes between the security forces and Tamil groups. The Tamil
groups in Sri Lanka had their supporters among the political parties of Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu
continued to serve the Tamil cause in three ways; first: providing sanctuary; second: the base

for training and third: it was the conduit for the supply of arms and was also a source of funds.

The Sri Lankan army having become aggressive over the Tamils in Jaffna, the Indian leaders
started thinking of direct intervention. Plans for such intervention were finalised by March 1987,
and Colombo was warned to desist from attempting military solution over Jaffna. However,
when Sri Lanka did not heed to the warning, India intervened directly in June 1987, by
dropping relief supplies to beleaguered Jaffna: first through naval boats and when these boats
were stopped by the Sri Lankan Navy, then by air under the cover of Indian air force
planes. This intervention brought the Sri Lankan military operation in Jaffna to an end and led to
the conclusion of the Indo Sri Lanka Agreement in July 19877.

The Tamil Nadu Factor

Tamil Nadus role in the India-Sri Lanka relations can never be ignored. Due to the close ethnic
and geographical proximity, Tamil Nadu had always tried to have a say in India s policy towards
Sri Lanka. However on many occasions New Delhi bypassed Tamil Nadu in its crucial decisions.
In the initial stages of the ethnic conflict while the Tamil Nadu and the central government in
New Delhi were keeping a close watch on developments in Sri Lanka, they scrupulously
refrained from doing anything that could be considered as interference in Sri Lankan affairs,
despite there being tremendous support from the opposition parties and other key players of
Tamil Nadu for a more active policy towards Sri Lanka 8. However, Tamil Nadus role became
inevitable only after the Tamil militants began to play a active role in Tamil Nadu. Their presence
in Tamil Nadu activated the Tamil social constituency in India and many Tamil public figures,
media organisations and even local politicians started sympathising with their cause. Tamil Nadu
factor should be analysed on the premise of two important factors; first: role of Tamil polity of
both Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka during the initial period of ethnic crisis, second: their role since
the beginning of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Until the movement of Tamils militants into Tamil
7 S.D.Muni, Pangs of Proximity, India and Sri Lankas Ethnic Crisis, Sage Publications, (New Delhi, 1993)
S.D.Muni, Pangs of Proximity, India and Sri Lankas Ethnic Crisis, Sage Publications, (New Delhi, 1993)

Nadu, the Government of Tamil Nadu was only giving lip service and not real involvement,
especially in terms creation of Tamil Eelam.
However, this position of non involvement changed with the presence of Tamil militants in the
Indian soil. Since 1983, the major section of the Tamil Polity began to advocate one of the three
goals establishment of the independent Eelam or Autonomy of the regime - or the
establishment of a separate state. This situation has of course changed over the years.
Movement of population within country, the regional powers coming to power in various states
and the formation of coialation government in New Delhi had integrated India politically. The
tall claim made by Vaiko that a blood bath would take place in Tamil Nadu if the war in Sri
Lanka were to intensify has no popular support in Tamil Nadu.

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was an accord signed in Colombo on July 29, 1987,
between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. The
accord was expected to resolve the ongoing Sri Lankan civil war. Under the terms of the
agreement,Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops
were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender their
arms.
Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the LTTE (which at the time was one of the
strongest Tamil forces) had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender
their arms to the IPKF only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active
confrontation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) declared their intent to continue the
armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The Indian PeaceKeeping Force found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further
complicating the return to peace was a burgeoning Sinhalese insurgency in the south.

Sri Lankan Civil War :-

Sri Lanka, from the early part of the 1980s, was facing an increasingly violent ethnic strife. The
origins of this conflict can be traced to the independence of the island from Britain in 1948 . At
the time, a Sinhala majority government was instituted which passed legislation that were
deemed discriminatory against the substantial Tamil minority population. In the 1970s, two
major Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started
agitation for a separate state of Tamil Eeelam within the system in a federal structure in the north
and eastern Sri Lanka that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, enactment of the
sixth amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution in August 1983 classified all separatist
movements as unconstitutional, effectively rendering the TULF ineffective. Outside the TULF,
however, factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon emerged, and the
ethnic divisions started flaring into a violent civil war9.

Indian Involvement :India had, initially under Indira Gandhi and later under Rajiv Gandhi, provided support to Tamil
interests from the very conception of the secessionist movement. This included providing
sanctuary to the separatists, as well as support the operations training camps for Tamil guerrillas
in Tamil Nadu of which the LTTE emerged as the strongest force. This was both as a result of a
large Tamil community in South India, as well as India's regional security and interests which
attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the United
States, Pakistan, and China. To this end, the Indira Gandhi Government sought to make it clear to
the Sri Lankan President, Jayewardene that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement
was an option India would consider if any diplomatic solutions should fail. Following the antiTamil riots, the Tamil rebel movement grew progressively strong and increasingly violent.
However,after Indira Gandhi's assassination, the Indian support for the militant movement
decreased. However, the succeeding Rajiv Gandhi government attempted to re-establish friendly
relations with its neighbours. It still however maintained diplomatic efforts to find a solution to
the conflict as well as maintaining covert aid to the Tamil rebels.

9 www.srilankaaccord.gov

Operation Liberation
From 1985 however, the Sri-Lankan Government started rearming itself extensively for its antiinsurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa. In 1986, the
campaign against the insurgency was stepped up and in 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody
insurgent movement, Operation Liberation was launched against LTTE strongholds in
Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by helicopter gunships
as well as Ground attack aircraft. In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of
Jaffna. As civilian casualties grew, calls grew within India to intervene in what was increasingly
seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian crisis, especially with reports
use of aerial support against rebel positions in civilian areas. India, which had a substantial Tamil
population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home, called on the Sri
Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement.

Operation Poomalai :However, the Indian efforts were futile. Added to this, in the growing involvement of Pakistani
and Israeli advisors, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a show of force. Failing to
negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would
send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance
but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.
Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made by the Indian government to
mount an airdrop of relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of
Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a blatant show of force, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation
Poomalai in broad daylight. Five An-32s of the Indian Air Force under cover of heavily armed
Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well
within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to
New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister External Affairs,

K. Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation. It was also indicated to the Ambassador that if the

operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military
retaliation against Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the
credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as a
symbolic act of support for the Tamil Rebels, as well to preserve Rajiv Gandhi's credibility.
Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and facing an increasingly war-weary
population at home, the Sri Lankan President, J. R. Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the
Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a
round of negotiations that led to the signing of the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on July 29, 1987[21]
that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops
withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels disarm,[ and saw the induction of the IPKF as a

peace keeping force in Sri Lanka.

IPKF role in the Ethnic Conflict

Within 24 hours of signing the Accord, 10 the Indian Peace Keeping Force landed in Northern and
Eastern provinces to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka, which was plunged by an
extended conflict between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority. Following the Indo- Sri
Lankan Accord, cessation of hostilities proved a unilateral affair: Tiger militants used their arms
creating violence and interfering in civil administration in the North- east. As a result, the IPKF
alone endeavoured to enforce peace in the Tamil provinces.
The IPKF mission was inherently complex and unusual. Added to this complexity was India s
complete inexperience as peacekeepers in a civil strife in a neighbouring country. Though Indian
forces were in other countries for peacekeeping mission, but in all the cases it was part of
multinational forces under the UN Resolutions or Multinational Agreements. In the case of Sri
Lanka the IPKF had to work under a bilateral agreement, and there it had a host of mutually
incompatible relations and linkages with the contending parties in the civil strife on the one hand
and its own objective on the other11.
The IPKF was to act on behalf of India in executing and assuring the performance of everything
enunciating in the resolution of the Indo - Sri Lanka agreement. Thus the mission and the
10 Gamini Keerawella, , Indias Involvement in the Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis, in eds, Mahinda Werake et al,
Security Dilemma of a Small State, South Asian Publishers (New Delhi, 1995).

11 S.D.Muni, Pangs of Proximity, India and Sri Lankas Ethnic Crisis, Sage Publications, (New Delhi, 1993)

objectives, scope and functions of the IKPF became broad and general, not precise nor
restrictive. Several people in the island however understood the IKPF's exercise in a different
light. A general obligation was undertaken by India to guarantee an observance of the resolutions
and in the annexure to the agreement was a pledge of assistance through Indian forces to secure a
halt to fighting within Sri Lanka12.
While the situation in North and East was returning to normal, the suicide of the LTTE cadres
who were arrested by the Sri Lankan navy while the cadres were returning in an armed boat,
made way for the LTTE revert to taking up of arms. Evidently the IPKF also grew impatient
waiting for the LTTE to conform to the agreement, surrender arms and follow its provisions. But
soon it became clear that the LTTE was going back on the agreement. They either had to be
forced by IPKF to do so or eliminated so that the agreement then could be executed through
other small Tamil militant factions. For this reason the IPKF's operational aspects soon turned
out to be offensive; combating an intractable enemy, the LTTE in the Northeast. To the LTTE
settlement to the ethnic conflict contained in the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement was unacceptable. It
was unsatisfactory.
On the contrary President Jayewardene asserted that, he on sensing the threat to people wanted to
counter the same, so he invoked military assistance immediately, and subsequently affirmed that,
The entry of the IPKF was a military act and it was the decision of the president. When the
LTTE dishonoured the agreement, "in November, Rajiv Gandhi had to disarm them according to
the terms of the Agreement," he also added disclosing the reason for seeking the Indian military
assistance. Consequently from a Sri Lankan view, the IPKF's mission and objectives were to
render the LTTE military inactive, and also save Sri Lankan citizens from Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna's rebellion.
The sudden change in the political situation had its impact on the affairs of the IPKF. With the
departure of President Jayewardene from the office, the commitment to the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord at the highest level of the Sri Lanka government was bound to ebb, especially because
his successor had never shown much enthusiasm for it. Moreover with Premadasas election to
the office of the President in December 1988, the IPKFs continued presence in the island had
12

BertramE.S.J. Bastiampillai, Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, in eds, Mahinda Werake et al, Security
Dilemma of a Small State, South Asian Publishers (New Delhi, 1995).

become a point of contention between the Indian and the Sri Lankan government. Eventually the
vicissitudes of electoral politics in India, which saw the defeat of Rajiv Ghandhis government
and the formation of a new coalition under V.P. Singh, also changed the situation. Soon the IPKF
was withdrawn on a timetable determined by V.P.Singhs government under the key negotiator
for India I.K. Gujral, then Minister of External Affairs. The process of withdrawal of IPKF was
completed in March 1990.
The IPKFs presence in the north and east of the island was not without its advantage to the Sri
Lanka government. Sri Lankas defence expenditure dropped noticeably after mid 1987. The
Indian government bore the heavy expenditure involved in the employment as such as it was of
the north and east. At the time the IPKF arrived in the island, only the Sinhalese were hostile and
opposed to its presence. Within a short time of the IPKFs presence in the north and east, even
the Tamils who originally welcomed them as liberators got alienated from them13.
The withdrawal of the IPKF and the assignation of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in May 1991
in Tamil Nadu, marked the end of an era of Indias active involvement in the Sri Lankan
ethnic problem, a process that stated after the 1983 July ethnic riots. Before its total withdrawal
India tried to prop up a pro-Indian provincial administration in North and east headed by EPRLF
and also an army called TNA. But both the organisations collapsed even before the departure of
IKPF. Indias failure to bring about satisfactory solutions to the ethnic problem in the island has
led to a qualitative change of the world opinion in its assessment of India s future role in Sri
Lanka. Subsequently LTTE was also banned in India and its leader also became the most
wanted criminal in India.

13 K.M. De Silva, Reaping The Whirlwind, Penguin Books (New Delhi, 1998).

Post IPKF Tenure

The exit of IPKF and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi started the third phase of Indian Interests
in Sri Lanka. After India withdrew from the Sri Lankan peace talks, third party involvement in
Sri Lanka was put on hold until the involvement of the Norway. The Norwegian government
acted as a facilitator in order to revive the interrupted communication between the contending
parties. The MoU of 2002 marked the first success of Norways facilitating efforts. Since the
ascension of Chandrika Kumaratunga as the President of Sri Lanka, the Indo-Sri Lankan
relations have been on an upswing. President Kumaratunga made numerous trips to India to chart
out closer ties with India. With the LTTE gaining more power than the Sri Lankan defence forces
and the capturing of more places in the northern coast made the Sri Lankan government seek
Indian help in 2000. Even though India did not help Sri Lanka, it was felt that Indian help was
needed to counter LTTE. Although India had clearly expressed its position of non-involvement in
the Sri Lankan affairs, due to strategic reasons it remained a spectator of the Sri Lanakan affairs.
The Norwegian mediators, the Sri Lankan authorities and other international players, throughout
the peace process visited India to inform New Delhi about the progress of the peace process.

President Chandrika Kumaratunga in an interview to Frontline said:

India does not participate in our conflict resolution (process) except that it wants to be kept
briefed and it wants to know what is going on since it is very closely related to us and also
because of its geographic, concerns
The November 17, 2005 Presidential election saw a change in the political set-up of Sri Lanka.
The new President Mahinda Rajapakse, who was regarded as a realist by the LTTE, came to
power in the pretext of ending the ethic war. The initial response of the new government was to
start the peace process; however the LTTE in all its undependability began its attacks on the
people and the Government establishments in the following months.
Since the unofficial declaration of the Eelam War IV India has been extremely unhappy about the
developments in Sri Lanka. The security concerns have gone up with the change of events; this is
mainly due to the fear of infiltration of the LTTE into India as refugees. In addition the
sophistication of the LTTE, especially with its air wing also prompted India to tighten its screws
in the coastal security.
Although India did not openly support Sri Lanka in Eelam War , its subtle involvement of was
clearly evident. Initially there were repeated denials from the Government of India on the supply
of arms to Sri Lanka, however news paper reports show that India in addition to sharing of

intelligence, also give tactical weapons to the Sri Lankan armed forces.

Instruments of Policy

Three major factors still remain the determinants of the India-Sri Lankan relations. These factors
not only have an impact on the lives of the Sri Lankans but also of the Indians. With the end of
the violent phase of the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis, these issues would play in determining the
nature of India- Sri Lanka relations. Although these issues do not form the main trump card on
the subject of this essay, however the ethnic conflict has had an enormous impact on these issues,
which is likely to continue for the coming years.
Fishermen Issues :The fishermen issue has deeply affected the history, economy and culture of the coastal regions
of both Tamil Nadu and northeast Sri Lanka. Due to ceding of Kachchtativu Island in the 70s,
the livelihood of TN fishermen has been badly affected. The fishermen of both the countries have
not respected the maritime boundary at all. Despite the historical linkages between the fishermen
of both Tamil Nadu and North-eastern Sri Lanka, they still see their comrades as martyrs and
those on the other side of the international boundary line as aggressors. The Sri Lankan
fishermen poaching in other countries waters are more widespread than that of Indian Fishermen.

The Tamil Nadu Fishermen on the other hand even today invoke the historical rights and

routinely stray in to Sri Lankan waters for fishing. This has led to apprehension by the Sri
Lankan Navy and in some cases even shooting. Another factor that makes the Indian fishermen
cross to Sri Lankan waters is because of the better catch both in quantity and quality. On the
other hand the Sri
Lankan fishermen also cross over to Indian waters near Lakshadweep islands for Tuna fish.
Though these issue are reflected in the media but still not in a major way. There is a need for the
Southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala and the Centre to come to grips with the problem and
resolve this issue on a lasting basis. Various proposals have been made from time to time to
obtain fishing license for the fishermen of the area. A proposal for lease in perpetuity or
reciprocal licensing has also been mooted. All this requires concerted action by the
Governments.
The main problem in the fishing rights in the Palk Bay is that of the laws binding the law of the
sea and the traditional fishing rights. Historically Indian fishermen and the Sri Lankan fishermen
have been fishing in Palk Bay with occasional fights between the two groups; 14 however with the
ceding of Kachachativu to Sri Lanka in 1974, fishing has become an issue of contention between
both India and Sri Lanka. The LTTE in the capacity of third navy in India s backyard increased
the complexities of the issue of fishing. The protracted ethnic war having come to an end fishing
rights is likely to be a major issue that both nations would need to sort out at the earliest possible
time. A solution to this issue is only possible if there is a proper agreement on possibility of
fishing around Kachchativu islands. The following section would give a brief background to the
issue Kachchativu.
Issue of Kachchativu :Kachchativu is a small island in the Palk Strait situated in north-east of Rameswaram, about 11
nautical miles from the Indian coast and about 10 nautical miles south-west of Sri Lankan
Island of Delft. The is no source of drinking water and the only building is the poorly
maintained St. Athonys Church. By tradition, the island had been used by fishermen from Tamil
Nadu as a staging post to dry nets and to celebrate St. Antonys festival, as he was considered as
14 V. Suryanarayan and R. Swaminathan, Contested Territory or Common Heritage? Thinking out of the Box,

Ganesh and Co, Chennai, 2009, p.14

patron of seafarers. The issue of sovereignty over the island of Kachchativu has been
emotionalised to a considerable extent in Tamil Nadu and in Sri Lanka. The maritime boundary
in the "historical waters" was fixed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UN
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958.
It is claimed that Kachchativu was originally part of the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad and
that the people of Rameswaram and other coastal areas regard the area as part of their traditional
fishing grounds. Kachchativu was essentially integral part of the Zamindari of Raja of Ramnad
which was ceded to Sri Lanka, initially during 1880 and 1885 for the collection of roots for
dyeing purposes and in 1913 for the full exploitation of sankha shells. Five decades lapsed
between Sri Lanka laying claim to the island in 1921 and the discussions leading to the 1974
Agreement. During this period, neither the Zamindari of Ramnad nor the Government of
Madras / Tamil Nadu as the successors to the Zamindari, moved any court in India or in Sri
Lanka to establish ownership rights over the island. The Government of Tamil Nadu also did not
mount any judicial challenge to the Central Governments decision to accept (in the 1974
agreement) Sri Lankas claim to sovereignty over Kachchativu. 15 The issue of Kachchativu was
discussed at the highest political level for the first time in November - December 1968, during
the visit of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake to India, the formal official talks ended in a
deadlock. Indian Foreign Secretary T.N.Kaul informally elaborated on certain proposals made by
him earlier. One suggestion was the lease of the island in perpetuity, either by Sri Lanka to India
or by India to Sri Lanka. As this involved modification or denial in some degree of Sri Lanka's
claim of sovereignty over the island, it was not acceptable to Sri Lanka.
Meanwhile Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh had discussions with Jayasinghe in Colombo
on 24 December 1973, after delivering Indira Gandhi's letter dated 18 December 1973 to Mrs.
Bandaranaike. He repeated the proposals made by his predecessor in 1968. One of them was that
India had sovereignty over Kachchativu, but will give it to Sri Lanka on perpetual lease on
nominal rent or without rent. He, however, apprehended that Tamil Nadu may object even to this
and that the Madras High Court may intervene and the Supreme Court may allow a writ, but Sri
Lanka did not agree to this proposal. From then on the Kachchativu has become an area of
dispute between the Indian fishermen and Sri Lankan fishemen.
Lok Sabha Debates, 17 May 1966, Cols. 1683-84

15

Refugee Issues :The official Indian rationale for Indias involvement in the Sri Lankan crises, at least at the
beginning, was because of the influx of the Sri Lankan Tamils to India as refugees. The Sri
Lankan Refugees as Prof. V. Suryanarayan opines come from a poor country to a poorer
country. Their journey is not all the way roses;16 however security for their lives make this
daring violent passage through the palk straits to land in the shores of their fatherland - Tamil
Nadu as Anoton Balashimgham puts up. A typical life of the Sri Lankan refugee is best described
by VIS. Jayabalan as
My son is in Jaffna, wife in Colombo, father in the Wanni, mother, old and sick in Tamil Nadu,
relatives in Frankfurt, a sister in France, and I Like a camel that has strayed in Alaska am stuck
in Oslo. Are our families cotton pillows to be tron scattered by the monkey fate?
The Sri Lankan Refugees arrived to India in phases. The first phase was from 1983 89, where
1,34,053 persons arrived from Sri Lanka. The second phase was from 1989 91, where 1,22,078
persons came to India. From 1991 there was a significant drop in the refugee influx till 1996. The
third phase was from 1996 2001, where 21,940 refugees arrived in India.
Sri Lankan Refugees can be broadly divided into camp refugees and non camp refugees. The
camp refugees live mostly on the dole and the non-camp refugees live mostly in rented houses or
with friends and relatives. The Treatment that is given to the Sri Lankan refugee living in camps
in India has had its ebb and flow. This is mainly because of the lack of Refugee Law in India.
Following Rajiv Gandhis assassination there were reports of camp refugees in Tamilnadu were
forcefully repatriated. Many of the repatriated refuges reverted to India because of uncertainty in
Sri Lanka. During these forced repatriation many of the refugees families have been broken
down, and many of them are back to the refugee camps in India in a pitiable condition.
Life as a Refugee in India is also not an easy task. Most of the camp refugees although are
allowed to work, in some occasions have been forced to stay back in their camps. Even education
was not affordable during Jayalalitha government due to the restrictions imposed on the

16 V. Suryanarayan, Dilemmas of Indias Sri Lanka Policy, Agni

opportunities for higher education. However, these stringent rules have been removed and
education as been made available to all the Sri Lankan refugees, including higher education.
Although the violent form of ethic conflict has come to an end in Sri Lanka, however due to the
ill treatment meted out to the Tamils of Sri Lanka has made these innocent victims of war seek
refuge in Tamil Nadu. The government of Tamil Nadu and the Indian Government of India have
a vital task of equipping these people intellectually and as a skilled labour to rebuild their
homeland on their return in the near future. However with Sri Lanka planning to resettle Sinhalse
soldiers along with their families in the north may also discourage the rehabilitation of the Tamil
refugees languishing in the camps in Tamil Nadu.

CONCLUSION

History will have to record that the greatest tragedy of this period of social transition was not

the strident clamor of the bad people, but the appalling silence of the good people.
From the days of non-involvement in Sri Lankas policy the Indo-Lanka policy has come a long
way. Politics and ethnic conflict have become one of the facets of bilateral relations. Since the
end of the Eelam War IV a new chapter has began in the India- Sri Lanka relations. It is likely
that this period would not see the policy of involvement but rather of mutual trust and harmony.
It is important that India looks at the issue of internally displaced persons numbering to 300,000
in Sri Lanka. Their needs are enormous and immediate and any delay in delaying help to these
people would put them into enormous trouble. The Sri Lankan Government with all its

insincerity in giving a proper political package in the past has promised a political package for

the Tamils. But the fear in most of the Tamils is that Sri Lankan government would again deprive
them of a package unless Indian involves itself on the side of the Tamils.
It is imperative that India adopts a pro active policy towards Sri Lanka, in order to not only save
the people but also for its own security reasons. Economy aid could be a big trump card in
Indias policy. Indian corporate houses have shown interest in investing in Sri Lanka. There is
also a favourable mood in Colombo in allowing Indian houses to invest. India can use this
leverage to not only develop the north and east that has been affected by the protracted war.
With the end of war, Sri Lanka has become closer to China, Pakistan and Israel because of their
support to Colombo during the Eelam War IV. China building the Hambotota port cannot be
ignored by India. Hence it is important that India looks at these developments with great caution
and ensure a proper policy towards her closest southern neighbour. India needs to invest in Sri
Lanka to keep the latter in its zone of influence. Indias timely help during the Tsunami has
proved to the world that we are capable of handling challenges facing the region. Having proved
ourselves, it is important that India should consolidate the good will amongst the neighbours.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS : Sri Lanka: A Country Study. 1988. Retrieved 2007-05-02.

The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29,
No. 4. (April 1989), pp. 401-415.
Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka, A Third World Perspective, Chanakya
Publications, (Newdelhi, 1982)
Amal Jayawardane, Documents on Sri Lankas Foreign Policy 1947 1965, Regional

Centre for Strategic Studies, (Colombo, 2004)

Indo srilanka ethnic crisis by Munni, S.D

INTERNET :-

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