Case digest in Succession

1. MARIA USON vs MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,

DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr
Facts: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left five (5)
parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan. Faustino Nebreda
left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, Maria Uson claims that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands
thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. Maria del Rosario however alleged that on
February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public
document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their
separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her
right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. She also contends
that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino
Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the
new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural
children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264
and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first
time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
Issue: WON Maria del Rosario and her four children has the rights of inheritance from Faustino
Nebreda.
Ruling: When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time
passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights
of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants
that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly
renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the
simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves
no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and
must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or
donation has no valid effect.
2. SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA vs CONCHITA MCLACHLIN
Facts: In the year 1916, Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was
still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter Ana Quitco Ledesma. In
1921, it seems that the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end,
but the latter executed a deed acknowledging Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on
January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children. On
March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died, and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father
Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death,
administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in court..

Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the
committee on claims and appraisal, Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935, filed before said
committee the promissory note for payment.
On November 14, 1933, the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs,
Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the reconsideration of said order.
Issue: WON properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation
are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving
any property.
Ruling: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children
presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by
his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor.
The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M.
Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit
anything.
3. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y
BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
Issue: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
Ruling: Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue
of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.
4. ATTY. PEDRO M. FERRER vs SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ and IMELDA DIAZ, REINA
COMANDANTE and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO PANGAN and ELIZABETH PANGAN
Facts: Atty. Ferrer represented Comandante, daughter of spouses Diazes obtain loan to petitioner.
The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Petitioner further claimed that prior to
said loan, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of
the abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). The Diazes, however, reneged on their
obligation as the checks issued by Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite
repeated demands, said respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract against the
Diazes and Comandante.

Issue: WON a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the
parents are still living valid.
Ruling: Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the
inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the
contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the
second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:(1) That the succession has
not yet been opened.(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,(3) That the
promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of aright which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents
properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two
requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes
waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their
death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in
nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract
involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor.
5. In Re Petition For Probate of Last Will & Testament of Basilio Santiago
Facts: Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to
Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene
and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and
Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano,
Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago. Basilio and
his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed
Santiago. After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second marriage
petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan a petition for the probate of
Basilios will. The will was admitted to probate and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix. The will
contained the following provisions, among others:
Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at
IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago,
Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat
ng solar sa danay ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang
palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng
palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o
roperacion [sic], sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa
pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at
pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga
lunsod x x x.

f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa,
Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at
Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking
kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng
salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga
iyon matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay
maawas na. Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa
kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking
nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano,
Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan,
makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon
mula sa aking pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang
ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga
gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Issue: WON
Ruling:
6. Coja vs CA
Facts: Luz Aquillo Victor (hereafter Luz) and Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. (hereafter Feliciano Jr.), both
deceased, were the legitimate children of the late spouses Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. (hereafter Feliciano
Sr.) and Lorenza Mangarin Aquillo (hereafter Lorenza). During their marriage, Feliciano Sr. and
Lorenza acquired a 120-square meter lot located at Poblacion, Mandaon, Masbate, upon which they
built their conjugal home. The subject lot was covered by Tax Declaration issued in the name of
Feliciano Sr.
After the death of Lorenza, Feliciano Sr. cohabited with Paz Lachica and lived at the aforesaid house.
However, after Lorenzas death, her heirs failed to partition their hereditary shares in their inheritance.
On February 27, 1960, while Lorenza was cohabiting with Feliciano Sr., Paz Lachica purchased a
192-square meter lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 02115 from the heirs of Juan Rivas. She later
sold 40.10 square meters of the property to Isabel L. de Real leaving her with only 151.9 square
meters.
On July 7, 1965, or two (2) days before he died, Feliciano Sr. married Paz Lachica. After Feliciano Sr.
died, his heirs also failed to partition among themselves their hereditary shares in their inheritance.
On December 18, 1986, Paz Lachica and herein petitioners, Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa
Coja, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the former sold the 336-square meter parcel of land
to the latter. Charlito Coja filed an application for the issuance of title with the Regional Trial Court
Luz, being one of the heirs of Feliciano Sr., opposed the application for registration. During the
pendency of the case, Luz died. She was substituted by her spouse, Quinciano Victor, Sr., and her
children, Lorna, Antonio, Quinciano Jr., and Susana, all surnamed Victor.
On November 3, 1989, respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and ownership with
damages against the petitioners and Paz Lachica.
Issue: WON TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
IS NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY OF THE COUPLE, THE LATE SPOUSES
FELICIANO AQUILLO AND LORENZA MANGARIN.
Ruling: Article 160 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
All properties acquired during the marriage are thus disputably presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership. As a condition for the operation of above article, in favor of the conjugal partnership, the
party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage.
Under Article 996 of the Civil Code, upon the death of Lorenza Mangarin, one-half of said property, or
60 square meters, is transmitted to her heirs, namely: Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., and
Luz Aquillo, at 20 square meters each, while the remaining one-half is transmitted to Feliciano Aquillo,
Sr. Upon the death of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., his rights over the property, consisting of the 20 square
meter-inheritance from his late wife and his 60 square meter-share in the conjugal partnership, or a
total of 80 square meters were transmitted to his heirs, namely: Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and
his widow, Paz Lachica. The surviving spouse is entitled to the same share as that of the legitimate
children, to the portion of one-third each or 26.6666 square meters each x x x. Thus, as a result of the
death of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., a regime of co-ownership exists among Feliciano, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and
Paz Lachica, with respect to the undivided 80 square meters of the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1151.
The 120 square meters less the hereditary share of Paz Lachica which is 26.6666 square meters, or
the 93.3333 square meters of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1151, belong to the
appellants, being the heirs of the late Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. and Luz Aquillo. Considering that Paz
Lachica owns only 26.6666 square meters of the 120-square meter property and the remaining
93.3333-square meter portion thereof is owned by the respondents, the former could only validly sell
the portion which rightfully belonged to her. However, considering that Paz Lachica, the predecessorin-interest of the Spouses Coja, was a co-owner of the subject 120-square meter property; and
considering further that partition of the property is wanting, this Court is precluded from directing the
Spouses Coja to return specific portions of the property to respondents.
7. Reyes et al vs CA
Facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein
in part, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion "Oning" R. Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques,
statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common with my
brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camigiun;
real estates in Lunao, Gingoog, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguitan, Balingoan, Sta.
Ines, Talisay, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of
the will. On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo,
namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural children with Celsa
Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the
last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of
law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at
the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to
and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the
latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never
annulled. Thus, Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was
violative of public morals.

Issue: WON the testators invalid marriage which was not expressly provided in the will, will affect the
validity of his last will.
Ruling: In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he
said
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect
in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word
of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the
law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so. . . . All doubts must be resolved in
favor of the testator's having meant just what he said. (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and
real properties to his wife, Asuncion "Oning" Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit
relationship. The trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was
still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the
witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo
Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion.
8. Nepomuceno vs CA
Facts: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the
sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom
he had 3 children.
Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging
that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of
concubinage with the petitioner.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence
making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except
the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do
what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical
purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
9. Enriquez vs Abadia
Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its
probate. Some cousins and nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he left no will,

filed opposition. The trial court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a
holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testators death, such form of a will is already allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since the
new Civil Code is already enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the testator which according
to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic will of Rev. Sanchio,
the time of the hearing of the case shall be considered and not the time of its execution.
Ruling: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's
death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided
by the court but at the time the instrument was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the new Civil
Code. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of
the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among
the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the
heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature cannot validate void wills. Hence, the trial courts decision was reversed.
10. Jimenez vs Fernandez
Facts: The land in question (2, 932 sqm) formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez had
2 sons, Carlos and Fortunato. Fortunato predeceased Fermin leaving behind a daughter, Sulpicia.
After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name
of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. Carlos
Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as
Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square
meters. Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan
and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby
the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation since
August 1969 -- PET executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property
appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. A
TCT was then issued in petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property. PET,
joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the
property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
Issue: WON Melecia Cayabyab had any right over the eastern part of the property she took
possession of and later sold.
Ruling: Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the
property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia
Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right
to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally
transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.