Freedom Liberty Twins

Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?
Author(s): Hanna Fenichel Pitkin

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), pp. 523-552
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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ARE FREEDOM AND LIBERTY TWINS?

HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN
University
of Californiaat Berkeley
SPEAKERS
OF ENGLISH HAVE A UNIQUE opportunity:

They
get to choose between"liberty"and "freedom."No otherEuropean

sucha choice.I Germanknowsonly
language,ancientormodern,offers
Freiheit,Frenchonlyliberte,and so on. But whatis thechoiceworth?
on thesetopicsin Englishassertor
writing
Almostall politicaltheorists
Sir Isaiah Berlin,for
assumethatthedistinctionmakesno difference.
instance,in hisfamousessayon liberty,declaresthathe will"use both
words to mean the same."2 Maurice Cranston,more attentiveto
semanticdetail,nevertheless
concludesthat,"inEnglishusagethewords
Whichto employ,
interchangable."
'freedom'and 'liberty'are virtually
style,"buthe specifiesno stylistic
he says,"is usuallya matterofliterary
criteria,mentioningonlythat"'liberty'tendsto be used in legal and
politicalcontexts,'freedom'in philosophicaland moregeneralones."3
Contextmaywellbe a clue; yetfreedomof speechand press,say, are
surelymuchdiscussedin politicalcontexts,and Englishphilosophers
have long disputedabout libertyand necessity.Nor is thereanything
eitherphilosophicalor generalabout a freelunch.
Among the manytheoristsequatingfreedomwithlibertythereis,
exception.Hannah Arendtconsideredprecisely
however,one striking
this conceptual differencecentral to her most urgenttheoretical
offundamental
concerns,and took our blindnessto it as symptomatic
moderndebilities.
Who is right:Arendtor everyoneelse? How to adjudicatesuch a
dispute?Most people mightwellsay,ifasked,thattheyuse thewords
butthatproveslittle.People generallycannotgivean
interchangeably,
explicit account of the regularitiesof their language, which they
observein speaking.Modernscholarshipofferstwo tools
consistently
forinvestigating
semanticdifferences:
etymologyand the analysisof
ordinaryusage. Neithertool is veryusefulunlessappliedin technical,
in thiscase is
painstakingdetail.That thetediummay be worthwhile
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 16 No. 4, November1988523-552
? 1988Sage Publications,Inc.
523

524
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER1988
thisarticle
inadvancebyArendt's
claims.Accordingly,
suggested
begins
inturn,to etymology,
withthem,proceeding,
and
conceptual
history,
itcan.
whatconclusions
ordinary
usagebeforedrawing
themeaning
HannahArendt
In OnRevolution,
sharply
distinguishes
and"liberties."
of"freedom"
from
thatof"liberation"
Thoughperhaps
"thatliberation
and
a truism,she says,it is worthreemphasizing
offreedom
freedom
arenotthesame;thatliberation
maybea condition
to it."4 Liberation
is "negative,"
butbyno meansleadsautomatically
theideaofa
while"a positivenotionoffreedom
... wouldtranscend
The latter,at most,rendersone "freefrom
successful
liberation."
Its"fruits
areabsenceofrestraint
butnot"free,"
oppression"
period.5
ofthepoweroflocomotion."6
Itsfruits
areliberties,
and
andpossession
evenifconstitutionally
remain
"notpowersofthemselves,
guaranteed,
anexemption
from
theabuseofpower."7
butmerely
Eventhepolitically
crucialFirstAmendment
is "ofcourseessentially
Liberties
negative."8
can be enjoyedin privateisolationand can exist even without
orina feudalhierarchy,
notunder
undera monarch
democracy,
though
ordespotism.9
tyranny
The "actualcontentoffreedom,"
bycontrast,
is "participation
in
oradmission
tothepublicrealm."Itrequires
a "political
publicaffairs,
wayoflife,"whichmeans"theconstitution
ofa republic."10
Suchbald
beliethecomplexities
ofArendt's
declarations,
however,
distinction
and
thedifficulties
ofcorrelating
itwithherothercentral
categories:
action,
thepolitical,
andthepublic.WhatArendt
triestodelineate,
whether
she
is distinguishing
freedom
fromliberation,
or politicalfromsocial,or
oractionfrom
publicfrom
orlabororwork,isalways
private,
behavior
a constellation
ofthreemainthemes,
eachdirected
againsta characteristicblindspotinourmodern
thinking.
First,againstour debilitating
senseof helplessness,
of historical
Arendtstressesthe humancapacityfor actionand
inevitability,
for makinga difference,
creativity,
in events,starting
intervening
something
unprecedented.
ThusArendt's
"freedom"
meansspontaneity
andinitiative.
Second,againstour overwhelming
tendency
to thinkin termsof
efficiency,
utility,
andmaterial
causation,
Arendt
stresses
howhuman
interaction
differs
fromworking
on objects.To us, spontaneity
and
initiative
arelikely
tosuggest
technical
innovation,
scientific
discovery,

Pitkin/ ARE FREEDOM AND LIBERTY TWINS?
525
perhapsartistic
in our
expression.
ButArendt's
concernis initiative
relationships,
in nonmaterial
culture:
meaning
ratherthancausation.
Heretheproblems
arenotmerely
technical
butmoralandpolitical;
here
notonlymeansbutgoalsareat issue,andtheultimate
stakesarenot
merelywhat or how much we can have but who we shall
be. Arendt's"freedom,"
then,concernsdoingratherthanmaking
(praxis ratherthanpoesis), innovationin the nonmaterialmedia of
meanings
andrelationships.
Thirdandmostimportant
toArendt,
againstourprivatization,
our
flight
intothepersonal,
psychological,
andintrospective,
shestresses
the
public,external,and political.Sometimes,
as in passagesalready
quoted,Arendt
claimsflatly
thatfreedom
mustbepolitical.
Politicallife
is"theonlyrealmwheremencanbetruly
free,"
and"political
freedom,
generally
speaking,
meanstheright
'tobea participator
ingovernment,'
""IMoreoften,
oritmeansnothing.
andmoremodestly,
it'sa matter
of
degree:Freedomcanappearinmanyforms
andplaces,butitshighest
andfullest
development
occursonlyinthepoliticalrealm.
Arendtgivessurprisingly
littlejustification
forso strongly
linking
freedom
andpolitics.
Freeactionmustaimat"glory"
or"principle,"
she
a public,anaudience
says,andthesepresuppose
tohonorwhathasbeen
done.Activities
driven
oraimedatsomepractical,
bynecessity
technical
goal can succeedevenwithout
humanrecognition,
but,accordingly,
theycannotfullymanifest
freedom.
Betweenthelines,however,
one can detecta further
justification:
Politicallifeoffers
thepotential
formaximizing
boththefirst
andthe
secondof Arendt'sthreethemes,bothinitiative
and interpersonal
relations.
Politicsconsistsin nonmaterial
relationships
and activities:
institutions
and conventions,
rulesand practices,
deedsand words.
Materialconstraints
areat a minimum.
Politically,
we areableto do
whatever
wecaninduceeachother,andourselves,
to do. Politicsalso
givesthegreatest
scopeto initiative
becausepeoplecollectively
can
createthingsfarmoreextensive,
and lastingthanany
important,
individual's
deed.Politicsmaybe lessefficient
thanothermodesof
humanorganization-say,
orbureaucratic
military
ones-butitnonethelessoffers
greater
scopeforinitiative,
precisely
because,inpolitics,
is notsubordinated
to a single,indisputable
everything
goal. Goals,
is up fordispute.Atthesametime,the
means,principles-everything
politicalactor,unlikethe engineer,
neveracts alone,confronting
butas onepersonamongothers
inanimate
material,
equallycapableof
who mustbe takeninto accountas persons.Arendt's
initiative,

526
POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1988
"freedom,"
then,cannotbe enjoyedin isolation,but requiresa
Itmust
collectivity
ofpeers,recognizing
eachotheras fellow-initiators.
be publicanditmustbe shared.
In allthreeoftheserespects,
itishardforustoget
Arendt
maintains,
freedom
right,and we confuseit withother,relatedideas.Evenif
truisms,
thedistinctions
havebecomeobscuretous.Atvariouspoints,
Arendtblamesabstract
for
socialscience,andliberalism
philosophy,
thisobscurity,
but,mostofall,sheascribesitto ourhavinglostthe
activity
andexperience-and
theunderstanding-of
the
consequently
"Theentire
political.'2
modern
freedom
andpolitics,"
agehasseparated
shesays,so that,
ithas becomealmostaxiomaticevenin politicaltheoryto understandbypolitical
freedomnot a politicalphenomenon,but,on thecontrary,
themoreor less free
rangeofnonpoliticalactivities
whicha givenbodypoliticwillpermitand guarantee
tothosewhoconstitute
it.13
We tendto assume"thatfreedombeginswherepoliticsends,"to
itinterms
construe
ofguaranteed
protection
forourprivacy,
andto
measuretheextentoffreedominanygivencommunity
bythefreescopeitgrantsto
freeeconomicenterprise
apparently
nonpoliticalactivities,
orfreedomofteaching,
of religion,of cultureand intellectualactivities.'4
Butsuchnegative
freedom
frompoliticallifeis precisely
whatArendt
identifies
as liberties,
thefruits
ofliberation.
So ourlossofthepolitical
and our depoliticization
of freedom
resultin theconfusion
of these
concepts.
As so often,
Arendt
suggests
thatthecureliesinreturning
toancient
or originalunderstandings.
She undertakes
to "tracethe idea of
Freedomhistorically,"
andmakesvariousexplicit
etymological
claims
aboutit.'5It is exciting
to finda theorist
ofArendt's
power,withher
historical
erudition
andloveofwords,proposing
to clarify
a semantic
difference
lostto us. Buta morecarefulreadingrevealstrouble:The
distinction
Arendt
stresses
doesnotcorrespond
inanysimple
waytothe
difference
between
the"free-"
family
andthe"liber-"
family
ofwords;
sheherself
doesnotconsistently
maintain
it,nordo heretymological
claimssupport
it.
First,whileopposing"freedom"
to "liberation"
and "liberties,"
Arendtneveropposesitto "liberty."'6
Second,sheacknowledges
that
theword"freedom"
hasmorethanone"sense,"
andthatoneofitssenses

527
(the "negative,"
as distinctfromthe "positivesense")corresponds
semantically
to "liberation."
Indeed,Arendtsays the passionfor
in
positive,
political
freedom
"canonlyarisewheremenarealreadyfree
that
Thussheacknowledges
thesensethattheydo nothavea master.117
"18
from
there
beingliberated.
is,after
all,a "freedom
thatcomes[simply]
followsordinary
herself
usage
Third,inotherrespects,
too,Arendt
intheconventional
Shewrites
way
evencontrary
toherowndistinction.
rights
as "freedoms":
ofcertain
constitutional
guarantees
andpersonal
fromwantor fear.'9She
freedom
of speechor movement,
freedom
thatshould,
markers
andmodifiers
continues
to usevarioussemantic
shecapitalizes
to herdistinction,
be redundant.
Sometimes
according
sheusesexpressions
tomarkherconception
ofit;sometimes
"Freedom"
or"true
like"publicfreedom,"
freedom,"
"political
freedom,"
"positive
on the otherside, she writesof "personal
freedom."Sometimes,
liberties,"
"private
liberties,"
and"negative
liberties."20
wemay
ofan important
Still,ifwehavelostawareness
distinction,
needsuchredundant
Arendt
evenwantto arguethat
reminders.
might
sinceit reflects
our
ordinary
usageis no guideat all in suchmatters,
authority?
ideologies
andillusions.
Yetwhatcanserveas an alternative
refer
to
Arendt's
resort
toetymology
isdisappointing.
Herclaimseither
insucha generalwaythatonecannottellwhether
theyare
"freedom"
orelsetheyrefer
intended
toignore,
include,
orcontrast
with"liberty";
to theGreekeleutheria,
whichis theancestorof neither
specifically
them.
Englishword,andthuscannothelpto distinguish
meantare also
Arendt'sclaimsabout whatfreedomoriginally
andobservable
rather
than
confusingly
multiple:
(1) thatitwasexternal
innerorpsychic,
"a worldly,
tangible
reality,"
(2) thatitdistinguished
thestatusofa freemanfromthatofa slave,(3) thatit was a bodily
a healthy
formovement
at will,(4) thatit
condition,
person'scapacity
meantunimpeded
movement
moregenerally,
bothphysical
including
andsocialopportunity,
thelatter
capacity
beingdeniedtoa slave.What
mattered
mostaboutnonslavestatuswasthatitallowedone"tomove,
togetawayfromhome,togo outintotheworldandmeetotherpeople
in deed and word."'2'Theselastphrasesare familiar
fromArendt's
accountsofparticipatory
citizenship,
and,indeed,shealso claims(5)
meantpoliticalparticipation.
"The realmof
thatfreedom
originally
in
and
human
affairs general"wasfreedom's
"original
field,"
politics
whereit had "always been known . . . as a fact of everydaylife."
"in Greekas wellas Romanantiquity,

freedom
was an
Originally,
exclusively
political
concept."22

528
In all ofthis,Arendt'sonlyreference
to a non-English
wordis to
eleutheria,whichshe identifies
as the ancientGreek"wordfor
freedom."23
She rejectsthe mostcommonmodernderivationof
eleutheria
fromthenotionofa genetically
related
"stock"ofpeople,as
too "uncomfortably
close"to Nazi racism,
to "thenotionsofGerman
thenineteen-thirties
first
scholarship
during
when[thishypothesis]
saw
the lightof day."24Preferring
the "Greekself-interpretation"
that
derivedthewordfroman expression
"to go as I wish,"she
meaning
concludes,
"there
is nodoubtthatthebasicfreedom
wasunderstood
as
freedom
ofmovement."25
Thisnotionofunimpeded
movement,
rather
however,
undermines
thansupportsArendt'sdistinction.
On the one hand,she liststhe
"physical
fact"ofa healthy
bodycapableofmovement
andthesocial
factofnonslavestatus,whosepointis alsobeingableto"move... get
as theoriginal
of"theideaofFreedom."26
home,"
awayfrom
meaning(s)
On theotherhand,sheexplicitly
classifies
"absenceofrestraint
and
possessionof thepowerof locomotion"
as merefruits
of liberation
falling
shortoffreedom.27
Evenmoreconfusingly,
shecalls"freedom
of
movement
... unchecked
bydiseaseormaster... originally
themost
ofall liberties."28
elementary
In addition,Arendtrepeatedly
insiststhatfreedom
did notmean
motionornonslave
unimpeded
statustotheGreeks,
butsomething
else
to whichtheseweremereprerequisites:
in a polis among
citizenship
In making
peers.29
thispoint,Arendt
sometimes
writes
as iftheGreeks
spokeEnglish.
Theythought,
shesays,thatthecitizen's
freedom
hadto
be
preceded
byliberation:
inordertobefree,
manmusthaveliberated
himself
from
thenecessities
oflife.Butthestatusoffreedom
didnotfollowautomatically
upon
theactofliberation.30
Yet theGreekshad onlyone wordfortheseideas:eleutheria.

Did it
meanfreedom
orliberation
orbothorneither?
Arendt's
accountisboth
andconfusing.
intriguing
Coming
toterms
withitwillrequire
looking
at
etymology,
andordinary
conceptual
history,
usage.
That "freedom"
and "liberty"
are interchangeable
is primafacie
implausible
becausethetwowordshaveentirely
different
ancestries.
Theformer
is Germanic,
transmitted
to us bytheAnglo-Saxons.
The

Pitkin/ ARE FREEDOM AND LIBERTYTWINS?
529
into
latter
derives
from
theLatinbywayofOldFrenchandwasbrought
EnglishbytheNormans.
All theetymologists
ofwords
seemagreedthatthe"free-"
family
as *priyos,
comesfroman Indo-European
adjectivetheyreconstruct
like:one'sown,the
from
meansomething
theverb*pri,tolove.*Priyos
thanof
ofaffection
orcloseness
rather
personal,
butwitha connotation
legalproperty.
EmileBenveniste
saysitwasusedofpersonal
possessions,
of partsof one'sbody,but also of peoplewithwhomone had an
itcanbetranslated
emotional
Thus,"according
tocontext,
connection.
sometimes
by'hisown'andsometimes
by'dear,beloved."'Itsvarious
or
to delight
Europeanderivatives
also includewordsforwife,friend,
endear,and-in religiousdiscourse-"asortof mutualbelonging"
between
godsandhumans.31
In Gothic,however,
of*priyos
thederivatives
splitintotwodistinct
oneofwhichincludes
theother
wordsforloveandfriendship,
families,
The etymologists
wordsmeaning
free and freedom(or liberty).32
hypothesize
thatthelatter
meaning
maybeduetoCelticinfluence,
may
of
"perhaps
even[be]a direct
borrowing,"
sinceinCelticthederivatives
*priyos
meanonlyfree,
notdear,andderivatives
withthismeaning
are
foundinno otherlanguagegroup.33
But,bywhatlogic,whatsemantic
transitions
didtheIndo-European
wordforownordearcometomean
inCelticorsomeotherlanguage?
free,whether
that
which
Postpone controversial
questionfora lookat "liberty,"
from
the
derives
Latinliber,free.Therewereliberare,
tofreeorliberate;
or freedom;
libertas,
liberty
liberos,thefreeman;and itsmasculine
plural,liberi,
whichmeantchildren,
offspring.
Therewasalsoa Roman
as thegodofvegetative
god,Liber,whomBenveniste
identifies
growth
andspecifically
ofviniculture.
Theetymologists
agreethatLatinliber
derivesfromtheVenetic*(e)leudheros,
whichtheyhypothesize
came
fromtheIndo-European
verbalroot*leudh-.
Thatroothasderivatives
invariousEuropeanlanguages
withmeanings
likethe(or a) people,a
to growordevelop.Therewasa Venetic
gens,butalsoverbsmeaning
ofwhosenamewouldmakeher
goddess,Louzera,theLatinequivalent
thecounterpart
ofthegodLiber.34
theorigins
ofLatinliber
Most-thoughnotall-etymologists
regard
as closelyparalleling
thoseof Greekeleutheria,
and theyderivethe
theVenetic
Thisisplausible
*leudheros.
because
latter,
too,from
partly
thefullydevelopedrangesofmeaningoftheLatinand Greekword
families
areclosely
parallel(as,indeed,
theyaretotherangeofmeanings
oftheAnglo-Saxon
ancestorofthe"free-"
family,
freo).Thatrange

530
POLITICALTHEORY / NOVEMBER1988
movement
unobstructed
includesnobility(of birthor character),
theoppositeof
thatof objects,theoppositeofconstraint,
including
lawfulselfthe oppositeof domestictyranny,
foreigndomination,
is
the
and
whenand
to
which
earliest,
meaning
But
as
government.35
respectively,
from
roots
meaning,
Indo-European
how it developed
growthand own or dear, are muchdisputedquestions.For our
interrelated
theories
maybe summed
themany,complexly
purposes,
and slavery,one
on groupmembership
into three:one centering
onsexualpleasure
onunimpeded
andonecentering
motion,
centering
andpotency.
takes
theory
accepted
Themostcomprehensive
andnowmostwidely
the
a
status
classification,
of
all
to
be
thesewords
theoldestsense
a
on
in
depends
contrastbetweenslaveand nonslave,which, turn,
in
byOttoSchrader 1898,
Firstsuggested
notionofgroupmembership.
withthe
Beginning
byBenveniste.36
articulated
is morefully
thistheory
notesthat
*leudh-,Benveniste
notionof growthin Indo-European
stature,
meanaccomplished
growth:
severalofthatword'sderivatives
Instill
waybygrowth.
thatwhich
hasbeenshapedina particular
figure,
notionsuchas
thesameideashowsup as "a collective
otherinstances,
an ethnicgroup,the
group'to design[ate]
'stock,breed,'or 'growth
Thiswould
ofthosewhohavebeenbornandgrowuptogether."
totality
of*leudhthatmeana peopleorgensas wellas Latin
explainderivatives
liberi,offspring.37
reasonsthat
Fromthisideaofa growth
grouporstock,Benveniste
musthave
theearliest
ofbothLatinliberandGreekeleutheros
meaning
between
thosewho,beingbornofthestock,are
beenthedistinction
and the
by its law and thusnot subjectto enslavement,
protected
Similarly,
in
enslavable.
others-outsiders,
whoareslavesorpotentially
the development
offreo,one's own,dear folk-thein-group-are
fromthealiens,slaves,or enslavable.38
Othersensesof
distinguished
thesewords,thetheorygoes,emergeby analogy,as therestraints
masters
to otherkindsofobstruction
imposeon slavesareassimilated
Thereis,however,
aboutwhenand
andconstraint.
muchdisagreement
howtheimportant
happened.39
extensions
ofmeaning
A secondgeneral
onlytheLatin
theory,
lessbroadinthatitaddresses
fromtheidea of
and Greeketymologies,
derivesliberand eleutheros
Max
motion.
as wellas GeorgCurtius,
AdoptedbyArendt
unimpeded
in the ancient
Pohlenz,and T. G. Tucker,thistheoryoriginates
EtymologiconMagnum,whichtraceseleutheroswithinGreekonly,to
thephraseeleuthein
hoposero,I go whereI will,fromtheverbstem

531
Butwhatis theetymology
ofthatverb,and
eluth-,to go or come.40
doesn't
tothatinLatin?Arendt
related
(how)istheGreekdevelopment
views.
have
conflicting
say;theotherscholars
LatinliberdoescomefromIndo-European
For Pohlenz,although
different
"pre*leudh-,the Greekwordmusthavesomealtogether
at
all.4'
Tucker,by
Hellenicorigin,"perhapsnot"Indo-Germanic"
paralleland within
keepstheLatinand Greekderivations
contrast,
he says,whichdid
Indo-European.
Theirmutualsourceis *leudh-,
notion
[was]thatof'extending,"opening
meangrowth,
butits"primary
Its"natural
notion"wastheideaof"openness,
out,'or'coming
forth."'
verbs
orlooseness."HenceTuckerlinksitwithIndo-European
width,
to spread,openout,(make)flow.AndinLatin-whichis his
meaning
liquid,libations,
mainconcern-helinksliberwithwordsforpouring
andlove.42
desire,sexuality,
butalsowithwordsforpleasure,
which
theory,
to thethirdgeneraletymological
Thatlinkis central
toexplaintheGermanic
alongwiththeLatinandGreek
doesundertake
For RichardBroxtonOniansand TheodoreThassdevelopment.
group
theoriginalmeaningof thesewordsis neither
Thienemann,
Inallthree
culturesnorunimpeded
motion,
butsexuality.
membership
and procreation
argue,sexuality
Latin,Greek,and Germanic-they
linkedto,first,
andflowand,second,the
weresymbolically
liquidity
capacity(genius).Boththese
head,supposedlocusofthegenerative
in ceremonies
of enslavement
and emancisymbolsfigurecentrally
betweenslaveand
pation;thustheyconnectalso withthecontrast
on sexualityand
nonslave.The essenceof slaveryis constraint
capacityand its social confirmation.43
generative
procreation-the
nor"freedom"
as a sociopolitical
"primarily
Neither
originated
"liberty"
outofunconboth"emerged
Thass-Thienemann
concludes;
concept,"
fantasies."
theiractualetymologies,
sciouslibidinal
Howeverdifferent
the
their"psychological
isthesame,andkeytotheirmeaning:
etiology"
and frustrations
origiabsenceor removalof"shame,guilt,anxiety,
superego."44
natingfromtheprohibitive
remain
disputed,
Theetymological
of"freedom"
and"liberty"
origins
settleanything
abouttheessence
then,andthuscannotauthoritatively
that
oftheseconcepts.
theetymologists
demonstrates
Besides,reading
isnoclearcorrelation
or
semantic
there
between
andeither
etymological
as theessenceof
stresses
politicalparticipation
politicalviews.Arendt
thegroupmembership
Raaflaubshares
etymology.
andrejects
freedom,
herpoliticalviewoffreedom,
butforthatveryreasonfavors
thegroup
DieterNestleevenarguesthatthistheory
proves
membership
theory.

532
POLITICALTHEORY / NOVEMBER1988
andthus"political"
fromthe
to havebeenpolis-referential
eleutheros
witha
thissameetymological
first.45
Yet Benveniste
combines
theory
notionoffreedom
Arendt
wouldrejectas mereliberation.46
Dependingon whichetymological
theoryone adopts,one will
of eleutheria,
butnoneof the
endorseor rejectArendt'sderivation
as theearliest
availabletheories
takesherpoliticalnotionoffreedom
knownmeaningof any of thesewords.Whetherabout slavery,
orsexuality,
thesewordsdidnotstartoutmeaning
unimpeded
motion,
participation
inpoliticalself-government.
How and whendid theybecomepolitical?Even the distinction

between
slaveandmaster
ornobleandcommoner,
ofcourse,concerns
power and privilegeand is, to that extent,political.All group
likepoliticalmembership.
Butas these
membership
is,tosomeextent,
wordsdevelophistorically,
and fully
theytake on moreexplicitly
politicalmeaningssuchas theoppositeof foreign
the
domination,
lawfulgovernment,
oppositeofdomestic
tyranny,
participatory
govHowdo thesedevelop?
ernment,
citizenship.
thatthedistinction
BeginwiththefactLewisstresses,
between
master
andslave-whether
itbetheearliest
ormerely
"moralearly-becomes
ized."Thesewordscometodesignate
notmerely
socialstatus,
butalso
theconduct,
and circumstances
to thatstatus.
character,
appropriate
Theycomenotmerely
todesignate
butalsotojustify
status,
and-bythe
sametoken-toserveas standards
forcriticism.
Eleutheros,
liberos,
and
theGermanic
ancestors
of"freedom"
allbecomemoralized
inthissense;
thefirst
twoevendevelopcompanion
terms,
eleutherios
andliberalis,
whichcarryonlythemoralized
meaning.47
One featureof the masters'character
singledout forsemantic
inallthreelanguages
isgenerosity,
emphasis
munificence,
as inmodern
In allthreelanguages,
English
"liberality."48
also,whether
byextension
fromthemoralized
statusmeaning
orfromunrestricted
motion,
these
wordscome to designateconductthat is informal,
unrestrained,
appropriate
onlyamongone'sown,and-as a pejorative
corollary,
conductthatis excessively,
inappropriately
informal,
as in Sheridan's
"notso free,fellow!"
orShakespeare's
"liberall
villaine."49
Aboutthe originsof explicitly
politicalmeanings,
however,
the
aretantalizingly
etymological
historians
ambiguous.
TheGreekdevelopmentgetsthemostattention,
starting
withtheinterpretation
oftwo

533
Raaflaubcalls
ambiguous
passagesinHomerandtwoinSolon(though
oftheancestor
ofeleutheros
attention
totwomuchearlieroccurrences
inLinearB).50Theabstract
nouneleutheria
didnotappearuntilthetime
ofthePersianWar,as theGreekstriedtoarticulate
whatwasatstake:
notbeingenslaved,
ofcourse,
andnotbeingruledbyforeign
domination,
butperhapsalso alreadywhatwasdistinctive
abouttheGreekwayof
life.Thiswouldinclude,by contrast
withPersianways,lawfuland
impersonal
rather
thanarbitrary
anddespoticrule,openandcollegial
thana sacred,
publiclife(evenifstillrestricted
toa narrow
elite)rather
inaccessible
priest-king.5'
In thesubsequent
atAthensbetween
theeliteandhoi
classstruggles
and democratic
Raaflaubsays,
polloi,betweenoligarchic
factions,
andonlyrelatively
eleutheria
wasemployed
onlybythedemocrats
late,
in themid-fifth
In thisrespect
it differed
fromconceptslike
century.
justiceandequality,
ofwhicheachfaction
The
haditsownversion.52
oligarchs
maywellhaveoriginated
themoralized
statusmeaning
and
theterm
Themoralized
eleutherios
butdidnotapplythempolitically.53
meaning
"wasrootedinsocialstatusandvaluesrather
thaninpolitical
life."54
thedemocrats'
Eleutheria,
then,beingexclusively
conceptin
cametoreflect
their
politics,
demands:
direct
andactiveparticipation
in
political
lifebyallmaleadultcitizens
sothat"thewholepeople"governs
itself.
Thisincluded
theideasoflawful,
impersonal
ruleandcollegiality
inthecontrast
alreadyimplied
between
GreekandPersianways,butit
wentmuchfurther.
It impliedlegaland politicalequality,
including
tovoteonpublicdecisions,
entitlement
tomakeproposals,
tospeakin
It impliedrotationin office,
assemblies.
shortterms,
accountability,
equal accessto office,
andevenselection
bylot.55Eventually,
though
perhapsonlyinthelatercontrast
between
Athenian
andSpartanways,
italsoincluded
orsocialfreedom,
private
as expressed,
forexample,
in
accountofPericles'
Thucydides's
funeral
oration:
"Thefreedom
which
weenjoyin ourgovernment
extendsalso to ourordinary
life,"where
eachcando "whathelikes."56
In short,
eleutheria
meantdemocracy.57
Henceit was primarily
a "collective
term,"pertaining
to thecity
rather
thantheindividual.
Already
focusedon a sharedwayoflifein
to Persianrule,itremained
contrast
so inthehandsofthedemocrats:
"thedemosrules(i.e.,allthecitizens
areinvolved
ingoverning
thecity),
therefore
thecityisfree."58
Eleutheria
wasa condition
sharedamongthe
andembodiednotso muchinparticular
lawsas in an entire
citizenry
constitutional
fromthisholistic
systemand ethos."Onlystarting
canindividual
activeandpassiverights
ofthecitizenalsobe
beginning
witheleutheria."59
connected

534
both
Far less is known about the earlyhistoryof Latin libertas,
late at Rome and because
developsrelatively
literature
because written
virtuallyall ofitsearlyworksare lost.60Raaflaubdoes, however,trace
itto thehistoryofeleutheria.
contrasting
itslaterpoliticaldevelopment,
engagedin orexpecting
UnlikeAthens,Rome was almostconstantly
war; partlyfor this reason, Raaflaub argues, the Roman nobility
remainedfarmorepowerfulthan the Athenian.There was farmore
relationships
playeda
deferenceamongthelowerclasses;patron-client
far strongerand more lasting role; so did familyand gens, and
notonlyoverwomenand childrenbut
thepatriapotestas,
particularly
of discipline
even overgrownsons; therewas farmoreinternalization
and dutyin all social strata.As a result,the Roman aristocracywas
morewillingto compromisethantheAthenian,and the Roman plebs
were more stronglynecessitatedto do so than were the Athenian
commons.6'In addition,the loot fromRoman conquestsfacilitated
compromiseand quiescenceby givingthe aristocracysomethingto
distributein returnfor militaryand social discipline.62In Rome,
consequently,thoughpoliticalstruggleswere intense,theyoccurred
againstthebackgroundofthesharedassumptionthatthepeople were
balance. The strugglesconcerned
onlyone elementin a constitutional
thebalance shouldbe struck.63
where,not whether,
had moreto
an instrument
inthesestruggles,
Consequently,libertas,
do withprotectionsagainstthe abuse of power than withaccess to
unlikeAthens,Rome developedtworival
poweritself.More precisely,
one articulatedbythenobilityand another
politicalnotionsoflibertas,
notionwas directedas muchagainstthe
by theplebs. The aristocratic
ambitionsofpowerfulindividualsas againsttheclaimsofthecommons.
libertas
meantadherenceto thetraditionalorder,
Thus,forthenobility,
lawful ratherthan arbitraryor personal government,checks and
balancesto preventtheaccumulationofexcessivepowerin anyhands,
equalitybeforethelaw-but onlyin a contextof unquestionedsocial
and politicalinequality.It impliedpoliticalequalityamongthe aristocracy,perhaps,but not amongall citizens.64
But even the plebeian understandingof libertaswas not, as in
Athenianeleutheria,
a broaderextensionofequality,office,and power
to all. The Romanplebsstruggled
notfordemocracybutforprotection,
not forpublic powerbut forprivatesecurity.Of course theysought
never
guaranteesofthatsecurity.But libertas
public,institutionalized
meantpoliticalparticipation,an extensionof equalityfromlegal to
political or social rights,let alone equal access to office,voting,or
debate.65For bothclasses,Raaflaubsummarizes,
was "passive,"
libertas

535
It was also "extraordinarily

negative."
"defensive,"
"predominantly
to
connected
andrights
andtherefore
strongly
fixatedon institutions
andlegalistic.
specific
laws,"whichmadeit bothpluralorcomposite
disclosed
by
oflibertas
canbevirtually
"Forthemostpart,thecontent
thecompilation
oflaws."66
ofeleutheria
thepolitical
development
Raaflaub'scontrast
between
closelyto the line Arendtdrewbetween
and libertascorresponds
does derivefrom
And of course"liberties"
freedomand liberties.
"freedom"
does
forArendt's
thesis,however,
libertas.Unfortunately
of
Farlessisknownabouthowtheancestors
notderivefrom
eleutheria.
thanabouttheGreek
politicalmeanings
"freedom"
acquiredexplicitly
andLatinterms.
ofthethree
touches
wordfamilies
comparison
Lewis'sexcellent,
brief
ofa
or liberty
on politicsonlyonce.Wheretheissueis thefreedom
ifnot
refer
"chiefly,
andeleutheria
collectivity,
Lewispointsout,libertas
toautonomous
butthemedieval
ancestors
statesorcity-states,
entirely"
within
a
entity
of"freedom"
"nearlyalways"to somecorporate
refer
or
or
a
to
the
feudalpoliticaljurisdiction
Church,
(like guild town),
whichcuts acrosssuchjurisdiction.
Theythusimplynot political
frominterference
immunities
bythe
guaranteed
autonomy
butcertain
Themedieval
alsoundergo
Germanic
terms
jurisdictional
overlord(s).67
in the ancientones. Since the
a further
unparalleled
development
of a corporate
a newmember
bodysharein itsprivileges,
members
of"'thatbody,becomesa "freeman
of' it,or is
receives
the"freedom
sources,
"freedom
can
"freeof"'it.Hence,intranslations
fromancient
also simply
meancitizenship."68
FromLewis'saccountonewouldhaveto concludethattheearliest
oftheancestors
of"freedom"
hadmoreincommon
politicalmeanings
withwhatArendt
calls"liberties"
thanwithwhatshecalls
semantically
ButLewis'sexamples
arefrom
relatively
late,centuries
after
"freedom."
as politicalself-governtheearliestdictionary
examplesoffreedom
ment.69
ThereareMiddleEnglish
from
thethirteenth
century,
examples
orAnglo-Saxon,
ofOldEnglish
buttherearenoneindictionaries
which
inthecentury
thatthismeaning
anda half
mayhavedeveloped
suggests
after
theconquest.
Onewouldliketoknowmoreaboutwhenandhow:
likethoseof the
Was it in contextsof remonstrance
and nostalgia,
ontheContinent
andJohnBarbour's
Sachsenspiegel
thirteenth-century
TheBruceof 1375in Scotland(theone a veryearlyexampleofthis
intheGermanvri,theothertheearliestexampleofitinthe
meaning
Oxford English Dictionary)?70The question becomes all the more

536
interesting
whenonerealizesthattheliber-wordsbrought
to England
bytheNormanscarriedno suchmeaning!The notionofcommunal
politicalautonomy,
so central
toancient
hadfallenintodisuse
libertas,
and apparently
of Old Frenchand Anglodictionaries
disappeared;
Norman,at anyrate,listno suchmeaning
foranywordin theliberfamily.
Atfirst
theconquerors
weresimply
inEngland,
foreigners
speaking
theirown,entirely
distinct
liketheconquered
language.Or rather,
natives,
theywerea peopleoftwolanguages:AllofEuropeusedlate
Latinforlegal,administrative,
and religious
butevenclerics
matters,
andrulerslivedtheirpractical
dailylivesinthevernacular,
andmost
folksknewonlythat.For a coupleof centuries
thevernacular
of
England'srulers
differed
fromthatoftheruled.Theconquerors
spoke
NormanorOld French;theirdescendants
spokewhatis calledAngloNorman,whichis classifiedas a dialectof French.Not untilthe
fourteenth
didall classesinEnglandoncemoresharea single
century
language,
combining
Anglo-Saxon
withAnglo-Norman.
Whenliber-wordsmetfrewordsinthisway,theirsemantic
range
was remarkably
similar.Therewerea fewsignificant
differences,
however,and by the fourteenth
further
century,
differences
had
developed.In generalone wouldexpectthattheemerging
"liber-"
tool of therulers,wouldplaya roleinitially
family,
in contextsof
government,
law,administration,
andatcourt;inallthesecontexts
the
spokenNorman,and laterAnglo-Norman,
wouldbe reinforced
by
written
andsometimes
spokenLatin.The"free-"
family
wouldbemore
likelyto retainan exclusive
roleintheconcerns
ofpractical
dailylife,
thatoftheunderlings,
particularly
including
physical
work.
So oneatoncesuspects
that"liberty"
willbeconnected
withmoreformal
matters
thanits Anglo-Saxon
equivalent.
(The samemaybe said of suchpairsas
and"begin,"
"commence"
"initiate"
and"start.".. . Thusthedifference
between
"freedom"
and "liberty"
is analogousto thedifference
between
"justice"and
"fairness".)71
Moreprecisely,
theAnglo-SaxonfreandtheNormanliber-word
families
had thesemeanings
in common:Bothmeanttheoppositeof
slaveryand, therefore,
of variousmoreabstractconstraints;
both
carriedsome moralizedstatusmeanings,designating
conductor

537
tospecialprivileges
bothreferred
character
appropriate
tothemasters;
and
tocorporate
bodiesbya higher
andexemptions
granted
authority;
bothwereused in religiouscontextsforthe capacityof choosing
tothelibrearbitre
in
bothcouldrefer
between
goodandevil.Butthough
thisway,thatmeaning
playeda muchlargerroleintheNormanword
so much
one.Indeed,theliber-family
thanintheAnglo-Saxon
family
thecapacity
tochoose(virtue
emphasized
or)sin,thatsomeofitswords
of
conductinpursuit
sinfulconduct:agnosticism,
actuallydesignated
the passions,lecherousor gluttonous
conduct,as in the modern
"libertine."
TheAnglo-Saxonfrefamily
didnothavethesemeanings,
and whileit couldreferto thechoosingcapacity,itsmainreligious
from
thebondageofsinorthe
offers
wasthereleasethatChrist
meaning
letter
oftheMosaiclaw.It emphasized
notchoicebutgrace.
socialstatus.Whilebothwordfamilies
Another
difference
concerned
carriedmoralized
statusmeanings,
wordscouldalso
Anglo-Saxonfreor
Norman
liberwordscould
noble
status
while
designate
birth
itself,
not.Thatmeaning
ofLatinliber-hadlongsincefallenintodisuse;itis
notfoundinOldFrench.72
ButtheAnglo-Saxon
wordfamily
soonlost
itscapacity
fordesignating
actualnoblestatusas well,withthedecline
ofthefeudalorder.It alsosoonlostitsmoralized
statusmeanings,
but
theliber-family
or the
keptthem,as in modernEnglish"liberality"
"liberalarts."In short,aftertheNormansdisplacedtheAnglo-Saxon
of "noble"
rulingclass,theirwordssoon tookoverthedesignating
qualities.
A third
significant
difference
isthatthefrefamily
sooncametomean
costorcharge,
without
whiletheliberneverdid.Thishadnever
family
ofLatinliber-oritsNorman
beenpartofthemeaning
descendants
(nor
ofeleutheria).
thatitemerged
inAnglo-Saxon,
Lewisthinks
"doubtless"
fromtheidea ofunconstrainedness;
butthemeaning
is notlistedin
ofAnglo-Saxon.
dictionaries
Thereis an ambiguous
MiddleEnglish
examplefrom1225; the earliestexamplein the OxfordEnglish
is dated1340.73
Dictionary
Fourth,thefre-family
soondeveloped(or perhapsalreadyhad in
Anglo-Saxon)variousmoreconcreteand physicalmeanings:
unobstructedspace, unhampered
movement,
includingthe motionof
inanimate
Thesemeanings
objects.
hadbeenpartofLatinliber(thus,as
Lewispointsout,"thesea,inOvid,as opposedtotherivers,
istheplain
of freer-liberioris-water"),
buttheyapparently
disappeared
in the
formation
ofOld Frenchandwerenotredeveloped
after
theNormans
cameto England.74

538
A fifth
difference
is that,fromtheAnglo-Saxon
on,thefrefamily
orgladlydone,done
couldcharacterize
actionas spontaneous,
readily
didnot
ofone'sownaccord,evenzealouslydone.The"liber-"family
use
for
the
to
choose
between
its
thesemeanings,
carry
despite
capacity
because
is particularly
sinand goodness.75
Thisdifference
mysterious
not
in
that
was
found
lost
a
heretheEnglish
"liber-"
meaning
only Latin
liketoknow
One
would
Norman
liber-butalsoin
andAnglo-Norman.
rulers
no
use
for
such
a category?
have
why:Did thenew
The"liber-"
a grammatical
difference:
Sixth,andevenmorepuzzling,
in
to"free,"
family
didnothavea general
adjective
comparable function
existedin Latin,Old French,and even
eventhoughsuchadjectives
whichmeantnotonly
Anglo-Norman.
WhydidAnglo-Norman
liberal,
liberalbut also freeas wellas willingor zealouslose all thelatter
inEnglish?
havenousefora generaladjective?
meaning
Did therulers
themoralizedstatus
Or is it thatas "liberal"gradually
monopolized
itcameto be reserved
forthemalone,all "lesser"functions
meanings,
word?
beingleftto theunderlings'
At theconquest,as alreadymenFinally,thepoliticalmeanings.
couldsignify
tioned,bothwordfamilies
authoritatively
granted
privilegesand exemptions,
and neither
had anyotherpoliticalmeaning.
hadneveracquired,
andOldFrenchliberhadlostas
Anglo-Saxonfreit emergedfromLatin,theideas containedin ancientlibertasand
eleutheriaof communalself-government,
whetherthe absenceof
externaldominationor the presenceof internally
lawfulor even
participatory
government.
Bothwordfamilies
eventually
(re)acquired
suchmeanings.
Butaccording
tothedictionaries,
the"free-"
family
did
so centuries
beforethe"liber-"family.As alreadynoted,thereare
ofsuchuseinthe"free-"family
MiddleEnglish
examples
from
theearly
thirteenth
theearliest
ofanything
likethismeaning
century;
examples
in
the"liber-"
thefifteenth
datefrom
Dareonehypothesize
family
century.
thattheconquered
hadreasontospeakofwhattheyhadlost,whilethe
and theirdescendants
knewmuchaboutdominating
conquerors
but
neither
norcaredto discussthemutuality
experienced
ofsharedselfgovernment
amongpeers?
In anycase,itseemsthatinthefirst
centuries
following
theconquest,
freedom
wasfortheconquered
nativesa relatively
blunt,tangible,
and
totalcondition
thatoneeither
hadorlacked,almostan aspectofwhat
onewas,whether
anexternal
physical
condition
ofunobstructed
space
or movement,
or a legalstatusofnotbeingsubjectto another,
or a
in spontaneity.
psychicstatemanifested
For theconquering
elite,by

539
contrast,
liberty
was moreformaland legal,a matterofdegreeand
orwithheld,
ofspecific
andprivileges
detail,a collection
rights
granted
eveniftruly
appropriate
onlytothoseofhighbirth
andcorrespondingly
connotations
as
noblecharacter.
Boththelegalistic
andthepluralistic
foundinLatinliber-,
wellas themoralized
statusmeaning
werealready
as Raaflaubshows,butin Englishtheybecameisolatedin a distinct
wordfamily,no longersemantically
bound,for instance,to the
and
of objects,or to actionsspontaneously
unimpededmovement
gladlydone.
Examining
ordinary
usage-thecontexts
whereanexpression
might
finds
actuallybe spokenand soundscompletely
natural-oneat first
Theformer
littledifference
between
and"liberty."76
"freedom"
maybe
somewhat
moreat homein prepositional
phrases.The lattermaybe
tooccurintheplural.Wespeakof"civilliberties"
somewhat
morelikely
ratherthan"civilfreedoms,"
forexample,whilethe 1960sfeatured
than"liberty
"freedom
riders"
rather
riders"
as wellas theMississippi
FreedomDemocratic
Partyanda songabout"freedom
overme."Yet
earliertherewereFranklinD. Roosevelt's"Four Freedoms."And
PatrickHenry
orgivemedeath!"Hasthere
declaimed,
"Givemeliberty
inusageovertimeinthisrespect?
beena shift
Wedo tendto speakof
American
rather
slavesas havingbeenfreed
thanliberated,
whileatthe
timeoftheCivilWarbothwordswerereadilyemployed,
alongwith
"emancipated."
Suchdifferences
aretenuous
andhardtointerpret.
Butonemustlook
nounstootherwordsformed
onthesamestem.We
beyondthegeneral
are, afterall, concernednot merelywithtwo wordsbut withtwo
concepts,
shapedbythepenumbra
ofconnotations
oftheir
surrounding
A semantic
wordfamilies.
difference
intheverbsoradjectives
neednot
marka significant
butitmay.Onemustlookand
conceptual
distinction,
see.
Beginwiththe verbs,"to free"and "to liberate."Whileoften
difference
interchangeable,
theydo displaya significant
alreadyenintheetymology:
countered
Theformer
canmeanremoving
obstacles
to
evento themovement
ofinanimate
physicalmovement,
objects;the
latter
almostneverdoes.Thusourheromanages
tofree-notliberateone handfromthebondswithwhichhis captorsboundhim.One
frees-rather
thanliberates-the
linesofa ship,thepropeller
tangled
in

540
weeds,thejammedgearlever,thenutimmobilized
byrust."Liberate"
itmeansto releasean element
can applyto objects.In chemistry
from
ironicuse
combination.
Andin popularspeechthereis theoriginally
forone'sownuse ("I
fromWorldWar II, as meaningto confiscate
a wristwatch,threebottlesofwine,anda chicken').
alreadyliberated
But theseare exceptions.In general,inanimateobjectscannotbe
liberated,
butsomecanbe freed.77
Whenanobjectisfreed,
itmaybesaidtobecomefree.Itmayevenbe
tomove("Thatloosensitsome,butitstilldoesn't
saidtohavefreedom
havethefreedom
to swingall thewayover'),thoughtheremaybe a
oroddnesshere.Butinanimate
slight
senseofstrain
objectscannothave
(gain,lose,and so on) freedom,
toutcourt,without
somemodifying
orliberties).78
phrase(norcantheyhave,gain,orloseliberty
Next,note thatthe "liber-"familyincludestwo nounswithout
inthe"free-"
counterpart
"liberation"
and"liberator."
family:
"Liberation,"whichenteredEnglishrelatively
late,thee-arliest
dictionary
examplebeingfromthe fifteenth
has no "free-"family
century,
Thereare expressions
equivalent.79
suchas "freeing,"
"setting
free,"
"givingfreedom,"
and theirpassivecounterparts,
but theyreally
to"liberating,"
correspond
atliberty,"
"setting
andso onrather
thanto
" Ifoneneedsa nounfortheactofgiving
"liberation.
ortheexperience
of
getting
orfreedom,
liberty
therefore,
"liberation"
is likelyto be used
(thoughagainit willnotdo forobjects).To "liberator,"
theredoes
thenoun"freer,"
correspond
onewhofrees,
butitis infrequently
used.
Can theexistence
oftwosuchwordsinthe"liber-"
family
be takenas
thatliberty
is morethesortofthing
suggesting
thatcanbebestowed
on
whilefreedom
others,
mustbe takenorexercised
foroneself?
Yetone
canbe saidto freesomeone(notto mention
certainly
objects).
Stillmorestriking
semantic
differences
arefoundintheadverbs,
for
and "liberally"
"freely"
hardlyoverlapin meaningat all. Thisis, of
course,becausethelatterderives
from"liberal"rather
than"liberty,"
butitis theonlyadverbthe"liber-"
family
has.Theoldestandstillthe
mostcommonmeaningof "liberally"
is generously,
withoutstint,
thoughitcan also meanin a manner
suitedto thewell-born,
orinthe
manner
ofa liberal."Freely"
canmeangenerously,
too,butthisisonly
oneofitsfourextant
meanings
andnotthemostcommon.
Itsoldestand
mostcommon
isspontaneously,
meaning
readily,
ofone'sownaccorda meaningwithout
counterpart
in the"liber-"family.
Thusdonating
liberally
anddonating
freely
mayonoccasioncoincide,
buttheformer
is
a generous
likelytoindicate
gift,
thelatteran uncoerced
one.However

541
itis
interchangeably
a theorist
mayclaimtouse"freedom"
and"liberty,"
a safebetthat(s)hewillnotusetheadverbsthatway.
Thisis evenmoretrueoftheadjectives,
whichhavealmostentirely
distinct
of
meanings.
"Liberal"carriesthemoralized
statusmeanings
whatis appropriate
to theelite,including
leisure(as inthe
generosity,
"liberalarts"),open-mindedness;
it can also meanadherence
to the
viewsand policiestheseimply.Thesearenotpartofthemeaningof
"free";andthecorresponding
in
noun,"liberality,"
hasnocounterpart
the "free-"family.Conversely,
the "liber-"familyhas no general
adjective
thatstandsinrelation
toliberty
astheadjective
"free"
standsto
freedom.
One maybecomefreebybeingfreed,butone does not,in
general,
becomeliberalbybeingliberated.
In general,
havingfreedom
coincideswithbeingfree,but havingliberty
neitherimpliesnor is
impliedby beingliberal.The "liber-"familydoes offerthe past
participle,
"liberated,"
butitsrealcounterpart
is"freed,"
not"free";
one
canbe freewithout
havingbeenorbeingfreed.
Becausethe"liber-"family
no generaladjective,
offers
thereareno
in it to the manyadjectivalphrasesand compounds
counterparts
formedwith"free"(fromfreestone
peachesto freebooters
and freein meaning.
quarter)bywhichto detectfinedifferences
"Free"must
servebothwordfamilies:
Evenincontexts
wherethenounis "liberty"
andtheverb"toliberate,"
ifa generaladjective
is needed,
"free"
willbe
used. Shouldone thenconcludethatthetwofamilies
are radically
different
withrespect
toadjectives
orthattheymustbeverysimilar
fora
to be ableto serveboth?
singleadjective
Some uses of theadjective"free"can be readilyparaphrased
by
expressions
from
the"liber-"
butothers
family,
cannot;thelatter
reveal
further
semantic
differences.
Where"free"is equivalent
to"freed"
and
theverbsareinterchangeable,
"liberated"
canbe substituted.
In many
contexts,"free"is equivalentto "at liberty."
Where"free"means
"liberal"isequivalent.
unstinting,
Buttheseexpressions
cannotservein
thephrase"freeof";norcan"free"be replaced
from
the"liber-"
family
wherethetopicis inanimate
thefreeendofa rope,a
objects(free-fall,
the freeexpansionof a gas, a dust-free
free-standing
structure,
orwhere"free"meanswithout
environment),
cost(freeadmission,
the
the freeride,and the freelunch),or whereit means
freeloader,
or readiness
ofaction(a freegift,a freeconfession).
spontaneity
The
adjective"free,"then,is notjustbroaderand moregeneralthanany
locutioninthe"liber-"
adjectival
butbroaderthanall ofthem
family,
puttogether.

542
Stillanotherconsequence
ofthelackofa generaladjectivein the
"liber-"
family
isthatwhileonecanhave(acquire,lose,gain,andso on)
either
ingeneral,
freedom
orliberty,
onecanbe(become,
andso
remain,
on) onlyfree,not"liber-."Or rather,
of courseone can be liberal,
liberated,at liberty,
but theseexpressions
mean something
quite
different
from,andmorespecialized
than,beingfree.Beingliberalis
onlydistantly
relatedto liberty,
beingliberatedis onlyone wayof
acquiring
it,andbeingatliberty
coversonlya smallpartoftherangeof
beingfree.
In particular,
thereis no equivalent
in the"liber-"family
to a free
personinthesenseofpsychic
freedom:
innerautonomy,
ego-strength,
authenticity.
Itisnotthatonlythe"free-"
canhavepsychological
family
reference,
for"liberal"canbe characterological
initsmoralized
status
sense.Initsolderconnotations
ofmagnanimity
ornobility
ofcharacter
itmightevenpartlyoverlapwithpsychic
freedom,
thoughittendsto
suggest
severe,
stoicself-control
rather
thanspontaneity.
Buteveninthe
sense of magnanimity,
beingliberalis not the characterological
realizationof liberty,as beingfreecan be the characterological
realizationof freedom.And in its now morecommonsense of
generosity,
beingliberalis butonecharacter
traitamongothers,
rather
thana generalcondition
ofthepsyche.
In sum,the semanticdifferences
betweenfreedomand liberty
suggested
byordinary
usagearemultiple,
sometimes
subtleandhardto
interpret,
and complexly
interrelated.
Further
workcoulddoubtless
improvesomeof thequestionable
examplesand tentative
generalizationspresent
here,80
butitis unlikely
to splitthetwoconcepts
apart
neatlyalongsomesinglefaultline.Still,itis worthsummarizing
what
hasbeenlearned.
First,freedom
is morelikely
tobeholistic,
tomeana totalcondition
orstateofbeing,whileliberty
ismorelikely
tobepluralandpiecemeal.
Second,freedom
is morelikelythanliberty
to be something
psychic,
inner,andintegral
to theself.Thismight
temptoneto concludethat
is moreexternal
liberty
andobjective,
freedom
morepsychological
and
Butalmosttheopposite
subjective.
might
alsobesaid,because-thirdfreedom
includes
unobstructed
spaceandmovement,
evenofinanimate
objects,as liberty
doesnot.Aninanimate
objectcannotsuffer
psychic
conflict
orbe boundbyrules;itsfreedom
can onlybe physical.
In this
respect
freedom
seemsmoreexternal
andobjective
thanliberty.
Fourth,
onemight
venture
thehypothesis
that,becausefreedom
can
concern
boththepsycheandinanimate
objects,anditthusseemsboth

543
it will seem morecomplex,

moreand less objectivethanliberty,
on
willseemto residesecurely
mysterious,
and"deeper,"
whileliberty
than
Thusfreedom
wouldbe morelikely
ofthings.
therationalsurface
andtoinvite
togenerate
puzzlement
metaphysical
liberty
philosophical
aboutitsessence.81
speculation
moreformal,rational,and
Libertyseemsto connotesomething
a system
itconcerns
rulesandexceptions
within
limited
thanfreedom;
ofrule-governed
conduct,
ofrules.Itconcerns
neither
incapable
objects,
Atmost,in
northedepths
ofthepsyche
from
whichspontaneity
springs.
depths
it impliesfirm,
rationalcontrolofthosemysterious
liberality,
in
and of thedangerouspassionsfoundthere,nottheirexpression
action.In otherwords,although
liberty
meanstheabsenceof(some
thecontinuation
ofa
atthesametimeitimplies
particular)
constraint,
exemptions
network
of restraint
and order.It concerns
surrounding
theonly
within
a system
Thatiswhy-inperhaps
ofrules:permissions.
for"liberty"cannotbe substituted
instance
where"freedom"
flatly
A
navalshoreleave,arecalled"liberty."
military
leave,andparticularly
sailorgoes on liberty,
noton freedom;
thereleaseis temporary
and
limited.
withdifferent
kindsofabuses.The
Thusliberty
andfreedom
contrast
islicense,
ofa spurious
theseizing
commonly
mentioned
abuseofliberty
something
abusedsuggests
permission,
takingliberties;
whilefreedom
likeanarchy
orchaos,thelossofallboundaries.
to
Freedomthreatens
theself,toreleaseuncontrollable
forces
outofthe
anddangerous
engulf
orthepsychic
socialunderclass
underworld.
anongoing
Liberty
implies
ofcontrols,
structure
ofexternal
lawsandregulations
orthe
whether
oftheliberalgentleman.
That,nodoubt,ispartofits
genteel
self-control
onereasonwhyJohnStuartMillwrote
appealtoliberalsandLiberals,
the
hisessay"On Liberty"
rather
thanonfreedom.
Radicals,regarding
ills of thepolityas systemic,
are morelikelyto be suspiciousofthe
formal
in
andongoing
restraints
implicit
piecemeal
reforms,
guarantees,
andto prefer
therisksoffreedom.
liberty
a
Butsuchgeneralizations
areproblematic.
HannahArendt
ishardly
radical.Andpolitical
connotations
shift
withtimeandhistory.
political
IntheeraoftheFrenchRevolution,
as themeaning
ofliberte
expanded
doubtlessdrawingits Englishcousin"liberty"
and shifted,
afterit,
liberalswereradicals,
andLiberalswerePhilosophical
Radicals.In the
forindependence
sameway,ThirdWorldstruggles
todayare"liberation
thewomen'smovement
movements"
concerned
(and onlyyesterday
"women'sliberation'),mostlikelybecausetheybegan in French

544
on a worldscaleinFrench,
coloniesandwerefirst
butalso
publicized
becausetheycameso soon after-andclaimedan analogyto-the
"liberation"of Europe fromNazi occupationin WorldWar II.
Meanwhile,
ourgovernment
andtheAmerican
right
speakofantirevinCentral
America
andAfrica
andofrebellious
mercenaries
olutionary
groupsinEastern
onanalogy
Europeas "freedom
fighters,"
presumably
withcapitalist
"freeenterprise"
andthe"freeworld."
Arendt
isright,
arewrong
aboutwhether
then,andtheother
theorists
libertyand freedomdiffer.How mucha theorist's
neglectof the
differences
matters
doubtlessdependson thattheorist's
claimsand
TakeSirIsaiahBerlin's
purposes.
canonical
ofLiberty."
"TwoConcepts
claimaboutthetwonounsis,as already
Berlin's
notthat
modest:
noted,
no difference
butonlythathehimself
willusethem"tomeanthe
exists,
same."82Even this,however,turnsout not to be true.First,not
Berlinalmostalwaysuses"freedom"
whenexplicating
surprisingly,
the
viewsof a Germantheorist,
whendiscussing
a Frenchone
"liberty"
in theexpression
(who,indeed,wouldsubstitute
"freedom"
"liberty,
equality,
Moreimportant,
fraternity"?).83
aretheregularities
however,
to thesubstance
relating
ofBerlin's
argument.
Thatargument,
in brief,
distinguishes
betweena "negative"
and a
"positivesense"ofliberty
The former
(or freedom).
is defined
as the
absenceofinterference
thelatter
byothers,
as concerning
whichpeople
Thelatteris supposedto includebothdemocratic
mayinterfere.
selfgovernment
and(forreasonsnotfully
explained)
psychic
self-mastery.
Thebulkoftheessayundertakes
totraceas tohowthislastideahasbeen
extended,step by theoretical
step,into doctrinesthatrationalize
oppressionand despotism,the veryoppositeof trueliberty(or
The trueand "fundamental
freedom).
senseoffreedom
[or liberty],"
Berlinsays, is "freedomfromchains,fromimprisonment,
from
enslavement
by others.The restis extensionof thissenseor else
metaphor."84
the"negativesense,"Berlininvokestheauthority
Explicating
of
ordinary
usage,appealing
to whatmight
"normally"
or"naturally"
be
said,as distinct
fromwhatwouldbe"eccentric."
Yetthespecific
claims
hemakesherearenotinaccordwithordinary
usage.He employs
words
frombothfamilies
in makingtheseclaims,thoughthe"free-"
family
predominates;
buttheclaimsarefalsewithrespect
tothe"free-"
family,

545
In
though
theyare,orwouldbe,truewithrespect
tothe"liber-"
family.85
thissection,
Berlinreally
but
doesusethetwofamilies
interchangeably,
thereby
undermines
someofhisownclaims.
Whenhe turnsto the"positivesense,"and particularly
to psychic
heemploys
Thisis
self-mastery,
the"free-"
almostexclusively.86
family
inaccordwithordinary
inthissection
usage;indeed,manyexpressions
wouldsounddistinctly
odd if the"liber-"familywereusedinstead
(consider"freedomas self-mastery,"
to [or
"freedom
as resistance
escapefrom]
unrealizable
desire,"
"freedom
as rational
self-direction').87
Berlinis in a bind:For the"positivesense"to includepsychicselfmastery,
ithastobea senseof"freedom."
Forthe"negative
sense"tobe
as Berlin
characterizes
it,ithastobea senseof"liberty."
But,forBerlin's
essaytoworkatall,theyhavetobe twofundamental
sensesofa single
word(or ofan interchangeable
pairofwords).
As forArendt,
whilesheis right
toinsistonsignificant
in
difference
meaning,
shedoes notgetthatdifference
rightin termsof ordinary
usage,and herforaysintoetymology
are not helpful.If hermain
concernis theconstellation
ofthemes
suggested
earlier-spontaneity,
interpersonal
relations,
andpoliticalness-then
sheisright
tocontrast
it
toliberation,
forthesethemes
do go beyondtheremoval
orabsenceof
oppression,
beyondanything
thatcan be givento or doneforus by
others.
Butanimportant
herelieswithin
partofthesemantic
difference
eachwordfamily
rather
thanbetween
them.Arendt's
"freedom"
goes
notonlybeyond"liberation"
and"toliberate,"
butalsoequallybeyond
"tofree"and"befreed."
Noteveryone
thatisfree,
(letaloneeverything)
orhasbeenfreed,
hasfreedom.
Arendt
is right
toopposeherconcern
to"liberties,"
Similarly,
since
thatwordimpliesspecific,
whileshe intendsa
multiple
guarantees,
generalstate,evena wayof life.The "free-"
family
does havemore
holistic
connotations.
But,again,animportant
partofthedifference
lies
withineach wordfamily,
between
thesingularand theplural.Thus
Arendtmighthavecontrasted
her"freedom"
to "freedoms,"
or even
calledit "liberty"
and contrasted
it to "liberties."88
Indeed,"liberty"
wouldhaveoffered
herthisadvantage:
unlike"freedom,"
itwouldhave
ruledouttheinner,
concerns
psychic
Arendt
wantstoexclude.
Therealissueisnot,however,
whether
Arendt
chosetheright
word.
Thereis no right
word,letalonewordfamily,
corresponding
neatlyto
Arendt's
constellation
ofthemesand onlyto that.If sheis to havea
"freedom"
singlelabelfortheconstellation,
maywellbethebestchoice.
Therealissueconcerns
theadvantages
andcostsofsuchlabeling
andthe

546
therelationofordinary
usageto
tonein whichitis done;itconcerns
and
Berlin
turns
invoke
spurn
by
BothArendtand
politicaltheory.
thesupportof its
wanting
usage(and perhapsetymology),
ordinary
They
withwhatappearto be itsconstraints.89
authority
butimpatient
and they
butat politicaleducation,
scholarship
aimnotat linguistic
ofordinary
wantto geton withthattask.At timesthecomplexities
at worstan obstacleto,it.And,
from,
usageseemat besta distraction
from
ordinary
usagedo
andBerlin's
deviations
someofArendt's
clearly,
a perspicuous
advantages,givingtheirarguments
yieldrhetorical
Theregularities
ofordinary
usage
andan auraofauthority.
simplicity
confusedand politicallyand pedagogically
seem,by comparison,
pricefortheir
Butthetheorists
also paya considerable
inconclusive.
gains.
rhetorical
thoseregularities
ordinary
regularities,
theydepartfrom
First,where
confusion.
Despite
minds,
producing
continue
toechointheirreaders'
tocontinue
arelikely
forexample,
readers
declaration,
explicit
Berlin's
than
he meansliberty
(rather
thatwhenhe writes"liberty"
assuming
than
(rather
hemeansfreedom
"freedom"
andwhenhewrites
freedom)
to echoin thetheorist's
continue
Second,thoseregularities
liberty).
usage,
reverts
to ordinary
mindas well,so thatsheor he periodically
a
confusion.
WhenArendt,forexample,mentions
creatingfurther
thatmeansprecisely
whatshe earlierclaimed
"sense"of "freedom"
explicit
"freedom"
doesnotmean,thereaderis ata loss.Third,lacking
oftheordinary
cannotknowthefull
awareness
thetheorist
regularities,
and may
or rhetorical
of changesintroduced
semantic
consequences
to enhanceanother.
one argument
whilestriving
well undermine
usageis a caseinpoint.
appealto ordinary
Berlin's
self-defeating
butmore
Othercostsare less obviousand easyto demonstrate,
thetheorist's
to thereaderandthe
serious.Oneconcerns
relationship
afterall,is a
norBerlin,
Arendt
Neither
natureofpoliticaleducation.
They
ofsomeproposition.
merepropagandist,
readers
outtoconvince
their
do wanttoconvince,
buttheyalsowanttoeducateandempower
judgment,and (at least in
investigation,
readersfor independent
case butprobablyalso in Berlin's)action.Theirimpatience
Arendt's
thelatter.
goalbutimpede
withordinary
theformer
usagemayfacilitate
your
bystipulating
Itmayberhetorically
objections
effective
toforestall
ownspecialusage,as Berlindoes,orbypretending
accessto a word's
does.Butsuchdeviceswill
as Arendt
andtruemeaning,
lost,original,
reader's
not empower-indeed,
theywill tendto undermine-the
Theyare likelyto drivereaders'objections
judgment.
independent

547
thepotential
underground
rather
thanresolvethem;andtheysacrifice
educativepowerof makingcontactwiththe reader'sown tacit
knowledge
andinarticulate
experience.
Finally,neither
Arendtnor Berlinis engagedmerelyin political
ofintellectual
education.
Theirtheorizing
isalwaysalsoaninvestigation
and politicalproblems.And thattask,too, maybe hamperedby
impatience
withthecomplexities
ofordinary
usage.Whatseemslike
on withthesubstantive
getting
job mayinsteadmisdirect
it.In many
fromordinary
cases,ifnotall, a theorist's
deviations
usageare not
random
errors,
theresult
ofcarelessness,
butrather
mark-andmasksubstantive
problemsin the argument.
Berlinavoidsproblemsby
insisting
onsameness
whereordinary
usageindicates
difference;
Arendt
avoidsproblems
byinsisting
on simplified
difference
whereordinary
usageindicates
a complexmixofsameness
andvariousdifferences.
Berlin's
disregard
ofordinary
usage,wesaw,hidesthefundamental
issueofwhether
hehasinfactidentified
twodistinct
aspectsofa single
concept,one ofthemsubjectto dangerous
theoretical
extrapolation:
therearetwoandonlytworelevant
whether
hehasgot
whether
aspects,
themright,
whether
theyareaspectsofa singleconcept,
whether
and
howoneofthemis moredangerous
thantheother,
andso on.Arendt's
fromordinary
deviations
hidethefundamental
issueof
regularities
whether
freedom(or action,or politics)has preconditions
or is a
ineradicable
humanpotential:
whether
itpresupposes
perpetual,
liberationorthesecuring
ofliberties,
whether
itcanbe causedorbrought
itslosswasinevitable,
about,whether
whether
andhowthatlosscanbe
whether
to humanneeds,interests,
reversed,
andhowitis related
and
andso on.
desires,
Untiloneknowswhatthehiddenproblems
are,onecannotbeginto
assessthecostsof keepingthemhidden.Untilone knowswhatthe
existing
linguistic
regularities
are,theimpulseto deviatefromthem
be suspect-notas sinagainstscholarship
shouldtherefore
ortruth
but
as a clue to someproblematic
or unresolved
assumption
difficulty.
Thereareindeedsignificant
inmeaning
differences
between
"freedom"
and "liberty,"
in factbetweenfreedomand
differences
significant
Whoeverundertakes
to writeaboutthesecrucialhumanand
liberty.
woulddo wellto giverespectful
politicalconcerns
attention
to those
differences
andtothelanguageencoding
whichis-afterall-the
them,
theorist's
own.

548
NOTES
area.I amtold,for
choicesinthissemantic
1. Non-European
languages
mayoffer
theJapanese
distinction
doesnotcorrespond
to
instance,
thatJapanese
doesso,though
Norman
0. Brown,
C. DouglasLummis,
theEnglish
one.Forhelpwiththisessay,I thank
andSaraM. Shumer.
MichaelPaul Rogin,JohnH. Schaar,GeorgeShulman,
FourEssaysonLiberty
2. SirIsaiahBerlin,
"TwoConcepts
ofLiberty,"in
(Oxford:
OxfordUniversity
Press,1979),121. For anotherexample,see CharlesA. Beard,
inFreedom:
ItsMeaning,
ed.byRuthNandaAnshen
"Freedom
inPoliticalThought,"
(London:GeorgeAllen& Unwin,1942),7.
3. MauriceCranston,
Freedom(New York:Basic Books,1967),32. Compare
Benjamin
Gibbs,Freedom
andLiberation
(London:SussexUniversity
Press,1976),10,
"nowhaveslightly
nuances
ofmeaning"
butdoesnot
whosaysthatthetwoterms
different
whattheseare.
specify
4. HannahArendt,
OnRevolution
(NewYork:Viking
Press,1965),22.
5. Arendt,On Revolution,25, 22.
6. Arendt,On Revolution,25.
7. Arendt,
On Revolution,
141,quotingJamesFenimore
Cooper,TheAmerican
Democrat(1838).
9. Arendt,On Revolution,25, 33.
11. Arendt,
OnRevolution,
110,221.
12. HannahArendt,
"WhatIs Authority?"Between
PastandFuture(Cleveland/New
York:World,1961),91-141,
at95;HannahArendt,
"OnViolence,"
Crises
oftheRepublic
(NewYork:Harcourt
BraceJovanovich,
1972),103-98,
at 142;HannahArendt,
"WhatIs
Freedom?"BetweenPast and Future,143-71,at 145, 155; Arendt,On Revolution,22.
13. Arendt,
"WhatIs Freedom?"
150;Arendt,
OnRevolution,
22.
14. Arendt,
"WhatIs Freedom?"
149.
15. Hannah Arendt,Willing,vol. 2 of The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt
BraceJovanovich,
1978),5.
16. Exceptin one passagereferring
to thatparticular
carefully
"notionofliberty
inliberation";
implied
Arendt,
OnRevolution,
22.Atleastonce,liberty
isusedtomean
whatArendt
elsewhere
callsfreedom;
"WhatIs Freedom?"
Arendt,
155.Other
occurrences
theviewArendt
explicate
opposes;Arendt,
OnRevolution,
24,26.
17. Arendt,
On Revolution,
121;myitalics.
18. Arendt,
203.Stillanother
Willing,
senseoccursinHannahArendt,
TheHuman
Condition
ofChicagoPress,1958),245.
(Chicago:University
19. Arendt,Willing,25, 279.
20. Arendt,
Willing,
121,221,236,279.
21. Arendt,
"WhatIs Freedom?"
148;Arendt,
Willing,
5.
22. Arendt,
"WhatIs Freedom?"
146,145,157.
23. Arendt,
19.
Willing,
24. Arendt,
Willing,
220n.27.
25. Arendt,Willing,19.

549
148.
"WhatIs Freedom?"
26. Arendt,
Willing,
5; Arendt,
25.
27. Arendt,
On Revolution,
28. Arendt,Willing,
200; myitalics;butnotethatthiswas an unfinished
work,
and misformulation
so one shouldexpectsomecarelessness
published
posthumously,
init.
29. Arendt,
HumanCondition,
32;Arendt,
OnRevolution,
24,22;butnotethatthese
noteleutheria.
See alsoArendt,
HumanCondition,
passagesconcern
isonomia,
26,ona
whenspeechwasnotyetprimarily
timeinpolislifebefore
"actionandspeechseparated,"
humanwayofanswering,
"thespecifically
"a meansofpersuasion"
butsimply
talking
backandmeasuring
andwasdone."
upto whatever
happened
30. Arendt,
"WhatIs Freedom?"
148.
31. EmileBenveniste,
Indo-European
Languageand Society,trans.by Elizabeth
ofMiamiPress,1973),266.
Palmer(CoralGables:University
The initialasterisk
indicates
wordsthatlinguists
havereconstructed-that
is,
hypothesized-for
whoseactualexistence
thereis noindependent
evidence.
32. Benveniste,
266-267.
Indo-European,
33. Benveniste,
266-267.See also SigmundFeist,Vergleichendes
Indo-European,
Worterbuch
dergotischen
Die
Sprache
(Leiden:E. J.Brill,1939);PierGiuseppe
Scardigli,
Goten,SpracheundKultur
(Munich:C. Beck,1964),54;Wolfgang
Krause,Handbuch
des Gotischen
(Munich:C. Beck,1953),55.
34. Benveniste,
263-264.
Indo-European,
35. C. S. Lewis,Studiesin Words(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,1981),
124-125.
111-117,
36. Otto Schrader,
IX (1898),172-173.
"Anzeiger,"
Indogermanische
Forschung
Arendt
inascribing
is thusmistaken
ofthistheory
totheNaziera.
theorigin
37. Benveniste,
264.
Indo-European,
38. Although
Benveniste
for"freedom"
a group-based
as wellas
hypothesizes
origin
forlibertas
andeleutheria,
healsosaysthattheformer
evolved
alongquitedifferent
lines,
to theindividual
usingnotionsrelating
and notto thesociety.
EmileBenveniste,
Le
I. economie,
vocabulairedes institutions
indo-europeennes,
parente,societe(Paris:
Editionsde Minuit,1969),325.I present
myowntranslation
ofthissomewhat
cryptic
passage.
Benveniste
pointsoutthatinancient
Iranian,
too,the"wordfor'free'.
. . properly
'bornofthestock."';Indo-European,
signified
inIndo-Iranian,
267.Similarly
theword
that"freemenapplytothemselves
as opposedtoslaves,"
isalsotheself-designation
ofthe
"theantithetic
formto . . . 'stranger,
community,
slave,enemy."';
Indo-European,
299,
301.HereBenveniste
takesthedistinction
between
slaveandnonslave
tohavepreceded
theethnicself-designation
of a people.ButDieterNestlethinks
thatthesameword
meantfriendly,
originally
andonlylaternonslave.
true,pious,sweet,
He alsomentions
a
wordthatfirst
meantfellow-warrior
Langobardian
andlatercameto meannonslave;
I. Teil:dieGriechen
Eleutheria,
J.C.B.Mohr[PaulSiebeck],1967),7.
(Tubingen:
Perhapsinitially
thoseofthestockorbelovedgroup,
onlythemasters,
spokethe
locallanguage
so thattheirself-designation
literally
coincided
withnonslave
status.Or
theself-designation
ofanelitesimply
perhaps
dominated
thelanguage
so thatwordsthat
meantthestockorbelovedgroupwereusedevenbytheunderlings
literally
inthesociety
todesignate
Thelatter
wasNietzsche's
viewinTheGenealogy
onlythemasters.
ofMorals.
OrlandoPatterson
claimsthattheconcept
offreedom
wasfirst
developed
bytheslaves,
but givesno supporting
evidence;Slaveryand Social Death (Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,1982),98,340,342.

550
andtheyderivefroma
andinconsistent,
accountsarecryptic
39. Theetymological
Indo-European,
Lewis,Studies,114;Benveniste,
passages.
Compare
very
few,ambiguous
SozialeTypenbegriffe
im
derGriechen,"
"ZumFreiheitsberiff
264,299;KurtRaaflaub,
alten Griechenlandund ihrFortlebenin den Sprachender Welt(vol. 4), ed. byElisabeth
at 186-188,
Kurt
191-92;
Verlag,1981),108-405,
(Berlin:Akademie
Charlotte
Welskopf,
andtheConceptofthe'FreeCitizen'inLateFifthOligarchy,
Raaflaub,"Democracy,
Athens"PoliticalTheory11 (November1983),517-544,at 521; Nestle,
Century,
Polis" in
Eleutheria,7-14,20, 24-27,29-30; ChristianMeier,"Die griechische
vol. 2 of HistorischesLexikon zur politisch-sozialen
GeschichtlicheGrundbegriffe,
Koselleck
Werner
ed. byOttoBrunner,
Conze,andReinhart
Sprachein Deutschland,
ErnstKlettVerlag,1975),426-429.
(Stuttgart:
220 n. 27; GeorgCurtius,
derGriechischen
EtyGrundzuge
40. Arendt,Willing,
in GreekLife
1879),496-497;Max Pohlenz,Freedom
mologie(Leipzig:B. G. Tuebner,
Press,1966),181n;T. G. Tucker,Etymological
and Thought
(NewYork:Humanities
Dictionaryof Latin(Chicago: Ares,1976), 139.
41. Pohlenz,Freedom,
181n.
42. Tucker,EtymologicalDictionary,139.
43. RichardBroxtonOnians,The OriginsofEuropean ThoughtAbouttheBody,the
Press,
Mind, the Soul, the World,Time,and Fate (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
TheSubconscious
Language(NewYork:
Theodore
Thass-Thienemann,
1951),472-480.
Washington
SquarePress,1967),207-216.
SubconsciousLanguage,216.
44. Thass-Thienemann,
45. Nestle,
Eleutheria,
11,14.
46. Benveniste,
Indo-European,264.
47. Lewis,Studies,21, 111, 113, 115.
48. Lewis,Studies,113, 115-16.
49. Lewis, Studies, 116, quoting Sheridan, St. Patrick's Day, II, ii; Raymond
Press, 1983), 180,quoting
Williams,Keywords,rev.ed. (New York: OxfordUniversity
Shakespeare,Much Ado About Nothing,IV, i.
50. Benveniste,
"Zum
Eleutheria,
14,19-30;Raaflaub,
Indo-European,
264;Nestle,
Polis,"426.
189,192-193;
Meier,"Griechische
Freiheitsbegriff,"
51. Kurt Raaflaub,"Freiheitin Athenund Rom: ein Beispieldivergierender
inderAntike,"HistorischeZeitschrift
238 (1984),529-67,
politischerBegriffsentwicklung
at 563; Raaflaub,"Zum Freiheitsbegriff,"

31, 34; Meier,
195; Nestle,Eleutheria,
"Griechische
Polis,"426.
52. Raaflaub,
"Freiheit
inAthen,"
543,563.
Nestle,
16-18.
"Democracy,"
527-536;
Eleutheria,
53. Raaflaub,
"Freiheit
inAthen,"
563.
544-546,
54. Raaflaub,
55. Raaflaub,
"Democracy,"
529.
56. Thucydides,
ThePeloponnesian
War(NewYork:RandomHouse,1951),104;
inAthen,"
Polis,"427.
Meier,"Griechische
"Freiheit
546,564,mytranslation;
Raaflaub,
inAthen,"
521.
57. Raaflaub,
"Freiheit
545-546;
Raaflaub,
"Democracy,"
58. Raaflaub,"Freiheit
in Athen,"563-564;Raaflaub,"Democracy,"
521; Meier,
"Griechische
Polis,"428.
to
59. Raaflaub,
"Freiheit
inAthen,"
I usetheGreekeleutheria
546,mytranslation;
avoidtheproblem
ofhowtotranslate
ofeleutheria
does
Ofcoursetheevolution
Freiheit.
notstopatthispoint.Forlaterdevelopments,
KurtRaaflaub,
"Athen's
see,forexample,
Xenia8 (1984),45-86.
desTyrannen,"
'IdeologiederMacht'unddieFreiheit

Pitkin / ARE FREEDOM AND LIBERTY TWINS?
551
60. Raaflaub, "Freiheit in Athen," 532; Jochen Bleicken,"Romische libertas,"

vol. 2, 430.
Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe,
61. Raaflaub,"Freiheitin Athen,"553-556.
62. Bleicken,"Romischelibertas,"431.
65. Raaflaub,"FreiheitinAthen,"542,546-550,560,562.See also ChaimWirszubski,
Libertasas a PoliticalIdea at Rome (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1960),
11-15.
66. Raaflaub,"Freiheitin Athen,"550; Bleicken,"Romischelibertas,"432-435.
67. Lewis,Studies,124-125.
68. Lewis,Studies,125.
69. Hans Kurath, ed., Middle English Dictionary (Ann Arbor: Universityof
MichiganPress, 1953).Of course,thefactthatwe lack an earlierexampleneverproves
thata wordwas not used in a particularway earlier.
70. On the Sachsenspiegel,see ChristopherDipper, "StandischeFreiheit:Juraet
"Freiheitals
libertates,"Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe,
vol. 2,448; HerbertGrundmann,
HistorischeZeitschrift
religioses,politischesund personlichesPostulatim Mittelalter,"
183 (February-June
1957),23-54,at 50.
71. Paul Ziff,SemanticAnalysis(Ithaca: CornellUniversity
Press, 1960), 190. The
orderof "freedom"and "liberty"in thelast sentenceof thepassage seemsto have been
reversed.
72. I have consultedJ. Bonnardand A. Salmon, eds., Lexique de l'ancienFranqais
(New York: G. E. Stechert,1928); AlbertDauzat, Jean Dubois, and HenriMitterand,
eds., Nouveau dictionnaireetymologiqueet historique(Paris: Larousse, 1964); A. J.
Greimas,ed., Dictionnairede l'ancienFrancais(Paris: Larousse,1969);RobertKelham,
ed., Dictionaryof the Normanor Old FrenchLanguage (East Ardslay,UK: Tabard,
1978);Louise W. Stone,WilliamRothwell,T.B.W. Reid,eds.,Anglo-Norman
Dictionary
(London: ModernHumanitiesResearchAssociation,1983).
73. Lewis, Studies, 117. I have consultedArthurR. Bordeu,Jr.,ed., Old English
PressofAmerica,1982);and T. NorthcoteToller,ed., An AngloDictionary(University
Saxon Dictionary(OxfordUniversity
Press,1954/1898).
74. Lewis,Studies,1 3,quotingOvid,Metamorphoses,1,41.Lewisimpliesthatsuch
use also appliesto eleutheria.If one consultsthe OxfordEnglishDictionaryforuses of
motionofinanimateobjects,theearliestunderSense 14
"free,"meaningtheunobstructed
in movement")is from1590,butunderSense 8 ("Of
("Of materialthings:Not restrained
actions,activity,
motion,etc.:Unimpeded,unrestrained')thereis an examplefroma 1400
book on surgery:"The necke schall have his freemevynge."Such meaningsare not
I haveconsulted,though-in theabsenceof
listedintheOld Frenchdictionaries
explicitly
illustrative
to tellwhethertheyaremeantto be includedin a brief
examples-it is difficult
likethatof Old Frenchliberal,meaningmodernFrenchlibre.
definition
75. Arendtpoints out the importantdifference
betweentwo ways of conceiving
freedomin action: as a choice betweenpreexistingalternativesor as the creationof
somethingnew; Willing,29, 32, 132.
76. Concerningwhatis meantby "ordinaryusage," see Ziff,SemanticAnalysis,2,
15-38;and my Wittgenstein
and Justice(Berkeley:University
of CaliforniaPress,1972),
esp. 7-21.

552
Thelattermaysometimes
soundsomewhat
77. Animalscan be freedor liberated.
thebird"),butitneednot,in appropriate
mannered
thecage,he liberated
("Opening
context.
Quailraisedincaptivity
andreleased
forhunting
orforthetraining
ofhunting
dogsare"liberated
quail."
78. Note,however,
theOxford
Sense10of"freedom"in
English
Dictionary
("Physics:
ofmotion').In fairy
Capability
inanimate
tales,ofcourse,
objectscando anything.
79. TheOxford
English
Dictionary
mentions
for"liberation,"
onlya Latinderivation
butWilliams
itsimmediate
identifies
forerunner
as theFrench
181.
liberation;
Keywords,
therewas no suchwordin Old French,thoughtherewas in Latin.One
Apparently
ofOldFrench
dictionary
doeslista noun,liberacion,
butdefines
itas meaning
liberality;
Bonnardand Salmon,Lexique.The earliestdictionary
examplesof modernFrench
liberation
datefromthefourteenth
theearliestOxfordEnglishDictionary
century;
exampleoftheEnglish
wordisfrom1440,andtheMiddleEnglish
alsogives
Dictionary
fifteenth-century
examples.
80. Justas I have,ofcourse,benefited
frompastwork.In additionto the
greatly
sources
cited,I foundparticularly
useful
AlanRyan's"Freedom,"
XL (April
Philosophy
1965),93-112.
81. Anysucheffect
wouldpresumably
bereinforced
bytranslation
from
Continental
Europeanphilosophy,
whereGermanmetaphysics
addressesFreiheit,
whileFrench
lucidity
reasonsaboutliberte.
(Morerecently,
ofcourse,
theFrench,
too,havesought
out
themurky
depths.)
82. Berlin,
"TwoConcepts,"
121.
83. Berlin,
"TwoConcepts,"
136,151-154,
163-164.
84. SirIsaiahBerlin,
"Introduction,"
FourEssays,lvi.It is notclearwhether
Berlin
thisas anetymological
intends
claim,and,ifso,whether
onlyabout"freedom"
orabout
as well.
"liberty"
85. Berlin,"Two Concepts,"122.One suspects
thathe thought
theseclaimstrue
becausehefirst
formulated
them
interms
ofliberty,
theninserted
theword"freedom"
into
someofthem,
assuming
itwouldmakenodifference,
oreventrying
deliberately
tousethe
words"interchangeably";
thepassagesoccurimmediately
after
hisdeclaration
thathewill
so usethem.
86. "Liberation"
and"liberty"
occuronceeach(thelatter
ina sentence
referring
back
tothe"negative
sense')and"liberates"
twice;
words
from
the"free-"family
occur15times;
"TwoConcepts,"
Berlin,
theexceptions
141-146;
occurat 142,144.
87. Berlin,
"TwoConcepts,"
134,146,136,145.
88. PatrickHenry,
onesupposes,
hadsomething
likeArendtian
"freedom"
inmind
whenheaskedtobegiveneither
ordeath.Butthenagain,maybenot;after
liberty
all,he
askedtobegivenit.
89. "Perhaps,"
becauseitis notclearwhether
Berlin's
reference
to a "fundamental
sense"is intended
etymologically;
seenote84,above.
Hanna Fenichel Pitkinis Professorof Political Science at the Universityof

Californiaat Berkeley.She is the author of The Concept of Representation,
Wittgenstein
andJustice,
andFortune
Is a Woman.


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Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?

Author(s): Hanna Fenichel Pitkin

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ARE FREEDOM AND LIBERTY TWINS?

OF ENGLISH HAVE A UNIQUE opportunity:

get to choose between"liberty"and "freedom."No otherEuropean

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POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER1988

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POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1988

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Pitkin/ ARE FREEDOM AND LIBERTY TWINS?

"in Greekas wellas Romanantiquity,

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POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER1988

Yet theGreekshad onlyone wordfortheseideas:eleutheria.

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How and whendid theybecomepolitical?Even the distinction

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It was also "extraordinarily

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it will seem morecomplex,

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at 563; Raaflaub,"Zum Freiheitsbegriff,"