G.R. No.

135128

August 26, 1999

MACEDA VS. DBP

FACTS: In their Complaint, P alleged that they were the owners of the old Gran Hotel in Tacloban City; that pursuant to their
plan to build a new Gran Hotel, they applied for 11 M loan with PR submitting to the latter a project study of the new hotel, the
Philippine Tourism Authority's approval of the project, as well as the plans and specifications of the new Gran Hotel; that on July
28, 1976, PR approved a loan of 7.3 M and required them to produce 2.9M by way of equity, to constitute a first mortgage and to
sign a Promissory Note in the amount of 7.3 M; that the contract for the new Gran Hotel was awarded to Moreman Builders Co.,
which demolished the old Gran Hotel and proceeded to build the new Gran Hotel; that payment to said contractor was to be taken
from the approved loan, on a progressive manner, based on actual construction or work accomplishment; that as of June 24, 1977,
they have advanced to the contractor the sum of P1,262,988.38; that PR had also released a total of One P1,911,360.00, out of
their loan, to the contractor; that PR, through its officer in charge of the project, defendant Oscar De Vera, conspired with the
contractor to enable the latter to secure undue fund releases from their loan; P filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract and
Damages and complaint for Estafa against the contractor and defendant Oscar De Vera .P thus prayed (1) that PR be ordered to
release the balance of their approved loan, (2) that the interests and other charges imposed on the loan be nullified, (3) that PR be
made to pay them (a) unrealized earnings and/or loss of income, (b) actual damages representing additional costs or price
increase in construction labor and materials, (c) moral damages, (d) exemplary damages, (e) attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs of suit.1wphi1.nt
In their Answer to the Complaint, PR and De Vera averred that releases on the loan of P to the contractor were made through P,
Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., that while the trial court decided in favor of P, still PR could not make any releases on their loan
considering the appeal filed by the contractor; that while said case was pending, at least two suppliers filed cases against P,for
non-payment of salaries/wages and costs of suppliers; that said pending case also caused the construction of the hotel project to
stop and the period of the loan availment to lapse; that during the negotiation for revival of the loan, PR alleged that P failed to
make payments according to schedule; and that having agreed to all the terms of their transactions, P are estopped from
questioning the conditions of the loan as well as the releases thereof. After praying for dismissal of the Complaint, PR
counterclaimed for P200,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, P500,000.00 in moral damages and costs of
suit. TC ruled in favor of petitioners PR filed a Notice of Appeal, while P filed a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking to
increase the amount awarded to them by TC. They also filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. On October 2, 1997, TC
issued its first questioned Order, (1) modifying its Decision by increasing the amounts awarded to [Petitioner] Bonifacio
Maceda, Jr. and (2) granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of two awards in its Decision. On November 5, 1997, PR
filed its Notice of Appeal from the February 25, 1997 Decision, as amended by the October 2, 1997 Order of TC On the same
date, it also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 2, 1997 Order insofar as it grants execution pending appeal.
Thereafter, or on March 26, 1998, it filed a Supplemental Motion for the approval of a supersedeas as bond in the amount of
P35M and to stay the execution pending appeal in the event that its Motion for Reconsideration be denied. TC denied all PRs
motion. Thus, PR appealed the TCS decision before the CA. CA ruled in favor of PR on the ground that there existed no
sufficient ground or compelling reason to allow the execution of the judgment pending appeal.Hence, this Petition. 10
ISSUE: WON there are good reasons to justify execution of the trial court judgment pending appeal.
HELD: NO.The execution of a judgment during the pendency of an appeal is governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Court. This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for "courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment
which has not acquired a final character." 12 In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution "is usually not favored
because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal." 13There are three requisites for the grant of
an execution of a judgment pending appeal: "a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and c) the good reason must be stated in a special
order."14 Underscoring the importance of the requisite "good reasons," the Court ruled in Ong v. Court of Appeals:15
Petitioners have failed to present adequate reasons to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors in overturning
the trial court's Order. As movants, they have the burden of showing why the lower court's Decision should be executed without
awaiting the result of the appeal. Absent such justification, execution pending appeal cannot be granted.1wphi1.nt
PETITION WAS DENIED.

THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the
body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners was likewise denied.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of
P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as
evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary
damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC acquire jurisdiction for not specifying the correct amount of docket fees.
HELD:
The trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to
state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefore within the
relevant prescriptive period.
The trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended and
supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private
respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy Po Tiong GR No. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required
answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,
exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not
specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M.
In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the
amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986,
private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00
as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of
P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages
so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was
ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of
Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent
appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended
and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee
of P257,810.49.
Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid?
Ruling:
Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect.

The Court dismissed petitioners motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket fees.
Personal Observation:
The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon
reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is
no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket
fees.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. KMK GANI

182 SCRA 591

FACTS:
1. Two containers loaded with 103 cartons of merchandise covered by eleven airway bills of several supposedly Singapore based
consignees arrived at the Manila International Airport.
2. The cargoes were consigned to different entities, among others, KMK Gani and Indrapal and Company, private respondents.
3. While the cargoes were at the MIA, a reliable source tipped the Bureau of Customs that the said cargoes were going to be
unloaded to Manila.
4. The Suspected Cargo and Anti-Narcotics (SCAN) dispatched an agent to verify the information.
5. The cargoes were seized and thereafter subject to Seizure and Forfeiture proceedings for technical smuggling.
6. Atty. Armando Padilla entered his appearance for the consignees KMK and Indrapal.
7. Records of the case do not show any appearance of the consignees in person.
8. The Collector of Customs rules for the forfeiture of all the cargoes.
9. Appeal was made to the Commissioner of Customs.
10. The Commissioner of Customs affirmed the finding of the Collector of Customs of the presence of the intention to import the
said goods in violation of the dangerous drugs Act and a Central Bank Circular in relation to the Tariff and Customs Code.
11. Appeal was then made to the Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
12. Hence this petition to review.
ISSUE:
Did private respondents fail to establish their personality to sue?
Can private respondents sue within Philippine jurisdiction under the isolated transaction rule"?
HELD:
No foreign corporation transacting in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action
recognized under Philippine laws. (Section 133, Corporation Code of the Philippines)
However, a foreign corporation not engaged in the in business in the Philippines may not be denied the right to file an action in
the Philippine courts for an isolated transaction.
The fact that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines must be disclosed if it desires to sue in the Philippine
courts under the isolated transaction rule. Without this disclosure, the court may choose to deny it the right to sue.
In the case at bar, the private respondents KMK Gani and Indrapal aver that they are suing upon a singular and isolated
transaction. But they failed to prove their legal existence or juridical personality as foreign corporations.
*** The isolated transaction rule refers only to foreign corporations. Here the petitioners are not foreign corporations. They
do not even pretend to be so. The first paragraph of their petition, containing the allegation of their identities, does not even aver
their corporate character. On the contrary, KMK alleges that it is a single proprietorship while Indrapal hides under the
vague identification as a firm, although both describe themselves. With the phrase Doing business in accordance with the
laws of Singapore.

In Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 201 Phil. 369, 372-373 (1982), the Supreme Court said:

Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court.The law merely recognizes the
existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government.
It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court.

Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in
the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted
under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words doing business as Juasing Hardware may be added to the
title of the case, as is customarily done. [Emphasis supplied.] (ROGER V. NAVARRO, VS. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, G.R.
NO. 153788, NOVEMBER 27, 2009, BRION, J.).
FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS
144 SCRA 377
FERIA; September 24,1986

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the order of the RTC of Baguio

FACTS
-Petitioner Remedio Flores filed a complaint with the RTC of Baguio: his first cause of action was against respondent Ignacio
Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando
Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
-On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
-It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the
amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.
-At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
-RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
-Petitioner appealed by certiorari to the SC

ISSUE
WON the application of the totality rule in Sec 33(1) 1 of BP 129 and Section 112 of the interim rules is subject to permissive
1

Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. ...
2

Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the

joinder of parties under Sec 63 of Rule 3

HELD
Petitioner maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of
BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
-Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended
which reads as follows: Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action , irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test , and argues
that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional
test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions.
-This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a
defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in
all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
-There is a difference between the former and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant joined in a single complaint.
-Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to
different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant.
-Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of
action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action
against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more
plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there
should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
-In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the
total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one
complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
-In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the
complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
Disposition
The order appealed from is affirmed.

aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due
to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
3

Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action;
but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in aconnection with
any proceedings in which he may have no interest.

Flores v Mallare-PhillipsFacts:
Flores sued the respondents for refusing to pay him certain amount of money as alleged in the complaint:-first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit frompetitioner on various
occasions from August to October, 1981;-second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay theamount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner onseveral occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.The action was opposed by
an action to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Under Sec 19 of BP 129, theregional trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more
than P20,000.That although, the other respondent was indebted in the amount of P10, 212.00, his obligation wasseparate and distinct from that of the other
respondent.The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Plaintiff appealed by certiorari in Supreme
Court.
I
ssue:
WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties under theRules of Court.
Ruling:
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, thetotal of all the claims shall now furnish the
jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demandedin each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinderof parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
and that, after acareful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a
misjoinder of parties
for the reason that theclaims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls withinits jurisdiction.Section 6 of Rule 3
which provides as follows:Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief inrespect to or arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions is alleged to exist,whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in theserules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question oflaw or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action;but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendantfrom being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
whichhe may have no interest

Ligaya, Jaime, Silvina, Fausta, Pablo all surnamed Mina vs. Antonia Pacson, Crispino Medina and Cresencia Mina(1963)
[facts]
C
ase 1: The Minas are claiming to be the illegitimate children of Joaquin Mina while married to Pacson. They areclaiming that the
DOS allegedly signed by Joaquin when he was ill was fraudulently obtained. They pray for theannulment of the DOS and
their recognition as illegitimate children.
C
ourt in
C
ase 1 ordered that Pacson be impleaded. The Minas failed to comply with said order, thus, it wasdismissed.
C
ase 2: The Minas filed another case, this time impleading Pacson but with the same cause of action andincluding Medina and
C
resencia.
Defendants filed a MTD on the ground of res judicata.
[issue]
Whether or notCC3015 (case 1) effectively bars the present case
[ruling]
Partially. Failure to comply with a court order has the effect of adjudication upon the merits (Sec 3 Rule 17).Thus, failure to
comply with the court order in CC 3015 justifies the dismissal on the issue of annulment of DOS.However, present case is not
deemed dismissed as to the issue of filiation and Pacson, as she is not impleaded in theprior case
Agustin Casenas vs. Concepcion Sanchez de Rosales, Romeo Rosales, et. Al. (1967)

[facts]
-Case 1 prays for the execution of DOS in favour of
Casenas: filed by Rodolfo Aranas(assignor) and
Casenas(assignee) vs. Jose Rosales and Sanchez.
-Rosales and Sanchez filed an answer before trial.
Counsel for Aranas and Casenas manifested the death of JoseRosales and Aranas. The court orderedCasenas to amend the
complaint.
Casenas failed to comply, thus, it was dismissed.
-Case 2 (present case) prays for quieting and reconveyance of title in favour of
Casenas. Sanchez claims res judicata.
[issue]
Whether or not dismissal in the prior case effectively bars the present case
[ruling]
No. The order to amend the complaint is not in accordance with the procedure of the RC
. The court should have ordered the counsel to make a substitution of the deceased by the legal representatives of the deceased.
Casenas failure to comply with the order of the court did not validly justify the dismissal of the said case
Barrameda vs Barbara, the SC held that an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed
by Sec. 17, Rule 3 (Sec. 16, new law), is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order
dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that
the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly
substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to lack of jurisdiction.

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His Estate, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
FACTS:
Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., for the recovery of possession and
ownership of his share of several parcels of land; and for the partition thereof among the co-owners. In his complaint, the private
respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died intestate and aside from himself, was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and
her mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate and Dulce was then only about four years
old. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the delivery of his mothers share in the subject properties on so
many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit stating that he was the sole heir of
Dionisia when in fact, the latter was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the City of Danao for P7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle received
this amount without his (private respondents) knowledge. The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for
reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in
the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees
thereof was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed
decision with modification. The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the
appellate court erred:

ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTCS judgment was validly rendered
HELD:
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in
the subject properties. The plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such

party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment
and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as partiesplaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of judicial power over the said case, and
rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Hence, the trial court should have ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.

G.R. No. L-55750 November 8, 1989

MELGAR VS. BUENVIAJE
FACTS:
January 11, 1980 a vehicular accident happened along the National Highway of Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay, whereby a
passenger bus owned and operated by the late Felicidad Balla and driven by Domingo Casin swerved to the left lane and came
into head-on-collision with a vehicle owned by Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from the opposite
direction. It then swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on-with a passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and
driven by Fabian Prades. As a result of the accident, Felicidad Balla, owner and operator of the passenger bus and mother of
herein petitioners together with Domingo Casin, driver of the bus, died on the spot. Ruben Lim Relucio, driver of the service jeep
and Fabian Prades, driver of the other passenger bus died in the same accident. On July 4, 1980 the spouses Oscar Prades and
Victoria Prades private respondents herein as the only surviving forced heirs of the deceased Fabian Prades, filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla, petitioners herein for damages
since the respondents are contending that Domingo Casin ( Felicidads driver) drove his vehicle in a reckless and imprudent
manner which was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the incident.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against them, arguing
that it is entirely incorrect to hold the children liable for the alleged negligence of their deceased mother and to consider suing the
heirs of a deceased person the same as suing the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last portion of Section 21 of Rule
3 of the Rules of Court means that the creditor should institute the proper intestate proceedings wherein which he may be able to
interpose his claim.
CFI denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit . The petitioners herein, filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that:
Distinction should be made between a suit against the estate of Felicidad Balla and the present action which is a personal action
against the children of Felicidad Balla, considering that the children have absolutely no participation directly or indirectly in the
alleged negligent acts of Felicidad Balla, and there is absolutely no logical basis to hold the children liable for damages resulting
from alleged negligent acts of Felicidad Balla. In fact that second sentence of Article 1311 of the New Civil Code provides: The
heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. Spouses Prades, private respondents herein,
filed their comment and motion to admit amended complaint together with an amended complaint amending the title of the case
naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla as represented by the children named in the original complaint.
CFI issued its order denying the motion for reconsideration and admitting the amended complaint.
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners as heirs of Felicidad can be ordered substituted for the deceased Felicidad Balla
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE.
What was originally filed was a complaint for damages against petitioners herein, who are the children and surviving forced heirs
of the deceased Felicidad Balla, owner and operator of the passenger bus "FUSO" which allegedly caused the death of the
deceased Fabian Prades. Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are abated by death are: (1) All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent; (2) All
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent; and (3) Judgments for money against the decedent
(Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]).
It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated. Otherwise stated, actions for damages caused by the tortious
conduct of the defendant survive the death of the latter.
The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an executor or administrator.
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Hence, the inclusion of the "estate of Felicidad Balla" in the amended complaint as defendant.

The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate proceedings exist for the reason that her children had not filed any
proceedings for the settlement of her estate, claiming that Balla left no properties . Thus, while petitioners may have correctly
moved for the dismissal of the case and private respondents have forthwith corrected the deficiency by filing an amended
complaint, even before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to
dismiss, the action under Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which allows the suit against the legal representative of the
deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate, would still be futile, for the same reason that there appears to be no
steps taken towards the settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad Balla, nor has an executor or administrator of the estate been
appointed. From the statement made by the petitioners that "many persons die without leaving any asset at all" (Reply to
Respondents' Comment, p. 78; Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, p. 5), which insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is
reasonable to believe that the petitioners will not take any step to expedite the early settlement of the estate, judicially or extrajudicially if only to defeat the damage suit against the estate. (Note however the deceased Balla apparently left the bus). Under
the circumstances the absence of an estate proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the place of the deceased
(Javier v. Araneta, 90 Phil. 292 [1951]).
As restated in a much later case, in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of the estate or
in case where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs
of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased (Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 173 [1986].

Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corp.

Facts:Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned "Damages withprayer for a writ Replevin" against Conpac and Movers.
It was alleged that pursuant toa lease agreement, Cyborg had delivered one forklift to Conpac. The lease agreement stipulated a monthly
rental of P11,000.00 for the use of the equipment. Conpac failedand refused to pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took control of the
operations ofConpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject porklift.Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the return to it of
the equipment and the formaldisclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A Writ of Replevin was issued.Petitioner was served with a copy of the
summons and the latter filed a motion todismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC sincethe
complaint had asked for the actual market value of the equipment, actual damage,,exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injuction
againstMTC Judge, COnpac and Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC granted Cyborg'sapplication for premininary injunction. Petitiner assails the
decision of RTC. Hence thispetition.
Issue: WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held: NOMTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the concern of the case.
The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determined by theaverments in the complaints and the character of the
relief sought. The complaint filedby Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the return of the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner orin the alternative for the
payment of 150T plus damages, amount of unpaid lease andatty's fees.It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid
rentalswere just in incident of the action for the return of the forklift considering that privaterespondent specifically sought in the
complaint not only seizure of the forklift frompetitioner Movers but also payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals. MTC'sdismissing the
complaint was properly decreed,Petition for review is granted

Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action (ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS ASSO., INC. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 156660, August 24, 2009, First Division, Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
The interest of the party must also be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party (Caete v. Genuino
Ice Company, Inc., supra; VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra).