Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1 Models
The guerrilla must swim in the people as the sh
swims in the sea.
U.S. Marines and ANA soldiers on patrol during counterinsurgency operations in Marjah, Afghanistan, February 2010
In The Insurgent Archipelago John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of insurgency from
the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to
the global insurgency of the start of the 21st-century.
He denes this distinction as 'Maoist' and 'post-Maoist'
insurgency.[6]
1
3 COUNTER-INSURGENCY THEORISTS
In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel ghters were working in conjunction with or in a manner
complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case
with the French Resistance during World War II and the
National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. The
3 Counter-insurgency theorists
strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to
weaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree that
3.1 Santa Cruz de Marcenado
victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However,
in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel ghters
The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684 working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they
1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt system- are home-grown militias or imported ghters who have
atically in his writings with counter-insurgency. In his no unied goals or objectives save to expel the occupier.
Reexiones Militares, published between 1726 and 1730,
he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient in- According to Liddell Hart, there are few eective
surgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they counter-measures to this strategy. So long as the insurcould not be warded o. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recog- gency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its
nized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitiA state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors. macy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long
Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the popu- as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be
lation and good governance, to seek the peoples heart defeated by regular forces.
and love.[8]
3.2
B. H. Liddell Hart
3.3
David Galula
Vietnam War
Although the United States and its ARVN allies won several major battles with North Vietnamese forces and their
allies suering staggering losses, the cost of victory was
so high in the opinion of the US public (58,193 U.S.
deaths) that it came to see any further possible gains as
not worth the troop losses.
As long as popular support is on their side, an insurgency
can hold out indenitely, consolidating its control and replenishing its ranks, until their opponents simply leave.
Current situations
In these cases, such as the Israeli occupation of Lebanon,
which ended in 2000, and the recent Iraqi insurgency, the
goal of the insurgent is not to defeat the occupying military force; that is almost always an impossible task given
the disparity in resources. Rather, they seek through a
constant campaign of sneak attacks to inict continuous
casualties upon their superior enemy forces and thereby
over time demoralize the occupying forces and erode political support for the occupation in the homeland of the
occupying forces. It is a simple strategy of repeated pinpricks and bleedings that, though small in proportion to
the total force strength, sap the will of the occupier to
continue the ght.
3.3
David Galula
David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French ocer in the Algerian War. His
theory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, but
a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority.
Galula proposes four laws for counterinsurgency:[9]
1. The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conict;
support of the masses can be obtained with the help
of an active friendly minority.
3. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be eciently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite
party.
4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by
removing or driving away armed opponents, then
gaining support of the population, and eventually
strengthening positions by building infrastructure
and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacied territory as a basis of operation to conquer a
neighbouring area.
3
Galula contends that:
A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not
the destruction in a given area of the insurgents
forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the
insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by
and with the population. ... In conventional
warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent
of support from the population as measured
in terms of political organization at the grass
roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position
of strength when his power is embedded in a
political organization issuing from, and rmly
supported by, the population.[10]
With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them
into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control:
In a Selected Area
1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sucient troops to oppose an insurgents comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and
towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut o its links
with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the
incompetents, give full support to the active
leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national
political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent
remnants.[10]
According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped
in areas that are only partially under insurgent control,
and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government.[10] Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as Build
(or rebuild) a political machine from the population
upward.[11]
3 COUNTER-INSURGENCY THEORISTS
3.4
Robert Thompson
Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency[12] in 1966, arguing that a successful
counter-insurgency eort must be proactive in seizing the Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal imporinitiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines ve basic tance, because
principles for a successful counter-insurgency:
1. The government must have a clear political aim:
to establish and maintain a free, independent and
united country which is politically and economically
stable and viable;
2. The government must function in accordance with
the law;
3. The government must have an overall plan;
4. The government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas;
5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government
must secure its base areas rst.[13]
3.5
David Kilcullen
Establish, Consolidate, Transfer
CONTROL
Tempo
Stability
Violence
POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
Military
Mobilization
Police
Humanitarian
Assistance
Governance
Extension
SECURITY
Human
Security
Public Safety
Institutional
Capacity
Population
Security
Social
Reintegration
Intelligence
Information Ops
Media Ops
Development
Assistance
Eectiveness x Legitimacy
Ressource &
Infrastructure
Management
Growth Capacity
INFORMATION
Counter-ideology
Counter-sanctuary
Counter-motivation
Van Creveld argues that by denition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of
a small, weak organization of insurgents - let alone the
civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which
may lend it support - will commit crimes in an unjust
cause, while a child who is in a serious ght with an
3.6
adult is justied in using every and any means available not because he or she is right, but because he or she has
no choice.[16] Every act of insurgency becomes, from the
perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the
conict, while also being a reason for the insurgents to
continue until victory. Trng Chinh, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his Primer
for Revolt:
4 TACTICS
explain what you have done and make certain that
everyone understands that you are ready to strike
again.[20]
3.7
Lorenzo Zambernardi
4
4.1
Tactics
Population control
The oil spot approach is the concentration of counterinsurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone. The
origins of the expression is to be found in its initial use by
Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the main theoretician of French
A somewhat similar strategy was used extensively by US colonial warfare and counter-insurgency strategy.[24][25]
forces in South Vietnam until 1969, initially by forcing The oil spot approach was later one of the justications
4.5
Public diplomacy
given in the Pentagon Papers[26] for the Strategic Hamlet 4.5 Public diplomacy
Program.
In General David Petraeus Counterinsurgency Field Manual, one of the many tactics described to help win in counterinsurgency warfare involves the use of public diplo4.3 Cordon and search
macy through military means.[34] Counterinsurgency is
eective when it is integrated into a comprehensive
Cordon and search is a military tactic, one of the bastrategy employing all instruments of national power,
[27]
sic counter-insurgency operations
in which an area is
including public diplomacy. The goal of COIN operacordoned o and premises are searched for weapons or
tions is to render the insurgents as ineective and non[28][29]
insurgents.
Other related operations are Cordon
inuential, by having strong and secure relations with the
[30][31][32]
and knock
and Cordon and kick. Cordon
population of the host nation.
and search is part of new doctrine called Stability and
Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where An understanding of the host nation and the environment
there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and that the COIN operations will take place in is essential.
therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is Public diplomacy in COIN warfare is only eective when
used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mis- there is a clear understanding of the culture and populasion is to search a house with as little inconvenience to tion at hand. One of the largest factors needed for defeating an insurgency involves understanding the populace,
the resident family as possible.
how they interact with the insurgents, how they interact
with non-government organizations in the area, and how
they view the counterinsurgency operations themselves.
4.4 Air operations
Ethics is a common public diplomacy aspect that is emphasized in COIN warfare. Insurgents win their war by
attacking internal will and the international opposition.
In order to combat these tactics the counterinsurgency
Air power can play an important role in counteroperations need to treat their prisoners and detainees huinsurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of opermanely and according to American values and principles.
ations:
By doing this, COIN operations show the host nations
population that they can be trusted and that they are con Transportation in support of combatants and civil- cerned about the well being of the population in order to
be successful in warfare.
ians alike, including casualty evacuations;
See also: Counter-insurgency aircraft
Operation Moshtarak; A U.S. Marine hands out candy to children while conducting counterinsurgency operations in Marjah,
Afghanistan 2010
SPECIFIC DOCTRINES
Conducting public diplomacy through relaying information and communicating with the public in a counterinsurgency is most successful when a conversation can happen
between the counterinsurgency team and the local population of the area of operation. Building rapport with
the public involves listening, paying attention, and being responsive and proactive which is sucient for the
local population to understand and trust the counterinsurgency eorts and vice versa.[36] This relationship is stringent upon the counterinsurgents keeping their promises,
A counterinsurgency is won by utilizing strategic com- providing security to the locals, and communicating their
munications and information operations successfully. A message directly and quickly in times of need.
counterinsurgency is a competition of ideas, ideologies, Understanding and inuencing the cognitive dimension
and socio-political movements. In order to combat in- of the local population is essential to winning counterinsurgent ideologies one must understand the values and surgency warfare. The peoples perception of legitimacy
characteristics of the ideology or religion. Additionally, about the host nation and the foreign countrys counterincounterinsurgency eorts need to understand the cul- surgency eorts is where success is determined. The
ture of which the insurgency resides, in order to strategi- free ow of information present in all theaters via televically launch information and communication operations sion, telephone, and Internet, can present conicting mesagainst the insurgent ideology or religion. Counterinsur- sages and quickly defeat the intended eects.[37] Coorgency information operatives need to also identify key au- dination between the counterinsurgency operations, the
diences, communicators, and public leaders to know who host nation, and the local media in information presented
to inuence and reach out to with their information.[36]
to the public is essential to showing and inuencing how
4.5.1
Information operations
the local population perceives the counterinsurgency efforts and the host nation.
Public opinion, the media, and rumors inuence how the
people view counterinsurgency, the government hosting
their eorts, and the host nation legitimacy. The use of
public diplomacy to strategically relay the correct messages and information to the public is essential to success
in a counterinsurgency operation. For example, close relationships with media members in the area is essential to
ensure that the locals understand the counterinsurgency
objectives and feel secure with the host nation government and the counterinsurgency eorts. If the local media is not in sync with the counterinsurgency operatives
then they could spread incomplete or false information
about the counterinsurgency campaign to the public.
5.3
5.1.1
France
Malaya
5.2
Dutch Empire
The Dutch formulated a new strategy of counterinsurgency warfare, during the Aceh War by deploying
light-armed Marechaussee units and using scorched earth
tactics.
In 1898 Van Heutsz was proclaimed governor of Aceh,
and with his lieutenant, later Dutch Prime Minister
Hendrikus Colijn, would nally conquer most of Aceh.
They followed Hurgronjes suggestions, nding cooperative uleebelang or secular chiefs that would support them
in the countryside and isolating the resistance from their
rural support base.
During the South Sulawesi Campaign Captain Raymond
Westerling of the KST, Special Forces of the Royal
Netherlands East Indies Army used the Westerling
Method. Westerling ordered the registration of all Javanese arriving in Makassar due to the large numbers of
Javanese participating in the Sulawesi resistance. He also
used scouts to inltrate local villages and to identify members of the resistance.[41]
9
and undermining local support for the Republicans. His
actions restored Dutch rule in southern Sulawesi. However, the Netherlands East Indies government and the
Dutch army command soon realised that Westerlings notoriety led to growing public criticism. In April 1947
the Dutch government instituted an ocial inquiry of his
controversial methods. Raymond Westerling was put on
the sidelines. He was relieved of his duties in November
1948.
5.3 France
France had major counterinsurgency wars in its colonies
in Indochina and Algeria. McClintock cited the basic
points of French doctrine as:[42]
Quadrillage (an administrative grid of population
and territory)
Ratissage (cordoning and raking)
Regroupement (relocating and closely controlling a
suspect population)
Tache d'huile' The 'oil spot' strategy
Recruitment of local leaders and forces
Paramilitary organization and militias
Much of the thinking was informed by the work of
earlier leading French theoreticians of colonial warfare
and counter-insurgency, Marshals Bugeaud, Gallieni and
Lyautey.[25]
While McClintock cites the 1894 Algerian governor,
Jules Cambon, as saying By destroying the administration and local government we were also suppressing our
means of action. ...The result is that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no
inuence and in which movements take place which are
unknown to us. Cambons philosophy, however, did not
seem to survive into the Algerian War of Independence,
(19541962).
10
5.3.1
5
Indochina
Post-WWII doctrine, as in Indochina, took a more drastic view of Guerre Rvolutionnaire, which presented an
ideological and global war, with a commitment to total
war. Countermeasures, in principle, needed to be both
political and military; No measure was too drastic to
meet the new threat of revolution. French forces taking
control from the Japanese did not seem to negotiate seriously with nationalist elements in what was to become
Vietnam,[44] and reaped the consequences of overcondence at Dien Bien Phu.[45]
It occurred to various commanders that soldiers trained
to operate as guerrillas would have a strong sense of
how to ght guerrillas. Before the partition of French
Indochina, French Groupement de Commandos Mixtes
Aroports (GCMA), led by Roger Trinquier,[46] took
on this role, drawing on French experience with the Jedburgh teams.[47] GCMA, operating in Tonkin and Laos
under French intelligence, was complemented by Commandos Nord Vit-Nam in the North. In these missions,
the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. One Laotian, who became an ocer, was Vang Pao, who was to
become a general in Hmong and Laotian operations in
Southeast Asia while the US forces increased their role.
5.3.2
Algeria
SPECIFIC DOCTRINES
5.4 India
There have been many insurgencies in India from its creation in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which started
by 1989, was brought under control by Indian government and violence has been reduced. The Armys elite
Rashtriya Ries (RR) played a major role in putting down
the insurgency. The RR was well supported by Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force
(BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and state government police.
1. separate the guerrilla from the population that sup- The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIports him;
JWS) is located in the northeastern town of Vairengte
in the Indian state of Mizoram. Personnel from coun2. occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously op- tries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
erated from, making the area dangerous for the in- France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Vietnam have
surgents and turning the people against the guerrilla attended this school.[51] High quality graduate level training by a joint sta of highly trained special operators at
movement; and
11
Camp Taji Phoenix Academy and the Counterinsurgency
Center For Excellence is provided in Iraq[52] as well as
many Iraqi Ocers.
6 See also
5.5
Notes
Portugal
7 References
[1] See American and British English spelling dierences#Compounds and hyphens
[2] An insurgency is a rebellion against a constituted authority (for example an authority recognized as such by the
United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion
are not recognized as belligerents (Oxford English Dictionary second edition 1989 insurgent B. n. One who rises
in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not
recognized as a belligerent.)
5.6
United States
12
REFERENCES
[39] Thompson, Robert (1966). Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chatto & Windus. ISBN 0-7011-1133-X.
[41] http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/05/19/
westerling039s-war.html
[43] Pike, Douglas. PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam. (Presidio: 1996) pp. 37-169
[24] Lyautey, Hubert. Du rle colonial de l'arme (Paris: Armand Colin, 1900)
[25] Porch, Douglas. Bugeaud, Gallini, Lyautey: The Development of French colonial warfare, in Paret, Peter;
Craig, Gordon Alexande; Gilbert, Felix (eds). Makers
of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 376-407.
[26] Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, Chapter 1,
US Programs in South Vietnam, Nov. 1963-Apr. 1965,:
section 1. Mtholyoke.edu. Retrieved 2009-10-03.
[27] Basic Counter-Insurgency.
Retrieved 2009-10-03.
13
[55] Hodge, Nathan (14 January 2009). New Administrations Counterinsurgency Guide?". Wired. Retrieved 24
June 2013.
Melton, Stephen L. (9 April 2013). Aligning FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency with Reality. Small Wars Journal.
Retrieved 20 June 2013.
Paul, Christopher; Clarke, Colin P. Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Worldwide, 19782008. NDU Press. National Defense University. Retrieved 24 June 2013.
[56] FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14
May 2014. (Approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.)
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Theory of Asymmetric Conict. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ISBN 0-521-548691.
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Light: A Critique of U.S. Counter-terrorist Grand
Strategy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 549563.
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How to Lose a War on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of a Counterinsurgency Success and Failure, in Jan ngstrm and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Eds., Understanding Victory and
Defeat in Contemporary War. (London: Frank Cass,
2007).
Burgoyne, Michael L. and Albert J. Marckwardt
(2009). The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa With E. D.
Swintons The Defence of Duers Drift. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-08093-2.
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger,
1964), ISBN 0-275-99269-1.
Joes, James Anthony. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. (Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), ISBN 08131-9170-X.
Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New
York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-670-84218-6.
Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. (London:
Hurst, 2009).
Kilcullen, David.
Hurst, 2010).
Counterinsurgency.
(London:
Kitson, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. (1971)
Larson, Luke. Senators Son: An Iraq War Novel.
(Phoenix: Key Edition, 2010), ISBN 0-615-353797.
Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago. (London: Hurst, 2009).
Mao Zedong. Aspects of Chinas Anti-Japanese
Struggle (1948).
Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars:
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam.
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
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Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
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8 External links
Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion by Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein
Small Wars Journal: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency
Research page
CNAS, Abu Muquwama 'The Counterinsurgency
Reading List'
The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual
14
Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after
Beslan
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conict U.S.
Depts. of the Army and Air Force
Inside Counterinsurgency by Stan Go, ex - U.S.
Special Forces
Instruments of Statecraft U.S. Guerrilla Warfare,
Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940
1990 by Michael McClintock
Counter-Revolutionary Violence Bloodbaths in
Fact & Propaganda by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman
The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More by SS Brigade
Commander Jrgen Stroop
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century by Steven Metz and Raymond Millen
Wired News article on game theory in war on terror
Military forces in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations at JihadMonitor.org
Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School India
Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Counterinsurgency by Edwin Moise (Vietnam-era)
Bibliography: Doctrine on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Edwin Moise (recent)
Military Brieng Book news regarding counterinsurgency
Max Boot - Invisible Armies, youtube video, length
56:30, Published on Mar 25, 2013
U.S. Army/Marine corps counter insurgency eld
manual, pdf document
EXTERNAL LINKS
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