Land Titles Day 5 To 8 CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998]
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens
certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2]
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January
8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus:[3]
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a
registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title
thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda
Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to
issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for mandamus.[5]
Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department
of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said decree:[6]
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted
case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3,
Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and
Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels
of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a
copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25,
1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof, requesting for
a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex C
hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy
is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate

of title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been
received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan
Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the
name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of
several sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8,
1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the
policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon.
Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x x.
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for an early resolution of the
case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8]
x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resoon of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the
Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what
concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondents Memorandum) to actually
verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and
situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and
917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was attached a letter dated
November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:[9]
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon.
Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the
subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the
decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land,
and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189
Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10]
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that
they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is an in

rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied with.[11] Since there was no showing that
the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to
take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of
said private person-holders of said titles to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property
subject of petitioners application for registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title,
because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT
No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.[12] Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this
case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its
satisfaction.[13]
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that
[the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case
and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void.[14] On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of
registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which held:[16]
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in
the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation
where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of
another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without
offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive
presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, (t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may
be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under
the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring
supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under
the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of
registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We
explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:[17]
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision
having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order
to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that
section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under section 30,
the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his
decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
registration.

In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the
preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said
court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons
including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the application for registration, and
whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and
quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to
the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this
section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force
and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title
issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue
his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase
innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995,
respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which
petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over
which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of
TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of
the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an
earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void,[19] since the principle behind original registration
is to register a parcel of land only once.[20] Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs.
Olivia:[21]
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court
of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the
certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding
possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express
no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in
decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the
petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This is so,
because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on
the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the
statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first
registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the
latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to
apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and
guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.

Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: [22]
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree
can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a
lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of
De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of
title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that
only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly
indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become necessary before
the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General
Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer,
the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration
Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an
administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise
of discretion.[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance of the particular
act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded.[25] But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case,
mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide
for or against one of the parties.[26] As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus.[27] The court has to decide a question
according to its own judgment and understanding of the law.[28]
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits
and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A
is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration
Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the
property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is
ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according
to the facts and the law as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] This case was filed prior to the issuance of Revised Administrative Circular 1-95 which directs that actions against quasi-judicial bodies in
general should be filed in the Court of Appeals.
[2] Per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila (now Pasig City), Branch LXVIII.
[3] Rollo, p 5.
[4] Rollo, p 6.

[5] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 25, 1997, upon this Courts receipt of the public respondents reply in
compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 10, 1996.
[6] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[7] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[8] Rollo, p 85; original text in upper case.
[9] Rollo, p 113.
[10] Rollo, p 70; petitioners memorandum, p 2.
[11] Rollo, p 71; petitioners memorandum, p 3
[14] Rollo, p 63; the LRAs rejoinder, p 2; citing Rojas, et al., vs. City of Tagaytay and Hon. Jimenez, 106 Phil 512, November 24, 1959; Duran
vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154, September 29, 1961.
[15] 244 SCRA 418, 423-424, May 29, 1995, per Romero, J.
[16] Rollo, p. 165; the LRAs reply, p. 5.
[17] 168 SCRA 503, December 15, 1988, per Padilla, J.; citing Section 32, PD 1529; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil 113; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil
256; Afalla and Pinanoc vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil 622; Roman Catholic Bishops of Cebu vs. Phil Railway Co., 49 Phil 540; De los Reyes vs. De Villa,
48 Phil 227; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922; Director of Lands vs. Busuego, 12 SCRA 678.
[18] Supra, at 422.
[19] Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783, November 17, 1992, citing Pamintuan vs. San
Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922.
[20] PD 1529 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -- The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
[21] Supra, at pp 159-160, per Labrador, J; citing Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, supra; Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil 587, 590, March 5, 1923; Perez
vs. Bolbon, 50 Phil 791, 795, September 30, 1927; Singian vs. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil 192, 203, June 19, 1934; Addison vs. Payatas
Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil 673, September 27, 1934; Sideco, et al. vs. Aznar, 92 Phil 952, April 24, 1953.
[22] 85 Phil 256, 260-261, December 29, 1949, per Tuason, J.
[23] Go vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 567, January 29, 1996.
[24] Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99, July 17, 1996, University of San Agustin, Inc. vs. CA, 230 SCRA 761, March 7, 1994; Tamano
vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567, October 13, 1992; Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439, July 7, 1986; Samson vs. Barrios, 63 Phil 198, July
20, 1936.
[25] Pelileo vs. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil 272, December 29, 1949.

[26] Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284, April 25, 1991; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil 608, July 11,
1952.
[27] Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[28] Lupisan vs. Alfonso and Arguieta, 78 Phil 842, July 31, 1947.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004]
Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This
provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision[2] and
the July 22, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original DECISION of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and another one is
entered AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from, as follows:
1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful owner and with better right to possess the property in question, being an innocent
purchaser for value therefor;
2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie]
Abrigo, to wit:
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:
1. P300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual damages;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. Cost of suit.
As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:
1. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;

4. Cost of suit.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:
As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial court:
On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No.
1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the
vendor and the vendees.
On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back
the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall
remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy
back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name.
Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved
[on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.
On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie
Abrigo].
On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the
Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a
Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.[5]
Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of
documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to [petitioners]
as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence
dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.[7] Since Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and
for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues

Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:
1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid.
2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a purchaser for value in good faith.
3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question.[10]
In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the property.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Main Issue:
Better Right over the Property
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to
her.[11] They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value.[12]
Law on Double Sale
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property
to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 1997, a
second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then,
the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.[13] There is no ambiguity in the
application of this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529[14] which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration.[15]
Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.[16]
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their
predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective sales
under Act 3344.[17] For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the Torrens system[18] because, during the sale, Villafania
had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.[19]
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs
under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is
registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is
used under Art. 1544 x x x.[20]

We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-30522.[21] The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafanias name.[22] As a consequence of
the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to respondent.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali[23] held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in
dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not
effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale
of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In
that case, the priority in time principle was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the
conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the
Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo[25] explained the difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens
system in this wise:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The
aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over
the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals[26] is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to
land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale
was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of
money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,[27] this Court held that Article
1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and
even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale
only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property
was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer
belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.[28]
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once
registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.[29] All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[30]
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good
faith.[31] Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.[32] We explained the rationale in Uraca v.
Court of Appeals,[33] which we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better
right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he
governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided
by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first
her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if
he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article
1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the
first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) ---- from the time
of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.[34] (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate.[35] Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go
10

behind the registry to determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of
title.[36] Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good
title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.[37]
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[38] petitioners contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent
and negates her good faith at the time she registered the sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C. Vitug:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA
33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge
taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26 December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second
realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R.
95843, 02 September 1992).
xxxxxxxxx
Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish
Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder
would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts.
708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be
inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's
interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or
when there is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138).[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,[40] which held:
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in the Santiago case,
registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
such buyer. On account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good
faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. x x x.[41]
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from the
issuance of the TCT in their names.[42] There was no registration under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale under
Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land.[43] Such registration was therefore considered effectual.
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not
register the sale.[44] In Taguba, registration was not an issue.[45]
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the
property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why
petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529)
which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs.
Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the
certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than
what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the
title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R.
75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"[46]
Respondent
in Good Faith
11

The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.[47] After its factual
findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained thus:
x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in
the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant
[Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to
[petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her
vendors title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she bought
the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said case. In
sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything
about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same, and only then when she bought the same, and
only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the
[Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her
vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x x x.[48]
We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general
averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the property,
she would have found petitioners to be in possession.[49]
This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses own admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the actual
occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the property.[50] The family members may reasonably be assumed to be
Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus,
good faith on respondents part stands.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Id., pp. 24-31. Former Fifth Division. Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with the concurrence of Justices Hilarion L. Aquino (acting
chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member).
[3] Id., p. 33.
[4] CA Amended Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 30-31.
[5] CA Decision dated November 19, 2001, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 163-164. Citations omitted.
[6] Id., pp. 3 & 164.
[7] Id., pp. 5 & 166.
[8] CA Amended Decision dated March 21, 2002, p. 7; rollo, p. 30.
[9] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 29, 2003, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum signed by Atty.
Villamor A. Tolete. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg, was received by this Court on May 13, 2003.
[10] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 252.
[11] Id., pp. 6 & 253.
[12] Id., pp. 11 & 258.
12

[13] Gabriel v. Mabanta, 399 SCRA 573, 580, March 26, 2003; Bayoca v. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154, 166, September 12, 2000; Balatbat v. Court
of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858, 872, August 28, 1996.
[14] The Property Registration Decree, June 11, 1978.
[15] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, 274 Phil. 516, May 20, 1991.
[16] Revilla v. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480, 484, March 30, 1960.
[17] 113 of Chapter XIII of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) provides:
SEC. 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument
affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall
have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
x x x x xx x x x.
The sale by Gloria Villafania to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go was registered on June 18, 1993, while the sale by Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go to
the Spouses Abrigo was registered on October 30, 1997. Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 257.
[18] Formerly Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act, November 6, 1902; now PD 1529.
[19] Respondents Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 229.
[20] Id., pp. 13 & 236; citing Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1990), Vol. V, p. 154.
[21] Id., pp. 4 & 227.
[22] Ibid.
[23] 8 SCRA 489, July 31, 1963.
[24] 395 SCRA 43, January 13, 2003.
[25] Supra.
[26] 31 SCRA 558, February 18, 1970.
[27] The second paragraph of this provision states: Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. x x x.
(Italics supplied.)
[28] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, pp. 521-522, per Gancayco, J.
[29] Alvarico v. Sola, 383 SCRA 232, 239, June 6, 2002; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595, October 2, 1915.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Gabriel v. Mabanta, supra; Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 38, 50, May 21, 2001; Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 446,
454, February 28, 1994.
[32] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[33] 344 Phil. 253, September 5, 1997.
[34] Id., p. 265, per Panganiban, J; citing Cruz v. Cebana, 129 SCRA 656, 663, June 22, 1984, per Teehankee, J (later CJ).
13

[35] Lu v. Manipon, 381 SCRA 788, 796, May 7, 2002.
[36] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 456; Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, p. 518.
[37] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra.
[38] 247 SCRA 336, August 14, 1995.
[39] Id., p. 346, per Melo, J; citing Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence (1993), pp. 604-605.
[40] Supra.
[41] Id., p. 167-168, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
[42] Supra, p. 339.
[43] Supra, p. 159.
[44] Supra, p. 484.
[45] 132 SCRA 722, 728, October 23, 1984.
[46] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, supra, p. 604. This paragraph was originally between the two paragraphs cited in
Santiago.
[47] An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest
in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property. De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, GR No. 146222, January 15, 2004.
[48] CA Amended Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 29-30.
[49] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 12; id., p. 259.
[50] Id., pp. 13 & 260.
EN BANC
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN,
- versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 179987
Promulgated:
April 29, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not
titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
14

xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people
and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by
the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of
which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to
bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that
there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The
petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court
confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is
primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though
our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting
documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided
it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco
sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the
property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any
evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area
of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part
of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower,
and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
15

SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on
15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite
notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or
is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision.
The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic
v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation
by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the
earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
16

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. To
bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription
under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period
should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the
ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to
the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses
into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the
Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details
and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title
to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
17

provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section
14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171514
July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an
application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is
more particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother,
Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-ininterest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
18

Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is
alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map
Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963,
verified to be within Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels
name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 to prove that she had been in possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim
that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by
the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration Nos.
14010, 17681 and 010717.8
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public
Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b)
the tax declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time
required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting Espinosas petition for registration, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the registration and the confirmation of title of
Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of
5,525 square meters and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein
applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that he complied with the
requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that Espinosa was
able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is within the area considered by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public, continuous,
adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the
Land Registration Act.11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for
the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabels possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12,
1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970
following the sale that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According
to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential
absent proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his
application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the
submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is
alienable and disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled
that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to
private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title over the subject land and that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and
19

exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his
predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No.
141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for
thirty (30) years or more."17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the
identity and location of the property can be established by other competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a
decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation of her titles and did
not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should
not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more
preponderant proof has been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both by the lower court
and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra the Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory
requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to ones application for registration. However, such pronouncement
need not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of the
tracing cloth plan.
x x x:
xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the
advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location
of the lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly
approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and
disposable area of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006.
Petitioners Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CAs assailed decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to
prove by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies
the property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section
17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the
property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the property only if it
bears the approval of the Director of Lands.
20

Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of
confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that
the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in question
is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his
possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions.
On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the
subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to apprise themselves of the
changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against
the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
21

On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was
adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D.
No. 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have
been acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had
already been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was
promulgated be denied because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal
predicament as follows:
However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942
ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should
have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes
place by operation of law, then upon Abejarons satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the
disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot
impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have
been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January
24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations
omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain on
the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on
January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not the case that there is an
option between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither
contemplated under Section 48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945,
it is still possible to acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the
application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property for at
least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his application. However, there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or
prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for
thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabels name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977,
only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession.
The CAs reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court23 is misplaced considering that the application therein was filed on
October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.24 The petition for registration therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under
Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into possession of the property on June 17, 1978 and filed their
application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the individuals from whom the applicant purchased the property, or
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No.
1942, or while the prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty
(30)-year prescriptive period was already completed.
22

Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply in this case, as the lower
courts held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things, that Isabels possession of the property dated back at least to
June 12, 1945. That in view of the established fact that Isabels alleged possession and occupation started much later, the lower courts
should have dismissed Espinosas application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there were instances wherein
applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above.
Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and
disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under
Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an official
declaration to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property
"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth." (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does
not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property
is not held by the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the
PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For prescription to run against the State,
there must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or the
development of national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the
case may be, prior to the filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the conversion of the
property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of
land is still reserved for public service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable, possession and
occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the States if such did not
commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would
overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public
domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying
for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v. Republic30 that the notation made by a surveyor-geodetic
engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is not the positive government act that would remove the property from
the inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:
23

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which
bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C.
Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring
supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosas application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan,
there are numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and
location of the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land
Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the property which is certified as correct
by the geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the
land, its boundaries and location can be established by other competent evidence apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and
necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not
overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to
present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed blueprint of the
survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove
the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.33
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as evidence of the identity, location and the boundaries of the
property applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan
Fabio,34 this Court enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the
inalienable public domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as
proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of such official record.1wphi1 These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.35
(Citation omitted)
24

Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper,
Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable
and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to
whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the
resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's
application for registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Di.cdican. with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rol!o, pp.
32-39.
2 Associate Justice Enrico!\.. Lanzanas replaced Associate Justice Sesinando E. Vi lion; id. at 40-41.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652
June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
25

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against
respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter
without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares,
located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother
Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by
Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed
for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title).
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan
River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial
deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to
said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered
upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have
been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to
petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00
as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action
of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact
that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on
the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940
or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in
question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not
overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was
only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the
land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because
Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation
purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil
Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion
to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code).
Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does
not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v.
Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in
order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948,
could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the
action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of
the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and,
therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.
26

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the
beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively
established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention
poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land
in question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls
within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by
specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the
area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered.
Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil.
55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do
not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez,
et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that the defendants have been
in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the
plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation
(Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the
south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to
the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then
less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his
lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's
attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that
they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had
the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but
because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly,
relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself,
but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the
additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any
serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it
was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and
of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that
the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their
rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the
defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
27

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of
said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes
automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under
the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by
the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed
by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires
determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence,
found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after
an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession
started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in
1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:t.hqw
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R, raising the question of whether or not
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956
reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
28

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent
(Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property applied for
was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land.
One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands,
however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for nonservice of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid
previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the dispositive portion of which reads:
2+.wph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance
with law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per
hectare or P2,211.00 for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales Application No. 3231, covering the tract herein awarded, which is
more particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,+.wph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:+.wph!1
NMaria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SEProvincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SWPublic Land;
WMunicipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands
conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was
designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the
land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes,
the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it
will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081
hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement
and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area
after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already
been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose
P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400
hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
29

Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island
of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition
under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9,
President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under
the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot
1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of
proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the
ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the
Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of
Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to
Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an
area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: +.wph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby
affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and
containing an area of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to
relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081
hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances.
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center,
Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration
Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122
of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." 9 It
would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the
proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the president to reserve by
executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised
Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land
belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved
"shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public
30

Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for
the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole
12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos
covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court
to draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an
area of 22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road and Mary
Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400
hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he
directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land
having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio
de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein
the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing
an area of 20 hectares 64, ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably
bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to conclude that what was really
awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a
cash deposit of only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the purchase
would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33 hectares, the total purchase price would be
P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should have made the required 10%
deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and awarded to him was only 22
hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th
installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936,
excluding "the military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said site, at the time of last installment was
already excluded from Sale Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws only 22 hectares and since two years
thereafter the Director of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then
would have been left to applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate
Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption. What was ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the
Order of 22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment
was already reflected in the Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to
applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific
description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares, located at
Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial
road and the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 16 Specific description is
ordinarily preferred to general description, or that which is more certain to what which is less certain. 17 More so, when it is considered
that the series of executive proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the Government to
reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and most strongly against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to
the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In general, the quantity of the land
granted must be ascertained from the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go
beyond a description of a tract in a patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the
33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of
the land, which right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only for the
earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33
hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to preemption confers np contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the
authority of the President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the
divesting by the government of title threof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. 22 Lands covered by
31

reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have settled on
occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart
therefrom, this terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a
preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void.
25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son
Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown
by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition
title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants
or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to
have obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming
hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus,
necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as
provided in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been
donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject
to the condition that it would be returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in 1936, the
Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered
into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National Defense was
only organized in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the existence of such donation
thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty may
be established by secondary evidence, it is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document. And the due of the execution of the document would be
proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged,
or (3) any who was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. 28 None of these modes
of proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad
statement that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department was not
yet in existence. The notary public who presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the instrument were never
presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the signing of the
document as witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a secondary evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is
especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment thereof in a public document in order
to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a copy of the "paper"
signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon
de jesus went to his office to register a document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido
Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy
the requisites of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First
none of these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its execution and delivery ind recognized
the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution; second, the reference to a
"paper" or "document" ambigous as to be synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the deed, Sesinando
de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss
of the document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept was
sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of
the deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Acting Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the
reservation cannot substitute the proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much less official
admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin
Marabut, such donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly
donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or settlement and
reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself
but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in
donation may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the term "right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the processor has
32

the jus disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his
assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the
disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of disposable public lands by
Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore
farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the
same may not be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the
land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right granted to the sales awardee is only
"possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and
registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be considered "disposed of by the
Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domian that is
"disposable" by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional because the applicant has
still to comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only after compliance with such requirements to the
satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of by the
Government." This again is a circumstance that demeans the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre
and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of
the petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital
motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Footnotes+.wph!1
1 Eugenio de Jesus previously applied for the purchase of 65.6374 hectares in 1918, but his application was unacted upon due to the prior
application of natives, Marcelo Palmera and Pantaleon Palmera, for a portion of the property.
2 Annex "C", Petition, petitioner's.
3 Annex "E", Petition, petitioner's.
4 Annex "E-2", Petition, petitioner's.
6 Proclamation No. 328, Annex "F", Petition, petitioner's.
7 Proclamation No. 350, Annex "F-1", Petition, petitioner's.
8 Reyes, A., ponente, Leuterio, Fernandez, Pascual, JJ., concurring. Chanco J., dissented, voting for the reconsideration of the decision and
awarding the whole Lot 1176-B-2 (12.8081 hectares) to Mindanao Medical Center. The decision of July 2, 1974 was penned by Reyes, A., J.,
with Pascual and Chanco, JJ., concurring.
9 See also Sec. 87 of the Public Land Act which directs the registration of unregistered lands included in a Presidential Proclamation.
10 Republic v. Octobre, L-18867, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 848.
11 Vide, dispositive part of Sales Award, quoted in this Decision.
33

13 Sec.25, CA 141, provides: "All bids must be sealed and addressed to the Director of Lands and must have inclosed therewith cash or
certified check, Treasury warrant, or post-office money order, payable to the order of the director of Lands, for ten per centum of the
amount of the bid, which amount shall be retained in case the bid is accepted, as part payment of the purchase price ....
15 Vide, dispositive part of Sales Awards, quoted in this Decision.
16 Idem.
17 See 72 ALR 412, quoting Von Herff case, 133 SE 533.
18 63 Am. Jur. 2d 544; 73 C.J.S. 853.
19 Leavenworth, L & R Co., 23 L ed. 634.
20 63 Am Jur 2d 544; 73 C.J.S. 853; U.S. vs. Union Pacific R. Co., 1 L ed 2d 693.
21 63 Am. Jur 2d 515.
22 Idem, at 489-490.
23 Sec. 87, Public Act (CA 141); Whitehill v. Victorio L and Cattle Co., 139 P. 187.
24 73 C.J.S. 720.
25 Hennington v. State of Georgia, 41 L. ed 176; Lake Superior Ship Canal, R & I Co., v. Cunningham, 39 L. ed 190.
26 Director of Lands v. Reyes, L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, En Banc, per Antonio J., 68 SCRA 177, Lee Hon Hok v. David, L-30389, December 27,
1972, 48 SCRA 378-379.
27 Cano v. De Camacho, L-28172, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 390; Kayaban v. Republic, L-33307, August 30, 1973, 52 SCRA 361; 55 ALR 2d 554.
28 Sec. 4, Rule 130, Revised Rules of court provides: "When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destrucuion, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. "See also Director of Lands v. court of appeals, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38
SCRA 637-38.
29 Government v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 (1918); Hernaez v. McGrath, 91 Phil. 565 (1952).
30 See Jones on Evidence, Vol. I, 5th ed., 459.
31 "Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberty whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it."
32 That is why, "future property" cannot be donated, because ownership does not yet reside in the donor (Art. 751, new Civil Code).
33 An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Reyes & Puno, Vol. II, 1967, ed. p. 225.
34 Heirs of Francisco Parco v. Haw Pia, L-22478, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 175-76; Francisco v. Rodriguez, L-31083, Sept. 30, 1975, First
Division, 67 SCRA 212. The requrements are: (1) full payment of the balance of the purchase price of the land , minus 10% deposit, if not
paid in full upon the making of the award (Sec. 27, CA 141); (2) not less than 1/5 of the land awarded shall have been broken and cultivated
by the awardee within 5 years after date of award; and before issuance of patent, actual occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at
least 1/5 of the land appliced for until date of final payment (Sec. 28, Idem).
35 Director of Lands v. Court of Appels, L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 80.
34

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring
481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and
tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public
land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of
improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September
18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when
the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
35

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition
not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open.
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by
reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there
any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under
any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If
they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private
lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In
that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessorin-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco
appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen
claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public
lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant
has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
36

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable
public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land
is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to
Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is
the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case,
with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under
the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
37

little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of
Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that
the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc.
because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land
in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from
the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without
due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right
of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable
that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-ininterest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held
by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period
(30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
38

confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent
in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all
the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court
can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application
of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only
reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many
past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice
Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of
Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
39

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to
the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the
Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of
Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by
operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title
to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite
the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be
established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant
the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then
to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
40

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,
where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated
his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by
the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all
that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to
the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that
the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be
to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes
the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have
the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and
Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for
confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
(a) ...
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
41

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br.
1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations
from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd.,
p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts
should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect
as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the
former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute
may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to
prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision
effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
42
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of
Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to
the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the
Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the
public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of
Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated).<re||an1w> We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent
corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public
policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title
to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
43

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite
the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in
1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and
they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be
established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant
the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then
to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,
where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated
his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by
the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all
that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to
the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that
the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be
to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes
the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have
the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and
Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for
confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
44

(a) ...
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for
the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br.
1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title
to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations
from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd.,
p. 351).
45

It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts
should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect
as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the
former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect.
Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute
may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to
prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision
effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in
the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982
LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO ADORMEO, VIDAL
ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS, MAXIMO BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR.,
HERACLEO CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS, NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA, DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO
DIVINAGRACIA, ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA, MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS
EMPERADO, PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA
NAQUILA, TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR., DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO PANARES, VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO,
JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO VALMORES, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, intervenors.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing
public lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975, and to the
1964 decision of the trial court, ejecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by the Court
of Appeals. That legal question arises under the following facts:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales
Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two
hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957
dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was made from that
decision.
The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now petitioners herein) entered the
land only after it was awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The Director
characterized them as squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a
writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). **
46

Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). The forty defendants were Identified as follows:
1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic
2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic
3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic
4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales
5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia
6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban
7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas
8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante
9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila
10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay
11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac
12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday
13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy
14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa
15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa
16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa
17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante
18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante
19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani
20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas
That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. The trial court found that the protests of twenty of the abovenamed defendants
were among those that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned.
On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan Development Co., Inc. On November 10, 1961, an official
of the Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it was stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation
and other requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the purchase price of the land (p. 248, Rollo).
It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was issued to the corporation for that lot with
a reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered. Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee.
The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources, recommending approval of the sales
patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution,
that the land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was in conformity with the guidelines
prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section
11, Article XIV of the Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).
47

Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that the applicant had acquired a nested
right to its issuance (p. 259, Rollo).
Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants (out of forty), namely, Julio Ayog, Guillermo
Bagoy, Generoso Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto, Toribio Naquila, Elpidio Okay, Alfeo Sante,
Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa, Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan, testified that they entered the disputed land long
before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28, Record on Appeal).
The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land
was free from private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision of the Director of Lands dismissing the protests of the
defendants against the sales award (p. 30, Record on Appeal).
Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8, 1964 found that the plantings on the land could not be
more than ten years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the sales award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the
defendants to vacate the land and to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on
December 5, 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs, Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the decision was denied by
this Court on May 17, 1976 in Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505.
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the corporation filed a motion for execution. The defendants, some of whom are now
petitioners herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was
a supervening fact which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition,
already mentioned, that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area."
The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of the manifestation of the defendants that they would file a
petition for prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the instant prohibition action was filed. Some of the petitioners were not
defendants in the ejectment case.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Bian Development Co., Inc.
because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest" (16
C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the
existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and
natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully complied
with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable
justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant had fulfilled the construction or cultivation requirements and has
fully paid the purchase price, he should be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation
in the new Constitution would not apply.
48

In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held that where the cultivation requirements were fulfilled before the new
Constitution took effect but the full payment of the price was completed after January 17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to
a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo).
Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a high executive official carries great weight and should be
accorded much respect. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land
in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from
the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without
due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).
As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot entertain petitioners' contention that many
of them by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed portions of land even before the war. They should have
filed homestead or free patent applications.
Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of
the trial court's 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. On that issue, we have no choice but to sustain its
enforceability.
Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law grinds the faces of the poor, the
administrative authorities should find ways and means of accommodating some of the petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers
of the soil who in the words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in their stomachs, a little more shelter over their heads and
a little more clothing on their backs. The State should endeavor to help the poor who find it difficult to make both ends meet and who
suffer privations in the universal struggle for existence.
A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human rights, particularly freedom from want. The common man should be assisted in
possessing and cultivating a piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social security and to enable him to achieve a dignified existence
and become an independent, self-reliant and responsible citizen in our democratic society.
To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a social order where, as the architect
of the French Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the barest necessities.
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably
diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family- size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like
the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had owned social unrest.
Petitioners' counsel claims that Bian Development Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. 3711, the ejectment suit from
which this prohibition case arose, against some of the petitioners who were not defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo).
Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Nor do they derive their right of possession from
the said defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the said
defendants.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who were not defendants in that litigation or who were not
summoned and heard in that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a
stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520).
To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the case and who occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and
separate from the portions occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit, would be violative of due process of law, the law which,
according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. "The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See
Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234 and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)
49

Contempt incident.-During the pendency of this case, or at about four o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan,
Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with
their tractors a portion of the disputed land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners herein. The disputed
land was leased by Bian Development Co., Inc. to the canning corporation.
The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about five thousand pesos consisting of coffee, coconut and banana
plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred. However, it should be noted that
Emberador was not expressly named as a defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in the trial court's decision
although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case.
The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979 asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto Garcia, the manager of Bian
Development Co., Inc., be declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the restraining order issued by this Court on August 29,
1977, enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case No.
3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).
Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The incident was assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First
Instance of Davao. Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at the instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain, petitioner
Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore for the termination of this case.
The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four months after the said incident, Emberador, in consideration of P3,500, as the value of the
improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation (Exh. 1, 2 and 3).
We hold that no contempt was committed. The temporary restraining order was not directed to Bian Development Co., Inc. its officers,
agents or privies. Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected.
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against Emberador by reason of the destruction of his improvements, his
remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer of the improvements.
In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a
ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial
court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those
petitioners herein who were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 3711, and over whom the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is also dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Escolin, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the
dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not
defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction.
The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the parties thereto but also against "their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39, Rules of Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an
ejectment case may be enforced not only against the defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives or
privies who derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Delos Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). A further clarification of the
dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only the petitioners who do not
derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit.
50

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concurs.
Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the
dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not
defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction.
The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the parties thereto but also against "their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39, Rules of Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an
ejectment case may be enforced not only against the defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives or
privies who derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Delos Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). A further clarification of the
dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only the petitioners who do not
derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concurs.
Footnotes
* According to respondent corporation, some of the adverse claimants or protestants were not landless farmers but were well-educated
persons belonging to the middle class. Thus, Elpidio Okay was an elementary school principal. Vicente Rehoy was a landowner and barrio
captain. Patricio de Leon was a cashier and later assistant branch manager of the Philippine National Baank. Ernesto Paares was a high
school teacher and later a college professor. Francisco Mateo was a former college dean (p. 105, Rollo).
According to the 44 petitioners, they are tillers of the soil (p. 126, Rollo).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19535
July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both
surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of
land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and
designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
51

On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They
alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish
grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be
not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the
ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for
more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of
the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by
this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de
Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession,
and which possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in
rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the
property, barred them from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other words, the cause
of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same
grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in
the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that
"once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another
land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by
homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The
decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de
Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for
judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the
Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial
confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although
they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since
the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that
properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land. In any case,
appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the
aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation
authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason
52

of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their
favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of
Lands.1wph1.t
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with
costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.
53

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

Republic of the Philippines

July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Republic of the Philippines

June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

Republic of the Philippines

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

Republic of the Philippines

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

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TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

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LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

Republic of the Philippines

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES