Logic and The World

Logic and the World
Author(s): Joseph Almog

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 197-220
Published by: Springer
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JOSEPH ALMOG
LOGIC AND THE WORLD
I. INTRODUCTION'
Almightyand sublime,purifiedof any worldlyinfestation;our idea of

logic is laden with allusionsto the divine.Thus Russell:2
Purelogic aims at being true,in Leibnizianphraseology,in all possibleworlds,not
only in this higgledly-piggledly
job-lot of a worldin whichchancehas imprisonedus.
Thereis a certainlordlinesswhichthe logicianshouldpreserve:he must not condescend
to deriveargumentsfrom the thingshe sees about him.
And indeedthat is how most of us, "professionals",have come to

conceiveof logic: nothing chainsit to the banalitiesof what things
there are and how things are. Logic is free.
As againstthis lordly vision, a minorityof thinks have felt that
nothingcould be that free, not even logic. In the very same year in
which Russellarticulatedthe lordlyvision, Wittgensteinwas already
asking us pointedly:
If therewouldbe a logic even if therewas no world,how could therebe a logic given
that thereis a world?3
This questionwill serveas my stagingpoint from which thereis to

emergean alternativeto the lordlypicture.This alternativeapproach
I call the worldlyperspective.Its fundamentalclaim is that logic is as
concernedwith the real worldjust as trulyas zoology, thoughwith its
more abstractand generalfeatures.
II. THE LORDLY TRADITION
Two oppositepicturesthen, the worldlyand the lordlypictures.Before

we plungeinto their differences,let me stressa rarebut nonetheless
criticalpoint of agreementbetweenthem. It concernsthe objectsof
which we predicatelogical truth:what 'object'are we describingwhen
we describea truth as a logical truth?The sentenceexpressingthe
Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1989) 197-220.
xz 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

198
JOSEPH ALMOG
truth or the truth it expresses?A logical truth is first and foremosta

logical truth, both sides respond. From this old-fashioned perspective,
the modern, that is, post the Tarski and Carnap of 1933-34, fascination
of logic with sentences and the linguistic may seem as an aberration.
Thus though one may follow more recent customs and inquire which
sentences are logically true, in this work, I will focus on the more
traditional question as to which truths are logical.
Our question then is: which truths are logical and what makes any
such truth into a logical one? When we come to characterize the lordly
approach to these matters, three fundamental facts about it stand out.
First and foremost, the lordly tradition asserts the doctrine of logical
generalism: only purely general propositions can serve as logical
truths. Like other 'generalistic' doctrines, logical generalism is a sceptical doctrine. By nature, a generalist doubts that we can extend to
singular propositions certain notions he has been happy to apply to
general propositions. Modal generalism allows handsomely the application of the notion of necessity to general propositions but balks at
applying it to singular propositions: to say of a singular proposition,
by itself, that it is necessarywould be meaningless.Similarly,doxastic

generalismauthorizesthe notion of belief to apply to generalpropositions but forbidsits applicationto singularpropositions:to say that
Pierrebelievesthe singularpropositionthat-London-is-prettyby itself
is to forget the mode-of-presentationunderwhich he accessesthat
proposition.In the same vein, logicalgeneralismquestionsour certitude
that the singulartruththat Quine is red or not red and the truth
generatedby assigningQuine to the free variablein "Red(x) or not
Red(x)" are, in and of themselves,logical truths;for appearancesare
misleadinghere. It is only the sourceof these truths, the purely
general proposition, everything is red or not red, that is a logical truth.
The theorems of logic (and assuming soundness and completeness, the
truths of logic) consist of general propositions only.4
This idea that only general propositions belong in logic is one facet
of Russell's above quote, i.e. the freedom from the impurities of this
higgledly-piggledly job-lot of a world. The second mark of the lordly
tradition is also present in Russell's quote: the thesis that all logical
truths are necessary.

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
199
At times, Russell, and following him Wittgenstein and Ramsey,
even claimedthe conversethesis, viz. that the only necessitythereis is

that of logical truths.Be that as it may, they surelyall committed
themselves to the descriptive claim that all logical truths are necessary;
furthermore, they have asserted the normative claim that any candidate for the title should be necessary. The axiom of reducibility, the
axiom of infinity (for individuals) and, for Russell, even the theorem
of predicate logic (3x)(x = x), all seeming very contingent, were to
be banished away from the realm of logic, stigmatized by Russell as
"defects in logical purity" (op. cit. 192-193, 203-204). Ramsey, who,
as we are about to witness, wanted to keep (3x)(x = x), (3x)(3y)
(x # y) and their ilk within the province of logic, felt that he must
come up with nothing short of a 'proof' that would establish the
necessity of such propositions, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Either way, Russell's or Ramsey's, at the end of the day, the
lordly kingdom of logic was to have only necessary truths as subjects.
Insistent on the necessity of logical truths as these early logicians
were, the necessity wasn't built into their definition of the notion of
logical truth. However, by the time the main modern notion of validity
has emerged, the necessity has been written into the very definition of
"logically true" as "true at all models" (of the relevant sort). Originally the models were just . . . models, abstract structures with no
shred of modality in them. But under the guidance of Carnap, the
models have been taken, more and more in the last forty years, to
model the (logically) possible ways the world itself could have been.
In fact, soon enough the models have even been used not only to
analyze the meta-level notion of validity but also to give the truthconditions of object-level modal locutions like "Necessarily".
When the models are made to model modal reality in this way, it
becomesinevitableto think of every logicaltruth,i.e. a truthat all

models, as modallynecessary.5
This modal involvementon the part of the lordly logicianshould
not obscurethe third fact about this tradition,its analysisof what
makesa truthinto a logical truth.Clutteredwith modal constraintsas
his analysismight be, the lordlylogicianhas insisted,from time
immemorial,on a non-modal,(clearand) distinctanalysisof what

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JOSEPH ALMOG
makes a proposition logically true, viz. that, other worlds notwithstanding, it is actually true solely in virtue of its structure. Even
Russell, in the very same pages already quoted (op. cit., 196-197)
presents, very convincingly indeed, logical truth as being primarily
"actual truth in virtue of the form of the proposition". Wittgenstein
seconds this with "It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that
one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone and this
fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic" (Tractatus
6.113). I should add that this analysis was not confined to philosophical expositions or introductory classes, e.g. the very first formulation
of the completeness problem for (first order) logic, the one given by
Hilbert in 1928, relies on this notion, asking us whether all the truths
in virtue of form alone are derivable.6
I see in the traditional analysis of logical truth as actual truth in
virtue of the form of the proposition nothing less than a recognition
of the autonomy of logic. Logic is logic and not another thing: it is
not a branch of the theory of knowledge, nor is it part of the theory
of modality. Qua notion, the idea of actual truth in virtue of structure
is a distinct notion; distinct from both the modal notion of truth at
all counterfactual, merely possible, worlds and distinct from the
epistemological notion of truth ascertained independently of any
sensory experience. If it turns out that all the truths in actuality in
virtue of structure alone are both necessary and a priori, fine. If not,
not.
I conclude from this that we should distinguish virtues and vices in
the lordly approach.It is in a disengagementof its third idea, i.e.

what makesa truth logical, from the first two that my own proposal
lies: hold on to the insight that logical truth is truth in actuality solely
in virtue of structure, but don't follow the lordly philosopher in keeping it only for the perfected general propositions; extend it to all
propositions.
III. TRUTH IN VIRTUE OF THE STRUCTURAL TRAITS OF
THE WORLD
Consider the run-of-the-mill, singular, non-logical, truth that Quine is

a philosopher:
P, = ( Quine, Philosopher)

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
201
Mere analysis of the "internal architecture" of P, wouldn't betray its

actual truth value. But though we may remain in the dark as to
Quine's philosophizing, we can extract from such an internal analysis
the very existence of Quine: his own very lively presence inside P,
attests for this trait of actuality: there is that distinct individual.
Quine is. Quine exists.
This last discovery is more than a mere curiosity. For consider this
truth:
P2 =
(Quine, Existence)
Begin with its epistemic and metaphysical categorization. If P2 is

accessed in the "standard" way, viz. via the linguistic lens of "Quine
exists" or even "He exists", it isn't known a priori (subtleties aside).
Perhaps Quine may so know it if he accessed it by way of "I exist";
be that as it may, you and I do not have this access to P2. As for its
'modal profile', P2 is modally contingent: Among his imperfections,
we note that Quine might not have existed.
The a posteriority and contingency of P2 notwithstanding, P2 is a
logical truth. Or, so I claim. The question is: what is the general
source of the difference between Quine exists and Quine is a
philosopher? Between Elizabeth II is identical to Liz and Elizabeth II
was begotten by George VI?
The key to the answer might seem to rest in the various propositions,
but I believe the source of the difference lies at the other end, on the
side of the world. Both Quine is a philosopher and Quine exists are
fine propositions (sceptics about the latter have leaped, wrongly in my
view, from the special grounds for the truth of this proposition to its
alleged "incoherence"). The critical difference is that while the fact
that Quine is a philosopher is an ordinary, material trait of the world,
the existence of Quine is a very special trait of the world, what I will
call a pre-fact. Now, what are these 'pre-facts'?
They are structural traits of the world. Ordinary worldly facts are
not structural; they draw blunt invidious distinctions between the
existing worldly building blocks: that Quine is a philosopher is a fact;
permute him with Mt. Blanc and the fact is gone. The same applies to
the factivity of Mt. Blanc's being a mountain when Quine takes over
the subject position.

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JOSEPH ALMOG
Structuraltraits,pre-facts,are very differentin this respect.Quine

exists, that is a pre-fact.But replaceQuine in it by Church,Mt. Blanc
or the moon, and you still have a pre-facton your hands. That is
why I believe these pre-factsare structural:they do not single out a
particularconstituentof the world and reportthat it is thus-and-such.
They simply specifythe very conditionsfor being such an arbitrary
constituentof the world, "a one", in the first place. To be "a one",
the candidatehas to exist and have its distinct identity.
So much then for facts and pre-facts.What then makes the proposition that Quine exists or that Quineis distinctfrom Churchinto a
logical truth?
The idea is simple - the pre-factsdetail structuraltraits of the
world. But if the propositionis about such structuraltraits, this will
alreadybe coded into its own internal'bowels'.What will be the relevant sign?The structuralityof the pre-factwas reflectedin its blindness
to particularconstituents,in the closureof pre-factsunderpermutations of their subject-constituents.
My idea is that if a propositionis
about these structuraltraits,its truthwill also be closed underpermutations of subjects(no wonderthat its truthwill be permutationresistantin this way, if what makesit true, the pre-fact,is likewise
permutation-resistant).
I will call such propositions,truthsin virtueof the logicalstructure
of the world(or, for the impatientreader,"structuraltruths").I conjecture then for them the followingone-wayconditional:
[L1]
If a propositionis true in virtue of the logical structure

of the world, it is permutation-resistant.
IV. PERMUTATION-RESISTANCE
AS A SUFFICIENT
CONDITION
is not only a necessarybut

I myself believepermutation-resistance
also a sufficientconditionfor logical truth. But I wanted to separate
the innocuousfrom the controversial:while (L,) may seem acceptable,
its conversewould be out-of-the-questionto many. Why then has the
converseconditionalbeen deemedunacceptable?
Two separatemotivationshave been operativehere. I will begin
with the weakerone to get it out of the way. It is often said that

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
203
theremight be certain(atomic)propertiesP that just happento be

true of everything.Hence Quineis P would be permutation-resistant.
And yet, it is argued,Quineis P is surelyno logical truth,given the
merelyaccidentalnatureof the truthof (Vx)Px.
In my view, the objectioncommitsa double error.First, if by
"accidental"we mean "contingent",I have alreadyarguedthat the
falsehoodof a propositionin a counterfactualsituationis no hold
againstits truth in virtueof the structuraltraits of this, very actual,
world.
Secondly,suppose that the objectordiscardsthis modal readingof
"accidental"and goes on to say that it isn't the contingencyof Quine
is P that bothershim, it is ratherits "accidentalnature"in the sense
that the P-ness of Quine isn't true of him simplyin virtueof his being
a thing. Very well then, I concedethe point: Quineis P isn't true in
virtue of his being a being. But, I add, it isn't permutation-resistant
either. Similarly,if the objectorpoints to the universaltruthof If x is
red thenx is not greenand insists it is no logical truth, I agreebut,
either.
again, point out that it isn't permutation-resistant
All this is quite obvious if we rememberto permutenot only the
individualsbut the attributestoo. Thus we get, e.g., Churchis British
and If x is tall thenx is fat whichwould refute,in actuality,the alleged
of the originalpropositions.Of course,not all
permutation-resistance
attributes(relations)can be freelypermuted.As I have argued,Identity
and Existenceare no humdrumattributes,they ascribelogical traits.
Assumingthen that Existenceis an attributeand Identityis a relation,
they should be excludedfrom permutation.The logicalityof Quine
exists and Quineis not identicalto Churchattests to this.
In view of this favoritism,you may be compelledto claim that we
are movingin a circle, "definingthe attributesthat are structuralby
criterionand at the same time
alludingto the permutation-resistance
specifyingwhich componentsare not to be permutedby alludingto
the criterionof structurality".
I rejectthe accusation.For in the firstplace, I do not conceiveof
(L,), when strengthenedinto a biconditional,as a definitionor an
analysisof the notion of "truthin virtueof structuraltraitsof the
world". I do think of it as giving necessary-and-sufficient
conditions
for being such a truth. But this is still a far cry from suggestingthat

204
JOSEPH ALMOG
(L1) "defines" or "analyzes" the notion of "structural trait". What is

more, I regard this situation, where no "definition" is forthcoming, as
containing an insight rather than an embarrassment. For, in my view,
the last arbiter about the notion of "structural trait of the world" is
our intuition about cases. The only way to get hold of the notion itself
is by intuitions about particular cases as to what is and what is not a
trait that beings have simply qua beings; then given the notion, we
may supply necessary-and-sufficient conditions for belonging in its
extension. Thus, suppose one would have liked to go here beyond
existence, identity and other classical candidates, e.g. follow Tractatus
2.0251 "space, time and color (being colored) are forms of objects";
the argument, for me, wouldn't come primarily from the permutationresistance of e.g. x is in time. It would originate with a direct observation about the allegedly special feature of this trait, showing that it
is writteninto the very notion of a being that it be in time.

The other objection to taking permutation-resistance as sufficient
for logical truth hits closer to home. The second objector argues that
he cannot see why the external fact that every being has a property P
simply qua being endows the proposition that x is P with an internal
structure that is sufficient to divulge its actual truth.
Let me grant the objector his intended claim: the worldly structure
of the fact that, e.g., Quine is P leaves us much freedom as to the
parallel structure of the proposition that Quine is P. My answer to
our objector as to why permutation resistance is nonetheless a sufficient condition for logical truth is that logic investigates the structural
traits of the world, rather than the structural traits of propositions
representing it.
A truth is made into a logical one by special traits of that which
makes it true in the first place, i.e. the kind of trait of the world in
virtue of which this truth is the distinct truth that it is. The structure
of propositions, or for that matter of any other truth-bearing "representational" device, is irrelevant at this point. Suppose indeed that I
rejected altogether the existence of propositions, let alone their
endowment with internal structure. Would my above differentiation of
logical from non-logical truths go by the board?
Not at all. The truth that Quine is human or not human is logical
because the worldly individualQuine has this attribute in a way that is

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
205
very differentfrom the way he bearsbeing-human.

If, as I would have
it, the explanationof that which is specialto the logical way of
having an attributealludesto tests like permutation-resistance,
then,
again, we look at nothing more than individualsin the world and the
attributesthey possess, i.e. we checkwhetherthe attributeis had by
every being simply qua being. No mentionof propositionsis called
upon here.
In contrast,the notion of truthin virtueof propositionalstructure
focuses on the structureof the relevantrepresentations,the propositions. Philosophersmay and actuallydo differwidelyover the structure of such representations.Some think propositionsmay be as
structuredas the sentencesthat expressthem, some think they are
structurelesssets of possibleworldsand some think they are something
in between.Some think necessarily-equivalent
propositionsare identical, some think logically-equivalent
propositionsare identical,some
think only "epistemically-equivalent"
propositionsare identicaland
some (at least myself) think none of these equivalencesare sufficient
for propositionalidentity.Be all that as it may, such disputesconcern
the degreesto which our representations
of the world are endowed
with internalstructure.This is a matterwhichis posteriorto unfolding the structureof the world thus represented.
It may very well be the case that the discoveryof a trait of the
world that holds of everybeing qua being is not indicativeof analogous internalpropositionalstructure.But the discoveryof such a trait
cannot be similarlydetachedfrom the study of the structureof the
world itself: To discovera trait thingshave simplyqua things is to
unfold the structureof the world.7
V. THE WORLDLINESS OF ATTRIBUTES
We have encounteredabove two gradesof oppositionto my very

liberalinvolvementwith worldlyitems.First-ordergeneralismbanished
individual-involvingpropositionsfrom the realmof logical truthsQuine is red or it is not the case that Quine is red is out, but everything
is either red or not red is in. In its puritanism, second-order generalism
made the latterpropositionfollow the formerinto exile;only the

'pure', schematic, everything is F or not F (i.e., Vx(Fx v ~ Fx)),

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JOSEPH ALMOG
everythingexists (i.e., VxEx) everythingis identicalto itself (i.e.,

Vx(x = x)) are admissible.
For my own reasons,I agreewith the second-ordergeneraliststhat
Red is as unlordlyas Quine. For as overtlyas Quine, Red violates
epistemologicaland modal desideratathe generalistsposit on the
notion of logical truth:their being (i) a prioriand (ii) necessary.How
does Red createthis havoc?The second-ordergeneralistand I agree
that it may well satisfy the followingepistemologicaland modal
theses:
(E,)
That the attributeBeing-Redexists is given a posteriori
(M,)
That the attributeBeing-Redexists is merelycontingent.
Why would (E,) and (M,) be true?The source of both (E1) and (M, )
tracesto a third, more primordial,thesis that is neitherepistemicnor
modal. It is an ontological thesis about the actual existenceconditions
of the attributeRed:
(Os)
The attributeBeing-Redactuallyexists only if it actually

has instances.
Call any attributehaving such actual existence-conditionsworldly.I

cannot arguehere for the worldlinessof Red, though I note that my
chief lordly opponent,Russell, had, in one of his other moods,
admittedthat "Logic doesn't know whetherthere are in fact N-adic
relations(in intension);this is an empiricalquestion".Be that as it
may, I will ask you to meet me half way and grant here the truth of
(O,), for in the presentwork I merelywant to establishwith it a conditionalpoint: given its truth, interestinglogical truthsfollow.
Assume(O,) and we are at the origin of (E1) and (M,): becauseof
its ontologicaldependenceon worldlygenerators,we do not know
'withoutlooking' that Being-Redexists in actuality;also becauseof its
dependenceon such concreta,the attributeBeing-Redis as modally
imperfectas Quine:our world has been blessedwith Reds but a world
of Brownswould not have Being-Redamong its attributes.Whence
(M,).
We are also in a position to appreciatenow how the proposition

P3 = (Being-Red,instantiated)

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
207
imitatesnicely the recordof (Quine, Existence). A priorityis gone.

Thereis no purelyreflectiveguaranteethat the sentence"Being-Redis
instantiated"signifiesa proposition(consider"Being-Unicorn
is
instantiated").Modal contingencyis also unavoidable:P3 may have
been generatedin actuality;now that we have it we can take it and
evaluateit in a counterfactualRedlessworld. It cannot be generated
over there(cf. (Quine, Existence) in a Quinelessworld);however,
given its generationin actuality,we have it and it can be modally
evaluatedin counterfactualsituationswhereit doesn'texist.
Contingentand a posterioriP3 may be; and yet, the proposition
itself, P3, is actuallytrue solely in virtueof the structuraltraitsof the
world, i.e. the structure(in particular,the existenceconditions)of the
attributeBeing-Red.For the very existenceof Being-Redguarantees
that it bears the trait it is ascribedi.e., that it's instantiated.This is
not the case with other traitswe may ascribeto it, e.g. that it is my
favoriteattributeor even the necessarytrait that everythingthat has
it has the same color as the actualcolor of fire-trucks.A separate
confirmationof this point comes from the fact that the trait of being
instantiatedis permutationresistant.Any other basic attributeyou
might care to permutewith Being-Redwould also be actuallyinstantiated, at least on my view of basic attributes.In contrast,permute
Being-Greenwith Being-Red,and it wouldn'thave, in actuality,the
trait of being my favoriteattributeor be such that everythingthat
bearsit has the same color as the actualcolor of fire-trucks.
Finally,the propositionRed is instantiatedis not only true in virtue
of the structuraltraits of the world;the propositionis also true in
virtueof the proposition'sinternalstructure(just like Quineexists).
Given the assumptionthat it is the attributeitself that occursin the
proposition,its very presencein the propositionverifiesthe truthof
the predicationwithoutany externalevaluation.Hencethe proposition,
though neithera priorinor necessary,is true in virtueof an analysis
of its own internalstructure.
VI. THE WORLDLINESS
OF LOGICAL
NOTIONS
Aware of the unreliabilityof the attributes,Russellretreatedto

second-orderlogical generalism:only purely'logical'propositionswill

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JOSEPH ALMOG
do. At last, a safe haven for logic. But is it? Are the propositions,
e.g., everything is self identical and everything exists lordly, free of our
job-lot of a world?
I doubt it very much. Without any pretense to an informed, let
alone scholarly, reading of the text, I am guided here by the early
Wittgenstein:
The 'experience'we need in orderto understandlogic is not that somethingor other is
the state of things,but that somethingis: that howeveris not an experience.Logic is
priorto everyexperience- that somethingis so. It is prior to the question'How?',not
priorto the question'What?'(Tractatus5.552)
So much for the motif. Here is my own version of the idea. Very
much like Red, Existence and Identity are, on the worldly picture,
subject to the ontological thesis:
(02)
Existence and Identity actually exist, only if they have

actual instances (only if at least one object actually
exists).
Aware of the modal and epistemic corollaries induced by the counterpart thesis (O) in the case of Red, the lordly logician might be worried
that (02) may engender similar repercussions:
(E2)
That Existence and Identity actually exist isn't known

a priori.
(M2)
That Existence and Identity exist is merely contingent.
Presupposing that all logical truths are a priori and necessary, the
lordly logician looks at (E2) and (M2) as the last straw; truths like
(Vx)Exists(x) and (Vx)(x = x), let alone (3x)(Exists(x)) and
(3x)(x = x) are going to lack the desired traits and hence wouldn't,
in turn, be logical truths. In a word, a reductio of the worldly view
and of (02) in particular. The question is: is the lordly logician right
in so arguing?
Take the most damaging case one can think of:
P4 =
(Existence, Instantiated )
which is far more precarious than (Vx)(x = x) and (Vx) Ex (which

may not be a priori but would turn out to be necessary, if the
propositions actually exist in the first place).

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
209
Focusingon epistemologicalmatters,let us "stipulate"that P4 isn't

known a priori.Cartesianmodes of reasoningnotwithstanding,
pretendthat we may use the word'existence'competentlyin the sentence"Existencehas instances"and yet not know whetherthe attribute
Existencehas instances.Also, let us pretendthat it could have been
the case that no object whatsoeverexisted.In that apocalyptic
counterfactualworld, P4 is false. Let us supposethis is a genuine
possibility.
All this doesn't take away the actual truthof P4 in virtueof the
structuraltraitsof the world. For assumingthat (02) does give the
existence-conditions
of existence,its very being in the worldguarantees
its havingthe trait with which it is predicatedhere. In contrast,its
very being doesn'tguaranteethat it bears traitslike beingAnselm's
favoriteattributeor being the attributeactuallydiscussedby Moore
in "Is existencea predicate?".What is more, assumeagain (02), and
assumethat P4 has the attributeExistenceitself as constituent,an
assumptionabout the proposition,not about the world itself. At this
point, by a purelyinternalanalysisof P4, we can establishthat indeed
Existenceis instantiated.Thus, whetherwe know it a priorior not,
whetherit would still be true throughoutall counterfactualsituations,
the propositionP4 is actuallytrue in virtueof its own internalstructure. Which is also the case of (3x)(x = x), (Vx)(x = x) and
(Vx)(Exists(x)).8
VII. LOGIC AND NECESSITY:
THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE WORLD
Qua notion, in and of itself, logical truthseemsdistinctfrom the

modal idea of necessity.As for the extensionsof the two notions, so
far my cases of contingentlogical truthsconsistedof singulartruths
e.g., Quine exists and Redness is instantiated. There are other
examples of this sort: the proposition If a is F then some individualis
F, for everysuch individualexistingin actuality.Everybeing,simply

in virtueof being such, has the trait that if it F's something F's. And
yet such truths might be contingent: If Quine is possibly human then
something is possibly human is an example. Consider a Quineless
counterfactualsituationw in which everythingis made of sand. The

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JOSEPH ALMOG
antecedent Quine is possibly human is true at that situation, for actuality provides the required possibility. But the consequent proposition is
false at w: no-thing of w, no grain of sand, could have been human.
More examples of this sort can be concocted but in analyzing contingent logical truths, I would like to focus on one special case of a
differentsort.
The specialcase I have in mind originateswith Ramsey:true
propositionsabout the numberof individualsin the world, e.g., there
are at least two individualsare not mere truths but ratherlogical
truths.
If one presupposesthat all logical truthsmust be necessary,one
might be shockedby Ramsey'sview: the contingencyof our proposition is after all very hard to deny. Ramseyhimself avoided the
"shock".How? Insteadof admittingcontingentlogical truths, Ramsey
preferred to bite the bullet and pronounce this proposition necessary.9
Ramsey's main argument (op. cit., 59-61) for the logical truth of
propositions stating the number of individuals in the world relies on
standard first-order codings of the claims. E.g., the claim that there
are at least two individuals would be coded by "3x3y(x # y)". But,
in addition, he believed quantificational propositions are analyzable in
terms of singular propositions: existential quantifications are identified
with long disjunctions, universal quantifications are identified with
long conjunctions. So analyzed, the logical truth of At least two individuals exist is inescapable.'0
VIII. THE FLAWS IN RAMSEY'S APPROACH
The problem with Ramsey's argument is that it relies on an identification of a general proposition with its "singular expansion". This
seems questionable. Of course, those who (like myself) believe that the
identity of structured propositions is fixed by composition from the
identity of their constituents, will reject out of hand any identification
of a general proposition and a complex singular proposition. But in
fact general propositions are not necessarily equivalent to their "singular expansion"; so the equivalence fails even the least demanding
test of propositional identity.

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
211
Let Dis(F) stand for the disjunctionof propositionsof the form Fa

for each existingindividuala. We have alreadyseen that the
conditionalDis(F) D 3xFx is not necessary.(Take as F, our case of
possibly-human.) In the other direction, 3xFx - Dis(F) is not necessary either.How so? We havejust seen that the problemfor the
converse of this conditional, Dis(F) D 3xFx, came from diminishing
domains.The counterexampleto the necessityof the presentconditional arisesfromgrowingdomains.Let a counterfactualworld w

have a largerdomainthan the actual domain.Thus thereis a new
individualof w, for whichit is true that it does not actuallyexist.
Hence 3x Act(Not-Exist(x)) is true at w. However, we can generate
singularpropositionsonly out of actualindividuals(an idea to which

Ramseyhimselfstronglyadhered).But then the disjunction:
Actually (Not-exist (Church)) v Actually (not-exist
(Quine)) v Actually (Not-exist (Mt. Blanc)) v ...
is false at w. The same counterexampleappliesto Conj(F) D VxFx,

with Actually(exists) used as the offendingF. The antecedent
conjunctionis true at w. The consequentis false at w."
IX. A NEO-RAMSEYAN ANALYSIS
The irony of it all is that Ramseydoes not need to claim that a

generalpropositionis identicalto its singularexpansion.Nor does he
need to claim that they are necessarilyequivalent.He only needs to
show they logicallyimply each other. To provideus with an appropriate analysis,let me hitch my wagon to a star and call my own picture
"Neo-Ramseyan".It introducesa new relationbetweenpropositions,
that of structural implication. Say that P structurally implies Q iff the
materialconditionalIf P thenQis a truthin virtueof the structural

traits of the world.The insightI extractfrom Ramsey'swork is that a
generalpropositionand its singularexpansionstructurallyimply each
other. Indeed,the conditionals(1)-(2) are both logicallytrue (and, as
you can verify,permutation-resistant):
[1]
If Dis(Happy) then some individualis happy
[2]
If some individualis happy then Dis(Happy)

212
JOSEPH ALMOG
Assume this logical framework.Why would at least two individuals

exist be logicallytrue?Following Ramsey,we aim to deduce this
truth from singulartruths. Begin then with the conjunctivesingular
propositionantecedent,John exists and Mary exists. This is a logical
truth. The conditionalIf John exists and Mary exists thenat least two
individualsexist is also a logical truth. Detach now its consequentand
you have what Ramseysought:the logical truth of At least two individualsexist. An alterantiveroute is availableto those who persistin
questioningthe logicalityof propositionslike Mary exists. Simply
begin with if John is distinctfrom Mary then thereare at least two
individuals.Detach the consequentand you are home free.
What individualsthereactuallyare (and hence, how many of them
there are) may seem like a trait of the world that does not concern
logic. But nothingis quite what it seems. In the way that the structural
Quineexists differsfrom the materialQuinewalks,in the way that the
structuralQuineis distinctfrom Churchdiffersfrom the material
Quineis youngerthan Church,I believethat At least two individuals
exist differsfrom At least two cows exist. The latter generalfact arises
from two materialsingularfacts, e.g., Bossie is a cow and Lizzy is a
cow. Two facts about the goings-on in the world, about the state the
world is in.
Not so with At least two individualsexist. The latter merelyreports
what exists and what is identicalto what. In so doing, it merelydetails
the multiplicityof subjectsthe world has, not what the state of these
subjectsis. It tells us whatthings there are, not how they are.12
X. LOGIC AND NECESSITY - A DISENGAGEMENT
There are then contingentlogical truths.The question is: what does

this show?One reactionto these findingsmay consist in the attempt
to trace the sourceof this contingency.I know of one hypothesis
about this matter,due to Tony Martin(in conversation).He argued
that the sourceof the contingencyof the above logical truthsis the
contingentexistenceof their constituents(individuals,attributes).
Stipulatenecessaryexistencefor these items and all logical truths
would be again necessary.

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
213
Read strongly,i.e. "it is sufficientto posit necessaryexistencefor

all actual individuals and then ...",
the hypothesis has already been
refuted.Let all actual individualsexist necessarily.The conditional

3xFx D Dis(F) can be refutedin a counterfactualsituationwith
"new",additional,individuals.Read weakly (as Martinintended),
i.e., "it is sufficientto posit necessaryexistencefor all individuals,
actual or not ...",
the above counterexample wouldn't work. But
others would. The truth (and not only the sentenceexpressingit) that
if actuallysnow is whitethensnow is whiteis a contingentlogical truth
even if all individualsexistednecessarily."3
This first type of reactionis content to focus on the "Kantian"
question "how are contingentlogical truthspossible?"One can go
beyond this reactionby questioningthe implicitpresuppositionof the
"Kantian"formulation,viz. why shouldlogical truthsbe necessaryin
the firstplace?
I believethat we find ourselvesherein a situationsimilarto the one
createdby Kripke'sdisengagementof the a prioriand the necessary.
Kripkearguesthat the latternotions seem to be distinct.Thus if anyone were to show that all a prioritruthsmust be necessary,that would
call for a substantiveargumentratherthan a mere trivialobservation
on the meaning of "a priori". And indeed such a substantive argument
has been put forward:if we know about actualitya certaintruth P

"withoutlooking" at the world itself, then surelyP can't dependon
any contingentfeatureof that whichwe have not looked at. Hence P
is necessary.To this Kripkewould respond,even beforegiving his
cases, that it is preciselybecausewe cognize from withinthe actual
world and haveto so cognize that we may know of it, without looking, certaintruthsthat would not hold of other situations.
A structurallysimilarsituationholds in our case of the notion of
logical truth. Someonemay try his hand at the following"bridging
argument":if a trait is a structuraltrait of this world, then it must be
an essentialtrait of it. For though we may vary the materialtraitsof
the world, the "scaffolding"must be fixed for the notion of possibility
for the world to make sense. Perhaps(somethinglike) such an argument is given in Tractatus2.022, "an imaginedworld,howeverdifferent
it may be from the real one, must have something - a form - in
common with it".

214
JOSEPH ALMOG
Now I myself would respond to such an argument by pointing out

that logic focuses on special, structural ("formal"), traits of actuality,
traits that may very well be distinct of actuality, that may explain
what the actuality of this one and only one real world boils down to.
If so, there is no intrinsic reason to expect that such traits would extend
to situations which, by their very nature, are not actual, are merely
possible.
Be all that as it may, the real point of the presentwork is not so

much to win this debate;it is ratherto focus us on two observations
which would hold no matterhow the debate would unfold. The first
is that the necessityof logical truthswon't come from a trivialobservation on the meaning of "logical truth"; one will have to first deny
my cases of contingent logical truths, and then propose a substantive
metaphysical thesis of the order of the above quoted Tractatus
hypothesis as to why the actual truth of the logical truths extends to
all possible worlds. Secondly, such a thesis, true or false, would shift
the focus of the debate. For so far we were told that the key notion
was that of "logical truth", a proper reading of which would establish
automatically the necessity of such truths. But if I am right it's the
other way round: the notion of necessity is the critical notion here. It
will have to be made to satisfy the following thesis: if the world has a
given structuraltrait, it is a modallyessentialtrait of it, a trait it

couldn'thave lacked.And thus, if I am right, we shouldn'tbuild a
modal undersideto the notion of logical truth;we should ratherunfold
the structuralundersideof our modal notions.
APPENDIX: THE PERMUTATION-RESISTANCE
LOGICAL TRUTHS
OF
I define here the permutations with respect to which logical truths are
resistant.
A. Rules of Generationfor Propositions
(1) Let there be
(i) The domain of existingindividuals- Di

(ii) The domain of basic attributes- DBA

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
215
(iii) A binary relation - identity

(iv) Complex-attributes formers - Not*, And*, Nec*, Act*
(v) Determiners - Every, Some, Most, At least one, At least
two, . ..
(vi) propositional connectives - Not, And, Nec, Act

(2) The domain of (simple and complex) attributes, DA, is generated
by:
If P, Q e DBA,then P, Q,Not* (P), And* ( P, Q),
Nec* (P), Act* (P) e DA
(3) The
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
domain of propositions, D,, is generated by:

If x e Di and P E DA, then (x, P) e D,
If x, y e
then ((x, y), identity) e D,
Dg,
If P, Q E DA, then (Every(P, Q)), (Most (P, Q)),
( Some (P, Q)), (At least one ( P, Q)), (At least two
(P, Q)) e Dp
(iv) if 4, / e D,, then (Not(xz)), (And((K), (xz/))),
(Nec(xz)), (Act(K)) e D,
(4) Comments on generation rules
(i) DRAcontainsExistenceand Individual

(ii) I have allowed for an "ambiguous" treatment of not, and,
..., viz. Not* vs. Not, to distinguish the two syntactical
roles involved. The philosophical question as to which one is
basic is not addressed
(iii) Similarly, reasons for treating determiners, e.g., Every, as
binary relations (rather than in the Fregean monadic way) are
not given here (though note that propositions allowing Most
can be generated)
B. Permutations
(1) We have
(i) A permutation on individuals - I, a one-one map of Di
onto D,
(ii) A permutation on basic attributes - IInBA,
a one-one map
of DA onto DBAsuch that IInA(Individual)= Individual,
iBA (Existence) = Existence.

216
JOSEPH ALMOG
(2) Given the permutation
NiBA,
a permutation H, is induced on DA,
satisfying:
(i) HA(P) = HBA(P), for P e
DBA
(ii) IA(Not*(P))= Not*(HA(P))

(iii) HA(And*(P, Q>))= And*(<A(P), fA(Q)>
(iv) H4(Nec* (P))
(v) HA(Act* (P))
= Nec* (<H(P))
= Act* (<HA(P)>
(3) Given a pair of permutationsI,, IA,a permutationH, on

propositions,a one-one map of D, onto D,, is induced,
satisfying:
(i) If xzis atomic and of the form (x, P), then I,(Q) =
(<i(x),
b nT(A)>
(ii) If
is atomic and of the form ((x, y), identity), then

nI,() = ((Hi(x), n,(y)>, identity)
(iii) H,((Every (P, Q))) = (Every (HA(P), nH(Q)))
(iv) n,((Some (P, Q))) = (Some (n,(P), nHA(Q)
(v) Ip((Most (P, Q))) = (Most (n<(P), nA(Q)xz
(vi) H,((At least two (P, Q))) = (At least two
(n<(P),
hA(Q)xz
(vii) l,((At least one (P, Q))) = (At least one
(HA(P),nA(Q)xz>
(viii)n,((Not (4))) = (Not (n,(,)))
(ix) II,((And ((xz), (I)))) = (And ((II,()),
(x) HI,((Nec (xz))) = (Nec (<I,()))
(xi) II,((Act (4))) = (Act (I,(4)))
(H,())))>
C. The Thesis Formalized
(L) 4 is logicallytrue iff I,(4) is true for all i,.

NOTES
Many thanksare due to R. Albritton,K. Fine, Y. Gutgeld,M. Gehman,D. Kaplan
and T. Martin.I am also indebtedto the editorfor his adviceon mattersof form and
content.
2 Introduction
to MathematicalPhilosophy,p. 192. All referencesto Russell(unless
otherwiseindicated)are to this work.
sec. 5.521.
STractatus Logico-Philosophicus,

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
217
is redor not redratherpromiscu4 Some die-hardgeneralistsmay even find everything

ous: the singularityof the attributeRed is as offensiveas that of the individualQuine.
Only trulygeneraluniversalclosuresover both subjectand predicate,e.g., everythingis
For not F would then belong in the provinceof logic. Call the formerpositionfirstordergeneralism,the lattersecond-order-generalism
(in view of the kind of universal
closuresthey would retreatto, the formerto e.g., (Vx)(Red(x)v ~ Red(x)),the latter
to e.g., (VP)(Vx)(P(x)v ~ P(x))).
One formalmanifestationof this flightto (first-order)
universalclosuresis Quine's
as founde.g., in Mathematical
"generalityinterpretation"
Logic,pp. 80-89. The idea
is statedtherefor open and closedsentences;but wavingthis ontologicaldifference,it is
the gambitconsideredhere - only generalpropositionsare assertedas theorems.The
idea is anticipated,in its second-orderform,in Russell'sIntroduction
to Mathematical
Philosophy,op. cit., pp. 196-200, (especiallyp. 199).The earlieststatementis found in
the unpublished'Necessityand Possibility',1900,and 'RecentWorkon the Principles
of Mathematics',International
Monthly4 (1901)83-101. See also ThePrinciplesof
Mathematics,firstedition, London,CambridgeU.P. 1903,pp. 7-9 and OurKnowledge
of the ExternalWorld,London,Allen Unwin, 1961,pp. 53-54, 67.
5 As hintedin the above paragraph,the notion of "truthat all models"is not, in and
of itself,a modalnotion. For the criticalquestionis whatdo the modelsmodel.If we
thinkof each modelas reassigning,in actuality,semanticalvaluesto the non-formal
componentsof the claim, or less linguistically,as permutingthe constituents,ofthe
claimwhilepreservingits form, then the notioninvolvedis "truthin actualityno matter
which("non-logical")constituentsmadeup this proposition",a notion that doesn't
promisethe necessityof a logicallytrue proposition.Interestinglyenough,a variantof
such a notion of validityis givenby e.g. Kripkefor none otherthan..,. modallogic.
From the originalpaperin 1959throughthe variousapplicationsto modaland
intuitionisticsystems,his notion of validitywas that of truthin the actualworldof
everymodel,not, I insist, truthat all the worldsof eachmodel.Whenthe languageis
enrichedappropriately,as ours will be below,Kripke'snotion of validityallowsfor
contingentlogicaltruths.
6 Hilbertspeaksof "the formulasthat are not refutable(Widerlegbar)
throughany
definitestipulationof the suitablepredicates.Theseformulasrepresentthe valid logical
propositions".See his 'Problemeder Grundlegungder Mathematik',Math.Annalen
der
102, pp. 1-9. See also the thirdfootnote of K. Grdel's 'Die Vollstfindigkeit
Axiomeder logischenFunktionkalkiils',Monat.f"urMath.undPhys. 37, 1930(translatedin Gidel - Thecollectedworks,Vol. 1, OxfordU.P. 1986,pp. 103- 123)where
Godel uses this notion to settle the problemHilbertposed.Furthermoreand as against
popularmyths,this notion is contrastedby A. Tarskiwith the notion of truthat all
set-theoreticstructuresand held to be the intuitivenotion of logicalvalidity.See his
1936'On the Conceptof LogicalConsequence',in Logic,SemanticsandMetamathematics,ClarendonPress,Oxford 1956,the bottomof p. 410 and p. 411.
as a sufficientconditionfor logicaltruth,i.e.
7 So muchfor permutation-resistance
truthin virtueof the structureof the world.I take up the questionwhetherpermutation-resistanceof propositionsis sufficientfor truthin virtueof internalpropositional
structurein n. 12 below.A formaldefinitionof "permutation-resistance"
is givenin the
Appendix.
Notebooks19148 A, to me, remarkableanticipationis to be foundin Wittgenstein's
1916(translatedfrom Germanby E. Anscombe),Blackwells1961,p. 1le: "If we take

218
JOSEPH ALMOG
"(3x)(x = x)" it might be understood to be tautological since it could not get written
down at all if it were false, but here!".

of
9 See in 'The Foundationsof Mathematics',in Ramsey,F. P. TheFoundations
Mathematics,pp. 59-61. See also 'Facts and Propositions',op. cit., pp. 154-155 and
finally'CriticalNotice of Tractatus',op. cit., pp. 280-286. Ramseythoughthe had
two "proofs"for the necessityof the numberof individualsin the world.The main
one, pp. 59-61, I discussin the text. The additionalone, pp. 154-5, can be extracted
from the followingpassage(op. cit., 155):"admitthat numericalidentityand difference
are necessaryrelations,that 'Thereis an x such thatfx' necessarilyfollows from 'fa',
and that whateverfollows necessarilyfroma necessarytruth is itself necessary.If so,
theirpositioncannot be maintained;for supposea, b, c are in fact not everything,but
that thereis anotherthing d. Then that d is not identicalwith a, b, or c is a necessary
fact; thereforeit is necessarythat thereis an x such that x is not identicalwith a, b, or
c, or that a, b, c are not the only thingsin the world."
The passageis muchtoo coded. I reconstructfrom it two separatearguments:one
for the claim that therecould not have been fewerindividualsthan thereare, the other
for the claim that therecould not have beenmoreindividuals.
For the firstargumentassumethe actualexistenceof four individuals:a, b, c, d. Let
rpbe: rpx ((x # a) A (x # b) A (x # c)). We then have:
1.
O(pd
(by necessityof distinctness).
2.
(logicaltruth).
pd 3 3xpx
3.
O(JpdD 3xpx)
(necessitation).
4.
O(Lpdn 3xcpx)= (OLpd= 03xpx)
(Modal logic).
5.
(1, 3, 4, Modusponens).
03xqpx
Now I, of course,think Ramseymadethe fallaciousstep of moving from the logical
truthof a claim to its necessity(step 3). But on top of this, he seems to be involved
here in anotherfauxpas. Let Ramseyhave 03xp(x. He readsit: "of necessity,there
are at least four individuals".I ask: Why?All "O3xqpx"says is that "of necessity,
thereexists an individual(e.g., d) that is distinctfroma, b, c". That may be true and
yet otherworldswould have less than four individuals(e.g., they would only have d).
From the truthof a propositionlike "d is distinctfroma" at a counterfactualworld w,
Ramseyinfers(fallaciously)the existenceof d and a in that world. Thoughtherecannot
be actualtruthwithoutexistence,counterfactualtruthwithout(local) existenceis fine.
(cf. Quinedoesn'texist in a Quinelessworld.)
The secondargumentI reconstructfrom Ramseyproceedsas follows. Assumethere
are threeindividuals:a, b, c. Now grantthat therecouldhave been a 'new' individual.
The argumentnow runsas:
(- 1)
(0)
(1)
O 3xpx
Opd
OLpd
(by assumption)
(by what?)
(by necessityof distinctness)
(5)
(6)
03xrpx
3xrpx
(Olp
(as before)
p, Modal logic T)

LOGIC AND THE WORLD
219
Thus, by (6), the fourthindividual,d, alreadyexistsin actuality.The procedurecan be

repeatedfor any imagined'new'individual.Thus therecan be no 'growing'domains.
Note that here Ramseydoesn'tmerelycommitthe fallacyof necessitation.He also
moves from O3xcpx,a generalpossibility,to epd, a singlularone. He apparently
thinksthatjust becausewe can evaluatepropositionsinvolvingactualsin worldswhere
they don't exist, by symmetry,we have singularpropositionsinvolvingmerelypossibles,
i.e., d, evaluatedhere.
toFor we wouldidentify3x3y (x # y) with the followingdisjunctioninvolvingall
pairsof actualindividuals:((Church,Quine),Distinctness)OR ((Church,Church),
Distinctness),OR ((a, b), Distinctness),OR ... By our own, "modern",lightsthe first
disjunctis a truthin virtueof logicalstructure.But then so is the wholedisjunction.
And henceso is 3x3y (x $ y).
" For Ramsey'sview that generalpropositionsare identicalwith complexsingular
propositions,see, op. cit., pp. 34, 41 and especially59 - 61. Now supposethat thereare
infinitelymanyindividualsin the actualworld.The propositionsDis(F) and Conj(F)
would then involveinfinitarydisjunctionsand conjunctions.To some this may seem
unacceptable.I feel no specialjustificationis calledfor this assumptionin the present
work if only becausethe assumptionis madein the processof criticizingRamseywho
was the one to stress,thirtyyearsbeforesuchoperationsbecamecommon,that infinitary logicaloperationsare absolutelyinnocuous(op. cit., 34, 41 and 74). I also note,
and that goes beyondany discussionof Ramsey,that our operationsapplyto abstract
structures,i.e. propositions,not to sentences.Whencethe commondismay,justifiedor
not, about "infinitelylong sentences"may seem quiteinapplicable.
12 Some may agreethat the above argumentis fine but nonethelessinsistthat At least
two individuals
exist is not a logicaltruth.They wouldpoint out that the propositionin
questionis not truein virtueof its owninternalstructureand becauseof that it is no
logicaltruth.
Regardingthe generalquestion,I have alreadyarguedthat, on my view, a truthis
made into a logicalone by specialtraitsof that whichmakesit truein the firstplace,
i.e. the kind of traitof the worldin virtueof whichit is true.That is why I classifythe
truthAt least twoindividualsexist as logical.Similarly,the questionwhethermodus
ponens,with the help of whichwe deducedAt least two individuals
exist fromJohn
exists and Maryexists, preserveslogicaltruthshouldnot be confusedwith the question
whetherit preservestruth-in-virtue-of-internal-propositional-structure.
Now, I also happento believethat this propositionis truein virtueof its own structure.I take my lead from thefact that in orderto say that thereare at least two
individuals,we needto appealto two separatequantifiers,bindingtwo differentvariables.
(This,of course,would be triviallytrue on the exclusiveinterpretationof quantifiers
that Wittgensteinseemedto have sympathyfor in the Tractatus.But my point is that
this is truefor the normalinclusiveinterpretation
as well.)Of course,I do not pretend
to commenthereon a whole rangeof delicateresultsin definabilitytheory;nor do I
pretendto coverthe option of avoiding3x3y (x # y) altogetherand letting"two"
designatedirectlya number,a second-orderpropertyor a set of sets. I simplynote that
if our propositionhas the structureof the standardfirst-ordercoding,the use of two
quantifiers,and more important,the use of twovariables,is inescapable.The question
is: why?Why shoulda quantifiedpropositionbeara trace,not to say a scar,of the
kind of singularpropositionswhichwouldsupportits truth?Isn't the quantified
propositionsupposedto be purelygeneral?

220
JOSEPH ALMOG
For me, this much is an indicationthat our standardassertionthat the existence

of the form 3x3y (x # y) "goes withoutsaying",is very questionable.For it seems
that the form codes into itself the kind of singulartrait that would make it true. In
fact, it seemsto presentin a schematicway the kind of singulartrait from whichit
was abstractedin the firstplace. As such, I don't think of it as a form, at least not
a "platonicform".I think of it as a kindof proposition,a kind abstractedfrom
particularinstances,a point that would have been clearerin the notation
z(x,~
x1>,
whereit could be seen that to get the propositionalform (kind) of the quantified
proposition,we operateon alreadygivensingularpropositions.
" This is surelythe case if we treat Actuallyin the way I think we should, viz. as
attributingto propositions,just like Necessarilyand Possibly,an irreduciblymodal
property(Beingactually(necessarily,possibly)true). But even if we followed Lewisand
(sometimes)Kaplanand let it introducethe world itself into the proposition,the result
would still hold. For given that propositionsare generablefrom actual buildingblocks
only (an assumptionheld dear by Russelland Ramsey),the actualworld is the only
world that can figurein this way in propositions.Henceif a given proposition(e.g.,
snowis white)bearstrue-at-Wo,pureanalysiswould sufficeto show that P is true tout
court.And yet, the overallpropositionif snowis actuallywhitethensnowis whiteis
surelycontingent,as witnessedby a counterfactualsituationwith red snow.
Department of Philosophy,
University of California at Los Angeles,
405 Hilgard Avenue,
Los Angeles, CA 90024-141,
U.S.A.


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