Narendra Modis Foreign Policy The View from the West

Amitha Rajan is a former Reuters journalist who recently completed an

MA at the School of Oriental and African Studies. She is a contributor and
volunteer at PS21.
The year 2014 was a decisive one for Indian politics. With the biggest mandate for the post of prime
minister, Narendra Modi became the symbol of a new chapter in Indias growth story. While the focus of
Modis campaign was revitalising Indias economy, he has surprised political pundits with by emphasising
foreign policy. From inviting the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
(SAARC) countries for his swearing-in ceremony to making bilateral visits to 18 countries by the end of his
first year in office last month, Modi has been unafraid to raise his profile internationally. After a decade of
indeterminate foreign policy under the previous Congress-led government, Modi is keen to show the world
that India finally has a strong leader at the helm and that it is an easier place to do business in.
Domestically, opinion on Modis approach to foreign and economic policy is polarised: while some view
his overseas engagement through the lens of pride and nationalism, his critics chide him for spending far
too little time at home and getting his domestic affairs in order. Western observers are less caught up with
the ideological debate that makes Modi such a divisive figure in India, but remain uncertain over whether
his engagement abroad has been more about style than substance. Part of this scepticism comes from the
extremely low bar set by the previous government. India is certainly more visible on the global stage under
Modi, but does this imply that the prime minister has made progress in substantive policy issues?
Western views on economic policy, in particular, appear less favourable than is perceived domestically. In
an interview, Gareth Price, Senior Research Fellow in Chatham Houses Asia Programme, said that
although Modi ran on the platform of economic reform, there is no consensus within the BJP on
liberalisation policies, and that attitudes towards reforms were therefore likely to be determined on a caseby-case basis. Indeed, the government has struggled to push through key reforms such as the goods and
services tax bill and the land acquisition bill, both of which are critical for Modis signature Make in India
campaign and for luring foreign investment. Although the BJP has a majority in the Lok Sabha the lower
house of the parliament the absence of one in Rajya Sabha (the upper house) allows opposition parties to
stall policy reforms.
Stratfor, the US geopolitical intelligence firm, observes that the BJP has already lost some momentum from
the highpoint of 2014. This is demonstrated by the partys poor performance in the Delhi state elections
where the Aam Aadmi Party, a newcomer to politics, had a sweeping victory and will likely continue to
face an uphill battle in the upper house beyond 2016. Growing fissures within the BJP over key political
reforms are likely to further hamper progress. An added complication is the curious case of the government
adjusting the base year to calculate economic growth, which led to a revision in the 2014 growth rate to
6.9% from 4.7%. Even the countrys chief economic advisor, Arvind Subramaniam, appeared stumped by
the new GDP numbers, which CNN called a total mystery. Of course, it does not hurt that the revised

numbers are closer to Chinas growth rates, an important symbol for a prime minister seeking to attract
foreign investment.
Overall, the general view appears to be that for a prime minister elected primarily on the promise of
economic revival, Modis first year in office has been lacklustre. A Bloomberg editorial concluded that In
his first year, Modi has spent too much political capital to no coherent purpose. Part of this verdict reflects
the unrealistic expectations and the euphoria attached to Modis ascension to power. In his first year in
office, the prime minister has eschewed bold reforms in favour of what his officials call creative
incrementalism, characterised by steps to tackle issues such as easing bureaucracy, clearing backlogs of
projects, cutting fuel subsidies, and re-auctioning telecom and coal-mining licenses. And while the past
year has seen pledges for billion-dollar long-term deals from countries such as Japan, the US, China and
Russia, restoring the Indian economy to the glory days seen a few years ago will require much more
willingness from the government to make tough decisions, pick a fight with political opponents when
necessary, and make concessions and build consensus when the stakes are high.
The Western scorecard on Modis security policy is more forgiving. Because foreign policy was not
expected to be in such sharp focus, Modis charm offensive has captured the attention of the international
community. Modis multi-alignment strategy in foreign policy has helped build bridges and sustain
relationships, an essential factor for attracting investment. Moreover, Modis clear electoral mandate has
given him the flexibility to stabilise relations in the neighbourhood particularly with Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka that were previously held hostage by domestic politics. Crucially, Modis strategy is notable for the
absence of the ideology-driven bombast that some observers had foreseen, given the Bhartiya Janata Partys
strong rightwing and Hindutva worldview.
The prime minister has chosen pragmatism and tangible outcomes such as treaties and investment over
dogma in international relations. This approach has helped placate neighbours in South Asia and paved the
way for a reset of Indo-US ties. President Barack Obamas visit to India as the chief guest of the Republic
Day celebrations in January the first time an American presided over the ceremony had the dual effect
of boosting Modis legitimacy at home and demonstrating that India and the US are on an equal footing.
Western experts credit Modis savvy in turning around the relationship, which had hit a trough following
the arrest of the deputy Indian consul general, Devyani Khobragade, in late 2013 on charges of visa fraud.
Alyssa Ayres, a former US State Department official under the Obama administration and Senior Fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that because Modi has successfully set a new tempo, tone, and
trajectory for the bilateral relations instead of focussing on the Khobragade affair and the earlier rejection
of his US visa the bitterness of those disputes has been replaced by a sense of optimism. During Obamas
visit to India, both countries made progress on the 2008 civil nuclear deal and, importantly, issued a Joint
Strategic Vision for the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific Region, which affirmed the significance of
maritime security and called for the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
The statement garnered a lot of interest because it was a thinly veiled reference to Chinas increasingly
rigid stance on its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and because it was the first time that India and
the US spoke together on the issue. At a time when India is trying to reassert itself as a traditional security
partner of countries in the Indian Ocean region, the joint statement had the symbolic value of showcasing

the USs acknowledgement of Indias key role in the region. This, along with Obamas tilt towards India
and strained relations with Pakistan and the progress in breaking the logjam on the civil nuclear deal, has
led to optimism among some analysts that a new strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington
is underway.
Such expectations, however, may be exaggerated. Rather than an overhaul of existing foreign policy,
Modis strategy has essentially been a continuation of the previous governments policies, albeit in a more
articulate and confident manner. As Frederic Grare Director of the South Asia programme at Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace notes, the main difference between the Manmohan Singh
administration and the current one is Modis ability to communicate effectively, and the most substantial
results of Modi's diplomacy owe their success to policies begun by the previous administration.
There is no doubt that Modi has made visible headway in improving Indo-US relations. But this is unlikely
to translate into New Delhi becoming a strategic ally of Washington. India will work with the US only in
cases where it is in its interest to do so. For instance, closer ties with the US have not resulted in the erosion
of the friendly relations between Russia and India, even at a time when the Western world is suspicious of
Moscows intentions following its annexation of Crimea. Modi hosted Vladimir Putin in New Delhi late
last year and the visit yielded long-term contracts worth USD100 billion, including crude oil deals and an
agreement for Russian construction of nuclear reactors in India.
Moreover, while some in Washington envisage a strategic partnership between the US and India that could
help contain China, calculations in New Delhi are different. There is no doubt that the Indian security
establishment is cautious about China. Frequent incursions along a massive border on which there is no
consensus, Chinas development of the Gwadar port in Pakistan and its growing influence in the Indian
Ocean region, and Beijings ambitions of regional hegemony are viewed with suspicion in India. However,
New Delhi is far behind China in military investment, upgrade, and expansion, and it will be a while before
the military upgrade that is currently underway in India bears fruit. In the meantime, engaging with all
stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific region and actively participating in multilateral forums appears to be the
best strategy for India. Furthermore, China is an essential investment component of Modis economic
policy, which is his top priority. Modi will be careful not to upset this relationship. The policy of multialignment is therefore likely to continue in the near term.
Although economic concerns will continue to dictate Indias conduct on the world stage, under Modi there
is an acknowledgment of the need and even a desire for India to be more visible in international affairs.
It remains to be seen if a definitive doctrine emerges at the end of Modis term in 2019. What is
encouraging is the certainty that the prime minister has a mandate for five years that will give him the
leverage he needs to develop a deliberate foreign policy strategy. It may well be that all Modi can offer is
delivering on existing plans rather than overhauling New Delhis doctrine on foreign policy. Nevertheless,
even this accomplishment will go some ways to making India an active stakeholder in world affairs.