Jeff Nyquist

Making the Enemy’s Strategic Objectives Intelligible

I am delighted with Michael Bąkowski’s piece, “The Great Provocation,”

because it leads us to a discussion touching on the most significant events
of the last 18 months. I will now make Bąkowski’s case for him, which is not
so strange, because what he presented in “The Great Provocation” is what
I’ve been presenting in my work for many years.
With regard to the status of the former Soviet-dominated countries, I had
previously written that the “decisive argument for the authenticity of
Saakashvili’s revolution in Georgia is found in the Russian military strike of
August 2008: The Kremlin displayed its evil intentions and then was forced
to abandon its military offensive by Western economic pressure.”
What I wrote, of course, is true. But there is much more to this story.
Without accusing Saakasvhili of being a false democrat or secret Kremlin
agent, we should not miss the fact that enemies unwittingly help one
another all the time; for Saakashvili over-reacted to the violence in South
Ossetia, giving Russia a pretext for an invasion. This overreaction may be
due to Saakashvili’s youth, his impulsiveness, or his advisors. Michael
Bąkowski has suggested that Saakashvili is an agent of Moscow, but this
need not be the case. The Russians also possess mind control drugs of
various kinds which can produce aggressiveness in a targeted individual.
The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was a provocation.
Moscow needed a strong reaction from Saakashvili. The objective of the
Russian invasion was not to overrun Georgia or overthrow Saakashvili, by
the way. The objective was to destroy NATO and drive the Americans out
of Europe. At first glance, this proposition may seem outlandish. But I can
assure the reader, the president of Russian said as much on 15 July 2008.
In my 15 August 2008 column at FinancialSense.com [1], titled “Russia’s
Concept for Dominating Europe,” I wrote as follows: “The Kremlin
strategists believe that the United States is on the brink of a crippling
dislocation. According to a July 29 Pravda article, an anonymous Russian
diplomat revealed that the ‘Russian administration believes the United
States may soon suffer from a serious political crisis.’ The sequence begins
with a financial crash, advances to political unrest and finally to the
dissolution of American military power. As the Russian diplomat warned,
‘America is standing on the verge of a large-scale crisis of its own
existence.’”
The statement of the Russian diplomat was part and parcel of a larger
provocation, of which the Georgia invasion was an integral part. This
invasion also coincided with a potentially disruptive Russian attack on the
American financial system, which was intentionally revealed to the U.S.
Treasury Secretary on the eve of the war in Georgia. In other words, the
Russian government was attempting to provoke President Bush. This was
not as unlikely as it might appear. George W. Bush already had an
international reputation as a hothead, involving the United States in two
conflicts (Afghanistan and Iraq). What would the world say if the United
States launched military strikes against Russian tanks in Georgia? Would
they welcome this sort of thing, or chalk it up to Bush’s general insensitivity
to European opinion? In fact, President Bush was being pushed by his
advisors to launch strikes against the Russian forces in Georgia.
On 15 July 2008 all of Russia’s ambassadors from around the globe were
called to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. President Dmitri
Medvedev explained Russia’s objectives. “Russia is indeed stronger and
able to assume greater responsibility for solving problems on a regional
and global scale.” The Russian president explained that the Cold War was
not an American victory after all, because America’s adversary had
“survived.” It was time, he said, to established “a new equilibrium.” In an
allusion to President George W. Bush, Medvedev noted that “the habit … of
resorting to force … is increasing…. In such circumstances it is important to
maintain restraint and to evaluate situations carefully.” If the presidents of
Georgia and America could be provoked into a series of overreactions, and
if Russia was seen to act within certain limits, NATO might be disrupted.
Medvedev said he was “convinced that with the end of the Cold War the
underlying reasons for most of the bloc politics and bloc discipline simply
disappeared.” In other words, NATO’s continued existence was precarious,
and so was America’s position in Western Europe. According to Medvedev,
NATO’s violation of Yugoslavian sovereignty in 1999 would now enable a
devastating Russian counterstroke. History ought to be remembered, he
said, “We simply cannot accept the attempts taking place in individual
countries to highlight the ‘civilizing, liberating mission’ of the fascists and
their accomplices.” (An oblique reference in which Medvedev explained
that those who welcome American style democracy in the former Soviet
territories were the same as those who welcomed the Germans as
liberators in 1941 – and should be dealt with accordingly.)
“Characteristically,” continued Medvedev, “it is those states that have such
a passion for rewriting history … that are at the same time the most
zealous advocates of illegal acts, like the Kosovo precedent…. And those
same states are the ones who have become ultra-nationalist in their
policies, harassing national minorities and denying rights to the so-called
’stateless’ citizens in their countries.”
Medvedev is explaining the design, the pretext, and the model for
upcoming events in Georgia. “For us,” noted Medvedev, “this task is
particularly important, since in many cases we are talking about abuses
against Russians and Russian-speaking populations. And protecting and
defending those rights is obviously one of our responsibilities.” So the
provocation was already set, and the reaction of the Georgian president
already assumed. Medvedev clearly knew that Russia is going to invade
Georgia. “I have focused on these aspects because Europe today needs a
positive rather than negative agenda.” In other words, the invasion of
Georgia is not an end in itself. As the Russian president hinted, the real
purpose of this operation was to highlight the obsolescence of NATO by
raising tensions in a way that underscored the dangers of American
involvement in European affairs, as well as the dangers inherent in NATO
and “obsolete bloc politics.” The old treaties will not keep the peace,
Medvedev explained, because they are unfair. Russia is a great power and
deserves greater influence. “I’m absolutely convinced that this requires new
approaches. That is why we proposed to conclude a new treaty on
European security and to start this process at a European-wide summit.”
According to Medvedev, there are “flaws in the architecture of European
security….” What Russia wants is “a truly open and collective security
system.” What he is saying, basically, is that NATO must be eliminated,
and America kicked out of Europe. And what would be the catalyst for this
process? An increase of tensions between America and Russia may not
signify an increase in tensions between Germany and Russia, or France
and Russia. “A strategic partnership between Russia and the EU could act
as the so-called cornerstone of a Greater Europe without dividing lines….”
In order to achieve this, Russia hoped to stage a provocation that George
W. Bush could not resist. This provocation would also include an open
attempt to seriously disrupt shaky American financial institutions.
Obviously, the Germans and French would not be happy if the Americans
pushed them in the direction of war with Russia. Both countries have an
economic stake in regional peace. Germany, especially, is tied to Russia in
ways that only German politicians – looking at their private finances – can
fully explain. By pushing on Georgia, the Russian leadership was
attempting to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies.
What Mr. Bąkowski has pointed out in his piece, is the “provocative” nature
of Moscow’s strategic method. It is now clear that the invasion of Georgia in
2008 was not intended to overthrow Saakashvili or install a Moscow
puppet. The invasion was a provocation, plain as day. To make Mr.
Bąkowski’s argument for him: If we examine the Georgian events from this
perspective, we see that Moscow needed a reliable partner in Tbilisi who
could start the war in a way that later indicated the fault was on both sides
— that it wasn’t a simple case of naked Russian aggression. This idea, in
fact, was hinted at by Russian President Medvedev when he assured his
diplomatic corps that everything would unfold in accordance with
international legality. If there was to be outrageous behavior, the Americans
would be the ones to add fuel to the fire. But President George Bush, going
against his advisors, avoided the trap.
The authenticity of the Rose Revolution depends on whether Russia’s split
with Georgia was meant to serve as a “provocation” for the purpose of
undoing NATO. We do not know the answer, and we have no evidence that
Saakashvili sent troops into South Ossetia on secret orders from Moscow.
On the other hand, the Kremlin provocation did require a specific set of
actions from the Georgian president, and the Georgian president provided
those actions. If we study Medvedev’s speech with care, we can see that
the Russian president was giving a great deal of the game away. His
language, however, was subtle. Few analysts realized how important this
particular speech was.
With the recent revelations from former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson, it is worthwhile to reassess events in Georgia. At the same time,
we should remember President Medvedev’s reference to “fascists and their
accomplices.” Here is an admission that anti-Kremlin forces exist in
Georgia, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States. Here is a belt of countries
that could be used against Moscow, if only the people of those countries
realize what has been going on since 1991.
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