Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No.

101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented
and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as
a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of
the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the
respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further
ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result
in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR
to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right
of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was

done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to

a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the
Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie,
the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the
constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon
even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an
instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby
GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
G.R. No.s 171947-48, December 18, 2008
Concerned Citizens vs MMDA
Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and
protection of the Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that
the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the
allowable standards set by law (esp. PD 1152, Philippine
environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the
samples collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is
beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR.
MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to reduce pollution
along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as
evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the study on shipgenerated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis Dagat
project.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila
Bay.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment
Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the
concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and
asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the
agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents.

(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay

is not ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled
by mandamus.
Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by
mandamus.
Petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by
law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such
duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail
a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or
the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as
may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This
duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot
be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated;
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to
public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality
of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary
to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed
water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and cleanup water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of
his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned
shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall
be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible
for such pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to
take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on
the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither
official discretion nor judgment.
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa vs National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples
Facts:
Petitioners view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples. They argue that IPRA and its
implementing rules will amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources, in violation of
the regalian doctrine of the Constitution.

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
rights of private landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship
of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as
a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and program coordination." They contend that said Rule
infringes upon the Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Notes:
Puno: "When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land
and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of
this law cannot be appreciated without considering its
distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul
shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was
enacted by Congress not only to fulfil the constitutional
mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more
importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our
indigenous people."
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous
cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a
distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people
the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands
and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which traces its
origin to native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples
refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who
have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial.
They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions
and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs
also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the
country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain
some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from
their traditional territories or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains.
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples
effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two

postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the

principle of parens patriae.
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56
hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects
or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and
which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare.
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to
land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence
of government projects and other voluntary dealings
entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
widen farms and tree lots."
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by
native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2)
by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands
and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far
back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to
have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest.
Article 12
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish
workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial

assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and

utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the
State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law,
the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible,
determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and
national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the
ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks
shall be conserved and may not be increased nor
diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for
such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit
logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and
all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall
have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Mateo Cario vs The Insular Government (December
1906) 7 Phil 132
Political Law Regalian Doctrine
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land
Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of
a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then

municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory

information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US
military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The
State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant
should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and
Tiglao vs Government; and that the right of the State over
said land has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the
land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the
government. The government is still the absolute owner of

the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of

the land has not been of such a character as to require the
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many
years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of
animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used
by Cario for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the
occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he
must make that proof before the proper administrative
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did
the State remained the absolute owner.