Tumalad vs Vicencio

41 SCRA 143
Facts:
On 1 September 1955 Vicencio and Simeon, defendants-appellants, executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Tumalads, plaintiffappellees over their house of strong materials over a lot in Quiapo, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage
was executed to guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received from the Tumalads, payable within one year at 12% per annum. The mode of
payment was P150.00 monthly, It was also agreed that default in the payment of any of the amortizations would cause the remaining
unpaid balance to become immediately due and payable, the Chattel Mortgage enforceable, and the Sheriff of Manila authorized to sell the
Mortgagors property after necessary publication. When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, the Tumalads
were issued the corresponding certificate of sale.
On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced case in the municipal court of Manila, praying that the house be vacated and its possession
surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and Simeon to pay rent of P200.00 monthly up to the time the possession is surrendered. The
municipal court rendered its decision in favor of the Tumalads.
Defendant-appellants impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage claiming that they are still the owner of the house but waived their
rights to introduce evidence.
Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision
obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood for non-payment of rentals.
Issues:
1.
2.

WON the subject matter of the mortgage which is a house of strong material can be subject of real estate mortgage or a chattel
mortgage.
Whether or not the defendants are legally bound to pay rentals to the plaintiffs during the period of 1 year provided by law for the
redemption of the extrajudicially foreclosed house.

Held:
The inclusion of the building separate and distinct from the land in the enumeration of what may constitute real property, that the building is
by itself an immovable property. However deviations have been allowed for various reasons specially if it is stipulated in the subject of
contract. In the case at bar, although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as a personal property, yet by ceding,
selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage, defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as a
chattel.
Hence if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property
as so stipulated in the document of mortgage. It should be noted that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his
house to be chattel. Party in a chattel mortgage cannot question the validity of the chattel mortgage entered into. The doctrine of estoppels
therefore applies to the defendant-appellants.
Since the defendant-appellants were occupying the house at the time the auction of sale, they are entitled to remain in possession during
the period of redemption or within one year from the date of auction sale and to collect the rents or profits during the said period.
And since the plaintiff-appellees right to posses was not yet born at the filing of the complaint, there could be no violation or breach thereof.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and entered another dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffsappellees.

FACTS: Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad
over their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to
guarantee a loan, payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public
auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was
issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants,
praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners.

ISSUE: W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal
properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage.

HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are
immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as
personal property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the
principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner
declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from
subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as
personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel
mortgage could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an
inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
SIBAL VS. VALDEZ, 50 PHIL 512
FACTS: As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant VitalianoMamawal, deputy
sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the
plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Within one year from the date of the attachment and
sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount
sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which
he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. But Valdez
refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was attempting
to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels and that he had harvested and taken
possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in another parcel, amounting to 300 cavans;
and that all of said palay belonged to the plaintiff.
After hearing and on 28 April 1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the defendant
holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not subject to
redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane in question is personal or real property
HELD:
Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the Civil
Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits that growing crops are
sometimes considered and treated as personal property. Moreover, from an examination of the reports
and codes of the State of California and other states we find that the settle doctrine followed in said
states in connection with the attachment of property and execution of judgment is, that growing crops
raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property.
On the other hand, Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing crops are
personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage,
agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a
chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may
contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend, care for and protect
the crop while growing.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that "growing
crops" are personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated,
that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. 190 and

by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code
have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase "personal property" should be
understood to include "ungathered products."
We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by
section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the purpose of
attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products"
have the nature of personal property.
. IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
108 PHIL 335
FACTS:
Ignacio filed for the registration of title over a mangrove to which he later said that he acquired
right to the mangrove through accretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ignacio has the right to declare that such land can be subject to registration and
does not anymore form part of the public dominion.

HELD:
No, only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and power to
make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea is not necessary for purposes of public utility,
or for the establishment of special industries or for Coast Guard Service otherwise, the property
continues to be property of public dominion ,further, it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription
notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for such use or service. If no such declaration has
been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. Under Art. 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866.lands added to the shores byaccretions and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea, formpart of the public domain. Since alluvial formation along the
seashore is part of the public domain, it is not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private
persons.