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IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA REYES,

PAULINA SANTOS DE PARREO vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO, G.R. No. L-27657,


August 30, 1992 Facts:
Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in Special Proceedings No. 34354
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The settlement has spawned a number of litigation
which has reached this Court and includes not only the instant case but also other cases. The estate had
only special administrators until Gregoria Aranzanso who claims to be a first cousin of the decedent asked
that she be appointed regular administrator. Her motion provoked counter motions, oppositions, replies,
rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the printed record on appeal and which demonstrate
the zeal of the various counsel in espousing their clients claims to the estate which as aforesaid is
substantial. On January 29, 1966, the Court issued an order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso as regular
administrator and relieving Araceli A. Pilapil as special administrator. Motions for reconsideration of the
order were filed but the presiding judge held firm "considering that most of the movants have adverse
interests against this intestate estate." But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in. And so on
June 20, 1966, the court which incidentally was presided by a different judge issued an order grating the
omnibus motion filed by Paulina R. Santos de Parreo. The oppositors Gregorio Aranzanso, Demetria
Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion were declared to be without any right to intervene in the
intestate proceeding and, henceforth they should not be allowed to take part therein.
Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura were ordered to return to the estate the sum of
P14,000.00 which they received by virtue of the order of this Court dated October 2, 1965.
The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administratrix pursuant to the order of
this Court dated January 29, 1966 was revoked and she was ordered to render a final
account of her administration within 10 days from receipt. Paulina R. Santos de Parreno was
appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Juliana Reyes de Santos
and upon her filing a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office,
then letters of special administration be issued to her. A motion for reconsideration of the
order was denied which prompted Gregoria Aranzanso to appeal the order to this Court.
Issue:
WON lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as the
administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.
Ruling:
No. It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular administrator of the
intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her office but only for a cause or
causes provided by law. What is the law on removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the
Rules of Court which reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings
upon death, resignation, or removal.

If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly
provided by these rules, or absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit
him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to
someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration
may be granted to any suitable person.
It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, that Gregoria
Aranzanso, among other persons, is without right to intervene as heir in the settlement of
the estate in question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of Court. In
Paulina Santos, et al. vs. Gregoria Aranzanso,
a collateral attack on the adoption of the two girls was not allowed under the following facts:
When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for the settlement of her estate. In said petition he stated among other
things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos
and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that

he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first
cousin to the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator.
For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos' marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was
bigamous and thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was
likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents who were then living
and had not abandoned them. The CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption in question
could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings. The order was appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that
the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural
parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral
attack. Stating that, "The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondentsoppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption
decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos," this Court gave a negative answer. The
decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
as an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a
stranger to the deceased. In fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed
the appointment of the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. SC held that the
intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso in the settlement proceedings is not in the capacity of
heir although she might be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls should
succeed. The order of removing Gregoria Aranzanso as administrator was set aside. She was
reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.
__________________________________________________
SANTERO ET AL VS. COURT OF FIRSTINSTANCE OF CAVITEG.R. No. L-61700, September 14, 1987153
SCRA 728
Petitioners are the children of the late Pablo Santero withFelixberto Pacursa. PRs are 4 of the 7 children of Pablo
withAnselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of Pablo since neither of their mothers, was married
to him.Before the SC could act on the instant petition for certiorari,PRs filed a Motion for Allowance to include 3
other siblings of the PRs and praying that the administrator deliver the sum of P6K to each of the 7 children of
Anselma as their allowancefrom the estate of Pablo. The CFI granted the motion of thePRs but oppositors
(petitioners herein) asked the court toreconsider said Order. An Amended Order was issued by theCFI directing
Anselma to submit her explanation as to theadditional 3 children. Anselma in her "Clarification" statedthat in her
previous motions, only the last 4 minor children asrepresented by her were included in the motion for support ,and
her first 3 children who were then of age should havebeen included since all her children have the right to
receiveallowance as advance payment of their shares in theinheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of the New Civil
Code.Petitioners opposed the inclusion of 3 more heirs. AnotherOrder was issued by the CFI directing the
administrator to getback the allowance of the 3 additional children of Anselmaapparently based on the oppositors'
Motion.
ISSUE:1. Are the private respondents entitled toallowance?2. Was it proper for the court a quo to grantthe motion
for allowance without hearing?
RULING:Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfullyemployed, or married should not be regardedas the
determining factor to their right toallowance under Articles 290 and 188 of theNew Civil Code.Records show that a
hearing was made.Moreover, what the said court did was just tofollow the precedent of the court whichgranted
previous allowance and that thepetitioners and private respondents onlyreceived Php 1,500.00 each depending on
theavailability of funds.
ADVINCULA V. TEODORO (1956)
Short summary: brothers of the deceased wanted to oust surviving spouse/brother in law
as administrator of their sister's estate, after ss/bil already appointed as such and after
intestate proceedings already commenced, by showing will allegedly appointing one of them

as executor. Court held that until the will is probated, the provision in the will making one of
them the executor of the estate is not effective.
Advincula vs. Teodoro R 82 1 99 phil 413
Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, thenlater regular administrator of his
deceased wifes estate. Afterhe qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted
adocument purporting to be the deceasedd will. Emilio o p p o s e d t h e p r o b a t e
o f t h e w i l l o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e signature was not his wifes and even if it was,
the same wasp r o c u r e d b y f r a u d . O n e o f t h e b r o t h e r s - i n - l a w ,
E n r i q u e Lacson, prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed administratorin lieu of Emilio.
During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and
unsuitable to act asadministrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate. Thecourt ruled in
favor of Enriques motion. Emilio filed an MR butthe same was denied so he instituted the
present action forcertiorari to annul the lower courts order.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court acted with GADLEJ in grantingLacsons motion
HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator inlieu of Advincula is predicated on
the fact that Lacson wasnamed executor of the deceasedd will. This
provision, however cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted toprobate. The
discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso facto n u l l i f y l e t t e r s o f
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l r e a d y i s s u e d o r e v e n authorize the revocation thereof
until the alleged will is proved and allowed by the court.Furthermore, the lower court
appears to have followed theargument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to
thedeceaseds estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is
untenable because from the viewpoint of logic and experience, a stranger may be
competent, capableand fit to be administrator of the estate in the same way thata family
member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit todo so. Besides, Emilio as the surviving
spouse if a forced heirof the deceased. He is entitled to of all property apart fromhis share of the
other half thereof as heir of the deceased since all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong tothe conjugal partnership_______________________________________________
De Bautista v. De Guzman
Facts:Numenario Bautista, husband and father of plaintiffs-appellees, sustained physical
injuries while inside apassenger jeep driven by Medrano (convicted of homicidethrough
reckless imprudence); and owned and operated byRosendo de GuzmanWrit of execution was
issued against the driver butremained unsatisfied. After which, De Guzman died. Plaintiffappellees then prayed that heirs of De Guzman pay the sumsas well as the costs of suit. The
heirs of de Guzman refused. In support of thismotion, they maintained that the suit was for a
money claimagainst the supposed debtor who was already dead and assuch it should be
filed in testate or intestate proceedings, orin the absence of such proceedings, after the
lapse of 30days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings, that theheirs could not be
held liable therefore since there was noallegation that they assumed the alleged obligation.
Issue:Whether or not the heirs of Bautista can claim from the heirsof De Guzman
Held:
Bautista heirs can no longer recover because of negligence and a failure to observe
mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules. They overlooked the fact that theywere no
longer suing de Guzman who died shortly after theaccident but his heirs. Section 5, Rule 86
makes it mandatoryto inform the executor or administrator of the claims againstit, thus

enabling him to examine each claim and determinewhether it is a proper one which should
be allowed. The termination of intestate proceedings and thedistribution of the estate to the
heirs did not alter the factthat plaintiff-appellees claim was a money claim which shouldhave
been presented before a probate court. The onlyinstance wherein a creditor can file an
action against adistribute of the debtors asset is under Section 5, Rule 88.Even under this
rule, the contingent claims must first havebeen established and allowed in the probate court
before thecreditors can file an action directly against the distributees.
Sebial vs. Sebial (1975)
On R83.1: The 3-month period provided is not mandatory and the court retains jurisdiction even if the inventory is
filed after said period, but such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, may be a ground for the removal of the
administrator under R82.2
Short summary: child from decedent's second family filed for settlement of estate of her dad and prayed that she be
made the administratrix 17 years after death of dad. Child from 1st marriage opposed, saying that the estate was
already partitioned among heirs and that they had already disposed of the said properties in favor of 3P and that the
estate's value was small that it can be settled amicably. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner 2nd family child making
her the administratrix, even ordering that the 3P and the children of the 1st marriage to deliver the property to the
administratrix appointed. Court held that 1st, even if the appointed administratrix filed the inventory more than 3
months from appointment, the court still had jurisdiction. 2nd, it ruled that the trial court should first determine the
value of the estate, receiving evidence for it, and the ownership of the said properties covered by the estate, it being
argued that 3P already own it. It being unsure of WON the properties still belonged to the heirs of the decedent, it
was improper for the TC to order the delivery of said properties to the administratrix.
Heirs of Lorilla vs. CA
Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that upon the defendants death, the action "shall be dismissed to be presented in the
manner especially provided in these rules." Petitioners argue that this manner is provided for in Sections 5 and 7 of
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.1 As contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, the action has to be dismissed
without prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter presenting his claim as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased defendant.2 The claim becomes a mere incident in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the
deceased where the whole matter may be fully terminated jointly with the settlement and distribution of the estate. 3
Supreme
In the present case, however, the records do not show if any notice of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion,
counsel of record of Elias Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262 before the Makati Court. Thus, neither the Makati Court
nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to know
or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such notice. Neither could the petitioners have been made aware
of the trial courts judgment adverse to their father, for all notices and orders of the court were sent to Lorillas
counsel of record, who did not bother to inform the parties concerned of Elias Lorillas death. Apparently, Lorillas
counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of the death of his client, as the Rules require. 4
Torres vs. Ca

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Petitioners contend that the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals are null and void for being
rendered without the necessary substitution of parties (for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr.)
as mandated by Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides as follows:
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
Petitioners insist that the SEC en banc should have granted the motions to suspend they filed based as
they were on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where the probate of the late Judge
Torres will was pending, had yet to appoint an administrator or legal representative of his estate.
We are not unaware of the principle underlying the aforequoted provision:
It has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the Court for
the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the
deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court
without such legal representative or heirs, and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void
because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representative or of the heirs
upon whom the trial and the judgment are not binding. 16
As early as 8 April 1988, Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will which he had executed on 31
October 1986. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner
Edgardo D. Pabalan as the sole executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The proceedings,
however, were opposed by the same parties, herein private respondents Antonio P. Torres, Jr., Ma. Luisa
T. Morales and Ma. Cristina T. Carlos, 17 who are nephew and nieces of Judge Torres, being the children
of his late brother Antonio A. Torres.
It can readily be observed therefore that the parties involved in the present controversy are virtually the
same parties fighting over the representation of the late Judge Torres estate. It should be recalled that the
purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due
process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case, this purpose has been
substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal substitution) in view of the peculiar fact that both
proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in the probate
proceedings of Judge Torres holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his estate. Since
both parties claim interests over the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully protected in
the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either case, whoever shall be
appointed legal representative of Judge Torres estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents) would
no longer be a stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having thoroughly participated in the proceedings.