Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace

Panel on Ancestral Domain

G.R. No. 1833591,
October 14, 2008
Decision:
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the
extent of the powers of the President in
pursuing the peace process. While the facts
surrounding this controversy center on the
armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government
and
the
Moro
Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue
involved has a bearing on all areas in the
country where there has been a longstanding armed conflict. Yet again, the
Court is tasked to perform a delicate
balancing act. It must uncompromisingly
delineate the bounds within which the
President may lawfully exercise her
discretion, but it must do so in strict
adherence to the Constitution, lest its
ruling unduly restricts the freedom of
action vested by that same Constitution in
the Chief Executive precisely to enable her
to pursue the peace process effectively.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long

process of negotiation and the concluding
of several prior agreements between the
two parties beginning in 1996, when the
GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On
July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace
Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year,
they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North
Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel
Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD, pending the
disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
and the holding of a public consultation
thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray
that
the
MOA-AD
be
declared
unconstitutional.

Facts:
Issues:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the
GRP and the MILF was not to materialize,
however, for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases
before the scheduled signing of the MOAAD, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.

1. Whether the petitions have become

moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is
concerned, in view of the disclosure of
official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect
involving the Local Government Units is
concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with
the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the
legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

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3. Whether respondent Government of the

Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it negotiated and initiated the MOA
vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the
people's right to information on matters of
public concern (1987 Constitution, Article
III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II,
Sec. 28) including public consultation under
Republic
Act
No.
7160
(LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA,
Government of the Republic of
Philippines would be BINDING itself

the
the

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro

Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section
3(g)
&
Chapter
VII
(DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive
Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the
Province of North Cotabato, Cities of
Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte

in/from the areas covered by the projected

Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable
question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the
MOA
derogates
any
prior
valid
commitments of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Held:
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided
into four strands, namely, Concepts and
Principles,
Territory,
Resources,
and
Governance.
The power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases or controversies. Courts
decline to issue advisory opinions or to
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems,
or mere academic questions. The limitation
of the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies defines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government.
As the petitions involve constitutional
issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance,
the
Court
grants
the
petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents
that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel
mooted the present petitions, the Court
finds that the present petitions provide an
exception to the "moot and academic"
principle in view of (a) the grave violation
of the Constitution involved; (b) the
exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to
formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the

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fact that the case is capable of repetition

yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series
of agreements necessary to carry out the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
signed by the government and the MILF
back in June 2001. Hence, the present
MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another
one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared
to the original.
That the subject of the information sought
in the present cases is a matter of public
concern faces no serious challenge. In fact,
respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern. In previous cases,
the Court found that the regularity of real
estate transactions entered in the Register
of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to
the public of the various laws, the civil
service eligibility of a public employee, the
proper
management
of
GSIS
funds
allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials, the recovery of the Marcoses'
alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of
party-list nominees, among others, are
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly,
the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is
of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent
consultation
process,
as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and
in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the

present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same
is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is
declared contrary to law and the
Constitution.
LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
G.R. NOs. 178831, 30 July 2009
FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative
in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras,
her rival, and some other concerned
citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not
a natural born citizen of the Philippines
because when she was born her father was
still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her
marriage to Limkaichongs dad. During the
pendency of the case against Limkaichong
before the COMELEC, Election day came
and votes were cast. Results came in and
Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared
Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days
after the counting of votes, COMELEC
declared Limkaichong as a disqualified
candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding
their
proclamation
disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC
issued
a
proclamation
announcing
Limkaichong as the winner of the recently
conducted elections. This is in compliance
with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the
policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with
pending disqualification cases which shall
be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved
cases. Paras countered the proclamation
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and she filed a petition before the

COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras
petitioned arguing that since she is now the
proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no
longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
It should be the HRET which should
exercise
jurisdiction
from
then
on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation
done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or
not
COMELEC
should
still
exercise
jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong
was valid. The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17,
2007.
On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong
timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her
motion for reconsideration as well as for
the lifting of the incorporated directive
suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively
suspended the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution
of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to
the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as
the winner.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2.
Period for Filing Motions for
Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof.
Such
motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order and ruling.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after
Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the HOR, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows

then that the proclamation of a winning

candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it
at the time of the proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide a
case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latters
election, returns and qualifications.
The
use of the word sole in Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of
the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral
Tribunals
jurisdiction
over
election contests relating to its members.
POBRE vs SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 1399, 25 August 2009
FACTS: FACTS: A letter complaint was filed
by Antero J. Pobre regarding the offensive
speech against the Supreme Court and its
members made by Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor.
Portions of the Senators
reproduced below:

speech

are

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am

foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in
a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements
reflected a total disrespect on the part of
the speaker towards then Chief Justice
Artemio
Panganiban
and
the
other
members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. Accordingly,
Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
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other disciplinary actions be taken against

the lady senator
Santiago does not deny making the
offensive
statements;
however,
she
explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity. The immunity
Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily
on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides: "A
Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
ISSUE: Can Senator Santiago be suspended
or disbarred for violating the Canons of
Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
A careful re-reading of her
utterances would readily show that her
statements were expressions of personal
anger and frustration at not being
considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a
sense, therefore, her remarks were outside
the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity
must not be allowed to be used as a
vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy
the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal
wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed
that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for
their personal benefit, but rather a privilege
for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.
in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is,

"like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not
to promote distrust in the administration of
justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people."
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s
an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."
The lady senator belongs to the legal
profession bound by the exacting injunction
of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that
profession with the administration of the
law and dispensation of justice. Generally
speaking, a lawyer holding a government
office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct committed while
in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation
of his/her oath as a lawyer.
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any
conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct
reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor, a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to
the practice of law and for continuance of
such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of
Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct,"
the reference is not confined to ones
behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of
lawyers professional
duties, but also covers any misconduct,
whichalbeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which their license and the
law invest in them.
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NOTE: Petition was dismissed. The speech

in question is covered by parliamentary
immunity and it is the Senate that should
have
imposed
sanctions
for
her
unparliamentary acts and language, but
which the latter chose not to do.

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