Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
II
THE RIGHT TO
WORLD HERITAGE?
Lynn Meskell
in the world heritage system. States parties have most to gain in the geopolitical
machinations and voting blocs that have emerged in the last few years. Not only
they leverage heritage for strategic economic and political trade-offs for military,
religious, and geographical advantage.
a crisis on several fronts- financial, organizational and political- that threaten its
mission and its effectiveness to protect and preserve.
have come to eclipse substantive considerations of both global heritage and local
communities. Like other vested stakeholders, archaeologists are often ignorant to
the power alignments and pacting in force, finding themselves bystanders in the
outcomes of heritage making. Educating ourselves is key, and becoming more
effective facilitators for vulnerable communities, but perhaps also seizing on the
potentials of this international forum for advancing the recognition and rights of
others.
same time nothing, to do with archaeology. I found myself drawn to this paradox,
while inherently aware of my own caricatured sketches of the organization, and
So in light of these larger structural processes, I ask how are emergent rights
to the past being presented, promoted and prevented by particular actors
internationally? In this paper, I draw from recent developments involving UNESCO's
recognition of Palestine, the ensuing United States financial withdrawal, the crisis
meetings.
was the very issue of sovereignty in an increasingly transnational world and in the
face of indigenous claims and rights that often conflict with nation states. Yet, the
structural failures to foreground minority rights, indigenous perspectives and to
implement change within the World Heritage system are all underwritten by nationstate desires, colonial alignments and new imperialisms.
in itself, offers a powerful lens onto the potentials of something called heritage in
political, cultural, economic, and spiritual terms.
United Nations, it is the signatory states that are the most powerful decision makers
From 1977 to 2005, in 314 nominations, 42 per cent benefitted those countries
UNESCO that the E (for education) comes first. But given this history of recognition
with Committee members during their mandate. This is striking when one considers
that the 21 Committee members comprise only 11 per cent of the total number of
minority lifeways, it is not surprising that UNESCO has emerged as the only structural
signatories (UNESCO 2011: 6). And you will find that the same small subset of
avenue to global governance and promotion of cultural heritage. Within the United
countries rotates on and off the Committee every few years, so the Committee has
Moreover, during the last three World Heritage Committee sessions, I have
the cultural arm, the visionary agency, and the 'ideas factory' for the larger
witnessed a kind of revolution, leading some to predict the death of the Convention.
There are the mounting challenges to the expert opinions of ICOMOS and the
Within UNESCO is the World Heritage Centre that was established in 1992 to
IUCN, the increasing and overt politicization of the Committee, and UNESCO's
act as the secretariat or the focal point and coordinator for all matters related to
witnessed the geopolitical machinations within the Committee and the excessive
for 40 years with strong consensus and near universal membership. There are 195
signatories to the Convention. And from those nations are drawn the 21 members
of the World Heritage Committee: they are elected at a General Assembly and
serve a four-year term. That committee is the most powerful player within World
Heritage and those 21 states parties are charged with implementing the Convention.
Members must all be signatory nations to the World Heritage Convention and
but rather listing many more sites, regardless of conservation, authenticity and
outstanding value (labadi 2013) ... and archaeologists too have long been sceptical
9Bl sites on the World Heritage List, more than three-quarters of them cultural
sites.
Unlike the employees of the World Heritage Centre, members of the World
But let me turn to one radical step that UNESCO has taken recently, one
Palestine.
Heritage Committee are state representatives and are thus free to pursue their
The UN and UNESCO have actively supported Palestine for many decades,
own national interests, maximize their power, push their economic self-interest,
from the establishment in 1949 of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
and minimize their transaction costs (Pavone 2008: 7). These national imperatives
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to granting observer status to the Palestine
and economic nee'essities are more binding than any ethical norms. Annual
liberation Organization in the 1970, and attempts in the early 1990s to admit
Committee meetings are becoming more like market-places where the nations of
Palestine as a full member (Valderrama 1995: 246). In 2011, the vote to extend
the world address 'each other at great length, but by procedures that ensure genuine
UNESCO membership to Palestine was passed 107 to 14, with 52 abstentions. The
dialogue is ruled out' (Hoggart 2011: 99). Given the economic interests at stake
United States, Israel, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany were among those
and the presumed prestige inscription on the List bestows, states parties are
who opposed, while Brazil, Russia, India China, and South Africa all voted in favour.
increasingly insisting upon nominating properties that, in the opinion of the IUCN
The latter forms a politico-economic coalition known as BRICS (Claudi 2011, Meskell
2014), an acronym coined at Goldman Sachs for those nations at a similar stage of
a strong correlation between the countries represented on the Committee and the
newly advanced economic development who distance themselves from the older-
_ _ _ _ _ _L-Ll_
.......
before first being inscribed on the World Heritage List. In an open letter to the
committee, 15 organizations from Bethlehem imputed that the "international
community has a legal and moral responsibility to protect our sites". Referring to
the wider political context, including "45 years of illegal Israeli occupation", they
added: "We believe that this is a step in the direction of peace, providing historical
that on face value may have gone some way to remedy the financial crisis. But the
political economy of these specific transactions is more complex. First, the United
States was already in arrears with its contribution and then was withholding for an
justice to our city, its holy places and its people." The latter is fully in line with
UNESCO's aspirational stance, yet international politics and the interests of
additional two years. This ongoing deficit plus shortfalls in monies allocated to
the World Heritage Fund and for other extra-budgetary programms compounds
the crisis. In March 2012, the Director-General predicted a US$ 188 million cash
shortfall. But in June at UNESCO Paris headquarters, I was told it was closer to US$
240 million and that the effect was crippling on vital programmes, making it
almost impossible to keep global operations going. Second, the additional
international voluntary contributions will have little impact: some were earmarked
to return entirely to the donor nation like Algeria or allocated for special programmes
like Qatar and could not be funneled into the general budget.
Palestine argued that Israel and the US have sought to block their bid for heritage
status for the church by urging members of the committee to vote it down . During
the World Heritage meetings in St Petersburg, American representatives were heard
The US has suspended financial support to UNESCO twice before over political
decisions: once in 1977 when Israel's petition to be considered part of Europe was
decrying the United Nations system, the credibility of UNESCO, and claiming the
nomination was illegal. What was the right of the US to appeal, I heard one delegate
UNESCO some US$ 43 million in lost revenues (Valderrama 1995: 294). In fact, the
Bush administration's decision to rejoin UNESCO in 2004 was largely motivated
ask. The German ambassador echoed their views most vociferously: She called on
by the pressures of international politics and trying to shift his unilateralist cowboy
reputation. But, as the case of Palestine forcefully demonstrates, the US still runs
counter to a majority international position.
UNESCO's legal adviser to intervene and imposed her own authority as a lawyer to
denounce the nomination. Happily, the position of both the US and Germany toward
Palestine was isolated at best, as hundreds of delegates cheered the successful
inscription of Palestine's first site at the World Heritage Committee meetings.
But of course there have been longer-term political and financial consequences
for UNESCO afte/its recognition of Palestine in 2011. The US State Department
terminated the substantial funds it already owed and its continued funding going
denied and again in 1984 over national interest and cold war conspiracy, costing
On the ground, the creation of something called 'World Heritage: and the
recognition that ensues, can be incredibly powerful and liberating but as the US
backlash demonstrates, it can also incite and divide, not to mention impose
punishments.
States have actually signed these instruments, how long it takes to bring most
Conventions into force, how often the instruments are flouted by States which
or any specialized agency thereof which accords the PLO the same standing as a
member state." In 1994, the Congress barred funding "any affiliated organization
have signed them or at least publicly associated themselves with their sentiments,
the record is less impressive. It then sometimes looks more like an exercise in
international public relations than a genuine advance in world law" (2011: 40).
of the United Nations which grants full membership as a state to any organization
or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood."
world, most notably in the face of minority claims and rights that often conflict
with nation state agendas. This is increasingly pressing when we examine the
inclusion and management of indigenous heritage places and practices within the
World Heritage arena. I want to look now at the brilliantly conceived World Heritage
Indigenous Peoples Council of Experts (WHIPCOE), proposed first in Australia in
2000 and sadly quashed in Helsinki a year later (Logan 2013, Meskell 2013a). This
then is a story of a radical, yet failed attempt to craft a global indigenous council
of experts within UNESCO, an organization founded on nation-state sovereignty.
The initiative was taken in response to concerns voiced by indigenous peoples
about their lack of involvement in the development and implementation of laws,
policies and plans for the protection of their knowledge, traditions and cultural
values that apply to their ancestral lands, within or comprising sites now designated
as World Heritage properties.
In World Heritage meetings during 2001, there seemed to be widespread
support and even enthusiasm for the initiative. A representative from the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights presented the history and position of indigenous
issues within the greater UN system. Representatives of ICOMOS, ICCROM and the
IUCN offered overviews of their mandates, structures, processes, activities, and
existing working relationships and interaction with indigenous people. From those
meetings, numerous suggestions were made for possible roles for WHIPCOE within
the World Heritage process. These included ensuring full consultation with local
people; strengthening the management of existing sites; promoting intangible
cultural heritage and traditional knowledge; and assisting with crafting management
guidelines and participation in the nomination and evaluation of sites (WHIPCOE
2001). A council '"'m ight afford opportunities for training, specifically sharing
successful indigenous site management approaches and practices between groups
internationally. Numerous follow-up meetings were held, letters of evaluation
requested from states parties, but the decision to formalize WHIPCOE was deferred
again and again.
Not surprisingly, the United States was resistant, claiming that they already
had 'a clearly defined legal relationship to indigenous peoples that would render
it inappropriate for us to submit such lists without consulting them' . This would
prove both a convenient and ironic deflection in retrospect given that the United
Nations was impelled to a mission a decade later to evaluate the scope of
CON1EXT
Standing back from these events, it becomes clearer that UNESCO's universal
heritage goals are frustrated and impeded the interests of nations that cannot be
called to account, since UNESCO is underpinned by the desire for consensual and
diplomatic solutions within the wider UN structure, thus by the organization's
very definition and mandate. Perhaps there is a more fundamental divide too: the
possibilities for indigenous collaboration across state lines are complicated by
particular local cultures, national legal framings, histories of oppression, and
relationships with the state. These fraught specificities, while unifying in sentiment,
can also impinge upon implementing international processes and legislation.
Whether one is talking about Universal Human Rights or World Heritage, these
seemingly global elements (universal and world) remain stymied by statism.
Considering the future possibility of a global indigenous network to advise
on World Heritage, no one denies that there is a considerable and growing body of
shared expertise, successful management strategies, and alternative understandings
of heritage and heritage connections across natural and cultural properties. As the
continued desire for such a network underscores, webs of indigenous interaction
may be proliferating, so too the traffic in ideas and findings. Yet, the impossibilities
of actual instrumentalization are what I find compelling. How can organizations
like UNESCO be empowered to not only endorse, but to execute rights-based
strategies, much like they moved on Palestinian recognition and sovereigntyalbeit after many decades of campaigning? What structurally impedes this
progression? The short answer is the bounds of the Convention, which is in itself
a treaty that can have 'no third-party effect unless this is clearly intended by States
Parties and consented to by third states.' And while Palestinian recognition was
acceptable internationally, states are still very resistant to the insertion of indigenous
authority and over-sight, intra-nationally, within their own natural and cultural
.,
properties.
Assistant Director-General for Culture of UNESCO, Francesco Bandarin (2007:
193) has indirectly questioned the hegemony of statist structures, by asking whether
the heritage that lies outside the jurisdiction of states parties might be supported
indirectly, by establishing links with other international legal tools, or developing
partnerships with institutions and organizations expressed by civil society? This
opens the door for potential non-state party support and site nomination, but it
remains to be seen if such properties would be inscribed and under the auspices of
the nation? It may be possible to imagine this process, yet it rather confounds the
underlying structure of the United Nations.
St Petersburg with the destruction in Mali. On June 28, the World Heritage
Committee discussed the failures of an earlier treaty, The Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954), that 115
states parties have ratified, including Mali in 1961.
ICOMOS proposed that Timbuktu be immediately placed on the World Heritage
in Danger List. Two days later, Director-General Bokova publicly called for a halt to
the destruction. It was as if the public spectacle of the international meetings
themselves further escalated the violations . Eleonora Mitrofanova, the World
Heritage Committee Chairperson, described the destruction as 'tragic news for us
all and, even more so for the inhabitants of Timbuktu who have cherished and
preserved this monument over more than seven centuries.' On July 1, Mali addressed
the Committee and appealed for assistance, but gave little outline of how UNESCO
could effectively respond in the face of ongoing rebel attacks. And while Committee
members were eager to find a solution, they were quickly frustrated by their inability
to act or offer concrete solutions on the ground. Some delegations complained
All we have are computers, papers and pens ... you're dealing with bandits
and criminals and we only have paper and pens. The international community
at this time has not set up specific actions and effective measures, which
those who take human life and destroy cultural heritage have, the call to
reason does not always produce the best outcome with these people.
Perhaps the spokesman for the Ansar Dine insurgents rather nailed the point:
'God is unique: he told reporters. 'All of this is haram (or forbidden in Islam). We
are all Muslims. UNESCO is what?' Here I am reminded of Fasulo's assertion that
we have a fundamental misunderstanding of organizations like UNESCO, fearing
them to be too strong, rather than too weak to be effective. As one former US
ambassador put it, there is no such thing as the UN, just 192 countries with different
agendas and a whole collection of civil servants who work there. We can also say,
following Singh, that good intentions aside, this is still an elite vision of the world
and ready to be exploited for various political expediencies. And who listens to
this vision? UNESCO spends a great deal of time and resources producing various
that such inaction called into question the Committee's integrity, yet most of their
time was spent drafting a statement of condemnation. France quipped that they
iterations of its education, science, communication, and culture ideals but much
were not addressing a state party, so could be fairly sure that the perpetrators
would not be reading the declaration or following it. Undaunted, the German
ambassador called for one minute's silence, saying 'we have lost a child, we have
help and their own brand of expertise to a country like Mali, on a state-to-state
basis, yet UNESCO does not have the financial capacity or legislative mandate to
intervene. Remember too that many of those nations acted positively to recognize
Palestine and supported the inscription of the Church of the Nativity. But many of
those same states parties remain reluctant to embrace a network of indigenous
experts who could effectively address and attend to problems in their own countries
and indeed globally. It is easier to mobilize support for international injustice, for
over-turning regimes with whom we do not sympathize, to criticize heritage
practices that do not accord to pre-determined Western models of conservation-
now. Given the budgetary constraints, who exactly will pay for such promises of
rather than acknowledge otherness and other knowledges at home. Sovereign states
are indeed resentful. And regardless of UNESCO's own desires for structural
transformation, successful in the case of Palestine, not in the case of WHIPCOE,
the following day. Committee members wrangled for hours over wording like
reconstruction? The Indian ambassador imputed that UNESCO lacked both the
mandate and the capacity to take any action in Mali.
We cannot do this ... the international community has to do things at the
request of the state community ... we're getting into dangerous terrain.
In the end it was left to Mitrofanova to recapitulate UNESCO's economic and
political predicament:
those successes turn on the voting power of signatory nations, nbt bureaucrats
and programme officers in Paris. And as the US financial withdrawal underlines,
UNESCO's mission and global capacity is precarious at best, premised on the whims
of powerful, wealthy nations like the US, Russia and China. These are all daunting
facts for archaeologists, especially those working hard to support local, indigenous
and minority constituencies from the bottom up, only to see that heritage trumped
Meskell, l. M
2012 Th R h
".
'
e us to Inscribe: Reflections on the 35th Session of the
World Heritage Committee, UNESCO Paris, 2011, Journal of Field Archaeology
37: 145-51.
would always live in 'the best of times and the worst of times. Poised between the
impossible expectations of its charter and the abysmal realities it had to confront
, 2013a, UNESCO and the Fate of the World Heritage Indigenous Peoples Council
of Experts (WHIPCOE), International Journal of Cultural Property 20: 155-74
daily, an elusive hope in the midst of multilateral conflict and confrontation, where
poverty, hunger, disease and oppression had first claims on the minds of men in
most parts of the world' (Preston, Herman, and Schiller 1989: 5). Cultural heritage
has been part of that elusive hope for a better world for the past 40 years, and as
the UNESCO tries to educate the world, we as archaeologists have to educate
ourselves to the political economies at work in our research, at our sites, our host
nations and amongst our many communities.
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