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ECONOMIC
PAUL STRASSMANN
incomeequality,
425. - II. Economicgrowthand growing
I. Introduction,
439.
427. - III. Empiricalevidence,432.- IV. Conclusion,
I
Accordingto a strawman versionof static pricetheoryand welfareeconomics,wages will inevitablybe at an optimumlevel under
marketconditionsof perfectcompetition. Due to the freeinterplay
of supplyand demand, pricesof all productivefactorsand marginal
to maxiwillhave come to restat a level corresponding
productivities
mum economic efficiency.Governmentaction contributesto efficiencyonly by providingsocial overhead capital - highways,sanitation,education,order- and by preventingindustrialwaterpollution and other social losses. Particularlygovernmentinterference
with pricingitselfwould mean dislocationand impairedefficiency.
Hence minimumwage legislationwould adjust inequityonlyat some
increase in economic waste. An unequal distributionof property
income may be morallyinequitable,but is conceivedto have little
bearingon technicalefficiency.'
These conclusionsare usuallybased on one or moreofthe following assumptions:perfectdivisibilityof productsand factors,increasdemand,a given state of
ing or constantreal costs,income-inelastic
technology,and the impossibilityof making interpersonalutility
comparisons. ProfessorHarry G. Johnsonhas added the assumptionsthat all pricesand interestrates remainconstant,that changes
in the asset holdings of individuals and the repercussionson the
* ProfessorsDudley Dillard, Daniel Hamberg,and Allan Gruchyof the
Universityof Marylandhave read an earlierdraftof this article,and their
are acknowledged
withthanks.
suggestions
1. See, forexample,Tibor Scitovsky,Welfareand Competition,
pp. 55, 60,
179; or DenstoneBerry,"ModernWelfareAnalysisand the Formsof Income
and Social Policy,ed. Alan T. Peacock
in IncomeRedistribution
Redistribution,"
(London:JonathanCape, 1954),p. 51. But see also TiborScitovsky,"Two ConLXII (April1954),
ceptsof ExternalEconomies,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy,
and Foresight,"and
"ExternalEconomies,Investment,
143-51;J. A. Stockfish,
Tibor Scitovsky,"A Reply," JournalofPoliticalEconomy,LXIII (Oct. 1955),
446-51.
425
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426
3. RagnarNurkse,"SomeInternational
AspectsoftheProblemofEconomic
Development,"AmericanEconomicReview,XLII (May 1952),572. See also his
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427
theproblemofKeynesand Hobson,whoconsideredincomeinequality
or oversaving,and thereforea cause
a cause of underconsumption,
ofdepressionin the shortrunand diminishedgrowthin thelongrun.4
ofincomebecause it affects
They wereconcernedwiththe distribution
rateof consumption. We, on the otherhand, are conthe aggregate
cernedwiththe distributionof incomebecause it affectsthe distribution of consumption. Our conclusionscan thereforebe consistent
withunchangedor withdecreasedratesof consumption.
II
large population,
It is our contentionthat, given a sufficiently
economicgrowthdepends not only on capital formationand technological progress,but also on growingincome equality, which we
shall later redefineas consumptionequality.
We may illustratethe relationshipbetweenincomedistribution
by an economyin whicha homogeneouslaborsupply
and productivity
in agricultureand in whicha small groupoflandemployed
is largely
half
thenationalincome. Some productsare exported,
ownersreceives
the landownersto invest all theirsavings
enable
and these exports
these
amountto 5 percentofthenational
Let
us
savings
say
abroad.
the
have been in the habit of spending
that
landowners
incomeand
their
investments. The population
the
returns
on
foreign
abroad all
do not occur, and year after
and
innovations
is stable, inventions
the national income
account,
international
the
for
except
year,
remainsthe same.
Finally, however, the landowners decide to import superior
agriculturaltools. Productivitydoubles,and half the farmworkers
become available forotherpurposes. That portionof half the crop
that, in effect,was once receivedby the released workersmay now
partlyaccrue to those farmworkerswho remainemployed;but it is
not unreasonableto suppose that most will go to the landowners.
Afterall, theirinvestmentmade the release of labor possible. Since
it is improbable that the landownerscan personallyconsume an
increasedshareofthe crop,theymustre-employthe releasedworkers
if they are to have a returnon theirinvestment. They may even
provide the workerswith trainingand furthercapital equipment
4. H. A. Hobson, The Evolutionof Modern Capitalism, rev. ed., pp. 377 ff.,
and The IndustrialSystem,an Inquiry intoEarned and UnearnedIncome,pp. 333 ff.,
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428
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429
the released workerscan be employedin easily mechanizedmassproductionindustriesonly if the national income incrementoveraccruesto them. But in thiscase theremay be verylittle
whelmingly
incentiveforthe landownersto make the investment.
To illustrate numericallythe effectof differencesin income
inequalityon capital accumulationand the use of labor,let us adopt
some arbitraryvalues forour model country. The populationmight
consistof 1,000,000workersand 10,000landownersand theirdependents. Real income per week might be 100,000,000pesos, divided
equally between landlords and workers. This means a wage per
laborerof 50 pesos weeklyor 2,600 pesos annually,and an average
annual rentper landownerof 260,000 pesos. As previouslyassumed,
foryearstherewas littleincentiveto createlarge-scalemanufacturing
industriesbecause lack of demand kept the marginal efficiency
of
capital too low.7 Now let this countryfollowa social pattern of
developmentsimilarto that ofNew Zealand or prairieCanada. Wages
mightrise to threequartersof the national income,and rentsfall to
one quarter. Specifically,
wageswouldrisefrom50 to 75 pesosweekly
or from2,600 to 3,900 annually;average rentalincomewould decline
from260,000 to 130,000pesos annually. With this reduced,though
still formidableincome, landlords mightfeel compelledto be economical. Labor would now be too expensiveto be hiredas butlers
and chauffeurswheneverthe value of these servicesdoes not reach
75 pesosweeklyperworker. In fact,theprerequisiteforany worker's
employmentmustnow be a marginalproductivity50 per centhigher
thanbefore. Meanwhile,in the courseofthe transition,the marginal
of capital would rise. As long as the income elasticityof
efficiency
demand for mass-producedgoods is greater among workersthan
landowners,the returnsfrominvestmentin mechanizedindustries
will rise. If the incomeelasticityof the workers'demand formassof bothcapital
produced goods is very high,the marginalefficiency
and labor in mechanized industrieswill rise a great deal. Other
thingsequal, it wouldrisemostrapidlyin the mostmechanizedindustries. Many servantswould driftinto factories. It mightpay to
has on others. See his "The EconomicFoundationsof Wage Policy,"Economic
Journal,LXV (Sept. 1955),389-404.
7. In sucheconomiessavingsare typicallyused to bid up the priceof real
abroadin realterms. Thissituationis partlythat"liquidityestatewhileflowing
preference
forland" whichKeynesbelievedmighthave had "the same effectin
innewlyproducedcapitalofwealthfromcurrent
investment
retarding
thegrowth
debtshave had in morerecenttimes."
assets,as highinterestrateson long-term
Op. cit.,p. 241.
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430
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431
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432
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433
(Oxford,1920)."
6. Simon Kuznets, "EconomicGrowthand Income Inequality,"op. cit.,
p. 4; Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings (New York: National
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434
UnitedStates
(1944,1946,1947,1950)
UnitedKingdom
(1947)
Denmark'
(1948)
Italy
(1948)
Ceylon
(1950)
India
(1949-1950)
PuertoRico
(1948)
Share of Lowest
60 Per Cent
of Family
SpendingUnits
(%)
Per Capita
Income, Average
1948, 1949 in
U. S. Dollars
44
34
$1,489
45
36
775
45
32
735
49
31
230
50
30
73
55
28
57
56
24
275
Share of Top
20 Per Cent
of Family
SpendingUnits
(%)
Sources: United Nations, Statistical Office, National Income and Its Distribution in Under-
Since our model countryexploredthe effectsof incomedistribution in termsof ownershipand wages, it may be interestingto see
what the ratio of workers'compensationto ownershipincome is in
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435
OF PERCENTAGE
OF PAYMENT
Country
AND PER
A
DISTRIBUTION
CAPITA
INCOME
B
Compensation Profits,Interest,
of Employees2 Rents, Royalties
(%)
(%)
OF NATIONAL
IN SELECTED
Ratio of
A to B
INCOME
COUNTRIES
Per Capita
Income, 1948
U. S. Dollars
Finland
60.9
14.3
4.3
$569
Australia
54.0
16.9
3.2
812
Switzerland
59.4
19.4
3.1
950
Canada
58.8
19.7
3.0
895
New Zealand
54.3
18.4
3.0
933
Southern Rhodesia
48.9
22.0
2.2
105
Chile
46.0
26.1
1.8
180
Peru
42.2
24.1
1.7
82
(1948)
(1948)
(1949)
(1949)
(1948)
(1949)
(1948)
(1947)
Source: United Nations, Statistical Office, National and Per Capita Income8, Seventy Countrie8- 1949, Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1950); National
Income and It8 Di8tribution in Underdeveloped Countrie8, Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 3 (New
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436
indicatinggreatestequality,apply to contemporary
The highestcoefficients,
was found
Sweden(2.15), New Zealand (2.35), and Australia(2.12). Argentina
fortheUnitedStates
ofonly1.2-1.3. In 1945thecoefficient
to have a coefficient
was 1.75.
was estimatedto be 1.95. Britain'scoefficient
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437
Population(millions,1950)
AcresofArableLand perCapita (1950)
TextileConsumption
perCapita
Total EnergyConsumption
perCapita
(coal and coal equivalentofoil,gas,fuelwood,
(U. S. Dollars,1948)
Source:
17.2
4.1
Australia
8.2
3.4
12,441
4,732
11,965
247
36
16
4.3
4.3
17.8
21.3
255
1,160
1,780
5,440
315
812
(New York: TwentiethCenturyFund, 1953), pp. 48, 402, 462-63, 472-73, 516-17, 546-47. United
Nations, Statistical Office, National and Per Capita Income8, Seventy Countrie8 -
Papers, Series E, No. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1950), pp. 14-16.
1949, Statistical
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438
1. U. S. Bureau of the Census, SixteenthCensus Reports,ComparativeOccupation Statisticsfor the United States, 1870-1940, p. 189.
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439
IV
We have attempted to show the importance of social homogeneityand resultingpatternsofincomeequalityas factorsconducive
to high productivityand the use of capital equipment. The introduction of advanced machinerythroughoutan economyis, in part,
a functionofthe volume of saving,the available technology,and the
ratio of labor to natural resources. But patternsof ownershipand
income distributionalso affectthe introductionof machineryby
the proportionof the labor forceemployedin indus(1) determining
tries capable of intensive mechanizationand (2) influencingthe
marginal efficiencyof capital in mass-production(that is mnassmarket)industries. A low degreeof incomeinequalityin a largeand
prosperouseconomymay have no serious effecton growth. Such
inequalitymay largelyreflectthe changeableconditionsofsupplyand
2. L. Rostas, ComparativeProductivityin British and American Industry
. in
is thesame or smallerthan
wherethesize oftheindustry
a numberofindustries
in theU. S."
wool) thereis an advancein productivity
in Britain(e.g.,breweries,
ofU. S. A.
(ibid.,p. 59). See also, E. Rothbarth,"Causes ofSuperiorEfficiency
IndustryComparedwithBritishIndustry,"EconomicJournal,LVI (Sept. 1946),
383-90.
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440
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