Stoicism envisaged reality as a dynamic material continuum, which their threefold

philosophical system was meant to reflect by the interdependence of its constituent parts.
The similes employed to illustrate the latters organic unity ascribe, nevertheless, a
relative priority1 to physics, comparing it to a fertile fields soil, an animals soul, or even
the yolk of an egg, depending on the specific parabolic context.2. In view of the centrality
of physics, it would not be unreasonable to argue that, when later scholarchs elaborated
on Zenos definition of the moral end so as to include therein the seeking of things
according to Nature,3, they were rendering explicit the bequeathed formulas latent
naturalism rather than innovating upon it in any deviating direction. This was not a
gratuitous step to take, especially if we keep in mind that Stoicism, in keeping with
Hellenistic philosophys general orientation, was anything but adverse towards putting
theoretical speculation to practical use. One needed not only to grasp virtues meaning
intellectually,4, but also to receive some guidelines for conquering it. Setting up a specific
class of objects as an aim to be habitually sought after could thus be seen as serving a
pedagogical function, designed to assist the novice in his effort to become
eventually a .
Dissolving the original definitions simplicity, however, rendered it liable to the
sceptical Academys hostile critique. In particular, Carneades leveled against it the
alternative charges of vicious circularity and teleological duality. According to this
argumentative line, his opponents account was subject to an internal inconsistency that
could only be remedied by either a) absurdly identifying the aim of virtuous action, i.e.
striving after preferred indifferents, with striving after preferred indifferents itself, or b)
1 Exegetical rather than expository. Cf. Plutarch, Stoic. Rep. 1053B: ,
(sc. Chrysippus) , <> ,
, and 1053C: '
,
.

2 Cf. DL VII 40: ,

, , .
, , ' . <>
, , .

3 I am aware that this formulation does not do justice to the variety of Chrysippus, Diogenes
and Antipaters definitions, often intended to ward off unfavorable criticism. I intend to provide a
taste of this variety by tacitly incorporating elements of alternative formulations in what follows.
4 Sensu stricto, of course, knowledge of virtue would be sufficient for right action to ensue. This
formed part of the Stoics Socratic inheritance.

sacrificing the economical elegance of teleological monism in order to make room for
two ends, i.e. both aiming after and acquiring the prima naturalia. I propose here to show
that the above dilemma is in fact less compelling than it would appear upon first
inspection.
Leaving aside the fact that these objections to the Stoic are directed against a
definitional version thereof which, as has been already argued, aimed only at a secondorder, instructive account,5, let us focus on the first horn of the proposed disjunction.
Obviously, the allegation of circularity could not have been invited by the Stoics
subscribing to the moral ends self-referential value, since this was common coinage in
ancient eudaemonist ends. It was rather its formulation as a goal-directed activity which
invited the remark that only the admission of an external object could exorcise the spectre
of incoherency. The first part of the sceptical conundrum reveals itself to be merely a
dialectical step towards the only genuine possibility: the acquisition of these external
objects cannot but function as a second moral end, parallel to the well-reasoned choice
thereof.
Herein lies the Achilles heel of Carneades reasoning. For, although it is incontrovertible
that all goal-directed actions are generically required to have an externalior, practical end,
by no means is it necessary for this end to be coordinate with the moral one, construed as
action specifically qualified by virtue. In Thomistic parlance, it is perfectly possible that
there exists a twofold order in ends, the order of intention and that of execution.6. In the
case of Stoicism, the latter is defined by the . Because of their
accordance with natures providential prescriptions for each species preferred indifferents
5 I think that Chrysippus disagreement with Cleanthes over the nature of action, which the first
identifies with the , although ostensibly referring to walking, was in reality
intended to show that the virtuous character of an action was entirely dispositional. Cf. Seneca,
Epist. XIII.18: inter Cleanthen et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio.
Cleanthes ait spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsum principale.
6 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica II.I.95: In finibus autem invenitur duplex ordo, scilicet ordo
intentionis, et ordo executionis, et in utroque ordine oportet esse aliquid primum. Id enim quod
est primum in ordine intentionis est quasi principium movens appetitum, unde, subtracto
principio, appetitus a nullo moveretur. Id autem quod est principium in executione, est unde
incipit operatio, unde, isto principio subtracto, nullus inciperet aliquid operari. Principium autem
intentionis est ultimus finis, principium autem executionis est primum eorum quae sunt ad finem.
Sic ergo ex neutra parte possibile est in infinitum procedere, quia si non esset ultimus finis, nihil
appeteretur, nec aliqua actio terminaretur, nec etiam quiesceret intentio agentis; si autem non esset
primum in his quae sunt ad finem, nullus inciperet aliquid operari, nec terminaretur consilium,
sed in infinitum procederet. To my great dismay, I find that the great Dominican has already
expressed with unparalleled clarity a distinction I arrived at independently. I notice this lest
chronological priority should weight unduly in the ascription of credit.

kindle that impulse without which any kind of deliberate action would be impossible.7.
Nevertheless, the principle of execution remains ordered to the principle of intention:
well-reasoning effort to attain the prima naturalia. Since it is this principle by which
every action is informed, at least normatively, it is also the only one that can lay claim to
being the ultimate ethical end, only homonymously related to its practical counterpart,
and therefore unable to be grouped along with it. Even in the sphere of action, therefore,
the Stoics are able to steer clear from consequentialism by maintaining a dispositional
account of virtue.

The best paper of this bunch. 10/10

7 Cf Chrysippus apud Plutarchum, Stoic. Rep. 1069E:

, ;