Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Annual Meeting
Linguistics Society of America, January.
1995 Annual Meeting Linguistics Society of America, January 8, 1995.{*}
Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning.{4} Putnam 1980 explains that, for any consistent set of
sentences in a language, a model can be constructed using any domain of individuals that is not of the
wrong size.{5} To see this, note that by Gdel's Completeness Theorem (Gdel 1930) any consistent set
of sentences has at least one model -- call it M -- with a domain of individuals D. Now consider an
arbitrary domain D'. If D' is not of the wrong size a mapping can be given from the elements in D to
those in D'. (This also holds true if D' = D, where the mapping would essentially reshuffle the elements.)
Now a new model M' may be constructed by reinterpreting the predicates in the original set of sentences
using D', so that M' is isomorphic to M. M' will also satisfy the original set of sentences. Putnam 1981
shows how to extend this result to intensional models. He gives the following example (1981, 32-35): A
cat* is on a mat* will express the same proposition (be true in the same possible worlds) as A cat is on a
mat where cat* denotes (i) cherries, in worlds where a cat is on a mat and a cherry is on a tree, (ii) cats, if
a cat is on a mat and no cherry is on a tree, and (iii) quarks otherwise; and similarly for mat*. And he
gives a formal proof that such examples are, in general, constructable (1981, 217-8).
Putnam's explicit target is metaphysical realism. For suppose we have an epistemically perfect or ideal
theory of the world, T. T is consistent with all the observations we will ever be able to make and satisfies
all of our theoretical constraints. The metaphysical realist believes that T, nonetheless, might be false; but
according to Putnam's "model-theoretic argument" it could always be made true simply by reinterpreting
the predicates.
This situation arises under the assumption that the predicates of the language can be assigned wild
interpretations which are 'unintended', allowing members of D' to be included or excluded from the
denotation of a particular predicate solely to make the original set of sentences true. The problem is that
fixing the truth conditions of sentences does not fix the denotations of the words in them. To this, the
natural response would seem to be to supplement the model theoretic picture with constraints on
reference. Here the second part of Putnam's argument comes into play.{6} Putnam supposes some
reference determining mechanism, say a causal theory, has been proposed. He then remarks that, even so,
the indeterminacy problem is not solved because "adding to our hypothetical formalized language of
science a body of theory entitled 'Causal theory of reference' is just adding more theory" (1980, 18). In
other words, such statements merely become part of the consistent set of sentences, T, that may be
satisfied in unintended ways.{7}
Against this, David Lewis 1984 suggests the world itself imposes constraints on reference which rule out
the wild unintended interpretations of Putnam's argument. Lewis writes:
Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, gerrymandered, illdemarcated. Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so that their boundaries are established by
objective sameness and difference in nature. Only these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as
referents. (p.227)
Lewis views this kind of referential eligibility as a matter of degree. A degree of indeterminacy remains,
but the kind of crazy reinterpretations allowed with no constraints are ruled out. This reply of Lewis,
obviously different from compositionality, and not so obviously supportable. In particular Lakoff's one
supporting observation, "it is the nature of meaning that the meanings of the parts of a sentence
contribute to the meaning of the whole in a nontrivial way," does not in fact imply (R), despite his claim
that (R) "is a way of stating that." Shortly, we will give examples where the meanings of the parts do
contribute to the meaning of the whole in a nontrivial way but where, nevertheless, (R) does not hold.
Lakoff declares that (R) must hold universally "for all sentences of all languages. If a given theory
cannot guarantee that requirement [(R)] will hold for every sentence, then it fails as a theory of meaning"
(1987, 231; emphasis in original). Apparently Lakoff modifies Putnam's argument in this way hoping to
strengthen it by lowering the threshold of failure. He notes:
...Putnam makes an infinitely stronger claim, that in model-theoretic semantics condition [(R)] can be
violated for every sentence of a language. ... But any number of violations of requirement [(R)] will be
sufficient to show inconsistency. To make his point Putnam only needs to demonstrate the inevitability of
moderate indeterminacy of reference. (1987, 321-2).
Here, Lakoff seems to have Lewis' reply to Putnam specifically in mind. Noting Lewis' admission that
his proposal to invoke naturalness as a constraint on reference will still leave a moderate degree of
indeterminacy, Lakoff responds, "But...even moderate indeterminacy is enough to guarantee
inconsistency with requirement [(R)]" (1987, 243).
Viewed as an absolute constraint, as Lakoff views it, (R) imposes a kind of radical determinacy on
language. It rules out on a case by case basis any examples constructed to demonstrate that fixing truth
conditions does not fix reference, like Putnam's cat*/mat* example; but notice that in so doing (R) also
rules out actual paraphrases which evince the kind of local indeterminacy illustrated in examples (1)-(3)
on the handout. When we go from the (a) sentences to the (b) sentences in each case we change the
meanings of the corresponding parts while keeping the truth conditions of the whole the same.
(1)
a. Kim is taller than Sally.
b. Sally is shorter than Kim.
(2)
a. The woman sold a car to the man.
b. The man bought a car from the woman.
(3)
*We owe many thanks to Rich Hall, Grover Hudson, and Charles McCracken for their comments on
earlier drafts of this paper and for much helpful discussion and clarification of the issues in it. We are
also grateful to Mark Richard and two anonymous referrees for their insightful comments. Undoubtedly
many flaws remain for which the aforementioned are not responsible.^
1. Flew's definition continues "Thus understood, realism obviously reaffirms the standpoint of common
sense, and it achieves the status of a philosophy only because a case against it has been seriously
argued." It is quite ironic that Lakoff, in opposing realism and promoting idealism, takes himself to be
opposing philosophy, which he apparently views as some kind of single-minded monolith devoted to
realism (as well as model-theoretic semantics).
Lakoff names the realist doctrines he opposes "objectivism" and in the paper "Cognitive Semantics" he
concludes: "Objectivist cognition is a false philosophical doctrine that stands in the way of research on
the nature of meaningful thought" (1988, 149). Similarly a section of this paper aimed at showing the
wrongness of objectivism is labelled "A Case of Philosophy versus Science" (1988, 122). Lakoff 1987
argues in a similar vein at much greater length (see especially the Preface and chapters 11-15).
Lakoff's apparent confusion about what philosophy is may account for some anomalies in his
presentation. In addition to his failure to be able to cite any examples of actual objectivist philosophers
(cf. 1987, 157), the philosophers he does cite (e.g. Wittgenstein, Austin, Putnam (who himself
acknowledges his antecedent Kant)) are primarily opposed to objectivism (although David Lewis is a
natural exception to this generalization), whereas the "Defenders of the Classical View" cited in 1987,
chapter 9, are all psychologists!^
2. See Kalish 1967 for a clear presentation of this type of semantics and many historical references. It has
been pointed out to us that some of the issues discussed in this paper arise in the context of other
semantic frameworks (a fact that will be further acknowledged below), but we confine ourselves to
model-theoretic semantics since that is the target named explicitly by Lakoff. Part of our purpose in fact
is to clarify the extent to which the arguments given by Lakoff apply specifically to MTS.^
3. More recently Putnam has adopted a position called "natural realism" -- see Putnam 1994. In this work
he explains that when he used the term "internal realism" in Putnam 1978 he meant it to refer to his
earlier views and not the new ones he was putting forward at that time (1994, 461, n. 36). See also
Dreben 1992, 300-301 for critical commentary on Putnam's use of terms containing the word "realism".^
4. An interesting question is the exact relation between Putnam's argument and Quine's views, full
consideration of which unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this paper (not to mention these writers,
but see Dreben 1992 for some interesting insights). We'll just note here that while Quine apparently
believes that this indeterminacy simply exists, Putnam finds it unacceptable. (Cf. Putnam 1983, xiif.)
Hence his argument that it exists on the metaphysical realist view is intended as a reductio of that view.
(This point is made forcefully by Anderson 1992.)^
5. The reason for this cautious wording is that there may be more than one possible right size. If an
infinite model is required then, by the Lwenheim- Skolem theorems, a model of any infinite cardinality
will do. Otherwise, whether an exact size is required may depend, in part, on whether the identity
predicate is taken to be a logical constant. See Myhill 1951 for some clear and helpful discussion.^
6. Somewhat confusingly, in "Cognitive semantics" (1988, 128-9) Lakoff puts forward the two parts in
reverse order, as two separate arguments. He also cites the indeterminacy result prior to and
independently of the examples given by Putnam to establish it! We do not know whether this is just
carelessness on Lakoff's part or whether it reveals some confusion about the argument itself.^
7. The problem of reference is really at the heart of Putnam's concerns, and we regret having to give it
such short shrift here. In addition to the 'just more theory' argument just cited, Putnam has also put
forward what is known as the 'brain-in-a-vat' argument. See the exegetical works cited above for further
discussion.^
8. David Lewis also wonders why this argument is called "model-theoretic". Cf. Lewis 1984, 229f.
Oddly, even Lakoff seems to see this at some points in his discussion, e.g. when he says "The problem
lies not with the use of model theory per se. It lies with objectivist philosophy and the attempt to base a
theory of meaning on truth . . . ." (1987, 256). However comments like this tend to get swamped by the
many contrary statements such as those given in the text immediately below, which seem to take
Putnam's argument as aimed specifically at MTS.^
9. It must be noted that, in addition to these strong statements about the hopelessness of MTS, Lakoff
also makes weaker statements, including some which seem to contradict the strong ones. Compare the
quote cited in the preceding footnote with the following: "The problem lies in the use of model theory in
the service of a theory of meaning" (1987, 230). Lakoff even describes his own approach as "cognitive
model theory" (1987, 259). However it is not really recognizable as MTS (see 1987, ch. 17).^
10. Grover Hudson has suggested to us that Lakoff actually might have meant to impose, not principle
(R), but rather the principle in (i):
(i) The meaning of one part cannot be changed without changing the meaning of the whole.
There would be two things to say in that case. The first is to note that we can find examples in natural
language where (i) is violated, viz.:
(ii)
a. Someone is buying a car.
b. Someone is selling a car.
Of course (iia) and (iib) differ in meaning in some sense, but their truth conditions are the same and that
is all that is at issue here (since that is all that MTS claims to represent). And the other is that it is not
clear that it is possible to construct the kind of example Putnam uses in making his indeterminacy
argument (e.g. the cat*/mat* example described above) but changing the reference of only one word
rather than two. Put in more general terms, this would require showing that the model M' above could
agree with the model M on all but one predicate, and we're not sure that that can be shown.^
11. Of course the meanings of the parts of the sentences in (1)-(3) are not globally indeterminate due to
the existence of other sentences which conclusively 'disambiguate' those given. We do not know if it
would be possible to demonstrate a pathological indeterminacy -- the unavoidability of unintended
reference -- for only a part of a language. Quine 1969 gives an example of what, if he were right, we
might call "enduring" local indeterminacy. Japanese NPs consisting of a number word, a classifier, and a
head noun may in principle be parsed semantically in two different ways. Either the noun is taken as
inherently count, and the classifier in effect inflects the number word, or the noun is neutral between
count and mass readings and the classifier word 'countifies' it. (See Quine 1969, 35-38.) The problem
with this example of Quine's is that data from the rest of the language determines a constituent structure
within the NP which combines the classifier with the number word, and this in turn (assuming
compositionality) determines the semantics. See Miyagawa 1989, and the references cited there.^
References, and Some Related Works
Abbott, Barbara. 1994. Realism, model theory, and linguistic semantics. Ms, Michigan State University,
East Lansing.
Anderson, David L. 1993. 'What is the model-theoretic argument?' The Journal of Philosophy 90, 311322.
Dreben, Burton. 1992. 'Putnam, Quine -- and the facts'. Philosophical Topics 20, 293-315.
Flew, Antony. 1979. A dictionary of philosophy. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1992. Bully for brontosaurus. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Gdel, Kurt. 1930. 'Einige metamathematische Resultate ber Entscheidungsdefinitheit und
Widerspruchsfreiheit'. Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, mathematischenaturwissenschaftliche Klasse 67, 214-215.
Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, George. 1988. 'Cognitive semantics'. U. Eco, M. Santambrogio, & P. Violi, eds., Meaning and
mental representations, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 119-154.
Lewis, David. 1984. 'Putnam's paradox'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62, 221-236.
Myhill, John. 1951. 'On the ontological significance of the Lwenheim-Skolem theorem'. M. White, ed.,
Academic freedom, logic, and religion, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 57-70.
Putnam, Hilary. 1978. 'Realism and reason'. Meaning and the moral sciences, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 123-140.
Putnam, Hilary. 1980. 'Models and reality'. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45, 464-82. Reprinted in Putnam,
1983, 1-25.
Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1983. Philosophical papers vol. 3: Realism and reason. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Putnam, Hilary. 1994. 'The Dewey Lectures 1994: Sense, nonsense, and the senses: An inquiry into the
powers of the human mind'. The Journal of Philosophy 91:9, 445-517.