Villarico v.

SarmientoFacts:
Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue highway by
a strip of land belonging to thegovernment. Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a
portion of the saidgovernment land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp. In
1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villaricoacquired a portion of the
same area owned by thegovernment.He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that
respondents(Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way tothe Ninoy Aquino
Avenue and encroached on a portion of hislot.
Issue:
Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.
Ratio:
No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the state or
property of public dominion.
It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined toprivileged individuals but is open
to the indefinite public.Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built isfor the
use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public dominion.
Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be:
Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matterof contracts
Acquired by prescription against the state
Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution
Be burdened by a voluntary easement
It cannot be burdened by voluntary easement of right of way in favorof the petitioner and
petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself andhe cannot claim any right of possession over it
495 SCRA 591
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CITY OF PARAAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD
NG PARAAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAAQUE, respondents.
FACTS:
On 1 October 2001, MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition
and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The
petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately
600 hectares of land. including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then
under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of
the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless
specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption
from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA
negotiated with respondent City of Paraaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City.
MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew

the tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations" upon the

effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of
statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all
others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the
Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
ISSUE:
Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws.
HELD:
We rule that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by
local governments.
First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of
MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
Respondents argue that MIAA, being a government-owned or controlled corporation, is not
exempt from real estate tax. Respondents claim that the deletion of the phrase "any
government-owned or controlled so exempt by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local
Government Code withdrew the real estate tax exemption of government-owned or controlled
corporations. The deleted phrase appeared in Section 40(a) of the 1974 Real Property Tax
Code enumerating the entities exempt from real estate tax.
There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from
real estate tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from
Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy
was once located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the
properties would be available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for
public auction was the Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different
sectors.

HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property
was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
doesnt automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.

The Public EstateAuthority(PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake

reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement)to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amarownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga 22 SCRA 1334

Facts
Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the
provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50
providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its
conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be
fixed by theAuditorGeneral, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were identified and the
price were fixed thereof. Anallotmentfor its payment was authorized by the BIR
Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended section 50 of the
Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the
Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge
in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with preliminaryinjunctioncontending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as
it deprives the Province of its properties without just compensation anddue process.
Issue
Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional?
Held
The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the properties in
dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by the province in its
governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use remain as patrimonial
property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the properties that are
devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental capacity and thus must
retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties need not be paid by the City
of Zamboanga.
With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039 cannot be
applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that are not devoted
for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shallPAYjust compensation to the Province of
Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties.

PILAPIL VS. CA
G.R. No. 55134
December 4, 1995
FACTS:In the instant petition for review on certiorari, questioning the decision of the CA

affirming the decision of the trial court.

Felix Otadora was the registered owner of a parcel of land (273,796-sqm) in Ormoc city
covered by OCT No. 26026. He died and was survived by his wife Leona and 3 children
(vitaliana, Maxima and Agaton). Subsequently, Leona and the three children sold portions of
said lot, leaving a portion with an area of 51, 019 sqm (Lot 8734-B-5) . Then Leona died.
On March, 1962, the Otadora siblings, together with their nephew Antonio, executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of sales, giving each of them one-fourth undivided
share in the remaining property. That very same day, Vitallana and Agaton sold to petitioners
Pilapil and Penaranda an undivided portion of the, measuring 18,626 sqm of lot Lot 8734-B5. The deed of sale, which was executed in the presence of Antonio and another witness,
specified that the possession and ownership of the property sold shall be transferred to the
buyers from the date of the instrument. The deed of extrajudicial partition was annotated
on OCT No. 26026. Because of such partition, OCT No. 26026 was cancelled and replaced
by TCT No. 4026 which, in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 4029, indicating as owners
Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, and Antonio. The sale to petitioners was inscribed at the back of
TCT No. 4029 as Entry No. 10903 on March 29, 1962.
Later, Antonio sold his one-fourth share to his cousin Bensig, who ceded one-half thereof to
the spouses Visitacion Otadora and S. Aldrin, by a deed of quitclaim. Because of such, TCT
No. 4029 was cancelled and supplanted by TCT No. 4484, which showed Agaton, Vitaliana,
Maxima, Bensig, and the spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin as owners of Lot 8734-B-5.
Petitioners names did not appear among the owners, although in the memorandum of
encumbrances at the back of TCT No. 4484 regarding the sale to them by Vitaliana was
retained.
Despite the sale of 18, 626 sqm of their undivided share in said lot earlier made in favor of
petitioners, Agaton AGAIN sold his one-fourth share in the lot to his daughter Carmen
covered by TCT No. 9130. Vitaliana on the other hand, RE-SOLD her one-fourth share to
Maxima. 4 days later, Maxima sold her now one-half share to her sons Dionisio and Macario
who were able to register the said properties in their names. On Sept, 1971, TCT was issued
to spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin, and another TCT for Carmen and her husband.
Upon discovery of the new titles, petitioners filed a protest with the register of deeds or Ormoc
city, who in a letter informed Carmen, S. ALdrin, Macario and Dionisio of the existence of the
deed of sale in favor of petitioner and required them to present their original titles for proper
annotation. Such request was, however, ignored.
On July 1972, Carmen and her husband Masias sold the one-fourth share sold by Carmens
father to her to respondent Serafica and Sons Corp. which was not able to register the same
because of the annotation in TCT No. 9130 earlier made showing the sale in favor of
petitioners. Because of this, the corporation charged the vendors with estafa before the City
Fiscals Office, but the complaint did not prosper.
Petitioners therefore filed, on December 1973, a complaint for quieting of title, annulment of
deeds, cancellation of titles, partition, and recovery of ownership with damages, against
herein private respondents. The complaint alleged, among other things, that petitioners
succeeded in possessing only 12,000 square meters of the lot and needed 6,626 square
meters more to complete the total area purchased from Vitaliana and Agaton in 1962.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants (Serafica & Sons
Corporation) and against the plaintiffs (Pilapil) hereby dismissing plaintiffs complaint, and
ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants for attorneys fee, to vacate the lot in question

and deliver the same to defendant. In its decision dated June 1994, the court a quo concluded
that the annotation on TCT No. 4484 of the sale by Vitaliana and Agaton in favor of petitioners
was null and void because the latter failed to surrender the owners duplicate copy of the title,
in violation of Section 55 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The CA said that OCT No. 26026 thereby became inexistent, it having been already cancelled
by TCT(s) Nos. 4026 and 4029. It would have been against the law to have the deed of sale
registered in TCT No. 4029 without an order from the proper court authorizing such
registration, specifically because OCT No. 26026 had already undergone two cancellations,
first by TCT No. 4026 and then by TCT No. 4029 .It held that Appellants should have filed the
necessary petition with the proper court asking that the Register of Deeds be authorized to
annotate the deed of sale executed by Agaton Otadora and Vitaliana Otadora in their favor.
The said title was, therefore, null and void, and the same did not acquire the effect of a
constructive notice to the whole world of the interest over the land in question of the plaintiffsappellants. At most, the deed of sale is merely a contract between the plaintiffs-appellants
and the vendors appearing therein but without any binding effect upon their persons and upon
whom bad faith cannot be imputed. Also, The deed of sale did not specify what part of the 1/4
share of each of the registered owners who executed the sale was sold to the appellants. The
CA also agreed with the lower court that H. Serafica & Sons Corporation was an innocent
purchaser for value as it was not required by law to go beyond TCT No. 9130 which, on its
face, appeared to be unencumbered.
ISSUE: petitioners argue that the CA erred in holding that:
(1) The annotation of the sale in their favor on TCT No. 4029 is ineffectual;
(2) The deeds of sale respectively executed by Agaton and Vitaliana in favor of Carmen and
Maxima are valid and superior to that executed earlier by Agaton and Vitaliana in their favor;
Petitioners contend that the liability of the Otadoras who sold the same property twice should
have been determined to avoid multiplicity of suits
HELD: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners are declared the lawful owners of 18,626 square meters of said lot and the
unclaimed lot of petitioners be taken in equal portions from the shares thereof of Agaton and
Vitaliana or their successors-in-interest.
(1) The court below correctly ruled that the annotation of Entry No. 10903 in the certificates of
title was not made in accordance with law. To affect the land sold, the presentation of the
deed of sale and its entry in the day book must be done with the surrender of the owners
duplicate of the certificate of title. Production of the owners duplicate of the certificate of title
is required by Section 55 of Act No. 496 (now Section 53 of PD No. 1529), and only after
compliance with this and other requirements shall actual registration retroact to the date of
entry in the day book. However, nonproduction of the owners duplicate of the certificate of
title may not invalidate petitioners claim of ownership over the lot involved considering the
factual circumstances of this case.
(2) It is undisputed that after the sale of the lot to petitioners, the same vendors sold the same
property to persons who cannot be considered in law to be unaware of the prior sale to the
petitioners.
Considering these relationships and contrary to the findings of the courts below, the vendees,

Carmen and Maxima, cannot be considered as third parties who are not bound by the prior
sale between Agaton and Vitaliana as vendors and petitioners as vendees, because there is
privity of interest between them and their predecessors.The reason for this is that the validity
of a title to a piece of property depends on the buyers knowledge,actual or constructive, of a
prior sale.While there is no direct proof that Carmen and Maxima actually knew of the sale to
petitioners, they are deemed to have constructive knowledge thereof by virtue of their
relationship to both Agaton and Vitaliana. Hence, it has become immaterial if the sale to
petitioners was properly annotated on the correct certificate of title or not.
It is not disputed that of the 25,510 square meters which pertain to Vitaliana and Agaton as
their combined undivided share in Lot No. 8734-B-5, an area of 18,626 square meters had
been sold to petitioners who, in turn, were able to possess only 12,000 square meters thereof.
Thus, at most, Vitaliana and Agaton had a remainder of 6,884 square meters of undivided
share which they could have legally disposed of. As it turned out, however, they sold
theirentireindividual one-fourth shares to Carmen and Maxima who, as earlier concluded,
were privy to the prior sale to petitioners.
Thus, when Carmen sold the property to H. Serafica and Sons Corporation,she no longer had
any rights of dominion to transmit, since her own father who sold to her the property had
himself earlier relinquished his ownership rights in favor of the petitioners.Accordingly,
Carmen transmitted no right to the corporation.
Under these circumstances, the corporation, having failed to obtain relief through the criminal
complaint filed against the spouses Carmen Otadora and Luis Masias, and having relied on
the unencumbered transfer certificate of title shown to it by the Masias spouses, is entitled to
damages.
As regards the sale made by Vitaliana to her sister Maxima,the former can no longer transmit
any property rightsover the subject lot when she sold it to her own sisteras she had previously
sold the same property to petitioners. Moreover, as Vitalianas sister, Maxima was actually a
co-owner of Lot No. 8734-B-5 which, at the time of the sale to petitioners, was not yet
partitioned and segregated. Maxima was, therefore, privy to the contract
On the matter of whether the rights of co-owners had been transgressed by the sale to the
petitioners, the trial court erroneously ruled that there should be proof of compliance with
Article 1623 of the Civil Code requiring the vendor of the property to give a written notice of
sale to the other co-owners.
In view of the foregoing, the sale to the petitioners must be respected by the successors-ininterest of Agaton and Vitaliana. Inasmuch as petitioners had managed to possess only
12,000 square meters of the 18,625 square meters they bought from Agaton and Vitaliana,
the whole area purchased by them should be taken from the shares of Agaton and Vitaliana
upon partition of the property.
NOTES:
1. inAbuyo v.De Suazo:[t]he purpose of the registration is to give notice to third persons.
And, privies are not third persons. The vendors heirs are his privies. Against them, failure
to register will not vitiate or annul the vendees right of ownership conferred by such
unregistered deed of sale.
2. 2.inBasa v.Aguilar: a third person, within the meaning of Article 1620 of the Civil Code (on
the right of legal redemption of a co-owner) is anyone who is not a co-owner.

OZAETA VS CA
ANCAYCO, J.:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering the
appealed judgment final and executory for failure of petitioner to file the appellant's brief
within the required time.
In an action for damages arising from alleged infringement of patent, the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City rendered a decision requiring petitioner to pay private respondent
P200,000.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 exemplary damages, P10,000.00 attomey's
fees plus the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals, and when petitioner was required to
file the brief, on June 5, 1987 he filed a motion for extension of time to file brief in the said
Court and this was granted in a resolution dated June 18, 1987 giving him a period of sixty
(60) days from June 5, 1987 or until August 4, 1987 within which to file his brief. On July 17,
1987 petitioner filed a motion to suspend proceedings before the appellate court due to the
pendency of Inter Partes case No. 861 with the Philippine Patent Office wherein petitioner
sought to nullify the patent of private respondent.
In a resolution dated July 30, 1987, private respondent was required to file its comment to the
motion within ten (10) days from notice. Said comment was filed on August 29, 1987 to which
petitioner filed a counter-comment and private respondent was required to file a reply.
On January 27, 1988 a resolution was issued by the appellate court denying the motion to
suspend proceedings, a copy of which appears to have been received. by petitioner on
January 30, 1988. A motion for reconsideration dated February 15, 1988 was filed by
petitioner to which an opposition was filed by private respondent. On March 7, 1988 the
motion was denied, copy of said resolution was received by petitioner on March 11, 1988. On
March 15, 1988 petitioner filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file
brief on the ground that counsel is practising alone and he had other cases to attend to. This
was denied in a resolution dated March 22, 1988. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
filed by petitioner. On April 13, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to admit appellant's brief
attaching the same to the motion. On April 18, 1988 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal for failure of petitioner to file the brief on time and denied the motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dated March 22, 1988. A copy of said resolution was
received by petitioner on April 21, 1988 on which date private respondent filed a manifestation
and motion to strike out the motion to admit brief and the attached brief in the same case.
Petitioner then filed on April 22, 1988 an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dated April 18, 1988. The motion to admit brief of petitioner was denied in a resolution dated
April 22, 1988. On May 5, 1988 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's omnibus motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari, the resolution of which revolves on whether
or not the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief on time was proper.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The pendency of the administrative proceedings before the Philippine Patent Office to nullify
the patent of private respondent which appears to have been filed earlier than the complaint
for damages is not one of the grounds for the suspension of actions under Sections 1 and 3,

Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the said motion did not therefore suspend the
period within which petitioner was required to file the appellant's brief which was due to expire
on August 4, 1987.
As aforestated, what petitioner did was to file a motion to suspend the proceedings on July
17, 1987. He did not take any step to file appellant's brief but simply awaited the resolution of
the motion which was denied on January 27, 1988. Again a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution was filed by petitioner which was also denied on March 7, 1988. It was only upon
such denial and after the expiration of seven (7) months from the last day of filing the brief
that the petitioner filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file the brief
i.e., on March 15, 1988. Correctly indeed, the Court of Appeals denied said motion on March
22, 1988. Petitioner again sought a reconsideration of said resolution and asked for another
extension.
On April 13, 1988 petitioner filed appellant's brief. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on April 18, 1988 and denied the motion for reconsideration of its March
22, 1988 resolution.
From the foregoing set of facts there can be no question that petitioner and his counsel were
grossly negligent. Knowing that the period within which to file the brief was to expire on
August 4, 1987, they should have filed a motion for extension of time within which to file the
brief or a suspension of time within which to file the same pending resolution of the motion to
suspend the proceedings in the case. However, instead of taking any of these steps they
assumed that the filing of the motion to suspend proceedings automatically suspended the
running of the period within which to file the brief,, an assumption that is not supported by the
Rules or any other authority.
Moreover, when petitioner filed on March 15, 1988 a motion for thirty (30) days extension of
time within which to file the brief, the motion was filed was past the period of time sought to be
extended, i.e., seven (7) months past. The rule is explicit that such motion for extension of
time must be filed before the expiration of time sought to be extended.
The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. More so
in this case where petitioner not only neglected to file the appellant's brief within the stipulated
time but also failed to seek an extension of time for a cogent ground before the expiration of
the time sought to be extended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.