CASES IN PROPERTY BATCH 2 (FULL TEXT)

1) German Management & Services, Inc. vs CA ( GR No. 76216 and 76217)

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area
of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of
Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally
registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to
a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner
German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424
from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the
property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the
occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the
development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private
respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and
tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that
during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial
Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the
owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private
respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the
barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit
bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in
violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject
private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and
1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible
entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the
Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986, said
court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at
the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an
action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to
reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it
reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer
and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist.
The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented
in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both
parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the
fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any
violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were
ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable
possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve
to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in
a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence
or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action
of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of
self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

2) Caisip VS People of the Philippines (GR NO. L-28716)

This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of Grave Coercion, with
which they are charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the costs.
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated a parcel of land
known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu,
Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the
complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian.
The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein. Even before the
occurrence of the incident presently involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and
litigations involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the men of Hacienda
Palico on the other.
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action with the Court of
Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia. over lot No. 105-A of
Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958, the Court of Agrarian Relations declared
it has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of
land. An appeal was taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a
resolution dated April 10, 1958.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino Guevarra in the justice of the
peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry, praying therein that Guevarra be ejected
from the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing, the said Court in a decision dated May 2,
1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to pay damages and accrued rentals. A writ of
execution was issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on
Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R.
Aquino of this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites among other things that the
possession of the land was delivered to the Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and
Guevarra was given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within which to leave the premises.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to the
complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace

who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt to appeal,
which was not given due course because the reglementary period therefor had expired; that a
motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by him; and that a second motion for
reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and it was October 19, 1959 when such
testimony was given.
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and Caisip regarding the
cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16, 1959, the complainant allegedly
again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the
aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the peace court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the said
court as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust vexation for the
incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 970. Both cases,
however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight
(8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both cases were
on motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof provisionally dismissed, on
November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the
evidence of record ... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."
The decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:

It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to remain in the premises,
Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him to see Deputy Sheriff
Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed Caisip that he could not act on the
request to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from what she was doing without a proper court
order. Caisip then consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who, in turn, went to
the chief of police and requested for the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of
police, acting on said request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey,
police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote.
1
On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A
which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to
do so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and that the crops thereon
belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the police,
Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who
were some distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a
squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales
grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding.
Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her
northward towards a forested area, where there was a banana plantation as Caisip stood
nearby, with a drawn gun.
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed,
soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were dragging her. The
policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town which was on the west
Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by
them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged
about eight meters and her dress, as well as her blouse 3were torn. She then agreed to proceed
westward to the municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within Lot

105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they
passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she
was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, whereupon, he went down
the house and accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and
Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After being interrogated
by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and
allowed to go home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that, upon being
asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused to do
so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense, she was arrested
because of the crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey,
moreover, testified that, as they were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria
proceeded to tear her clothes.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and found that of
the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which fully
concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari its appealed decision
is limited to questions purely of law. 4Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred:
(1) in not finding their acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that
the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the
sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of
grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This
pretense is clearly untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having been given 20
days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17, 1959
or within said period invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession
thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not
"repel or prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria
from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had
explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the
view that he could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in the
presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants claim,
the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1) said
period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant Caisip,
who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by the
sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact, remained, in
possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his
representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its
owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to
vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties
who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing

crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," 5 and the cost of
cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary
expenses. 6
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal
authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law,"
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the
law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. 7
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness, he
should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly
observed:
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the complainant, unlike the
accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the ones who used force against Gloria, and while the
Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of the complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during
the incident, it sufficiently appears from the record that the motivation and inducement for the
coercion perpetrated on the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised
and particular purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land and working on the same. He
was the one who first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried to prevent her
from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria from doing the same act even the day
previous to the present incident. It was Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to accomplish
his purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the land and making her leave the premises. The
policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when the said policemen were already over-asserting
their authority as peace officers, Caisip simply stood by without attempting to stop their abuses.
He could be hardly said to have disapproved an act which he himself induced and initiated. 8
In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the
latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction. 9
In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength 10
and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her sex, 11 were present,
insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales and
Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of having taken advantage of
their positions as members of the local police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted
out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed in said Art. 286, 12
and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance with law. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.
3) People of the Philippines VS Pletcha (GR No. 19029-CR)

4) Rodil Enterprises, Inc. VS CA (371 SCRA 7)

These twin petitions filed under Rule 45 seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 39919, 36381 and 37243. Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the
lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building (O'RACCA) since 1959.[1] It was a "former alien property"
over which the Republic of the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477, as amended.
[2] Sometime in 1980 RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc,
Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,[3] members of the Ides O'Racca
Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION). On 4 September 1972 the lease contract
between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was renewed for another fifteen (15) years.[4] At that time the
O'RACCA was under the administration of the Building Services and Real Property Management
Office (BSRPMO) then headed by Director Jesus R. Factora.[5] On 12 September 1982 BP 233[6]
was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien properties" classified as commercial and
industrial, and the O'RACCA building was classified as commercial property.[7] On 8 January 1987
RODIL offered to purchase the subject property conformably with BP 233 and the REPUBLIC
responded that its offer to purchase would be acted upon once the Committee on Appraisal shall
have determined the market value of the property.[8] On 22 July 1997 the ASSOCIATION also
offerred to lease the same building through the Department of General Services and Real Estate

Property Management (DGSREPM).[9] Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the
property, Director Factora of the BSRPMO granted RODILs request for another renewal of the
lease contract on 23 September 1987 for another five (5) years from 1 September 1987.[10] The
renewal contract was forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of DGSREPM for approval. On 25
September 1987 Undersecretary of DGSREPM Rufino B. Banas recommended to Secrectary De
Jesus the suspension of the approval of the renewal contract because the offer of the
ASSOCIATION was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC.
Resultantly, on 30 September 1987 Secretary De Jesus issued another memorandum to
Director Factora disapproving the renewal contract in favor of RODIL, at the same time recalling
all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus likewise directed RODIL to pay
its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary occupancy permit to the
ASSOCIATION.[11] On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages
and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION.[12] RODIL prayed
that a restraining order be issued enjoining the ASSOCIATION or any person acting under it from
collecting rentals from the occupants or sub-lessees of O'RACCA. On 26 October 1987 the trial
court granted the writ of preliminary injunction.[13] On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the deposit of the monthly rentals with
the lower court pendente lite. On 20 November 1987 the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas and Factora
filed their Answer with Counterclaim for damages. On 21 December 1987 the ASSOCIATION also
filed its Answer with Counterclaim for damages. De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later
substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in the action for specific performance. On 31 May 1988 Factoran issued Order
No. 1 designating the Land Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as
custodian of all "former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. On 18 May 1992 RODIL signed
a renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved by Secretary Factoran.[14] The
renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years from 1 September 1987. A
supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where
rentals on the previous lease contract were increased.[15] On 14 August 1972 the action for
specific performance was dismissed by the trial court upon joint motion to dismiss by RODIL and
the Solicitor General. The order of dismissal however was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the
Court of Appeals.[16] On 25 September 1992 the spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania
Alvarez, sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the
authority of Factoran to enter into the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 with RODIL, and claiming
the right to purchase the subject property.[17]
While the appeal of the ASSOCIATION from the order of dismissal and the letter-appeal of
the spouses Alvarez were pending, the ASSOCIATION instituted Civil Case No. 92-63833 with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila[18] praying for the setting aside of the renewal contract of 18 May
1992 as well as the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992, and further praying for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3 May 1993 the trial court denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction.

On 30 July 1993 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear,[19] and
on 4 August 1993, a similar action against Chua Huay Soon.[20] On 10 September 1993 the trial
court dismissed the action for declaration of nullity of the lease contract filed by the
ASSOCIATION on the ground of litis pendentia.[21] The Order stated that the action for
declaration of nullity and the action for specific performance filed by RODIL were practically
between the same parties and for the same causes of action.[22] This Order was appealed by the
ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals.[23] On 19 January 1994 RODIL filed an action for unlawful
detainer against respondent Teresita Bondoc-Esto,[24] and on 1 February 1994 filed another

action against respondent Carmen Bondoc,[25] both with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
On 8 February 1994 the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona Jr.
denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez, but nullified the renewal contract of 18 May
1992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992.[26]
Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject respondents
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,[27] as promulgated in separate
decisions the dispositive portions of which read -IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143301 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.] and against the defendant [CARMEN BONDOC], to wit: 1.
Ordering the defendant and all those claiming title under her to vacate the subleased portion of
the ORacca Building, corner Folgueras and M. de los Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila; 2. Ordering
the defendant to pay plaintiff the back rentals from October 1987 to August 1992 at the rate of
P2,665.00 per month and from September 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 per month plus a yearly
increase of 20% per month up to the time that she vacates the premises; 3. Ordering the
defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143216 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES,
INC.] as against the defendant [TERESITA BONDOC ESTO] ordering the defendant and all persons
claiming rights under her to vacate the premises at ORacca Building located at corner Folgueras
and M. de los Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila, and turn over the possession thereof to plaintiff;
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,700.00 as rental in arrears for the
period from September 1992 plus legal rate of interest less whatever amount deposited with the
Court; ordering defendant to pay the sum of P3,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use
and occupancy of the premises from January 1994 until defendant shall have finally vacated the
premises minus whatever amount deposited with the Court as rental; ordering defendant to pay
reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and the costs of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142258 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.],
ordering defendant [DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR], its representatives, agents, employees and/or
assigns to vacate the leased premises or portion of the Ides ORacca Building presently occupied
by said defendant and to pay plaintiff the following: a) Rentals in arrears from October 1987 to
June 1993 in the amount of P521,000.00; b) Rentals in the amount of P9,000.00 a month from
July, 1993 until defendant will have vacated the premises; c) Attorneys fees in the amount of
P15,000.00; d) Costs of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142282-CV IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. defendant CHUA HUAY SOON
and all persons claiming rights through him, to vacate the premises occupied by him at ORACCA
Building, located at the corner of Folgueras and M. delos Santos Street, Binondo, Manila, and turn
over possession thereof to plaintiff RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.; 2. defendant to pay rentals in
arrears from October 1987 up to June 1993 at the rate of P6,175.00 a month, representing the
rentals in arrears; 3. defendant to pay P6,175.00 per month from July 1993 until he vacates the
premises, as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises; 4. defendant to pay the sum
of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; 5. defendant to pay interests on the amounts mentioned in Nos.
2 and 3 above at ten (10%) percent per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until
said amounts are fully paid; and, 6. defendant to pay the costs.
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court[28] in all the four (4)
decisions above quoted. Thus, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Divisoria Footwear

subsequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals,[29] followed by respondent
Chua Huay Soon.[30] While the consolidated appeals from the unlawful detainer cases were
pending, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 12 April 1996
with regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919 declaring the renewal contract between RODIL and the
REPUBLIC null and void.[31] RODIL moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[32]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.[33] On 29 November 1996 the Special
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. No. 36381 and CAG.R. No. 37243 setting aside the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, which sustained the
Metropolitan Trial Court, and dismissing the action for unlawful detainer filed by RODIL against its
lessees.[34] RODIL moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.[35] Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.[36]
On respondents' motion, G.R. Nos. 129609 and 135537 were consolidated.
RODIL now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling its renewal contract with
the REPUBLIC and in dismissing its actions for unlawful detainer against respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua. RODIL claims that the assailed contracts are neither
void nor voidable as the facts show they do not fall within the enumerations under Arts. 1305
and 1409, and an implied new lease still exists by virtue of Art. 1670. As a result, the right to
eject respondents properly belongs to it.[37] With regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919, RODIL argues
that the REPUBLIC, the only defendant who is a real party in interest, signified its assent to
having the action dismissed. Assuming arguendo that the ASSOCIATION was a real party in
interest, its counterclaim was nonetheless unmeritorious.[38] On the other hand, respondents
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua contend that the lease contract which the
lease contract of 18 May 1992 was to renew, never came into existence. Therefore, since there
was no contract to "renew," the renewal contract had no leg to stand on, hence, is also void.[39]
Respondents then conclude that since there was no lease contract to speak of, RODIL had no
right to relief in its action for unlawful detainer. The ASSOCIATION, for its part, argues that the
counterclaim it filed against RODIL cannot be dismissed because the trial court has not passed
upon it.[40] We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law.[41] Every owner has the freedom of disposition
over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC
being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract
with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to
eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action
for unlawful detainer are present. Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23
September 1987, 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts.[42] This is
true only of the Contract of Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did
not approve. RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it. The socalled approval of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of Secretary
De Jesus addressed to Director Factora.[43] This is evident from the fact that Secretary De Jesus,
in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a lease contract and forward it to his office for
approval.[44] The consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that no contract
shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is communicated to the offeror.[45] Until that
moment, there is no real meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence,
no contract.[46] However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May
1992. As argued by RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law
prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there is
nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order,
the validity of the contract must be sustained.[47] The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts
because they were supposedly executed in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by
the Regional Trial Court.[48] The appellate court however failed to note that the order restrains
the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not

petitioner RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL, it was
issued only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered into. As correctly stated
by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.[49]
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents
consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract of 23 September
1987. However, novation is never presumed.[50] Also, the title of a contract does not determine
its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract which dictate its nature.
[51] Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that would make
it valid and another that would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted.[52] The
assailed agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that the term
of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987. This is hardly conclusive
of the existence of an intention by the parties to novate the contract of 23 September 1987. Nor
can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite incompatibility between the
original contract and the subsequent one is not present.[53] Based on this factual milieu, the
presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been overturned. Respondent
ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring null and void the
lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor.
We do not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court's
judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto. Respondent
ASSOCIATION finally argues that the 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 contracts can be considered
rescissible because they concern property under litigation and were entered into without the
knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority.[54] Civil Case No. 8742323 involved an action for specific performance and damages filed by RODIL against the
REPUBLIC and the ASSOCIATION. The right to file the action for rescission arises in favor of the
plaintiff when the defendant enters into a contract over the thing under litigation without the
knowledge and approval of the plaintiff or the court. The right of action therefore arose in favor
of petitioner RODIL and not respondent ASSOCIATION.
Having preliminarily dealt with the validity of the lease contracts, we now proceed to
resolve the issue raised by respondent ASSOCIATION with regard to its counterclaim. The
ASSOCIATION argues that its counterclaim should not have been dismissed. On this point, we
agree. The requisites for the application of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are clearly
present.[55] The counterclaim is necessarily connected with the transaction that is the subject
matter of the claim. In malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charge was false and groundless.[56] A
determination of whether the charge is groundless would necessarily involve an analysis of
whether the action instituted by RODIL is meritorious. The counterclaim did not require the
presence of third parties over which the court could not acquire jurisdiction, and that the court
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim since the amount of damages
claimed by the ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim amounted to P3,500,000.00, clearly within the
jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court under BP 129.
However, in the interest of making a final adjudication on an issue which has been pending
for fourteen (14) years, we will rule on the issues raised by the ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim,
and accordingly deny the same, dispensing with any discussion regarding the merits of RODIL's
cause of action which is clearly neither "false" nor "groundless." Therefore, the elements of
malicious prosecution are absent. As regards the action for unlawful detainer, respondents
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua argue that this should not prosper because
RODIL is not in actual possession of the property and because they are not its sublessees.[57]
Their arguments do not convince.

In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with
the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue
of acquiescence.[58] The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a
"temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation
of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter
remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately
for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a
contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the
action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has
been unlawfully withheld.
Respondents finally argue that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of
Rule 45 so that its petition must be dismissed. They allege that petitioner failed to state in its
petition that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the date of filing, when the motion was
denied, and the date when the resolution denying the motion was received.

A cursory review of RODIL's petition belies respondents' assertion. All dates required under
Rule 45, Sec. 4, are properly indicated except when the motion for reconsideration was filed.
Procedural rules are required to be followed as a general rule, but they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his noncompliance with the
procedure required. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. The rules
have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting the proper
dispensation of justice. As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert and
defeat, instead of promote and enhance its objective, suspension of the rules is justified.[59]
Petitioner did not repeat its error in its later petition filed under G.R. No. 135537. The oversight
must be fashioned with leniency.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 36381, 37243 and 39919 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 39, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-70776, 94-71122 and 9471123 as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 23, in Civil Case No. 94-72209
affirming in toto the Decisions of the MeTC - Br. 28 in Civil Case No. 143301, MeTC - Br. 15 in Civil
Case No. 143216, MeTC - Br. 7 in Civil Case No. 142258, and MeTC - Br. 24 in Civil Case No.
142282-CV, as herein quoted, and the Orders dated 14 August 1992 and 6 November 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 87-42323, recognizing the validity and legality of the
Renewal of the Lease Contract dated 18 May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May
1992, are REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. Costs against private respondents in both
cases.

SO ORDERED.

5) Ruben Santos VS Spouses Tony Ayon (GR No. 137013)

For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution[2] dated
December 11, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration. The petition alleges that on
November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon,
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96. In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is
the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondent spouses are
the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous
occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties.
Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse. Petitioner further alleged in his
complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building
occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. But in
1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish
and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their
possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even
made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a
certification to file action was issued. In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case
on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship
between the parties. Respondents denied they were occupying petitioners property by mere
tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long
before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate
the portion of the subject properties and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as

well as dismantle/remove the structures found thereon. Defendants are further ordered to pay
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent months
thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorneys fees of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated
February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.[4] The RTC
upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents occupation of the contested portion was by
mere tolerance. Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through
court action. Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
review. In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the
RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus:
In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time
private respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is
occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondents
bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners possession was tolerated by (his)
predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners possession is
not decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature
of petitioners possession from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the
complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been occupying a portion of the
above properties of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the
plaintiff. Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners possession of
the premises. x x x. Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional
Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer. WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED.[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated December 11, 1998.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing
to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT
CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.
II
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH
EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in
holding that petitioners complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC. Petitioner
contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned property
before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated respondents
occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they vacate,
their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the
MTCC is proper. Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the
disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he

cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead
in time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.[6] This rule is no different in
an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.[7] All actions for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of
possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.[8] The said courts are
not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of
ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.[9]
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, reads:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. Under the above provision, there are two entirely
distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to
recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the
beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a
case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose
possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with
the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his
right thereunder.[10] Petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is
properly within the competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:

4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as

well as other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the
plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he
has no need of the property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the
defendants to vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures
found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused
to vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina
Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996.
The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no settlement was had. Thereafter, a Certification To
File Action dated March 27, 1996 was issued x x x;

x x x.[11] (underscoring ours)

Verily, petitioners allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer.
We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. A complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to
vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is
an allegation in petitioners complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property
is by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioners cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from
respondents failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996.
Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint. It
bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful
when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling
in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals[13] is applicable in this case: A person who occupies the land of
another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97,
affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao
City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

6) Bustos VS CA (350 SCRA 155)