Wilhelm v. Flores (133 S.W.

3d 726 (2003))
John black was operating a honeybee business. It was September 7, 1994, when Black was
purchasing some beehives from the appealing party and needed help in moving them along with
his employee, Alejandro Mercado. Flores consented to help and put on a defensive suit given by
Black. In the wake of ceasing at litigant's home to get a hive, the three men went to the property
where extra hives were kept. The property was situated in a remote region of Willacy County,
behind three bolted doors and miles from a cleared street. Appealing party did not claim the area
yet had consent from the landowner to keep the hives there. After stacking one hive onto their
truck, Flores enjoyed a reprieve and strolled into the brush a few yards far from the truck on the
grounds that he had the inclination to crap. He soon returned hollering for help and stunning. The
shroud on his suit was open. Flores managed a few honey bee stings. He endured an anaphylactic
stun response. Flores passed on before an emergency vehicle could achieve him. Appellees sued
Black, Joan Walsh Reichert (Black's business accomplice), and litigant in the 370th District
Court of Hidalgo County, and found that the carelessness of Black and litigant was the proximate
reason for Flores' death. Reichert settled before the case was submitted to the jury. The jury was
given a charge on general carelessness passing. The jury appointed fifty percent of the
carelessness to Black and appealing party, every, and honored compensatory harms to appellees
in the measure of $1,591,000. The jury likewise discovered Black and appealing party terribly
careless and surveyed model harms of $75,000 against each. Litigant brings this claim from that
judgment. Dark does not request the judgment.
Wilhelm was one who appealed against the decision. Respondents claims were summarized by
the appellate court as: (1) failure having a sensible security program; (2) inability to guarantee
Flores was tried for honey bee sting hypersensitivity; (3) inability to give legitimate defensive
hardware and guidelines on the best way to utilize such gear; (4) inability to caution Flores of the
hazardousness of honeybees and Africanized honey bees; and (5) inability to give Flores fitting
and convenient medicinal consideration.
In the conclusion of court of appeal it was stated that: After considering the evidence herein and
weighing the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury from a bee sting against the social
utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the
consequences of placing the burden on [Wilhelm], we hold the evidence is both legally and
factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that [Wilhelm] had a duty to warn Flores of the
dangers associated with bee stings, including the danger of an adverse allergic reaction, and that
appellant breached that duty.

Had Wilhelm hired Black as an independent contractor to move the beehives, Wilhelm would
have owed Flores no duty of care because Wilhelm did not control Flores, Black did. Nor would
Wilhelm, as occupier of the premises where the beehives were kept, have owed an independent
contractor's employees a duty to warn them about being stung, since that danger was obvious. It
would have been Black's responsibility, not Wilhelm's, to warn Flores of the danger of an allergic
reaction, if Flores was not already aware of it. But Black was merely a buyer of the bees; he was

not Wilhelm's independent contractor, and Wilhelm owed Black's employees no greater duty than
if he had been.

Santos Flores, Sr. (Flores) died from anaphylactic shock triggered by a bee sting. Appellees,
Flores's estate and his four adult children, sued appellant, Curtis Wilhelm, and other parties. A
jury found appellant liable for Flores's death. On appeal, appellant raises nine issues. In the first
six, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting various jury
findings. In his remaining issues, he contends: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
laws pertaining to the transportation of bees; (2) the award for pain and mental anguish was
excessive; and (3) he was protected from liability by the Good Samaritan law. Appellees raise a
jurisdictional issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse and render, in part.

Clancy v. Goad (858 N.E. 2d 653 (2006))

In May 2002, Tim Clancy was employed as president of Action K-9 Security, Inc., a company
that provided guard dogs to businesses for security purposes. On May 27, 2002, Clancy received
a call that he was needed at a business in Chicago, Illinois, where a dog had apprehended an
intruder. Clancy awoke between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m. and went downstairs in his house. Clancy
inadvertently awakened his sixteen-year-old son, Josh, who asked permission to accompany his
father to Chicago, and Clancy agreed. The two left for Chicago in Clancy's black Chevrolet S-10
pickup truck. After retrieving the guard dogs, the men went to the local police station so that
Clancy could assist detectives in the filing of a police report.

Clancy and Josh then ran a couple of errands and Clancy began driving home on State Road 231.
[1] Robert and Dianna Goad were traveling in the opposite direction on State Road 231, each on
separate motorcycles. While driving, Clancy fell asleep at the wheel of the truck. The truck
crossed the center-line of State Road 231 and, after narrowly missing two other vehicles and
Robert's motorcycle, collided with Dianna's motorcycle. The collision severed Dianna's leg
above the knee, and she was thrown from her motorcycle into a water-filled ditch at the side of
the road. Clancy was awakened by the sound of the impact, and the truck veered into the ditch,
as well.

After swerving on his motorcycle to avoid Clancy's truck, Robert heard the truck hit Dianna's
motorcycle. He looked back and saw his wife fly from her bike, *656 and he noticed a white
flash around her leg that he later realized was actually the bone extending approximately three
inches from where Dianna's leg had been torn off. Rather than braking slowly on his motorcycle,
Robert hit the bike's "kill switch" and performed a controlled slide maneuver to lay it on its side
and bring it to a stop quickly. In doing so, Robert twisted his knee and received several scrapes

and bruises from his impact with the pavement. Robert immediately ran to Dianna's aid and held
her head out of the water-filled ditch. In the meantime, Clancy and Josh exited their truck and,
seeing Dianna's injuries, Clancy phoned 911 on his cellular phone. Paramedics arrived shortly
thereafter, and Dianna was transported to a hospital.

Robert refused medical treatment at the scene of the accident, and his injuries improved over
approximately five days without treatment. Dianna, however, remained in a coma for
approximately two weeks following the accident. In addition to the loss of her leg, Dianna also
suffered from a fractured pelvic bone, a fractured left elbow, and a lacerated spleen, which had to
be removed.
In September 2003, the Goads filed a claim and request for a jury trial against Clancy, Josh, and
Action K-9 Security, Inc. Following numerous interim filings, on April 15, 2004, the Goads filed
their Second Amended Complaint. In Count I, Dianna alleged negligence, recklessness, and
willful and wanton misconduct against Clancy and Josh, depending upon the identity of the
driver. If Josh was the driver, Dianna also alleged negligent entrustment against Clancy. In Count
II, Robert incorporated the same claims from Count I against either Clancy or Josh and added his
own claims for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Count III, the
Goads incorporated the same allegations from Count I and asserted that Clancy's employer,
Action K-9 Security, Inc., was liable for Clancy's negligent actions. Action K-9 Security, Inc.
filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 15, 2004, which was granted without prejudice on July 16,
2004.[2]

A three-day jury trial commenced on September 21, 2005. At the close of the Goads' case-inchief, counsel for Clancy moved for judgment on the evidence as to Josh only and on the Goads'
negligent entrustment claims against Clancy. The trial court denied the former but granted the
latter. At the end of the trial, counsel for Clancy objected to Final Jury Instruction No. 14, which
instructed the jury on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim under Indiana's modified
impact rule.

The record indicates that before the accident, Dianna was an active and athletic person. She was
an avid runner, often jogging three-and-a-half miles a day. Tr. p. 313. She belonged to a health
club where she regularly trained with free weights. Id. She often engaged in these activities with
her adult son, Colin. Id. Dianna enjoyed rollerblading, hiking, and cross-country skiing, activities
in which both Colin and Robert regularly joined her. Id. at 314. In addition, Colin described
Dianna as "very house proud," and he indicated that she always did all of the housework,
cooking, cleaning, and other domestic chores for the family, as well as handled all of the
finances. Id. at 314-15. Dianna also worked full-time in a managerial accounting position where
she earned approximately $45,000.00 per year and where she planned to work until her
retirement. Id. at 425-26.

The injuries Dianna received in the accident as a result of Clancy's negligence were catastrophic.
Several volumes of medical evidence were admitted at trial to demonstrate the extent of Dianna's
injuries and the recovery process she has suffered through. See Exs. 24, 29, 32-34. Dianna, her
treating physician, and members of her family all testified regarding her injuries and the effect
those injuries have had and will continue to have on her life. She spent two weeks in a coma. Tr.
p. 312. Surgeries were performed to medically amputate her leg above the knee and to set her
broken pelvic bones and her broken elbow. See id. at 275, 281. Dianna's spleen could not be
repaired and was inevitably removed, resulting in an increased lifetime risk of infection. Id. at
290-91. In fact, Dianna required treatment for a severe infection while still in the hospital
recovering from her injuries. Id. at 356. Also, Dianna has endured multiple skin graft procedures
and extensive physical therapy. Id. at 283, 301-02. At the time of the trial, Dianna had undergone
seven surgeries, taken more than 6400 pills, and her medical expenses totaled more than
$368,000.00. Id. at 429-31; Exs. 30, 32-33.

Furthermore, Dianna's medical expenses and challenges continue and are expected to continue
indefinitely. She experiences "phantom limb pain," where she feels shooting pains and
discomfort in her missing leg. Tr. p. 276. The frequency and intensity of her phantom limb pain
has decreased over time and with the use of medication, but it still bothers Dianna and requires
ongoing pharmaceutical control. Id. at 433-34. She also experiences a great deal of pain and
discomfort in the remaining portion of her amputated leg *659 and stiffness and pain in her arm,
and she takes regular doses of pain medication to control these symptoms. Id. at 277, 431-34,
437. Dianna also has suffered from depression and anxiety since the accident, and she takes
medication for these illnesses, as well. Id. at 303, 431

As in Ritter, there is evidence in the record before us to support a jury verdict in favor of Robert.
Robert was involved in Dianna's accident and witnessed her injuries first-hand when she was
thrown from her bike and when he ran to her side. He replays these events in his mind and
manifests the severe depression and anxiety classically associated with PTSD. His wife describes
him as a completely different person since the accident and acknowledges that his symptoms
have so affected him that she "misses" her husband. Evidence was presented that Robert is
undergoing counseling and is taking medication for his condition. Further, as stated in our
discussion regarding Dianna's award, there is simply no evidence to support Clancy's claim that
the jury sought to punish him for framing Josh as the driver of the truck. Without such evidence
and considering only the evidence that supports the jury's award, we cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the jury. We cannot conclude that this award is unreasonable given the
evidence.

Sutton v. Warner (12 Cal App 4th 415 (1993)) & (15 Cal Rptr 2d 632 (1993))
It was 1983 when Warner was inherited a 33% interest in a home located in San Francisco and in
another property situated in the Russian River territory of California. She and her husband,
Donald Warner, had interest in retaining the second property while they were not interested in the
home at San Francisco. They acquire a loan of $170000 in order to buy the other beneficiaries.
They pledged both properties as insurance for the $170,000 credit. They couldn't bear the cost of
the installments on that home loan and along these lines looked for support from others. Donald
Warner had a friend Kenneth Sutton to whom Warner suggested in October 1983 to rent the
Molimo Street property. The Suttons turned into occupants and made all rent installments in real
money.

In January 1984, Donald Warner proposed that the Suttons purchase the residence so that the
estate could be settled. His proposal included a $15,000 down payment towards the purchase
price of $185,000. According to the Suttons, they were to have five years to purchase the home
after the Warners obtained a loan necessary to acquire the two properties. In addition, under the
terms of this agreement, the Suttons were required to make all mortgage payments and real estate
tax payments. In sum, the Warners were not to have to make any payments on the Molimo Street
property. The property was transferred out of the estate to Arlene Warner after April 1984. John
Murphy, a long-time acquaintance of Kenneth Sutton and Donald Warner, testified that he
overheard discussions between the two which supported Sutton's version of the contract. In fact,
he testified that Warner had created a jingle, "4-9-89," which Warner told him was the ending
date of the Suttons' option to purchase the Molimo Street property. Murphy testified that he
recalled Warner reciting this jingle on multiple occasions over the years.

Donald Warner confirmed that, but for the sale of the Molimo Street property to the Suttons, he
and his wife would not have acquired the 419*419 remaining interests in that property. He
admitted receipt of the $15,000, but testified that the Suttons had only six months in which to
exercise their option, or they would lose their interest in the property. He testified that he
extended that option on two occasions until he finally told them, in January of 1986, that he
would not extend it again. This would have required an increase in the value of the property from
$185,000 to in excess of $200,000 to support a conventional loan of $170,000 in six months'
time. Further, it would have required the Suttons to pay points and closing costs twice in a sixmonth period. The court found the Warners' version of the contract neither credible nor
reasonable. Sutton testified that in late 1986, he, his wife, and Warner traveled to Santa Rosa to
meet with Susan Cohen to explore creative financing for the house. She suggested that they
either put money in the bank to get a loan or that the Warners obtain a separate loan on the
Russian River property. Warner claimed they discussed financing for a purchase at the current
market value. Cohen was not called to testify.

Thereafter, in January 1987, a meeting occurred at the Molimo Street property with the Suttons,
the Warners, and Attorney Garrett Checcini representing the Suttons. According to Checcini, the
purpose of the meeting was to formalize the arrangement between the parties. Checcini testified
that he was willing to cosign a loan to enable the Suttons to obtain financing. Kenneth Sutton
summarized the terms of the agreement, to the effect that the original purchase price was
$185,000, that a down payment of $15,000 had been made, along with additional paydowns on
the principal balance. No objection to these facts was voiced by either Donald or Arlene Warner.
Checcini testified that no agreement was consummated at that meeting because Donald Warner
consumed a six-pack of beer during the forty-five-minute meeting and became inebriated.
According to Checcini, Arlene Warner ended the meeting by telling Checcini that she would
have her lawyer contact him. He waited a period of time and then wrote them, seeking to
consummate the transaction.
The Warners refinanced the loan in April 1988, obtaining a $199,000 loan, which paid off the
Russian River property. The Molimo Street residence had appreciated significantly and was then
able to carry the loan on its own. The principal balance paid off with refinancing was the sum of
$166,929.96.

In July 1988, the Warners offered, through counsel, to sell the property to the Suttons for
$250,000, which they contended was less than its fair market value. The Suttons did not dispute
the value of the property. A letter from Warners' counsel at this time also advised the Suttons that
in the event they did not exercise the option to purchase the property for that sum, their rent
would be increased, based on the permissible increases under the San Francisco Rent
Stabilization Act. That rent was calculated on the standard increases based on a rent which
equalled the original mortgage payments in 1984, confirming the Suttons' contention that they
had paid the full mortgage.

Upon the Suttons' receipt of the letter from the Warners' attorney, this litigation ensued.

The question here, then, is whether the continued possession of the property by the Suttons and
their other actions are sufficiently related to the parol option contract to constitute part
performance. The trial court responded in the affirmative. After entering the oral agreement, the
Suttons made a $15,000 down payment and increased their monthly payments to the Warners
from the original $1,000 per month rental payment to payments in the precise amount of the
variable mortgage payments due under the $170,000 loan. They reimbursed the Warners for
property taxes in the sum of $800 every six months. Although it was disputed whether the dollar
value 424*424 of improvements made by the Suttons in reliance upon the oral agreement
constituted "substantial" improvements, it is undisputed that many of the improvements such
as painting the interior of the house and the installation of a toilet and entry lamp were done
by the Suttons' own labor. The trial court found that these actions were unequivocally related to
the purchase agreement. We cannot gainsay this determination. Furthermore, the Warners did not

dispute the existence of an oral lease-option agreement. Rather, the dispute centered upon when
the option would expire. The actions taken by the Suttons in reliance upon the oral agreement,
when considered together with the Warners' admission that there was an oral agreement of some
duration, satisfy both elements of the part performance doctrine evidence of the existence of
the oral contract on the terms found by the court and reliance by the Suttons upon that contract
warranting specific performance relief.

Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Company (203 Cal App. 3d 432 or 249 Cal Rptr.
872)
Bronco Wine Company is involved in crushing grapes for using in wine preparation.
There is a supportive corporation, Allied Grape Growers, which is a bunch of many grape
cultivators that are involved in supplying grapes to wineries. A contract for the supply and
buying of more or less 30,000 tons of red and white grapes every year for utilization in mass
wines between Bronco and Allied in the year 1981. In 1982, the contract was breached due to
rejection or downgrading of supplied grapes and ultimately payment of lower prices by Bronco.
The case was won by Allied and was juristically awarded $3.4 million for its claims. Bronco
requested a non obstante veredicto judgement and a new trial, which resulted in denial. Bronco
claimed that there was juror misconduct and mistake was made by the judiciary while applying
Business and Professions Code area 17200 as an issue of law. Cross-arguments were made by
Allied on the hypothesis that it was qualified for exceptional late charges as per Agricultural
Code segment 55881 for Bronco's late installment for those segments of the agreement that it did
honor.
It was 1978 when the contractual relationship between Bronco and Allied was made and
renewed in June 1981 for another three years. According to the terms of agreement Allied was
bound to supply Thompson seedless grapes about 20,000 tons and other varieties ranging 10000
to 13000 tons each season throughout 1981 and 1984 however, in the year 1982, there were
occasions that challenged expectations of both parties. The grapes were reported to be low in
quality and standards of sugar-content.
It was contended by the Allied that that Bronco had generously over contracted for
Thompson seedless grapes in 1982. Allied griped that Bronco deliberately did not open its
winery in Fresno until September 20 and did not open its winery in Ceres until September 28,
notwithstanding its rehashed requests for Bronco to open its wineries prior. At the point when
Bronco at long last did open its plants, over a large portion of the grapes statewide had been
crushed. Additionally, as indicated by Allied, rain in September was very plausible and
everybody in the wine business realized that it would result in harm. In 1982, when there was a
breach of contract by Bronco, by not tolerating the grapes and downsizing them with lower
prices. At the end Allied was successful in its claim.
The jury was not able to achieve a decision on Allied's two extortion claims. In a different
listening to directed by the trial court on Allied's case of out of line business hones, the trial court
allowed injunctive alleviation for Allied in accordance with Business and Professions Code area

17200. On offer Bronco battles that there is lacking confirmation to backing the jury verdicts and
that the trial court failed in not giving its movements for judgment non obstante veredicto or for
another trial. There was attendant wrongdoing that the trial court blundered in applying Business
and Professions Code area 17200 as an issue of law. Allied cross-claims on the hypothesis that it
was qualified for exceptional late charges as per Agricultural Code area 55881 for Bronco's late
installment for those parts of the agreement that it did honor.
This was a case among the two parties that involved in the wine business based on the
breach of contract between two. It is evident from the knowledge of weather that there was over
production of crop which was of lower quality. Due to this Bronco rejected or downgraded the
grapes supplied and bought at lower price. As this was not in the terms of initial contract, he was
not benefited. Keeping this scenario in mind it is clear that Allied had the right to claim what he
won and was rightly awarded the money.