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There is no legitimate reason to give the members of two political parties exclusive
access to an integral stage of a public election process. Doing so compromises the stability and
health of our democracy and all of its institutions.
The ruling of the lower court comes in direct conflict with several of this Courts
longstanding precedents including United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801
(1995) (holding that a state may not create an election process that burdens a fundamental right),
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) (holding that a state may not limit the
fundamental right of non-association without meeting strict scrutiny), and Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that voters have a fundamental right to cast an equally meaningful
vote at all integral stages of the election process).
The argument repeatedly used against the relief sought by Petitioners has been
intentionally, yet improperly, framed as a protection of the two state-qualified political parties
right of private association, a right never contested in this matter by Petitioners. Petitioners do
not want, nor legally seek, the right to participate in the private Democratic or Republican Party
primaries. Indeed, they seek just the opposite, an end to their exclusion from an integral stage of
the public election process.
To be clear, Petitioners are merely seeking an injunction against the current closed
primary election process. In its place, Petitioners simply request this Court mandate, not
dissimilar to its decisions in Gray v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, that New Jersey implement a
system that gives every voter, regardless of their party affiliation, an equally meaningful vote at
every integral stage of the process.
There are many ways to achieve this goal without compromising the private rights of
political parties and their members. As with womens suffrage, racial equality, and
malapportionment, the equal rights of all voters were not always a part of our national
experience. Though now axiomatic, there were those who viewed the elimination of their
excluded status as foreign, unwanted, and even scary. Nevertheless, this Court has recognized
that the fundamental right to vote derives from citizenship and nothing else. It has also required
that changes be made when infringements on that right are not tolerable to our American
concepts of individual liberty, equality, and self-government.
Such a large number of voters must not be denied an equal right to the voting franchise
just because it is inconvenient to the existing major parties or because the State of New Jersey
has a historical interest in doing so, especially in light of the States eight percent (8%) average
voter turnout in its most recent primary elections.
Without conceding that a direct initiative process is a remedy for this constitutional
infirmity, it is important to note that the Petitioners have no other forum available to them in
New Jersey due to the States lack of a public initiative process. If this Court decides not to
intervene to protect the rights of all voters to participate in an integral stage of the State election
process, then the disenfranchised have no other reasonable path to seek enforcement of their
rights. Put simply, the two major political parties have complete control over the initial, and
often most important, stage of the election process in New Jersey. Unless this Court is willing to
consider whether this system is constitutionally permissible, these two major political parties will
maintain control over the People of the State forever.
This is a matter of the type and timing that historically must be decided only by this
Court.
Finally, despite its import, both lower courts have dismissed this case without discovery,
with prejudice, and without publication.
Therefore, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.