Chapter 20: The role of Thomas Tucker Lyttle and his relationship with RUC

officers
20.1 It is central to my Terms of Reference to establish the link between any of the
individuals involved in the conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane and any State agency. I
have, therefore, sought to examine in detail the admissions reportedly made by an Ulster
Defence Association (UDA) Brigadier, Thomas Tucker Lyttle, to journalists that he was
aware of the conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane and that he discussed the targeting of
Mr Finucane with a Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch (RUC SB) officer.
Background
20.2 In 1989 Tucker Lyttle was the UDAs long-standing West Belfast Brigadier. As one
of the so-called Brigadiers, he sat on the UDAs Inner Council and by 1989 had become
the Chairman of the UDA. Lyttle was generally considered to be one of the oldergeneration, less militaristic figures on the Inner Council. His obituary in the Irish Times
reflected this by noting that by loyalist paramilitary standards, he was a moderate figure.1
20.3 Lyttle was active on the more political side of the UDA and was clearly viewed with
suspicion by the younger, hardline elements of the organisation. Nevertheless, Lyttle was
convicted of serious criminal offences and, as outlined in this report, he was undoubtedly
involved in a number of UDA conspiracies to attack republicans.
The comments made by Tucker Lyttle to journalists
20.4 Tucker Lyttle provided at least two interviews to journalists outlining his knowledge
of Patrick Finucanes murder and his alleged conversations with an RUC contact
regarding the targeting of Mr Finucane.
20.5 In the book, Stakeknife, the alleged code name of a Force Research Unit (FRU)
agent in the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the journalist Greg Harkin outlined his
conversations with Tucker Lyttle in early January 1990. Lyttle reportedly asked Harkin to
visit him and Harkin stated that:
We all have our police and Army friends ... Ive got mine. But Brians [Nelson] got the very
best of friends. He [Lyttle] predicted Nelsons arrest and then said that there was
something big going down in relation to Pat Finucanes murder ... The police and the
Army had wanted Finucane dead, he told me, and the UFF were happy to oblige. Lyttles
reason for calling me was simple: he expected to be arrested too and he wanted to issue a
warning
1 Tucker Lyttle obituary, Irish Times, 20 October 1995
that if he were charged in relation to the murder of Finucane, he would blow this whole
thing wide open. There was more to this than people thought, he said, and he knew
exactly what had happened. 2
20.6 Harkin also recorded that Lyttle told him that:
... within hours of Hoggs speech in the Commons on 17 January, he, Lyttle, met with his
Special Branch handler ... Lyttle later claimed that his handler discussed Hoggs comments
with him and said, Why dont you whack Finucane? Brian Nelson was then summoned to
Lyttles home in Sydney Street West and told to prepare an intelligence file on the lawyer.
3

20.7 Stakeknife included the claim that Lyttle had told Harkin that all the UDA members
involved in the killing, including Nelson, L/20 and Barrett, had attended a celebration party
in Lyttles house.4
20.8 It is difficult to assess the accuracy of the account provided to Greg Harkin. Lyttle
certainly appears to have been tipped off in relation to developments regarding the arrest
of UDA members so his claim to have known in advance that both he and Nelson would be
arrested is plausible. There is, however, no corroboration for the claim that UDA members
attended a celebration party in Lyttles house. The context in which Lyttle spoke to Greg
Harkin must also be considered: in early 1990 Lyttle certainly had an agenda in seeking to
exploit the issue of leaks. Given that Lyttle appears to have consistently denied being an
RUC agent, it also seems highly unlikely that he would have referred to an SB officer as
his handler (as opposed to his contact).
20.9 For those reasons, I am inclined to prefer Lyttles accounts provided to the BBC
journalist John Ware in 1993 and 1994. By this stage, Lyttle no longer appears to have
been involved in the UDA. John Ware has submitted to my Review the contemporaneous
notes he made of interviews with Lyttle on 24 December 1993 and 2022 June 1994.
20.10 John Ware summarised his discussions with Lyttle in a 1998 article in the New
Statesman. The article included the following passage in relation to the murder of Patrick
Finucane:
Lyttle ... confirmed that the original idea to murder Patrick Finucane came from two RUC
detectives. While a prominent UDA gunman was being held in Castlereagh, an officer
entered the interrogation room and said to his colleague: Have you put it to him yet? They
then suggested that the UDA shoot Finucane. Lyttle said that he was so astonished at this
suggestion that he informed a regular contact in the RUC Special Branch: I told him:
What the hell is going on in Castlereagh? Why is Finucane being pushed? The officer
said that it would be a bad blow for the Provos [the IRA] to have Finucane removed. Did
that amount to approval that he should be shot? Put it this way, said Lyttle, He didnt
discourage the idea that he should be shot. 5
2 Greg Harkin and Martin Ingram, Stakeknife, OBrien Press, 2004, p. 203
3 Ibid., p. 196
4 Ibid., p. 204
5 John Ware, Time to come clean over the armys role in the Dirty War, New Statesman,
24 April 1998
366
20.11 John Wares notes of his interviews with Lyttle provided a more detailed account
of Lyttles alleged conversations with an SB officer, as follows:
With regard to the planned assassination of the lawyer Patrick Finucane, T L told [the
RUC officer] that certain RUC officers were putting pressure on the UDA to have Finucane
shot ... They [Provisional IRA] would take months to recover from this, T L reports [the
officer] as having replied ... T L said this conversation with [the officer] took place early in
1989 after [L/03] had been arrested which was in December 1988. Finucane was
considered a target by the RUC, according to T L, because of his brother his [sic]
connection with the IRA ... T L said that [L/28] began to look at Finucane in January. T L
said that there is no question that [L/28] selected Finucane for targeting after it was made
clear to [L/03] and the two others by the RUC officers in Castlereagh that Finucane should
be shot ... T L adds put it this way [the officer] didnt discourage the idea that Finucane ...
should be shot. And if a man in his position doesnt discourage it then that amounts to
approval. 6

20.12 I have had access to the full record of John Wares conversation with Tucker Lyttle.
Taken as a whole, I am struck by the general accuracy of the information provided by
Lyttle to Mr Ware. Examination of the full note of the meeting in the context of the wider
information available to my Review leads me to the conclusion that Lyttle was, broadly
speaking, being candid with Mr Ware. That does not, however, mean that the specific
allegations that he makes should be accepted in the absence of wider corroborative
evidence. This is particularly the case given that Lyttle is now deceased, and so the
opportunity to test his allegations further has been lost.
20.13 In view of the serious allegations made by Lyttle, I have conducted an extensive
analysis to establish whether these claims can be corroborated. In order to pursue these
allegations, I have sought to establish whether, in the first instance, Lyttle was aware of the
conspiracy to murder Mr Finucane. I have then sought to analyse whether Lyttle discussed
Patrick Finucane with an RUC officer. To provide the context for this issue, it is necessary
to examine in detail whether Lyttle had been improperly receiving information from an RUC
officer or officers in the period before and after the murder of Mr Finucane.
Was Lyttle involved in the conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane?
20.14 Despite his apparent admission to journalists, the evidence with regard to Lyttles
potential involvement in the plot to murder Patrick Finucane is complex and, in parts,
contradictory. The FRU documents, for example, recorded L/28 claiming that Lyttle was
unaware of the operation. The CF dated 14 February 1989 included the following
passage:
6 John Ware, notes of conversations with Thomas Tucker Lyttle, 2022 June 1994
367
[L/28] said that he would be annoyed if the UFF [Ulster Freedom Fighters] were not
allowed to claim the attack. He added that Tucker Lyttle had known nothing about the
operation. [L/28] explained that he had been in [a club] at the time of the attack and Lyttle
arrived as soon as he heard about the shooting. Lyttle was very nervous and chomped his
way through a glass of ice cubes that [L/28] had had for himself. 7
20.15 Kenneth Barretts account to BBC Panorama provided a broadly similar picture.
Barrett told Eamon Hardy in September 2001 that [L/28] knew what was happening, do
you understand me? Tucker didnt.8
20.16 The two key UDA figures directing the operation L/20 and L/28 were certainly
wary of Lyttle and were capable of keeping him out of the loop with regard to plans for
UDA attacks. In August 1988 Nelson reported the tension between L/28, L/20, L/03 and
Lyttle.9 However, by November 1988 Nelson was reporting that Lyttle was secure in his
post of commander West Belfast Bde10 and Lyttle was certainly involved in UDA
operations around that time.11 L/28 would certainly have had a motive to exaggerate his
own power and influence by minimising Lyttles involvement, so it is not possible to rely on
his account.
20.17 The available evidence does lead me to the conclusion that Lyttle was at least
aware of the UDA conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane. In addition to considering
Lyttles own admissions to journalists, I have examined the following three intelligence
reports linking Lyttle to the conspiracy to murder Mr Finucane:

The FRU CF dated 20 December 1988 confirmed that Lyttle was present at the meeting at
which, according to reliable Security Service intelligence, a UDA commander planned to
discuss the targeting of three solicitors, including Patrick Finucane (see Chapter 16).12
RUC intelligence received on 16 February 1989, four days after the murder, indicated that
Lyttle had sanctioned the murder.13 Having reviewed the background to this intelligence
report, however, I am cautious about placing much weight on this source given his
somewhat limited access to the central UDA figures.
Security Service intelligence dated 15 February 1989 recorded that Lyttle had mentioned
Home Office Minister Douglas Hoggs comment about PIRA-sympathisers among the legal
professionin the week prior to the murder of Patrick Finucane. A Security Service officer
noted that Lyttle had therefore presumably had some foreknowledge of the Finucane
shooting.14
7 CF 14 February 1989, Item 18 [see Volume II, pp. 1015]
8 Panorama transcript of recorded meeting with Kenneth Barrett, 3 September 2001
9 CF 23 August 1988
10 FRU report to Security Service, Stormont, 24 November 1988
11 For example, Lyttle giving approval for attacks on Alex Maskey and Brian Gillen, CF 30
November 1988 12 CF 20 December 1988
13 RUC SB50, 16 February 1989 [see Volume II, p. 96]
14 Security Service intelligence, 15 February 1989
368
20.18 John Wares submission to my Review suggested that Lyttle was aware of the
targeting of Patrick Finucane but that he disapproved of the actual shooting.15
20.19 I do not regard any of these reports in isolation as conclusive in answering the
question as to Lyttles knowledge of the conspiracy. However, when considered
cumulatively, and in conjunction with Lyttles apparent admissions to the two journalists, I
am satisfied that Lyttle must have had foreknowledge of the UDA plan to murder Patrick
Finucane. It is, however, none the less possible that, although Lyttle was aware of the
targeting of Patrick Finucane, he was not privy to the operational details as to how and
when the UDA hit team intended to murder him.
20.20 Having established Lyttles awareness of the conspiracy to murder Mr Finucane, I
turn to consider the nature of Lyttles relationship, if any, with the RUC during the relevant
period.
Did Lyttle discuss Patrick Finucane with an RUC officer?
20.21 I have found no evidence to corroborate Lyttles claim that he discussed the
targeting of Patrick Finucane with an RUC contact. This is, in itself, not particularly
surprising given that Lyttles allegation relates to a conversation between two men that
was not recorded. Following Lyttles death in 1995 it is no longer possible to adequately
test his allegation to determine the weight, if any, that it should be given.
20.22 However, in view of my remit, I have also sought to conduct a more wide-ranging
examination of Lyttles relationship, if any, with RUC officers during the relevant period.
Tucker Lyttles links to RUC officers
20.23 It has been widely alleged in media reporting and in published books that Tucker
Lyttle was an RUC SB agent.16 Many of these allegations appear to be purely speculative

and need to be treated with great caution. I am satisfied that there is no sound evidential
basis for these reports.
20.24 However, I also recognise that, in the context of Northern Ireland in the late 1980s,
there was a broad spectrum of possible relationships between paramilitary figures and
members of the security forces. The officially sanctioned link between a handler and a paid
agent represents only one such type of relationship. As my analysis in Chapter 11
demonstrated, some members of the UDA had security force contacts who were willing to
provide them with information and assistance during this period.
20.25 In the light of this, I have sought to examine whether Lyttle was receiving
information or assistance from a member of the RUC during the relevant period. Although
15 John Ware, submission to the Review, p. 6. Mr Ware felt that this disapproval was
genuine.
16 See for example, Ian S. Wood, Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA, Edinburgh
University Press, 2006, p. 144
369
it would be possible to conduct a similar examination of Lyttles Ulster Defence Regiment
(UDR) contacts, given the nature of the allegations in this case, I have focused analysis on
whether Lyttle had RUC contacts during the relevant period.
20.26 I have considered the following sources of evidence on this issue:
(i) intelligence relating to Lyttles RUC contacts;
(ii) Lyttles account to John Ware of the kidnapping of L/39 in November 1988;
(iii) evidence that Lyttle received RUC intelligence information on Seamus Finucane and
others in February 1989; and
(iv) FRU concerns about Lyttles relationship with RUC officers.
Intelligence relating to Lyttles RUC contacts
20.27 Security Service and FRU reports suggest that, from at least 1986 onwards,
Tucker Lyttle had access to a number of RUC contacts who could provide him with
assistance. Security Service intelligence received in 1986 indicated that Lyttle was
receiving assistance from an RUC officer at Superintendent level, though the extent to
which this intelligence was subsequently investigated or corroborated is unclear.17
20.28 FRU reports from July and December 1987 suggest that Lyttle had a source who
was able to supply large quantities of RUC photographs of republicans. Although it is not
clear who Lyttle obtained this information from, it is certain that Lyttle had access to this
material in December 1987 because he passed it to Nelson who in turn provided copies to
his handlers.18
20.29 The FRU documentation shows that from May 1988 Lyttle was receiving
information indirectly from the RUC via another member of the UDA. This contact related
to the RUC SB operation to discredit James Pratt Craig and has been examined in more
detail in Chapter 7.
20.30 The critical period relevant to my Review is late 1988 to early 1989 when the
conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane was being formulated. The FRU records suggest
that Lyttle was receiving information from an RUC source in early 1989. The FRU CF

dated 25 January 1989 recorded that Lyttle had warned L/28 that houses were due to be
searched by the RUC. As a result of the warning, Nelson took two holdalls from L/28s
house to his Intelligence Cell.19
20.31 The CF dated 2 March 1989 also suggested that Lyttle had received very detailed
information about republicans suspected of targeting members of the UDA.20 Checks
made by the FRU handlers suggested that the information was likely to have been
accurate. Nelson commented that the information:
... may have been obtained by the RUC via sources and in turn passed to the UDA
hierarchy. 21
17 Security Service intelligence records, 1986 18 CFs 30 July 1987 and 15 December
1987 19 CF 25 January 1989
20 CF 2 March 1989, Items 612
21 Ibid.
20.32 Later CFs implied that Lyttle had access to a supposedly senior RUC officer, though
it is not clear whether or not Lyttle was receiving this information indirectly through another
member of the UDA who maintained a number of RUC contacts.22
20.33 Throughout his later statements and comments on this case, Brian Nelson
maintained that Lyttle had an SB source during this period (see paragraph 11.31). In his
conversations with John Ware, Nelson repeatedly emphasised that Lyttle had a good
police source. On 12 April 1991 John Wares notes record Nelson having said that Lyttle
had a very very good police source. On 13 June 1991, Nelson stated that TL had a good
SB source.23
20.34 RUC intelligence material also provides support for the proposition that Lyttle had a
number of RUC contacts during this period. Intelligence received in September 1988
suggested that Lyttle was being kept informed of RUC operations by a police contact.24
Later intelligence received on 2 February 1989 suggested that Lyttle was checking
information through various police contacts.25
20.35 I have also seen Security Service records which strongly suggest that Lyttle was
being offered information on the specific issue of the UDAs links to the Provisional IRA
(PIRA) by an RUC SB contact during this period.26
20.36 The intelligence material, when considered as a whole, provides a concerning
picture. It is difficult to corroborate Nelsons reporting of specific leaks to Lyttle during this
period, though when considered in conjunction with the RUC SB records, the evidence
certainly provides indications that Lyttle maintained police contacts. The Security Service
records, when considered in conjunction with the RUC SB operation in relation to James
Pratt Craig, confirm that Lyttle was receiving information from an SB officer on UDA
members who were believed to be in contact with PIRA.
Lyttles account to John Ware of the kidnapping of L/39 in November 1988
20.37 In the context of Lyttles allegations to John Ware, I have considered in detail his
claim that an SB contact provided him with the details of a loyalist, L/39, who was
suspected of having provided information to PIRA. L/39 was kidnapped and interrogated
by the UDA in November 1988 and subsequently expelled from Northern Ireland.

20.38 In their conversations on 2022 June 1994, Lyttle was recorded as having told John
Ware the following information:
... [the SB officer] offered to name [L/39]. [He] said youve got a problem in South Belfast.
I could help you with this man. But there are certain conditions.
The condition was that no harm would come to [L/39]. TL gave him [the officer] that
undertaking. [The officer] then disclosed to TL details of where
22 CF 20 March 1989
23 John Ware, notes of conversations with Brian Nelson, 12 April 1991 and 13 June 1991
24 RUC SB50, 16 September 1988
25 RUC SB50, 2 February 1989
26 Security Service intelligence records, 1988
[L/39] went, his movements, his habits, so that the UDA could pick him up. [The officer]
also suggested that his interrogation be videod ... TL got the UDAs Inner Council approval
for the [L/39] operation. [The officer] wanted a copy of the video ... [The officer] said the
purpose of kidnapping [L/39] was to get him out of the way so as to disrupt PIRA
intelligence. 27
20.39 Lyttles description of the reaction of the RUC officer to the operation was recorded
in the following passage in John Wares notes:
TL said that [the officer] suggested the UDA seek publicity for this stunt and that they say
[L/39] was being investigated by a special UDA unit called the Special Assignment
Section a clear echo of SAS [Special Air Service].
After [L/39] had been removed from the scene [the officer] told TL he was well pleased.
However, TL did not feel he was getting anything out of this relationship. TL said that [the
officer] knew very well that what he wanted was help on senior PIRA leaders like Brian
Gillen, Gerry Adams and [T/13]. [The officer] was stringing me along. He never said point
blank that he wouldnt give me help but help never materialised. 28
20.40 It is important to note that Lyttle stated that he did not receive the assistance he
was looking for in relation to senior PIRA figures. Many aspects of Lyttles story regarding
L/39 do appear to correlate with the facts of this case. Intelligence records show that the
RUC SB had been receiving detailed information for a number of months indicating that L/
39 was providing information to PIRA. In another example of the interconnected nature of
the conflict in Northern Ireland at the time, the information provided by L/39 may, indeed,
have been used by Seamus Finucane to target loyalists with the intention of murdering
them.
20.41 Nelson reported to his handlers on 26 November 1988 that the UDA had found out
who the PIRA informer was. The CFs confirm Lyttles claim that Nelson was given a copy
of the video recording of L/39s confession.29
20.42 It is also significant that L/39 himself subsequently observed how much information
the UDA held on his links to PIRA. After having been expelled from the country, L/39 was
quoted in The Scotsman as saying he initially believed that he was being questioned by
PIRA members:
I thought that because they knew so much. They knew the names of my three Provo
[PIRA] contacts and a contact telephone number. They knew of my meeting places and
they knew I had set up a UDA man and that the murder was to take place in ... [a] ...
shopping centre. I said I could set him up again and that they would get him this time.
Then they told me who they were [UDA men]. 30

27 John Ware notes of conversations with Tucker Lyttle, 2022 June 1994
28 Ibid.
29 CF 26 November 1988, Items 1314
30 The Scotsman, 29 November 1988, quoted in Ian S. Wood, Crimes of Loyalty: A History
of the UDA, Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 142
20.43 The most significant evidence which tends to corroborate Lyttles account, however,
comes from later FRU documentary records. In an account of another case, the FRU
recorded the following information about the kidnapping:
[L/39] was later compromised to the UDA by RUC and subsequently interrogated and
expelled from NI [Northern Ireland]. 31
20.44 Having reviewed the FRU document in full, the context in which this information is
recorded suggests to me that the FRU may have been informed by an RUC SB officer that
L/39 had been deliberately compromised. The general fact that information was passed to
Lyttle on the UDAs links to PIRA would also be consistent with the Security Service
records and the operation relating to James Pratt Craig outlined in Chapter 7.
20.45 Considering the evidence as a whole, I do believe that Lyttle was telling John Ware
the truth about an SB officer compromising L/39 to the UDA. The FRU documentary record
provides significant corroboration for Lyttles account. Although the SB contact appears to
have stipulated that L/39 should not be physically harmed, the passing of such information
to a paramilitary organisation is none the less inexcusable. This led directly to the
kidnapping, interrogation and expulsion of an individual from Northern Ireland.
Evidence that Lyttle received intelligence information on Seamus Finucane and others in
February 1989
20.46 As I noted above, Tucker Lyttle told John Ware that he was seeking information
from his SB contact on PIRA figures but did not receive the assistance he was looking for.
However, I have seen evidence suggesting that Lyttle did have knowledge of sensitive
intelligence material only four days after the murder of Patrick Finucane. This information
included intelligence about Patrick Finucanes brother, Seamus.
20.47 In order to establish Lyttles access to such information, it is necessary to examine
both the FRU and RUC SB documentary records. The FRU CF dated 22 February
recorded the content of a conversation between Lyttle, L/28 and Nelson (referred to here
by his source number, 6137) on 16 February 1989. Under the heading Information from
Informer , the CF recorded the conversation as follows:
Lyttle told [L/28] and 6137 [Nelson] that PIRA had had a meeting during the previous
evening and they were cracking up. He said that Seamus Finucane was Brian Gillens
Intelligence Officer and [T/30], [T/17] and [T/11] were members of Gillens team. Lyttle
added that PIRA wanted an operation involving a limpet mine to be carried out. 32
20.48 The CF recorded that Lyttle did not say where this information had come from.33
The intelligence was passed by the FRU solely to the Head of the Belfast SB on 23
February 1989 as part of a MISR entitled UDA/SF [Security Force] Contacts.34
31 Annex to FRU CF on a different intelligence operation 32 CF 22 February 1989 [see
Volume II, pp. 1718]
33 Ibid.
34 MISR 23 February 1989

20.49 The information imparted by Lyttle to Nelson is, on the face of it, highly detailed and
specific information about PIRA operations and activity. In order to ascertain the potential
source of the information, I have cross-checked Lyttles intelligence against the SB
records to ascertain whether Lyttle could have received the information from an SB
contact.
20.50 It is not possible to ascertain whether PIRA did indeed hold a meeting on the
evening of 15 February. However, Lyttles description of PIRAs Belfast Brigade
personalities does appear to have been essentially accurate: Seamus Finucane was an
Intelligence Officer and T/30, T/17 and T/11 were all, in effect, members of Gillens team.
20.51 The clearest evidence, however, that Lyttle was being provided with accurate and
sensitive intelligence information is provided by the reference in the discussion with L/28
and Nelson to PIRAs plan to use a limpet mine. Analysis of the RUC SBs Daily
Intelligence Book confirms that Lyttles information about the limpet mine attack was
accurate. SB intelligence recorded a specific PIRA plan to use a limpet mine. Subsequent
RUC SB intelligence indicated that the operation had been abandoned.35
20.52 It appears, therefore, that Lyttle had received sensitive information, which he then
disseminated to other members of the UDA. I have also seen other intelligence material
which provides circumstantial support for the proposition that Lyttle received this
information from an SB contact shortly after Patrick Finucanes murder.
20.53 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) informed me that knowledge
amongst loyalists of the roles played by individuals within Belfast Brigade PIRA was not
unusual and that paramilitary groups had knowledge of terrorist personalities from the
other side.36 It is certainly true that loyalists had a wealth of information on republican
personalities. I have been able to examine the intelligence dumps held by the UDA and the
exceptionally detailed records held by the FRU in relation to Nelsons knowledge of PIRA
personalities. However, having examined this material, I am satisfied that the information
imparted by Lyttle on 16 February was unusual in its level of detail. The UDA did hold
records on such personalities but they generally did not know the precise roles played by
specific individuals within Belfast Brigade PIRA.
20.54 The PSNI also informed me that the limpet mine threat would have been
disseminated widely throughout the police and Army and so this information would
therefore have been widely known.37 I have not found any records to confirm how the
intelligence relating to the limpet mine threat was disseminated in February 1989. It is
worth noting that other submissions to my Review have tended to stress the sensitivity
with which such intelligence reporting would be handled.
35 RUC SB Daily Intelligence Book, February 1989 36 PSNI letter to the Review, 27
September 2012 37 Ibid.
20.55 I am, however, faced with a clear documentary record that Lyttle passed extremely
detailed information to other loyalist paramilitaries on 16 February 1989. The information
about a PIRA meeting the previous evening cannot be confirmed, though there is no
indication that Lyttle was inventing this very specific claim. The information about the
make-up of PIRAs Belfast Brigade was accurate, as was his observation about the limpet
mine. I have also been able to review broader intelligence reporting which provides some
circumstantial support for the proposition that Lyttle received this information from an RUC
SB officer.

FRU concerns about Lyttles relationship with RUC officers

20.56 The documentary evidence suggests that the FRU were concerned about the
nature of the relationship between the UDA hierarchy, including Tucker Lyttle, and the
RUC. The FRU report on Brian Nelsons activity during 1988 included the comment that:
It is a constant worry that information passed by 6137 eventually gets back to the UDA via
the RUC. 6137 regularly feels himself under suspicion when this occurs ... 38
20.57 The FRUs concern was potentially well founded given that the interrogation of
Nelson came about as a result of warnings made by Lyttles SB contact that PIRA knew
about UDA targeting. Nelson was specifically asked by his FRU handlers in October 1988
whether Lyttle had mentioned his SB contact. Nelson replied that he had heard nothing
at that stage.39
20.58 A/13s statements to the Stevens I Investigation included comments that the FRU
suspected information was being passed by the RUC to the UDA hierarchy. When asked
in December 1990 why Lyttles name had been omitted from a MISR post-dating the
murder of Gerard Slane, A/13 stated:
I believe that, at the time, information had been given to members of the UDA hierarchy
by members of the RUC. I believed that either Tucker Lyttle or someone very close to him
was talking with a member of the RUC. If the information regarding Tucker Lyttles
involvement ... had been passed to the RUC, there was a possibility that Tucker Lyttle
would hear about it, therefore, in order to protect our source, Lyttles involvement was not
reported. 40
20.59 It is difficult to assess the validity of the point made by A/13. The handler was being
questioned in relation to omissions from a MISR and may therefore have been seeking to
provide an excuse for the failure to pass on information. When A/13s statement was put to
the PSNI, they stated that they believed this allegation to be an attempt to ameliorate the
shortcomings in relation to the recording and dissemination of FRU intelligence rather than
a potential leak from the RUC.41
38 FRU report on Nelson, 31 January 1989
39 CF 11 October 1988
40 Statement of A/13, 5 December 1990
41 PSNI letter to the Review, 27 September 2012
20.60 It is, however, clear that the concerns within the Army extended more widely than A/
13. In a note sent to the Head of GS Sec in response to the Panorama programme, Dirty
War, the then Commanding Officer of the Joint Support Group, A/16, stated that:
FRU had evidence that Tucker Lyttle was often spoken to by his own admission, by
senior RUC personnel and it seemed that Lyttle had been warned by an RUC contact of
the impending arrest [by the Stevens investigation]. 42
20.61 Although it is possible that the FRU may have sought to highlight Lyttles links to the
RUC in order to deflect criticism, these concerns were expressed in such a way as to lead
me to believe that they are likely to have been genuine. I do, therefore, weigh the FRUs
general concerns about the nature of the relationship between Lyttle and the RUC in the
balance when reaching my overall conclusions on this issue.

Overview
20.62 I am satisfied that Tucker Lyttle had foreknowledge of the plan to murder Patrick
Finucane in 1989, though he may have been unaware of the details of the UDAs operation
to kill Mr Finucane on 12 February. A detailed examination of the nature of Lyttles activity
both before and after the murder has highlighted his reported links to RUC contacts. Most
significantly, I believe that Lyttle was told by an SB officer of L/39s activity so that he could
be subsequently interrogated and expelled from Northern Ireland; and that he was in
receipt of sensitive intelligence information on 16 February 1989, including information
regarding Seamus Finucane.
20.63 The evidence of Lyttles links to RUC officers does not enable an inference to be
drawn that he discussed the targeting of Patrick Finucane with an SB contact. As Lyttle is
now deceased, it is not possible to adequately test the veracity of this specific allegation,
though I do note that other aspects of the information he imparted to John Ware in 1994
were accurate. I certainly cannot exclude the possibility that Lyttle did, as he told John
Ware, discuss the targeting of Mr Finucane with an SB contact.
20.64 However, it is none the less important to draw the general conclusion that Lyttles
relationship with RUC officers during the relevant period is a source of serious concern. I
do believe that Lyttle was being improperly assisted by RUC contacts in the period before
and after Patrick Finucanes murder and that one of these contacts was an SB officer with
access to intelligence information. In my view, Lyttles links to some RUC officers during
this period were so significant that they provided him with an entirely improper degree of
protection and assistance in conducting his paramilitary activities as the Brigadier for the
West Belfast UDA.
42 A/16 to Head of GS Sec, 9 June 1992