Russias Pivot to Asia: Visionary or Reactionary?

Jittipat Poonkham1

Introduction
Asia, in particular Southeast Asia, has rarely been a strategic priority for Russia.
Russias focal point of foreign policy almost always revolves around Europe. Throughout
history, a harbinger of the turn to Asia has been a reaction to a diplomatic failure of Russia in
or its exclusion from the European balance of power (for example, the Crimean War of 18541856). More recently, a major turning point in Russias policy toward Asia is its 2012 APEC
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) chairmanship at Vladivostok for the first time since its
membership in 1998. President Vladimir Putin asserted Russias status as an intrinsic part of
the Asia-Pacific region, and seriously pledged to engage with the region.2 To put it differently,
it is Russias turn to the East policy (povorot na Vostok) or, simply said, Russias pivot to
Asia. The pivot has been increasingly accelerated due to the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and the
concomitant European and American economic sanctions. This raises the question of whether
Putins shift towards Asia is the result of a visionary strategy or merely a reactionary tactic.
The article aims to provide an overview of Russias pivot to Asia, especially between 2014 and
2015, by highlighting the key developments within the region in general and important bilateral
relations with such states as China, Vietnam and Thailand in particular. The article argues that
Russian foreign policy in Asia is driven by the reemerging nature of Russias identity as a
Eurasian power. It is part and parcel of Russias grand strategy in world politics.
Russias Grand Strategy as a Eurasian Great Power
Russias foreign policy identity has recurrently twisted and turned largely due to a shift
in its foreign relations with the West, which is considered a strategic priority. That is, Russia
presents itself as a European great power when it perceives the West, in particular the U.S., as
an ally and strategic partner, while Russia represents itself as a Eurasian great power when it
is marginalized or excluded from the West, thereby envisioning the West as a rival. 3 For
instance, during the Dmitry Medvedev presidency (2008-2012), there was a resetting of
foreign relations with the U.S. under the Barack Obama administration, improving cooperation
in key domains such as concluding the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
supporting U.S. agendas in Afghanistan and Iran, strengthening the personal presidential
relationship, and succeeding in Russias entry into the WTO membership (after its 18-year
journey). Above all, Russia highlighted its identity as a European power. However, since
September 24, 2011 when Medvedev had announced Putin would stand for president in the
March 2012 election, it instigated drawbacks domestically (i.e. anti-Putinist mass protests and
the Pussy Riot) and internationally. Putin furiously blamed these on the international
provocateurs and enemies and tightened the grip on domestic arena passing some
legislative initiatives clamping down on pro-democratic groups and non-governmental
organizations, ending the USAID programs in Russia, prohibiting the adoption of Russian
children by American citizens (in response to the U.S.-initiated Magnitsky Act), and the
granting of political asylum to NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, to name just a few.
The Eurasian project has been relaunched since 2011, and increasingly accelerated after
the Ukraine crisis in 2014. The ultimate aim of Russia remains unchanged: the revitalization
1

Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University

Andrei Tsygankov, Russias Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 3rd Edition
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p. 217.
3
See Jittipat Poonkham, A Weary Titan: Russian Foreign Policy Thinking since 1992, Journal of Social
Science, Vol. 42: No. 1 (January-June 2012), pp. 52-64.
2

and stabilization of its great power status. To achieve that, the Eurasian project comprises three
key characteristics: first, Putins Russia deprioritizes the West, in particular antagonizing the
United States (albeit with no direct military confrontation with it). The policies are, as follows:
(1) pragmatism by pursuing selective or limited engagement with the West (e.g. antiterrorism) and lowering the priority of relations with the NATO and other Western institutions;
(2) economizing relations with the EU and Western countries in particular in the realm of
energy diplomacy; and (3) independent foreign policy by setting the parameter that no major
international decision can be taken without Russian participation and Russias views should be
taken into account and respect, (coupled with China) maintaining the Westphalian
international order of sovereign rights and non-interference, and promoting the idea of a
multipolar world order, thereby implicitly challenging U.S. hegemony.
Second, Putins Russia vigorously attempts to reintegrate the near neighborhood, or the
so-called near abroad. After the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia in August 2008,
Medvedev declared the Russian Monroe Doctrine whereby the area is a sphere of privileged
interests where Russia has rights to protect its compatriots (sootchestveniki). Putin does not
want a region to be a power vacuum that other great powers, especially the US, could fill in,
promote Western-oriented democracy or colored revolution, and lure other states into an antiRussian bloc. A crisis in Ukraine can be regarded as a test case of geostrategic competition.4
In a multilateral regionalism, Putin initiated a brainchild project of Eurasian Economic
Union, which was operationalized in 2015, and includes such member states as Russia,
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. In bilateral relations, Russia uses every means,
in particular economic and energy leverages (and military tools, if necessary), to persuade and
dissuade others to be friendly governments. In sum, for Putin, the near abroad should be under
the tutelage of Russian hegemony, if not a new empire.
Third, Putins Russia pivots to Asia, thereby reemphasizing the level of relations with
Asian countries, in particular such great powers as China, as well as strategic partners. Russia
wishes to be a Euro-Pacific power. This will be the topic of the next section.
All in all, contemporary Russia has pursued a multivector diplomacy, by
deprioritizing the Western vector while reprioritizing the Eurasian and Asian vectors.
Russias Relations with Asia
In Russias foreign policy thinking, Asia has continually been a strategic underpriority,
a distant second to the West. Perennially, a transition to Asia, coupled with its Eurasianness,
happens whenever Russias relations with the West is deteriorating and deteriorated. Recently,
a pivotal moment is, firstly, its hosting of the APEC summit in Vladivostok in September 2012,
where Putin declared his strategy of pivot to Asia. Envisioning Russia as an intrinsic part of
the Asia-Pacific region, Putin designed to put his pivot to Asia within a larger context of a
Eurasian project. In his words, the idea of Eurasian Economic Union is to become a bridge
between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific region, by pursuing closer integration of
economic models, regulation and technical standards among the EU, APEC, and the European
Economic Union, which would offer businesses the ability to operate seamlessly across a
vast area.5 This agenda closely linked to the domestic imperative for developing the Russian
Far East and Siberia. Russia in turn allocated an unprecedented amount of financial resources
to develop the RFE.
Furthermore, a referendum-cum-annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the shooting
down of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 in July 2014 unleashed Western economic
See John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the Wests Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked
Putin, Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2014, pp. 1-12.
5
Quoted in Andrei Tsygankov, Russias Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 3rd
Edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p. 218.
4

sanctions, thereby limiting Russias options and giving Asia greater significance. As Dmitri
Trenin argues, Russias pivot to Asia predates the Ukraine crisis, but it has become more
pronounced since then.6 At first, Russias eastern reorientation was driven by an interest in
developing its own economy, given advantages of Asias growing dynamism, yet later Russias
pivot to Asia has become inevitable due to its tension with the West. In this section, I examine
Russias multilateral engagement with East and Southeast Asia, and its bilateral relationships
with China, Vietnam and Thailand, respectively.
Multilateral Relations with the Asia-Pacific
First of all, Russia has increasingly engaged with Asias multilateral institutions, but its
role is still limited. It repeatedly declares to support regional frameworks such as the APEC,
Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It also
becomes an official member of the East Asian Summit (EAS) since 2011 (along with the US)7,
and participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (since 1994), ASEAN Defense
Ministers Meeting (ADMM) (since October 2010), and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (since
October 2010).
However, in fact, Moscows influence in the Six-Party Talks is very limited (compared
with other participants). For the SCO, despite their commonality in combating terrorism,
separatism, and extremism, Chinas and Russias objectives diverge: In the long term, Russias
focus on safeguarding its adjacent sphere of influence, monopolizing its energy, and building
Eurasian Economic Union, might not be compatible with Chinas focus on economic
integration, national resources trade, and the Silk Road economic belt. Russias presence in
Asia remains weak militarily, economically, and politically. More importantly, Putin has
occasionally been absent from multilateral summits, such as the EAS. For Russia, bilateralism
has prevailed over multilateralism, not only in Asia but also in the world.
Strategic Partnership with China: More than an Axis of Convenience8?
Now Russia-China cooperation is advancing to a new stage of comprehensive
partnership and strategic interaction. It would not be wrong to say that it has reached
the highest level in all its centuries-long history. Vladimir Putin (May 2014)9
In addition, Russia emphasizes its relationship with great powers in Asia such as China,
India and Japan. It specifically relies on a strategic relationship with a rapidly rising China.
Moscow and Beijing share a common interest in, firstly, countering the preponderance of
American power and dominance in the Asia-Pacific; secondly, in continuing a Westphalian
world order based on international law and multipolarity; and thirdly, in fostering emerging
regional and international informal clubs such as BRICS in order to challenge the U.S.-led
world order.
The crucial factor in Russia-China relationship is obvious personal ties between
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, a Chinese President. Both first formally met in 2010 (when
Putin was prime minister, while Xi was vice-chairman of the PRC and heir-in-waiting), but
6

Dmitri Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow
Center, April 2015), p. 1.
7
Before that, Russia became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996, and signed the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) in 2004.
8
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Baltimore: Brookings Institution
Press, 2008).
9
Quoted in Douglas E. Schoen, and Melik Kaylan, The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and Americas
Crisis of Leadership (New York and London: Encounter Books, 2014), p.viii.

their real friendship began on October 7, 2013, when Putin celebrated his birthday at the APEC
summit in Bali, and Xi was the only foreign guest invited to the small party. When Xi had
inaugurated as the Chinese President in March 2013, his first foreign visit was Russia.
Likewise, when Putin returned to his third-term presidency, his first foreign visit was China.
Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, China has been playing an important role
for Russia in part because China is the largest economy outside of the countries that have
imposed sanctions on Russia. Since 2009, China, instead of Europe, has been Russias largest
trading partner, with overall trade reaching $95 billion in 2014. In the energy sector, Russia
needs to diversify its energy supplies from Europe, a largest importer in the world, to the East.
Russia opened the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, destined for Daqing, in
2009, and a second phase in 2012, exporting more than 30 million tons of oil per year to Asian
markets particularly to China. In May 2014, Gazprom signed a $400 billion deal with China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), to supply natural gas to China over a thirty-year
contract.
Militarily, both countries have been cooperating in arms trade, military technology
transfer, and military exercises. Since 2013, Russia has re-supplied arms to China, such as
exporting twenty-four Sukhoi Su-35 fighters. In May 2014, the Russian and Chinese navies
held large-scale joint drills in the East China Sea. In May 2015, they had a joint military
exercise in the Mediterranean. Financially, in December 2014, when the ruble fell sharply and
precipitated Russias economic recession, China has offered Russia credit lines in yuan
currency, if necessary.
Thus, in terms of bilateral relations, Russia and China are moving beyond what Bobo
Lo called axis of convenience toward the Sino-Russian entente, in which Trenin defined
as a harmonious association of two major powers based on the commonality of some key
interests; mutual resentment of the global hegemon, that is, the United States; a measure of
foreign and security policy coordination; and a degree of empathy between their leaders.10 In
2014, Putin and Xi met five times, and in 2015, at least three times: in Moscow in May
(where Xi joined Putin to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the Victory Day over Nazi
Germany), in Ufa in July (during the BRICS summit) and in Beijing in September (where, in
return, Xi expects Putin to come to Beijing to celebrate the anniversary of the Victory Day over
Japan). In May 2015, Xi and Putin signed 32 agreements in Moscow.
Moreover, in the realm of global governance, Russia closely collaborated with China
to delegitimize and bypass the U.S.-led international institutions, thereby establishing nonWestern institutions such as the BRICS, SCO, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB). In 2015, the SCO will add India and Pakistan as new members. BRICS, now with a
development bank of its own, will seek to become an alternative to the G7 and the IMF. Russia
will host the 2015 BRICS summit in Ufa.
In a triangular diplomacy, to a certain extent, China balanced a momentum of USRussia rivalry. For example, during the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014, Xi put
himself in a central position between Obama and Putin in many settings. Nowadays, despite a
progressing Sino-Russian entente, Moscow tends to be Beijings junior partner.
Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asia: Asia Is Not Just China11
Between 2000 and 2013, Moscow substantially increased its trade volume with the
ASEAN states almost elevenfold. However, the volume of mutual trade remains modest.
10

Dmitri Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente (Moscow: Carnegie
Moscow Center, April 2015), p. 19.
11
Fyodor Lukyanov, an editor-in-chief of the journal, Russia in Global Affairs, said during Medvedevs trip in
2015 that For Russia, Asia is not just China. Quoted in Russia Expands Pivot East Beyond China to
Vietnam and Thailand, The Moscow Times, April 9, 2015.

Russias total trade with ASEAN grew by 9.9 percent from $18.2 billion in 2012 to $19.9
billion in 2013, with the 7.5 percent increase in ASEAN exports to Russia, from $4.9 billion in
2012 to $5.2 billion in 2013; and the 10.7 percent increase in ASEAN imports from Russia,
from $13.3 billion in 2012 to $14.7 billion in 2013.12 After 2012, Russias presence in the
region seems to be increasingly greater. Russia has contributed to the military dimension
through its role as an important arms supplier. In the economic realm, Russia provides the
region with many commodities, especially natural resources and energy. With the exception of
energy and arms, Russias export is largely uncompetitive. Overall, Russias role and influence
in ASEAN, with the exception of Vietnam, remains too weak.
Vietnam: A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Vietnam is the Eurasian Economic Unions first international partner. Dmitry
Medvedev (May 2015)13
The year 2014 marks the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on Principles of Friendly
Relations between Russia and Vietnam, which was a starting point in their post-Cold War
bilateral relations. Their cordial relationship advanced to a strategic partnership, during Putins
first visit to Hanoi in March 2001, and was officially upgraded to the status of a
comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. At the conclusion of his visit to Hanoi in
November 2013, Putin referred to Vietnam as a key partner of Russia in the Asia-Pacific
region.14
In ASEAN, Vietnam is the only strategic partner of Russia and a gateway to ASEAN,
with which Russia incessantly attempts to engage. Russia has had a comprehensive cooperation
with Vietnam, ranging from the high level of political confidence and trust between two states
to trade and investment relationship, robust military cooperation, and wider cooperation on
joint oil and gas exploration. Economically, trade and investment are considerable, though
modest. In 2014, total trade between Russia and Vietnam was $2.5 billion. In terms of debt
restructuring, Russia wrote off $9.53 billion of the $11.03 billion debt that Vietnam owes
Russia, and granted an extension for the payment of the balance until 2016-2022. There is also
an increase in mutual investment partnership, including building hydroelectric (such as the Hoa
Binh hydropower station) and nuclear power plants (such as the first nuclear power plant at
Ninh Thuan).
Militarily, Russia is Vietnams largest arms supplier, including military weapons,
equipment, and technology. In 2009, Vietnam purchased $2 billion for six Kilo-class diesel
submarines and twelve SU-30MKK fighter jets. Vietnam has granted Russia permission to set
up a ship maintenance base at the port of Cam Ranh Bay where Russia will provide training
for Vietnamese submariners, despite the fact that Moscow had ended a 25-year lease of the
naval base in 2002. Since 2012, Russia has been tacitly intending to reconstruct its former naval
base in Cam Ranh Bay as a prospective logistics base for Russian naval activities in the region
(correspondent to its naval modernization of the Russian Pacific Fleet by 2020), and as a hub

ASEAN, Overview of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations, http://www.asean.org/news/item/overview-ofasean-russia-dialogue-relations.

13
Dmitry Medvedevs twitter, 29 May 2015, https://twitter.com/medvedevrussiae/status/604346644780466177
14
Quoted in Vitaly Kozyrev, Russia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Return of the Brotherhood in Arms?,
Russian Analytical Digest, Vol. 145: No. 31 (March 2014), p. 9. See also Vladimir Mazyrin, Russia and
Vietnam: Building a Strategic Partnership, in ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects, eds. Victor
Sumsky, Mark Hong, and Amy Lugg (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 173-183.
12

for the Vietnamese submarine fleet. 15 This might tentatively be contributing to Vietnams
hedging strategy against China.
In the realm of the oil and gas sector, Russia and Vietnam succeeded in developing joint
ventures, notably a flagship company Vietsovpetro, which has been active on Vietnams
continental shelf. Recently, both countries also facilitate other joint ventures to expand oil and
gas exploration in Vietnam, in particular in the South China Sea. As a quid pro quo, Russia
allowed Vietnamese partners into an energy investment in Russia, notably in Siberia. The
pioneer is PetroVietnam.
During April 6-7, 2015 visit to Vietnam, Dmitry Medvedev held talks with his
Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung. First, Medvedev urged Vietnam to negotiate on a
free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, which he claimed that both leaders
have agreed on most contents of the agreement. I think this is the factor that would promote
bilateral trade.16 Second, Russia and Vietnam intended to boost trade volume by fourfold to
$10 billion in 2020. Medvedev also proposed conducting more trade and investment in national
currencies. Third, the two leaders agreed to expand oil and gas exploration in the highly
contested South China Sea. Medvedev wants to see more Vietnamese investment in Russia oil
sector (Russias Zarubezhneft and Vietnams PetroVietnam are already implementing joint
projects) and is offering corresponding incentives, such as tax benefits. During the visit,
Medvedev and Dung witnessed the signing of several energy cooperation agreements,
including Russias Gazprom Nefts intention to buy 49 percent of a 6.5 million-ton oil refinery
in central Vietnam.17 Last but not least, many documents were signed after Russian-Vietnam
talks, including strengthening many areas of cooperation, such as investment, healthcare,
friendship society, railways and electric power stations. 18 In short, Medvedevs trip
significantly cultivated closer ties in the Russo-Vietnamese strategic partnership.
Thailand: A Symbolic Relationship?
When a friend is in trouble, moral support from allies is needed. Russia still chooses
to be friends with Thailand today, and we will ensure the bond of friendship remains
tight. General Prayut Chan-o-cha (April 2015)19
Russia and Thailand have had long-standing diplomatic relations since King
Chulalongkorns memorable visit to St. Petersburg in 1897. After the Cold War, they have been
through ups and downs, particularly during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government when it
infamously extradited Viktor Bout, the Russian arms dealer, to the US in 2010. The mechanism
in facilitating their relationship is a Joint Commission (JC), which was signed in 1993 and
started in 1997. A major turning point in Russia-Thailand relations was between the Thaksin
Shinawatra and Putin administrations, when both leaders paid official visits (to Moscow in
2002 and to Bangkok in 2003, respectively). They enthusiastically invigorated their
cooperation in many domains, such as encouragement and mutual protection of investments,
promotion of tourism (in particular by allowing Thais or Russians to stay in their respective

Kozyrev, Russia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Return of the Brotherhood in Arms?, pp.10-11.
Vietnam Close to Free Trade Deal with Russia-Led Trade Bloc Medvedev, The Moscow Times, April 6,
2015.
17
Russia Expands Pivot East Beyond China to Vietnam and Thailand, The Moscow Times, April 9, 2015.
18
Dmitry Medvedevs Visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, April 7, 2015,
http://m.government.ru/en/news/17558/
19
Prayut Reaches Out to Moscow: Boosting Trade Tops Medvedevs Agendas, Bangkok Post, April 9, 2015.
15
16

countries without visas for a thirty-day period), cooperation in education, space technologies,
military and defense, and so on.20
However, Thai-Russia relations remain modest. In 2014, a total volume of trade was $5
billion, increasing from the previous year, though Thailand has had a persistent trade deficit
vis--vis Russia since 1992. As for the volume of tourism, approximately 1.7 million Russian
tourists came to Thailand in 2014, dropping from 1.9 million Russians over the previous year,
due largely to the fall of the ruble currency.
The military coup led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha in May 2014 has been
diplomatically shunned by democratic Western powers, thereby forging Thailand in closer ties
with China and Russia. Thailand seems to pursue a hedging strategy with China and Russia
against the West, especially the U.S.
After his visit to Vietnam, Prime Minister Medvedev embarked on a trip to Bangkok
between April 7 and 8, 2015, which marked the first visit by a Russian prime minister in 25
years. Medvedev held talks with Thai Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha. First of all,
both leaders witnessed the signing of five intergovernmental memorandums of understanding
(MOUs) on increasing cooperation on energy, tourism, culture, anti-narcotics, and investment,
coupled with five business-to-business MOUs.21 Second, Russian and Thai prime ministers
promised to strengthen a number of bilateral cooperation initatives. For instance, they hoped
to increase the volume of their trade from $5 billion to $10 billion over the next year. Russia
agreed to import some products from Thailand, such as rice, fruit, pork, seafood, and rubber.
Notably, Moscow promised to buy at least 80,000 tons of Thai rubber. They also mentioned
the promotion and increase in the volume of tourism. Third, the Thai prime minister invited
Russia to join its Rubber City Project, invest in Special Economic Zones at borders, and join a
project entitled Sister Cities for Commercial Cooperation. In return, Medvedev also invited
Thailand to take part in a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and invited
Thai investors to join the new Far Eastern Economic Zone. Fourth, the two leaders discussed
the celebration of 120-year diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2017. Russia will
establish Russian Cultural Center in Bangkok to commemorate the event.22 At a joint press
conference, General Prayut overwhelmingly praised Russia as a good friend to Thailand,
amidst the recent military rule and the concomitant Western pressures. In the near future,
Russia officially invited the Thai prime minister to visit Russia, and the sixth Joint Commission
(JC) upcoming meeting will be held in Moscow in July 2015.
Nevertheless, there was no major breakthrough during the visit. Unlike the RussiaVietnam partnership, the Russia-Thailand relationship is full of symbols and too many
promises, given their very vague, broad MOUs. Some claimed that the Thai-Russia
friendship, despite their long diplomatic history, is likely to be short-term, temporary and
symbolic. 23 More importantly, actualimplementation has yet to take shape, though is still
See Ekaterina Koldunova, and Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia-Thailand Relations: Historical Background
and Contemporary Developments, in ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects, eds. Victor Sumsky,
Mark Hong, and Amy Lugg (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 160-172.
21
They include: (1 ) Memorandum of understanding between Inter RAO Engineering LLC, Power Machines
OJSC and Turbo Machinery (Thailand) Co., Ltd; (2) Memorandum of understanding between Research and
Production Company Armastek, LLC, Russia and Panjawattana Plastic; (3) Memorandum of Understanding
between JSC Russian Railways and Banpu Public Company Ltd. in relation to the Kalimantan Railway
Infrastructure and Sea Coal Terminal Project in Indonesia; (4) Memorandum of Understanding between NonCommercial Partnership for Development and Use of Navigation Technologies (GLONASS) and GEORADIUS
Thailand Private Limited; and (5) Memorandum of Understanding between Moscow State Regional University
and Siam Technology College.
22
Thai-Russia Relations: Russia, Thailand Sign Cooperation Pacts, The Nations, April 8, 2015.
23
For example, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, the director of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS),
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, asserted that The Thai governments recent embrace of
China and warm welcome of Russia are likely to be short-term, expedient moves to counter Western posturing.
20

underway. One example is that although General Prayut claimed that Thailand was interested
in purchasing Russian arms, Thai military elites, which formerly have had a preference for
Western arms suppliers, made a decision to buy three China-made submarines instead of
Russian ones in July 2015.
Conclusion
Since 2014, Russia has been inevitably looking eastward, but its pivot to Asia remains
very much a work in progress. For Putin, this is a unique opportunity to pursue his nations
reengagement with Asia, which is a part of a full-fledged Eurasian grand strategy. Russia is
increasingly becoming a visible and proactive player in Asias regional architecture and
bilateralism. However, Putins policy, firstly, remains rather ambiguous; Moscows true goals
in the region are obscure. Secondly, it still encounters many challenges such as a precipitous
drop in oil prices, the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions, and an economic recession that
need a more nuanced, long-term and coherent strategy. Medvedevs trip was a small step
forward for Russia in Asia. Thus far, Russias policy in the Asia-Pacific rests on the appearance
rather than the reality of power in the region.

Thailand is playing a costly game in cozying up to these authoritarian powers. Between Democracy and
Authoritarianism, Bangkok Post, April 10, 2015.