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G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary
of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C.
MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in their
official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already been
rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for all
the prejudgments against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has
not been proved. Like any other person accused of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant
protection of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to
quash the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons. We shall treat it as
we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges
against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta
and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel,
Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to
appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the
morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III
Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of
Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo
as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993,
by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713.
Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.

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On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin
Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the
accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said
cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in
favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This
Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they
were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds
now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the
motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because: 1) he was
denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the
competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only
two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a Reply from the petitioner
within a non-extendible period of five days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court may consider
his non-compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting
his petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and
proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was
not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion,
manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or countermand all these
statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned, We are not going to submit any counteraffidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit because we
believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all these statements.

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Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come up soon.

Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he
could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty.
Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could
submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of witness
Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio
Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of
counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuo:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this case
is submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty.
Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the
affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental
affidavits dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel
at the hearing held on August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the
entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his
tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this
lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5, so may he
waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the
accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in
abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step.
Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.

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Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the
Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is
the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases
involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and
prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the
case ofAguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and
amended information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do
not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545
(1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It
must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any
[illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) isnot an exclusive authority
but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the
crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present
case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of Justice, in connection
with the charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth
cases, 11 may conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule,
an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest
is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and
an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by
PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board

13

this Court declared:

Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and
answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not
illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an
invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from
a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when
the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site
is a military camp, the same can be easily taken,not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it

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purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez
was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an
order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the
"invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had
come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are
applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he
was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the
sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the
killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn
statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place
on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense
had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated,
to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case,
the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and
to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas
issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to
93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay
cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.

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The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention
or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case at
bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue of
a John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming her
had been issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the Court
said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of arrest
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the
particular description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant was
unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be
a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid
warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just have left. This Court will not
participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court,

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more recently in the Umil case.

18

The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because
the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on
the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with
homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to
the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses
its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an
constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty
which is in the highest degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension
of the application of the death penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.

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Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised
Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy
with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead
of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is
that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the
assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence
Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing
her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations
filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent
slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate
rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but
the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his
own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty,
he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no
sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the
part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave
abuse of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases
by the President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against
whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts
try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will
justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for
such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. 22 Moreover, before resorting to
this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must first
avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion. 23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Alqueza and
Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or employees
at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This contention was withdrawn in his Reply
but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

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a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under
paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because
it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has
to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other
words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such
as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof,
not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's
office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The
offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the
commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official
functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a
result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as their
counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from
representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. The
Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was
nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that
brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the
crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the
amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper
or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the
crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The

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co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their
superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with
homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor
or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime,
being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the
applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent
judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co-accused, may
proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the criminal cases
being tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the evidence
that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The
Court will caution against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect
knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them
with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila,
and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived
transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the innate value of human liberty, which can hardly
be weighed.
Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator Jovito R. Salonga
invoked before this Court his "right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against
him." 1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before us, this time as counsel
pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far worse than his predicament
twelve (12) years ago. He postulates that no probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is worse
is that no bail is recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the existence
of which is necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a
warrant for his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause before an information is filed
and a warrant of arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case is filed, a warrant of arrest
issued and a person consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated allegations that only feign probable
cause.
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the
Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their
profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been
accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)
and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of
Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the
brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by
petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who
allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him
under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto
Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the
Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a "safe house" just behind the New
Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and
Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also
as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him
sign certain documents. The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite,
after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine
ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when the incident happened,
but he was certain it was about a year ago.
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, 3 separately raided
the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other, along Amalingan
Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Paraaque. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and
assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest.

11
Also arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several
firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of
PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal
proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2 Roger Bato, Expoliceman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty.
Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom
with murder, and usurpation of authority. 4 In his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993,
Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that
Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado Law Offices . . .
planned and conspired with other suspects to abduct and kill the German national Alexander
Van Twest in order to eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign several documents
transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and caused
the withdrawal of P5M deposit from the victim's bank account.
Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena to
petitioners informing them that a complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their counteraffidavits. Attached to the subpoena were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the
team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the
production of other documents for examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his defense
and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was interested in (a) the
"several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and
the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the victim's bank account," as stated in the complaint; (b) the
complete records of the PACC's investigation, including investigations on other suspects and their
disposition, PACC's Order of Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such other written statements issued
in the above-entitled case, and all other documents intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise
sought the inhibition of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created to conduct the
preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and
thus could not act with impartiality.
In its Order of 11 October 1993, 8 the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor
Bernelito R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members, confirmed
that the motion for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the Secretary of
Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993 resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new panel
granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional documents used or intended to
be used against him. Meanwhile, Task Force Habagat, in compliance with the order, submitted only copies
of the request for verification of the firearms seized from the accused, the result of the request for
verification, and a Philippine Times Journal article on the case with a marginal note of President Fidel V.
Ramos addressed to the Chief of the Philippine National Police directing the submission of a report and
summary of actions taken thereon.
Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their
respective counter-affidavits denying the accusations against them. 9
After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally propounded, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. But before the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a
manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counteraffidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth, justice and fair play" moved for the admissions of his
counter-affidavit 11 confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating
petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however, before petitioners could refute Bato's
counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground that it was extracted through intimidation and
duress.

12
On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard
over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an
information had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of Justice, however,
petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but later that afternoon they
were able to secure a copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page
undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the
PACC Task Force recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the information was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until 8 February
1994 to submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused. 14 On 7
February 1994, petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The following day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review and reversal
of the undated resolution of the panel
of prosecutors, 16 which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending
resolution of his appeal before the Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even date, respondent judge issued
the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15 February 1994, petitioners filed with us
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for hearing on
28 February 1994. After the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting further proceedings on the case
and, instead, to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners voluntarily
surrendered at the Headquarters of the Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP),
Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and on 29 February 1994, they were released on the basis of
our temporary restraining order.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is
probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against
petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of the
Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the certification is flawed." 21 Petitioners
maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed
to establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners
likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and impartiality (sic)." 22
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the
accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court speaking through Associate Justice
Sherman Moreland defined probable cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." This definition is still relevant today
as we continue to cite it in recent cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. 25 And as a protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or
apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting
the accused. 26
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence of probable cause. While it
appears in that case that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude

13
in determining the existence of absence of probable cause by affirming the long-standing procedure that
they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this
permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the
determination of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal question which can result in the
harassment and deprivation of liberty of the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a
thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is it believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the same
was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out by proper and
sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already
proceeded on sufficient proof.28
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is expressly stated
that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause
exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to see how
respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find
any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the
evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners.
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal
who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one,
there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor
have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the
use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next
morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by
simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely
closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. 30Thereafter, the remains undergo a
process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover
traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the government
investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they did not go at all
because they knew that there would not be any as no burning ever took place? To allege then that the
body of Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open field with the use merely of tires and
gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him
before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in his behalf a petition
for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and on 18 March 1993, a memorandum before
the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors, counsel
again manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that until the
matter of death is to be established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my duties and
responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that
counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead otherwise his

14
obligation to his client would have ceased except to comply with his duty "to inform the court promptly of
such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative," 34 which he did not.
Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van Twest
who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and never
refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In this regard, we are
reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that
when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who
testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.
Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn statement,
he said that he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the
plan to abduct Van Twest. 36 However, during the preliminary investigation, he stated that he was not part
of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his companions who supposedly discussed
the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37
Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest who
thereafter signed various documents upon being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory
questioning, however, Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go outside of the "safe
house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain
documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the order of the
prosecutors to produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M
that was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van Twest? These and more
remain unanswered.
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by Umbal's
confession of 16 September 1993, the application of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served
in the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15 September
1993, a day before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents
claimed that Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly, although he was
said to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16 September 1993
and only at the security barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing the
charges against petitioners, can hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously waned. The
records show that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after the panel had
considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit,
Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground that it was extracted through duress and intimidation.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes
its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that
matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of
Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and
not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. 40 While there may be bits of evidence against
petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove
petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing
indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be
deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to
sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the
belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of
petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the

15
complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the
certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that
the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard,
we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to
ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made
by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable
cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material
in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is
made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment
of trial is a function of the prosecutor.
In Lim v. Felix,

43

where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said

[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive
the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all,
the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as
detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond
the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for
the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when
the circumstances of the case so require.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes
that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the
test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. 44 On the contrary, the probable
cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must
be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of
the crime which has just been committed. 45 This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of
the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached
thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses
themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose
him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused,
their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed

16
themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They
should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause.
For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one" 46
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the
government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary
investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant
for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is
laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving
petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have
had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of
the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the
PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and the
information against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that they
will in the future reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of
judges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor,
which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which
determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination
of the existence of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with
which he is charged. Judges and prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a
delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Pao

47

finds application

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil.
216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be
to transgress constitutional due process (People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in
order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is
conducted in the sense of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity.
A preliminary investigation serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly,
it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in
the country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to
relieve the accused from the pain of going thru a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis supplied).
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of government
power which when unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly the
Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on occasion, for one
reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily
suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort
inflicted by government agents is not reflective of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are
not, by reason of their high and prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately
inflicting unnecessary injury.

17
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which
endanger the proper administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish
violators of the law. This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not
confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte
blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution.
Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution.
Hence, even if we apply in this case the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the officer to weigh the
manner and intensity of the interference on the right of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and
the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see probable cause to order the detention of
petitioners. 48
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of
political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include
personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of
the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former.
Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to
provide for an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. 49
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people submissive to the
dictates of government. They would have been illegally arrested and detained without bail. Then we would
not have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of injustice are lawyers who are
vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise available to those who cower
in fear and subjection.
Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government agents tasked with the
enforcement of the law that in the performance of their duties they must act with circumspection, lest their
thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their office and maim their countrymen
they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents, particularly the law enforcers, to
be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be oblivious of human rights protected by the
fundamental law. While we greatly applaud their determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their
impetuous eagerness violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized
community.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we
issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza,
is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto
C. Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
SO ORDERED

18
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO,
LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents, LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.
G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO,
PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
274, respondents.
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995
ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO,
LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274,respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamuswith application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and
set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and
Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding
in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of
the accused therein. 1
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, 2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith,
the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation 3 of those charged with the rape and killing on
June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, 5 and her sister Anne Marie
Jennifer 6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated May
22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the
crime; 7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons
of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S.Gaviola; 8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that

19
on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who
expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the sworn statement
of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong
investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar; 9 (5) the sworn statements of Belen
Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a
security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also
submitted and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer
nineteen (19). 10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. 11
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production
And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:
(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay of
Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.;
(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7, 1991);
(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;
(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;
(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated
September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other
than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police agencies;
(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their respective
positions and duties;
(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It alleged
it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner Webb to file
Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of
obtaining the original of said sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty.
Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The
original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It
appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request for its production.
Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he
went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27,
1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque,
Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela Francisco. 13 To further support his defense, he submitted
documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said
dates 14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14,
1991. 15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal
Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San
Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.

20
The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to
dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. 16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and
Artemio "Dong" Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in
their last known address. 17In his sworn statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the
evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the morning of the following day, he was at the residence of his
friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed
that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents
for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and
their co-respondents, 18 On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information 19 against petitioners and
their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the
respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against
the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any
suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the
bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners
Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before us.
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused
their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable
cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their
constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully
intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
I
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995
sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged
material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They
assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also
criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the
alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112
provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground
to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Section
3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information
for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The
said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

21
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either
dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to
the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counteraffidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall
also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall
be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counteraffidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on
the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which
the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine
or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating
officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer
shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the
investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial.
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath
that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ." 20 An
arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons
which ought not to be intruded by the State. 21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept
in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. 22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the
term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not
to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the
street. 25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an
abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused its
discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness
of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semiblond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement, thus: 26
xxx xxx xxx
To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of Alfaro:
On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question

22
First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.
Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just
said "on the following day I read in the newspaper that there were three
persons who were killed . . ."
Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies
on top of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."
On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.
Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela
and pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her
eyes."
On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a
meter high."
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."
On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house
First Affidavit: She never entered the house.
Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty
kitchen."
In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not
erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.: 27
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument
merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator
may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in the
commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would such a prior
agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only
rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that
the several accused had acted in concert or in unison with each other, evincing a common
purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted;
People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).

23
Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn
statements. InAngelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing
therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness failed
to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5) months earlier. Granting, the
Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is untrue, such circumstance is not
sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the witness.
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum
suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give time
to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of Hubert
Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses."
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's
statements, among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the
testimony of a witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting
other parts which the court may find incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law
which is universally applicable. It is not a legal presumption either. It is merely
a latinism describing the conclusion reached by a court in a particular case
after ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the court
deemed proper.
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations
when she first executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her
natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in
Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially specially so where
there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it
has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are
usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair
opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents
which transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and
what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant
indicate a prima faciecase that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed
offense.
We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of counsel 28 and
consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was planned and then
executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting sworn statements of
Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in
United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their
statements as follows: 29
xxx xxx xxx
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29, 1991,
between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside his room
with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany, were
instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time she saw
Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the United States.
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as a
laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales, that on

24
June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used to do, she
entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a matter of fact, in
that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who was only wearing his
pants, already awake and smoking while he was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's
scattered clothes and brought them together with the clothes of the other members of the
family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she began washing the clothes of the
Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in his
shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy,
she decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In the
said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door there is a small
opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on something. She observed
Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from inside his room.
On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and came
back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the secret door of
the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb family.
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in the
morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled to take
the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the airport's
lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male companion. He greeted him and
Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He
knew Freddie Webb because he often watched him then in a television show "Chicks to
Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie Webb referred to as his son, was of the
same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair complexion with no distinguishing marks
on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing a striped white jacket. When he and his
children were already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his
son was seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's
son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the television
program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her lawyer being
interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small built, with a height of
five feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for United States on March 9,
1991, he nurtured doubts because such description does not fit the physical traits of the son
of Freddie, who left with him for United States on the same flight and date.
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him for
almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years old.
Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September 1993.
She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play mahjong at
the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back of the Paraaque Municipal Hall.
At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the Paraaque
police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio room, she was
instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she followed Biong at the
radio room where she overheard him uttering, "Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige,
aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her,
"Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the
canteen apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow,
arrived with a male passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen. After it
made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat beside the
driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male passenger because the
window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around 7:00 of the same morning and
when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands and face, and took his handkerchief from
his pocket which he threw at the trash can. She asked him why he threw his handkerchief
and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and he
replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."

25
Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed him
doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments later, Galvan,
another policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF,
imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako." Biong went to the office
of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to accompany him and with whom she asked permission
to go with them. Before they proceeded to the place where the killings happened, she asked
Biong if he knew the exact address and the latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon."
She was surprised because Galvan never told him the place of the incident.
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to
contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman and
the president of the Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already in the
house, Biong started recording the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she
saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor,
she and Capt. Bartolome went out of the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of
the dining table, she saw the scattered contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong
came out from the room and proceeded to the front door to remove the chain lock; asked
the keys from the housemaid and it was only then that the main door was opened. Biong
noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go
inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard nothing
unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the door panel.
Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the sound of the glass
being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on the hood of the car.
On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with the
Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him remove from
his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling cards, driver's
license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace,
and the watch he took from the jewelry box inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry
items were later pawned by Biong for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow
restaurant in Santos Avenue, Paraaque. The next day, she saw Biong took from his locker at
the Paraaque Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the latter claimed to
have been given to him by the person who called him up in the early morning of June 30,
1991.
Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993. She
observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the Vizconde
case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and brought him to the
Paraaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong halted the investigation when
Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian
talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to him
(Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she remembered regarding this case.
The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of petitioners. It
ruled:30
xxx xxx xxx
The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of
denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the
records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant.
Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily,
alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive identification especially so where
the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA
124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and a long line of cases).
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters (People vs.

26
Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and becomes even more
weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the witness for the prosecution
(People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he claimed
was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than claiming that he "was
not and could not have been at or near the area of the Vizconde residence at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime," respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate
his claim of alibi.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the
form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the incident
occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence submitted by
respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to October
26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of the offense charged. The material
dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While respondent Webb may have submitted
proof tending to show that he was issued a California driver's license on June 14, 1991, there
is no showing that he could not have been in the country on the dates above mentioned.
Neither do we find merit in the allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a bicycle
on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2)
househelps of the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates.
Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California is no
conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the merchandise.
Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the DOJ Panel
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar
v. United States, 31 while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the
NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is
addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on
hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To
repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can
demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers
to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough
evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.
II
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by highlighting the following
facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to
issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial court were incomplete and insufficient
from which to base a finding of probable cause; and (4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included
in the Information as a mere accessory had a "NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and
evaluation of the documents" on the part of said judges.

27
The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no less than
the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect to
issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their
requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave and
Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one
is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each requires a
showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus one can exist
without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence: that
the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that
the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person
be implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any
showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy
to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of
warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112
simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search warrants is
more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the
facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by
these Rules.
We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants
in Soliven vs. Makasiar, 33 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or

28
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as
may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution
now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the submission of
petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses"
before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge
must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring
the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn
statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer 35 as well as the
counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties'
evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certaintyof guilt of an accused. In doing so,
judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They
just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it
is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by
merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to
review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no
personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. 36
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno 37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is predicated
on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even the corpus
delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case. Given the clear
insufficiency of the evidence on record, we stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a
further personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of
the existence or non-existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest against the
accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As priorly discussed, the
various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a finding of
probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a given fact. There is an
eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense of petitioner Webb is
also disputed by sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the
respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their
witnesses with searching questions.

29
III
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation
of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution
by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack
of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated
Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to
be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing
in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995; and
by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27,
1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion
for Production and Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment
and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14, 1995
(pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-requests
were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel requesting the latter to
furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI concerning the petitioner's
whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental
Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not
to issue subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a
"Petition for Injunction, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63 of Makati in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn
statement of Alfaro for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed
the petition after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn
statement of Alfaro, without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2)
conflicting and inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached
hereto is a copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July
28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."
It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary
investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel
continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-copies of the
submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel even
entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17
Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even announced that any party may submit
additional evidence before the resolution of the case. (p. 8, Petition) From the time the panel
declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twenty-seven (27)
days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated, and the information eventually filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque on August 10, 1995. This notwithstanding the directive
of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation.
The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for
the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of
the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of
the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to
adduce and present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct
of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse
resolution and filed the Information in court against them.
Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for
rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of

30
the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with Department
of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a resolution of
the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding
probable causeexcept upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no
appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant
is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu
propio by the Secretary of Justice.
An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however,
shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be
interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the resolution denying the
motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court after the
consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to
seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering her
alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is
anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For
Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by
the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances
are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that
he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other
requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused so
that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

31
Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion
in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification of
admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the
provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for his
discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the
discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information.
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal
prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all
the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.
The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they constitute
". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the
Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness." The argument is based on
Section 9, Rule 119 38which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused
to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right
to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on
a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution. 39 Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that
the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this
provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already
acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the
exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules
of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the
administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to
help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of
witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.:
"Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal
complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more
effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses
and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative
bodies/courts." 40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore
succeed.
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their
preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of
Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive
reading of the rights of persons under preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. To
start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings
during the preliminary investigation stage of a criminal proceeding. 41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule
117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection
of material evidence in possession of the prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the filing of
the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to
make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial. 43

32
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however,
negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right
to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any
significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As
aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to determine the probability that the
suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the
suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to
the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with
homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation
conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized in Rolito
Go vs. Court of Appeals, 45 "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A preliminary investigation
should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential
accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of
petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation considering their
exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt.
The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be operational
even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a)
of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint,
which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other jurisdictions. In
the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held that
"suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition
that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure conviction violates due process.
Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory
evidence in its possession. 48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady 49 "society wins
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should
not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is
not punished.
But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their favor,
we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn statement of Alfaro
dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not
have found probable cause. To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners,
submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement. It explained it cannot produce
the original as it had been lost. Fortunately, petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy
of the original from Atty. Arturo Mercader in the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
951099. 50 As petitioners admit, the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement as a part of their evidence. 51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ
Panel then still conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn
statement. Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them
despite the alleged material discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro.
For reasons we have expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with
grave abuse of discretion. 52 On the other hand, the FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of
petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the
totality of evidence presented by the NBI.
Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the
prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.

33
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation
considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in constitutional law
where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the public's right to
information, and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization.
The process of pinpointing where the balance should be struck has divided men of learning as the
balance keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on the side of order as the tumult of the time
and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of balance is a difficult act to follow.
In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of
publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and
fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with
views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case
the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media
blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials
cannot be completely closed to the press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 53 it was wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal
trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance
that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the
misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the
significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking
crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and
thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important
that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States,
348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to
observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as
valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g.,
Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those
of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to
attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right
to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted.
Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.

34
The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries,
important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances
can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro,
et al., 54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content,
of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the
sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be
sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining
whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution
carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record
evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the
discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners
seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners will
now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not synonymous with
guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat
can bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial. Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult
task of supervising every specie of speech relating to the case at bar, it behooves her to be
reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to
the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial
justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a
silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the
judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done and that is
the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

35
G.R. No. 123872 January 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which
alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are
considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the public interest. 1
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant
who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. 2 Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which
culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the
extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00
and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 3
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of
June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio
Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command
based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant.
That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at
about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in
Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the
same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a
passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place. 4
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial
that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some
pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had
earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio
City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay
Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never
informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him.
Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory
where she reportedly worked as a supervisor, 5 although, as the trial court observed, she never presented
any document to prove her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in
flagrantetransporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the

36
evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds
unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill
motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently selfserving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient
evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered,
transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the
alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of
the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted
the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is as
follows:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The
penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is
a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate
cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various
modes of commission 6 being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4
expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including
these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions," Section 4 could thus be violated
by the commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling,
administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged
therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The
governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided
by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or
more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information
cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness. 7 In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced
evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone
of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute,
hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been
produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in
order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by
the State against him These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the
primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was
justified and cannot be faulted as error.
For one the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations
of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both

37
testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer
could be dispensed with by the prosecution, 8 more so where what he would have corroborated are the
narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption.
Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and
preserve their invaluable services to the police. 9 Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in
court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course. 10 Finally, appellant could very well
have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court
below, 11 but which remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless
search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the
preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer
of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to
procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of
the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not
persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. 12 Evidence secured on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus,
(1) customs searches; 13 (2) searches of moving vehicles, 14 (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view; 15 (4) consented searches; 16 (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 and (6) "stop and
frisk" measures18 have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law
enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from
Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed
for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too
sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While
there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by
name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant
applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be
delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset
know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance
wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were begin
brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming
that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make
preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the
coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police
had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay
Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier.
Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were
of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he
would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin
and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. Moreover,
experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are
vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional
spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If

38
the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary
to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically
viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence
obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs
as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Under the provision, a peace officers or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense. 19 On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the
instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). 20 These instances have been applied to arrests
carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while
largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is
understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet,
and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 21
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of
filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a
higher degree or quantum, 22 and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even
in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept, probable cause is understood
to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings
complained of, 23 or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a
reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime. 24
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue
under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that
the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a
well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof. 25 It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that
is, the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause
exists." 26 It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be
considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once
indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1
Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag
and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man
even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects.
Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open
and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory
inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the
box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarter for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not
elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the
ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and
concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion
since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's
luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to
require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.

39
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search,
were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds
of the officers a well grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The
search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable
that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without
the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the
officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents
of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the
traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law
had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents
to have the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly
or impliedly. 27 Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search
should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law, 28 the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. 29
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately
establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in
court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be
noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of
marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were contained. The
articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that
the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as
such, were the same drugs taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in
evidence, satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who
categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant
appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily
answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can
therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio
City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which
had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in
violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed
to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police
authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438 30 which defines certain
rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting,
detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial
investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or
admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and
more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the
prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object
evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.

40
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter
alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case
of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs
carries with it the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which
case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be
gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not
amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine
subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation
thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of
Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said
section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. 32 While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the offender, these two
facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of
the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that
situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's
case, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in
Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of the Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal
Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

41
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried
and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time
to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali
on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he
was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He
also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged
not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also

42
rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge
sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was
not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was
at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received
the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before
June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano
Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming
of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information
from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports
of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

43
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June
25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel
Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,
maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many days before you received the
intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was
coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but
on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he
was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he
was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?

44
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you
had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was
coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not
need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.

23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded
a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."

45
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial,
we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt
its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it
a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is
the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant,
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so
ordered.

46
G.R. No. 133917

February 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
"BOBOY", accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate
freedom and liberty depend.1
For automatic review is the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
Malaguraalias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and sentencing them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana
which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1
Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed
at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged
marijuana pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accusedappellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names
and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
arrested.8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged
pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning. 9 Consequently, at around 8:00
A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which
immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of
SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where
they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. 10
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and
overtook the "trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accusedappellants were accosted.12

47
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was
holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. 13 Molina
replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." 14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the
police officers.15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 16 The
demurrer was denied by the trial court.17A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but
this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both
accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO
MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under
Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to
Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of this
case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their case by
the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.19
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED
THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE
IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the
acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:

48
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.21
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.22 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be
reversed.26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules
of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ). 27
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid
because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.28 This
brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall
within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed
in People v. Doria,30probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds
of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

49
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the MNWilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.
To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :.. [while]
holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances
sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of
the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or
was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So
also, in People v. Encinada,33the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding
a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1.nt
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes
'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'" 35 In declaring the
warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed.36
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an observation which leaves
us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the comer and
were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu.37
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if
possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which
allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an
inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the
arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be
the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

50
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant
Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest.
What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to
note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer
while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a
closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when,
SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon
admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the
arrest, to wit
"QWhen you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you
know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
ABecause I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when they
pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one
that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina"39
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have
learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who
allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior
to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications,
merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even
before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the
warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did
not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode
the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under
such bare circumstances."40
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches
and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by
the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana
seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court
is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free
society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,
264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
Malagura alias "Boboy", areACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly
detained for other offenses. No costs.

51
SO ORDERED.

52
G.R. No. 180452

January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, AND
RAYMOND S. TAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the January 16, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00485 entitled People of the Philippines v. Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou
Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan, which affirmed the April 1, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No.
Q-01-99437 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 103 in Quezon City. The RTC found accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425
or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Facts
An Information indicted accused-appellants of the following:
That on or about the 24th day of August 2000, at Barangay Bignay II, Municipality of Sariaya, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver and distribute, without authority of law, on board an
L-300 Mitsubishi van, bearing Plate No. UBU 827, and have in their possession, custody, and control,
without the corresponding license or prescription, twenty-five (25) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug, each containing: 2.954 grams,
2.901 grams, 2.926 grams, 2.820 grams, 2.977 grams, 2.568 grams, 2.870 grams, 2.941 grams, 2.903
grams, 2.991 grams, 2.924 grams, 2.872 grams, 2.958 grams, 2.972 grams, 2.837 grams, 2.908 grams,
2.929 grams, 2.932 grams, 2.899 grams, 2.933 grams, 2.938 grams, 2.943 grams, 2.955 grams, 2.938
grams and 2.918 grams, respectively, with a total weight of 72.707 kilos, and one hundred forty seven
(147) self-sealing transparent plastic bags likewise containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu),
also a regulated drug, with a total weight of 291.350 kilos, or with a grand total weight of 364.057 kilos.
That the above acts were committed by a syndicate with the use of two (2) motor vehicles, namely: L-300
Mitsubishi Van bearing Plate No. UBU 827 and a Nissan Sentra Exalta car without Plate Number.
Contrary to law.1
As summarized in the appealed CA decision, the facts are as follows:
On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information
from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya,
Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team
in coordination with a Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the operative, the team then
proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50
meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van.
Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan
(Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed

53
further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were
then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172
confiscated bags showed the white substance to be shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed
against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
Accused-appellants all maintained their innocence and presented the following defenses:
(1) Accused-appellant Hwan testified that he was planning to buy cheap goods at Villa Vicenta
Resort on August 24, 2000, when he saw a van full of bihon at the resort and inquired if it was for
sale. He went to relieve himself 15 meters away from the van. A group of police officers arrested
him upon his return.
(2) Accused-appellant Tan testified that he was a businessman collecting a debt in Lucena City on
August 24, 2000. He was at a restaurant with his driver when three persons identified themselves
as police officers and forcibly brought him inside a car. He was handcuffed, blindfolded, and badly
beaten. He was later brought to a beach and was ordered to hold some bags while being
photographed with five Chinese-looking men he saw for the first time. A tricycle driver, Ricky
Pineda, corroborated his story by testifying that he saw Tan being forced into a white Nissan car on
August 24, 2000.
(3) Accused-appellant Ng Yik Bun (Bun) testified that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist on
August 22, 2000. On August 24, 2000, he was at a beach with some companions when four armed
men arrested them. He was made to pose next to some plastic bags along with other accusedappellants, whom he did not personally know. He was then charged with illegal possession of drugs
at the police station. A friend of his, accused-appellant Kwok Wai Cheng (Cheng), corroborated his
story.
(4) Accused-appellant Kan Shun Min (Min) testified that he arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 2000
for business and pleasure. On August 24, 2000, he checked into a beach resort. While walking
there, he was suddenly accosted by four or five men who poked guns at him. He was brought to a
cottage where he saw some unfamiliar Chinese-looking individuals. He likewise testified that he was
made to take out white packages from a van while being photographed. His friend, accusedappellant Chang Chaun Shi (Shi), corroborated his story.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the six (6) accused namely Ng Yik Bun, Kwok
Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min and Raymond S. Tan (some also known by
other names), GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16 of RA 6425, as amended and each
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) each.
The shabu involved in this case and their accompanying paraphernalia are ordered disposed of in
accordance with law, now RA 9165. The two (2) vehicles are forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.2
In questioning the RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan raised the
lone issue of: whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest despite the
absence of a warrant.

54
On the other hand, accused-appellant Hwan sought an acquittal on the basis of the following submissions:
I
The trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the
accused-appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless
arrest as held in the case of People vs. [Cuizon].
II
The trial court violated Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution as well as Rule 115 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure when it heard the case at bench on June 26, 2001 at the chemistry division of
the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City without the presence of both the herein accusedappellant and his counsel de parte.
III
The trial court erred when it issued and dictated in open hearing a verbal order denying accuseds formal
"Motion to Suppress Illegally Procured Evidence" upon a [ratiocination] that is manifestly contrary to law
[and] jurisprudence set in the Cuizon case, supra.
IV
The trial court erred when with lack of the desired circumspection, it sweepingly ruled the admission in
evidence the 731 exhibits listed in the prosecutions 43-page formal offer of evidence over the itemized
written objections of the defense in a terse verbal order (bereft of reason for the denial of the raised
objections) dictated in open hearing which reads: "All the exhibits of the prosecution are hereby admitted.
The court believes that as far as the evidence submitted goes, these exhibits of the prosecution consisting
of several plastic bags of shabu were not yet shown to be the fruit of a poisonous plant." x x x
V
The trial court also erred in admitting the prosecutions photographs (Exhibit "K" and "M," inclusive of their
sub-markings), the photographer who took the shots not having taken the witness stand to declare, as
required by the rules, the circumstances under which the photographs were taken.
VI
The trial court erred when it tried and applied the provisions of R.A. 9165, the Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, in the instant case even though [the] crime charged took place on 24 August 2000.
VII
The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused. 3
The appellate court found accused-appellants contentions unmeritorious as it consequently affirmed in
toto the RTC Decision.
The CA ruled that, contrary to accused-appellants assertion, they were first arrested before the seizure of
the contraband was made. The CA held that accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto loading
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified
their arrests and the seizure of the contraband. The CA agreed with the prosecution that the urgency of the
situation meant that the buy-bust team had no time to secure a search warrant. Moreover, the CA also
found that the warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise be sustained under the plain
view doctrine.

55
The CA debunked accused-appellant Hwans arguments in seriatim. First, the CA ruled that People v.
Cuizon4was not applicable to the instant case, as, unlike in Cuizon, the apprehending officers immediately
acted on the information they had received about an ongoing shipment of drugs.
Second, the CA also noted that accused-appellant Hwan effectively waived his right to be present during
the inspection of exhibits and hearing, for the manifestation made by the prosecution that accusedappellant Hwan waived his right to be present was never raised in issue before the trial court.
And third, the CA found accused-appellant Hwans other arguments untenable. It held that the trial court
correctly admitted Exhibits "K" and "M" even if the photographer was not presented as a witness. The CA
based its ruling on Sison v. People,5 which held that photographs can be identified either by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. It agreed
with the Solicitor General that accused-appellants were correctly tried and convicted by the trial court
under RA 6425 and not RA 9165, as can be gleaned from the fallo of the RTC Decision. The CA likewise
dismissed the argument that conspiracy was not proved by the prosecution, noting that the evidence
presented established that accused-appellants were performing "their respective task[s] with the objective
of loading the plastic bags of shabu into an L-300 van."6
The CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in
Criminal Case No. Q-01-99437, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.7
On February 18, 2008, the Court, acting on the appeal of accused-appellants, required the parties to
submit supplemental briefs if they so desired.
On March 27, 2008, accused-appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan filed their Supplemental Brief on the
sole issue that:
THERE WAS NO VALID SEARCH AND ARREST DUE TO ABSENCE OF A WARRANT
On June 4, 2008, accused-appellant Hwan filed his Supplemental Brief, raising the following errors,
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ARTICLE III, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS RULE 115
OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN IT CONDUCTED A HEARING ON JUNE 26, 2001 AT
THE CHEMISTRY DIVISION OF THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY IN CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY WITHOUT THE
PRESENCE OF BOTH THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND HIS COUNSEL IN SUCH VITAL [PROCEEDINGS].
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD AS VALID THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH, SEIZURE AND
SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANT DESPITE THE NON-CONCURRENCE OF THE REQUISITE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS ARREST.
Essentially, accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure
and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that
an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a
search warrant subsequently made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a
result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.

56
Accused-appellant Hwan additionally claims that he was deliberately excluded when the trial court
conducted a hearing on June 26, 2001 to identify 172 bags of shabu for trial purposes. He asserts that no
formal notice of the hearing was sent to him or his counsel, to his prejudice.
The Courts Ruling
On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the Bill of Rights under the present
Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during
the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.8 In the instant case, contrary to accusedappellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police
officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police
officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3)
they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the
six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. The
following exchange between Capt. Ibon and the prosecutor sheds light on the participation of all six
accused-appellants:
Q: Upon arriving at Villa Vicenta Resort in Brgy. Bignay II, [in] what specific area [did] you position
yourselves?
A: Initially we [were] about three hundred meters away from Villa Vicenta Resort, then we walked
[stealthily] so as not to [be] [spotted] until we were about fifty meters sir.
Q: So you [positioned] yourself about fifty meters away from the point of Villa Vicenta Resort?
A: From the actual location we saw about six personnel walking together loading contraband.
Q: You said you [were] about fifty meters away from these six persons who were loading
contraband, is that what you mean?
A: Yes sir.
Q: In that place where you [positioned] yourself, could you tell us, what was the lighting condition in
the place where you positioned yourselves?
A: It was totally dark in our place sir.
Q: How about the position of the six persons who were loading contraband?

57
A: They were well-lighted sir.
Q: Why do you say that they are well-lighted?
A: There were several [fluorescent] lamps sir.
Q: Where?
A: One search light placed near where they were loading the shipment sir.
Q: How about the other?
A: About two fluorescent lamps at the house near the six persons your honor.
COURT: Are these portable lamps:
A: Fixed lamps your honor.
Q: Where else?
A: Another at the right corner[.] There was also somewhat a multi-purpose house and it [was] welllighted your honor.
Q: This is a resort and that multi-purpose house that you are referring to are the cottages of the
resort?
A: Yes your honor.
FISCAL: You said you saw six persons who were loading goods[.] In what vehicle [were they]
transferring those things?
A: Into [an] L-300 van sir.
Q: What is the color of the van?
A: White sir.
Q: What did you see that these six persons [were] loading?
A: We saw [them] holding white plastic with white substance your honor.
Q: What container [were they] loading?
A: Actually there were several checkered bags and other plastic [bags] sir.
Q: How [were] they loading these bags?
A: [Manually] your honor.
Q: Will you please describe how they [were] loading it, Mr. Witness?
A: Actually the plastic bags [some were] repacked [into] checkered [bags] while others [were]
loading inside the checkered bag sir.

58
Q: Did they put that on their shoulder or what?
A: Holding and holding [sic] sir.
Q: Nobody carrying [it] on their back?
A: Nobody sir.
xxxx
Q: You said you saw these six persons, will you please look around this courtroom and tell us if
these six persons that you are referring to are present?
COURT: Considering that there are many persons inside this courtroom, will you please stand up
and please [tap] the shoulder of these six persons?
xxxx
INTERPRETER: Witness tapped the [shoulders] of six male persons inside the courtroom.
xxxx
FISCAL: May we manifest your honor that when these six persons stood up when their names [were]
called on the basis [of] what [was] written [on] the information [were] once tapped on their
shoulder by this witness.
The last question I have [is] how long you stayed in this position watching these six persons loading
those [products] in the L-300 van?
A: Ten to fifteen minutes sir.
Q: Within that period could you tell us what transpired?
A: I called Major Tabo to inform [him of] what I saw, I called Major Tabo through the hand-held radio
sir.
Q: What was the reply of major Tabo with respect to your information?
A: He directed me to get closer to these six persons and find out if really the contraband is shabu
that was first reported sir.
Q: So did you in fact go closer?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How [close] were you [to] the six persons at the time?
A: When we were closing [in] somebody noticed us and they were surprised, I immediately shouted
"Freeze, dont move, we are Filipino soldiers," we further identified [ourselves] sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the six persons when you shouted those words?
A: They [froze] sir.

59
xxxx
Q: When you went closer and they [froze], what happened?
A: I asked them who among them are English-speaking?
Q: What was the reply given to you?
A: Somebody replied "tagalog lang."
Q: Who was that person who replied "tagalog lang?"
A: Chua Shilou Hwan sir.
Q: Will you please [identify] for us who answered that in [T]agalog?
COURT: Please [tap] his shoulder.
A: This man sir.
COURT: Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who identified himself as Chua Shilou Hwan.
CHUA SHILOU HWAN: Opo.
FISCAL: After answering you [with] "tagalog lang," what happened?
A: I further asked them "Ano ang dala ninyo?"
Q: What was the reply?
A: Chua Shilou Hwan said shabu.
Q: So [what] did you do next?
A: I asked them who is their leader, sir.
Q: What was the reply?
A: He told me it was Raymond Tan, sir.
Q: Is he inside this courtroom now?
A: Yes sir.
COURT: Please tap [his] shoulder.
WITNESS: This man sir.
COURT: Ikaw ba Raymond Tan?
INTERPRETER: A man stood and [nodded] his head.
xxxx

60
FISCAL: Now after they [froze], what did you do?
A: I inspected the contraband and I found these bags and I immediately called Major Tabo and
informed [him of] the matter sir.
Q: How many bags were you able to confiscate in the scene?
A: All in all 172 your honor.
Q: That 172, one of them is the bag in front of you [which] you identified earlier?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you saw that bag could you tell us what particular [contents] attracted you upon seeing
these bags?
A: It was marked by the members (interrupted).
Q: No what attracted you?
A: Something crystalline white sir.
Q: Are you referring to all the bags?
A: All the bags sir.9 x x x
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were
loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned
that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accusedappellantswho were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a
white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amendedis valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest
without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed
committed in his presence or within his view.10 In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that
accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading
them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court,
the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside
transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. And to
write finis to the issue of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has
consistently held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their
arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.11
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug.12 Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals caught loading and
possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that
they were duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there
is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accusedappellants.13 There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to
arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their allegation of a frame-up
in rebutting the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast

61
with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants loading
plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta Resort.
Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered by the police officers to act like
they were loading bags onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was
arrested inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who could have corroborated
their version of events were not presented in court. The only witness presented by Tan, a tricycle
driver whose testimony corroborated Tans alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties and affirm the trial courts finding that the police
officers testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. Appellate courts generally will not disturb
the trial courts assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances
have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded. 14 We find no reason to deviate from this rule in the
instant case.
On the alleged lack of notice of hearing, it is now too late for accused-appellant Hwan to claim a
violation of his right to examine the witnesses against him. The records show the following
exchange on June 26, 2001:
FISCAL LUGTO:
I would like to manifes[t] that Atty. Agoot, counsel of accused Chua Shilou Hwan, waived his right to
be present for todays trial for purposes of identification of the alleged shabu.
ATTY SAVELLANO:
[Are] we made to understand that this hearing is for identification of shabu only?
FISCAL LUGTO:
Yes despite the testimony of the Forensic Chemist, this is for continuation with the direct testimony
for purposes of identification which was confiscated or seized by the joint operation of the Military
and the PNP at Sariaya, Quezon.
For the record, this [is] for the continuation of the direct testimony of Forensic Chemist Mary Jean
Geronimo.15
As the records confirm, accused-appellant Hwan and his counsel were not present when the forensic
chemist testified. The prosecution made a manifestation to the effect that accused-appellant Hwan waived
his right to be present at that hearing. Yet Hwan did not question this before the trial court. No evidence of
deliberate exclusion was shown. If no notice of hearing were made upon him and his counsel, they should
have brought this in issue at the trial, not at the late stage on appeal.1avvphi1
All told, we hold that the findings of both the RTC and the CA must be affirmed. The trial courts
determination as to the credibility of witnesses and its findings of fact should be accorded great weight
and respect more so when affirmed by the appellate court. To reiterate, a look at the records shows no
facts of substance and value that have been overlooked, which, if considered, might affect the outcome of
the instant appeal. Deference to the trial courts findings must be made as it was in the position to easily
detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.16
Penalty Imposed
Accused-appellants were each sentenced by the lower court to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of PhP
5,000,000. This is within the range provided by RA 6425, as amended. 17 We, therefore, affirm the penalty
imposed on accused-appellants.

62
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485, finding accusedappellants Ng Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min, and Raymond
S. Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 16, Art. III of RA 6425, as amended,
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.

63
G.R. No. 191064

October 20, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO ARANETA y ABELLA @ BOTONG and MARILOU SANTOS y TANTAY @ MALOU, AccusedAppellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 29, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02308, which affirmed the March 12, 2004 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig
City (RTC),finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 and Section 11 of
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002."
Criminal informations were filed in the RTC against Rolando Araneta y Abella a.k.a. "Botong" for Violation of
Section 8 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in addition to the
Information filed against him and co-accused Marilou Santos y Tantay a.k.a. "Malou" for Violation of Section
15, Article III in relation to Section 21, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended. In view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the original informations were amended accordingly. The
said Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 11491-D
People vs. Araneta & Santos
(For Violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II, R.A. 9165)
On or about July 5, 2002 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell, dispense, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, a
police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
weighing of (sic) eight (8) centigrams (0.08 gram), which was found positive to the test for
metamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 11492-D
People vs. Araneta
(For Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165)
On or about July 5, 2002, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not
being lawfully authorized to use or possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 1.22 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the test
for marijuana, a dangerous drug, and eight (8) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance with the following recorded net weight, to wit:
1) Exh. B1 RAA/070502 0.07 gram;
2) Exh. B2 RAA/070502 0.10 gram;
3) Exh. B3 RAA/070502 0.08 gram;

64
4) Exh. B4 RAA/070502 0.07 gram;
5) Exh. B5 RAA/070502 0.08 gram;
6) Exh. B6 RAA/070502 0.04 gram;
7) Exh. B7 RAA/070502 0.06 gram;
8) Exh. B8 RAA/070502 0.09 gram
or having a total weight of 0.59 gram, which were found positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
The prosecutions evidence was summarized in the CA decision as follows:
On July 5, 2002, between 3:00 and 3:30 oclock in the morning, a confidential informant arrived at the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Pasig City Police Station to report to Officer-In-Charge SP04
Numeriano de Lara the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of live-in couple Botong and Malou, later identified
as appellants Rolando Araneta y Abella and Marilou Santos y Tantay, at Barangay Putol, Rosario, Pasig City.
SPO4 de Lara immediately formed a team composed of SPO2 Dante Zigapan who acted as the team
leader, PO2 Danilo Damasco, PO1 Orig, and PO1 Bede Montefalcon, to confirm the veracity of the
informants report and conduct a buy-bust operation. Before dispatching the team, SPO4 de Lara briefed
them as to the alleged illegal activities of the couple and gave their description.
SPO2 Zigapan designated PO2 Damasco as the poseur-buyer giving him a marked P100 bill to be used in
the entrapment. The team proceeded to the target area on board two vehicles. SPO2 Zigapan, Montefalcon
and the informant were in one vehicle while PO2 Damasco and PO1 Orig were together in the other
vehicle.
The team arrived at the target place around 4:10 in the morning. They positioned themselves some 20-30
meters from the alley where appellants were allegedly staying. SPO2 Zigapan gave instructions to the
informant to locate the appellants. After several minutes, the informant came back and confirmed the
presence of appellants at ROTC Street, Putol, Bgy. Rosario, Pasig City. Thereafter, the team proceeded to
the said location.
PO2 Damasco and the informant went near the appellants who were standing just outside their house. The
informant and appellants exchanged greetings. After a short conversation, Botong went inside their house.
The informant introduced PO2 Damasco to Malou by saying, "I-score itong kaibigan ko. Baka meron ka
dyan." Malou then asked PO2 Damasco, "I-score ka na ba." After Malou asked PO2 Damasco, "Magkano,"
the latter immediately gave her the marked P100 bill.
Malou called Botong and when the latter came out, Malou handed to him the marked money. Botong then
gave Malou a plastic sachet which she handed to PO2 Damasco.
After examining the plastic sachet, PO2 Damasco immediately gave the pre-arranged signal to the other
members of the team who thereafter rushed to the scene. PO2 Damasco arrested Malou while SPO2
Zigapan arrested Botong.
SPO2 Zigapan recovered from Botong the marked P100 bill and after frisking him, the police officer found
in Botongs pocket one plastic sachet of what looked like marijuana and eight plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. PO2 Damasco immediately placed "RAA" and the date July 5, 2002 on the
plastic sachet he brought from Malou and the plastic sachets confiscated by SPO2 Zigapan from Botong.

65
At the police station, PO2 Damasco prepared the written request for a laboratory examination of the
confiscated plastic sachets. Together with the request, the plastic sachets were brought by PO1 Orig to the
crime laboratory. The laboratory tests gave a positive result of the presence of methampethamine
hydrochloride or what is locally known as shabu on the contents of nine (9) sachets and marijuana on one
(1) sachet.
The evidence for the accused was summarized by the CA as follows:
Between 3:30 to 4:30 oclock in the morning of July 5, 2006, accused Rolando Araneta together with his
live-in partner and co-accused Marilou Santos were sleeping on the ground floor of their rented apartment,
when they were suddenly awakened by a loud noise coming from the upstairs. Rolando immediately stood
up and tried to go up the stairs. That was when he met a man who introduced himself as a policeman. The
man likewise pointed a gun to him and told him not to move. He was then instructed to sit down, to which
he acceded. Thereafter, the man went near the door of his house and opened the same. Suddenly, four (4)
other policemen went inside. One of the policemen went inside the comfort room and looked for somebody.
Later, he heard the said policeman utter, "Nobody is here." One of the policemen then approached Rolando
and asked him the whereabouts of a certain Teng. Rolando answered that he did not know Teng and that
there was no other person inside the house except for him and his wife Marilou.
The police operatives searched his house. They however found nothing illegal inside his house. After the
search, the police operatives invited Rolando and Marilou to come with them to the precinct to answer
some questions. Thereat, the police operatives informed them that they are being charged for their
involvement in illegal drug activities, which they vehemently denied. PO2 Damasco, however, told them
that if they wanted to be released, Rolando and Marilou must pay P20,000.00 each. When Rolando
declined to give said amount, the police operatives filed the instant cases against them. (TSN, June 23,
2003, pp. 2-8)
In the early morning of July 5, 2003, accused-appellant Marilou Santos and her live-in partner Rolando were
sleeping when they were awakened by a noise coming from the second floor of their house. Rolando tried
to go upstairs to find out what happened, but he met a man who instantly poked a gun at him. Marilou
tried to stand up but the policeman told her, "Stay there, dont move." Thereafter the police shoved them
near the chair. He also asked Rolando the whereabouts of Teng but the former answered that nobody by
the name of Teng lived there. While still poking the gun on them, the policeman opened the door of their
house. Five (5) policemen then entered and conducted a search.
After the search, the policemen brought them to the police station. Thereat, PO2 Damasco asked them
several questions. Moments later, the policeman got something from the drawer and told them that those
articles belong to them. Marilou denied that the said articles belong to them since the policemen did not
recover anything from them during the search. Despite her denial, they were still charged with Violations
of Sections 15, 16 and 8 of Republic Act 9165. After a while, PO2 Damasco demanded P20,000.00 from
them in exchange for their release. As they were innocent, Marilou refused to give said amount, prompting
the police operatives to formally charge them. (TSN, July 23, 2003, p. 3)
In the early morning of July 5, 2002, Marian Rodriguez was outside the alley in ROTC, Rosario, Pasig City
when she saw both accused going out of the alley accompanied by five (5) men. The accused and the five
(5) men passed in front of Marian. She hesitated to follow the group. Since then Marian never saw the
accused again. (TSN, September 10, 2003, pp. 3-4).
In its March 12, 2004 Decision, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced
them accordingly, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment, as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 11491-D, the Court finds accused Rolando Araneta y Abella @ Botong and accused
Marilou Santos y Tantay A Malou GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec.
26, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposes
upon them the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine P500, 000.00 each; and

66
2) In Criminal Case No. 11492-D (which absorbed Criminal Case No. 11490-D), the Court finds accused
Rolando Araneta y Abella @Botong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposes upon him the
penalty of imprisonment of from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Twenty (20) years and to pay a fine
of P300, 000.00. Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he shall be credited with the period
of his detention during his preventive imprisonment.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SO ORDERED.
The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present
during the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers. These were: 1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller; 2) the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold and
payment therefor.
Furthermore, the RTC held that the defense of denial, frame-up, forcible entry, and extortion could not
prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. It noted that accused Rolando Araneta
was not candid enough to inform the court that no less than eight (8) criminal cases were previously filed
against him in different courts for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Nevertheless, out of eight (8)
criminal cases filed against him, he admitted that one resulted in a conviction and two other cases were
dismissed. The other cases were then still pending trial.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed to the CA arguing that: 1) the RTC erred in not finding that they were
illegally arrested and, as such, the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from them were inadmissible in
evidence; and 2) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
On August 29, 2008, the CA rendered the subject decision affirming the decision of the RTC.
In arriving at said determination, the CA applied the "objective test" in buy-bust operations laid down in
the case ofPeople v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 698-699.3 The CA ruled that the prosecution evidence met the
standard for the "objective test" through the testimony of its witness, PO2 Danilo Damasco, who acted
as poseur-buyer and who related how the informant introduced him to the accused; how the transaction
was consummated through the exchange of marked money and the sachet of shabu; and how the accused
was arrested by the entrapment team.
The CA noted that the accused were arrested in flagrante delicto and that other contraband materials were
recovered from them during the ensuing search. It concluded that the corpus delicti was duly established.
Finally, the CA stated that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers were minor or
inconsequential. The accused failed to adduce evidence to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty in favor of the police officers. The accused likewise failed to show proof that the police
officers did not properly perform their jobs or had ill motives against them. Moreover, their defense of
denial and frame-up for extortion purposes was self-serving, negative evidence that was not entitled to be
given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
In due time, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the inadmissibility of evidence due to
their illegal arrest, and the inconsistency in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. They also pointed
out that the apprehending officers failed to establish that the corpus delicti (sachets
of shabu or marijuana) were the very same ones sold by and seized from them. Additionally, they claimed
that the apprehending team, who had initial custody over the confiscated drug items, failed to make an
inventory and to photograph the same in their presence.
On August 24, 2009, the CA issued a resolution4 denying their motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled,
among others, that the issues on the corpus delicti and the alleged failure of the apprehending team to

67
make an inventory and to photograph the shabu and marijuana in the presence of the accused were new
issues not raised in their appeal brief.
In their recourse to this Court, the accused presented only one
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATING SECTIONS 5 AND 11 OF ARTICLE II OF R.A. No. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"COMPREHENSIVE DRUGS ACT OF 2002.
The accused argue that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not able to establish without a
doubt, that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the very same ones allegedly sold by them. They
insist that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the requirements of the law as regards the proper
custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of the alleged buy-bust operation.
The prosecution stands firm by its position that the arrest of the accused and seizure of the shabu and
marijuana were lawful and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were truthful. In the absence
of any credible evidence to the contrary, the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their
official duty. More importantly, all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs
are present, to wit: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and 2) the
delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
The prosecution asserts that the accused cannot raise for the first time on appeal the issue on the alleged
failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. At any rate, the
prosecution believes that it has shown that the chain of custody of the seized items was not broken.
THE COURTS RULING:
After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of
conviction. It is morally convinced that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged against them. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect if not conclusive effect,
unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 5 In this case, the CA
found no such inculpatory facts and circumstances and this Court has not stumbled upon any either.
Doubtless, the prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller; 2) the identity of the object
of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold upon payment.
PO2 Danilo Damasco, (PO2 Damasco) the poseur-buyer, clearly and convincingly narrated in detail the
entrapment operation they had conducted that led to the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the
dangerous drugs. He related on the witness stand that upon receiving information from a confidential
informant about the illegal sale of dangerous drugs by the accused, they immediately formed an
entrapment team to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon reaching the area in the early morning of July 5,
2002, he and the confidential informant approached the accused. After a brief introduction and short
conversation, accused Botong went inside their house while accused Malou received the marked money
from the poseur-buyer. Malou then called Botong who thereafter came out of the house. Malou gave the
marked money to Botong who, in turn, gave Malou a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. The plastic sachet was then handed over to PO2 Damasco who examined it and immediately
gave the pre-arranged signal to arrest the accused. During the arrest, the marked money was recovered
from Rolando and so were several other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances together
with a plastic sachet containing marijuana. Subsequently, the accused were brought to the police station
and the seized items were later brought to the Police Crime Laboratory Office for examination.

68
The testimony of PO2 Damasco was corroborated by SPO2 Zipagan, the entrapment team leader, and
SPO4 Numeriano De Lara, the entrapment team organizer.
Contrary to the posture of the accused, the testimony of PO2 Damasco was clear, consistent and
convincing. As correctly assessed by the CA, his testimony passed the "objective test" in buy-bust
operations.
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The
manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase
the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that lawabiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all
cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into
ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look
at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. 6 [Emphasis supplied]
The Court looked into the accuseds defense of denial and accusations of frame-up, planting of evidence,
forcible entry and extortion by the police officers but found them inherently weak. Aside from their bare
allegations, the accused had nothing more to show that the apprehending police officers did not properly
perform their duties or that they had ill motives against them. They failed to substantiate their argument
that they were framed-up for extortion purposes.
Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the members of the buy-bust team
performed their duties in a regular manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full
faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not
needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust
team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of
apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. 7
In People v. Villamin, involving an accused arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust operation, the
Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of
the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the instant case. When carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in
illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as the idea to commit a crime comes not from the
police officers but from the accused himself. The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on
the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest
illegal.
The illegal drugs seized were not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense would like this Court to
believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under
Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides:
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

69
Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a
warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.81avvphi1
It should also be noted that after the RTC rendered a guilty verdict, the accused filed a motion for
reconsideration based on two (2) grounds, to wit: 1) inadmissibility of the seized items; and 2) credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. In the CA, they reiterated said grounds. After an unfavorable decision and
ruling, the accused added two (2) new arguments in their motion for reconsideration, to wit: 1) the
apprehending officers failed to establish that the corpus delicti (sachets of shabu or marijuana) were the
very same ones sold by and seized from them; and 2) the apprehending team who had initial custody over
the confiscated drug items failed to make an inventory and to photograph the same in their presence.
The Court totally agrees with the ruling of the CA that the issues on the corpus delicti and the compliance
with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 were issues that were not raised by the accused in their appellants brief,
and were only presented in their motion for reconsideration from the decision of the CA.
Hence, the Court cannot act, much less, rule on said new points. To do so would violate basic rules on fair
play and due process. Thus:
We point out the defenses failure to contest the admissibility of the seized items as evidence during trial
as this was the initial point in objecting to illegally seized evidence. At the trial, the seized shabu was duly
marked, made the subject of examination and cross-examination, and eventually offered as evidence, yet
at no instance did the appellant manifest or even hint that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized
items that affected their admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. In People v. Hernandez, we held that
objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. 9
WHEREFORE, the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02308,
isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

70
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL
and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX D.
PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP
Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY
RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila,
P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

71
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs.
Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New
People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely
applied long existing lawsto the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are
th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing
membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer
reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people
not the Court that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5
of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of
the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to
their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by
petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be
ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before
rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were

72
made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the
detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to
arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law
expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states
the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113,
which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is
justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an
offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an
outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under
the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St.
Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection)
is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder,
arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on
an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that
will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the
arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2)
conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an
offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it

73
will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the
arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes
Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the
five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January
1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City;
that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow
unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause
as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA
member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City
by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as
"Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the
records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were
fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention
and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that
Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and
hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable
sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers
who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their
official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance
with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against
Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly
placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988,
he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is
now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple(G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also
justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit

74
unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught
in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of
Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant,
informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and
disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the
authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied
by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information,
the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when
Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that
he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that,
at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live
ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on
13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening
of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns
were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12
May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the
head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the
court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason
which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the
military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito
Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location
and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information
they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of
certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine
safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he
was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and
communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their
membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their
former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the
corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that,

75
as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would
have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have
been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers
involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in
the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long
as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public
interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth
in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of
public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons
are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not
strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers
and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club
(NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on
23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing
offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers,
was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pretrial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged
atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of
authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the
scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court
has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu
had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear.
Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to
dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and
his bail bond cancelled.

76
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II
was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the
same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for
investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant
was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113,
since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was
probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without
warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible
flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of
Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information
charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo
Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted
therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of
an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which
liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations
against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and
supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113.
They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for
murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of
an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other
hand, in the case ofAmelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the
CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their
possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception

77
that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported
by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain
offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the
other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the
merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this
Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing
conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from
the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its
legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into and all other appropriate
courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions
under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee
shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to
languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or
convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated
the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated
suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long
existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests.
More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be
right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

78
.R. No. 174774

August 31, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias "Botong," and RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias "Mac-Mac," AccusedAppellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733, which
affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court of Appeals found accusedappellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes (Reyes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation to Section 16 of Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:
On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes, Emmanuel de
Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery,
distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known
as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, in its Resolution dated March 3, 2000,
found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was
concerned. The criminal information against accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, filed with the
RTC, reads:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES y SANTOS @ BOTONG,
RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and EMMANUEL DE CLARO y ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime
of VIOLATION OF SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO SEC. 16 ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, committed in the
manner herein narrated as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
any regulated drug, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
commit to sell, deliver, distribute and/or transport a carton of ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing white crystalline substance with the following grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6, 93.5, 98.3, 99.5,
99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a total of 980.9 grams, which substance when submitted for drug
examination, were found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu," a regulated drug, without the corresponding license and prescription. 3
On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom, insisting
on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said trial court granted
in an Order4 dated March 15, 2000.
After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated April 3, 2000,
recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de
Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom. The Office
of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events presented by the parties during the
preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except accused-appellant Reyes who did not participate in
the proceedings), which it summarized as follows:

79
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the Intelligence and Investigation of the
Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims that on 17
February 2000 a confidential informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the
vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they were dispatched to verify
the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00 p.m. after meeting with the confidential agent,
they strategically positioned themselves at the vicinity parking area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m.,
accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. "Botong," on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent
Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes calling accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro through his cellular phone; that
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro then proceeded to the latters parked
Mazda car where respondent Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic
bag was taken, which accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic bag
to accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the accused/respondents who according
to the arresting officers admitted having in their possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items
containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with a total
weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
In his "Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay," accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes claims that on 17
February 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City, together with a neighbor, one Marlon
David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness; that while looking for a parking space,
several men with firearms suddenly appeared, with one shouting, "buksan mo ang pintuan ng sasakyan at
kung hindi babasagin ko ito"; that he and Marlon David were forced out of their vehicle with one of the
armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart, asking where the said bag allegedly
containing "shabu" came from; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes answered "hindi ko alam,"
that he and Marlon David were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and continuously
asked who the source of the shabu was, with respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes replying, "hindi ko
alam at wala akong kinalaman diyan;" that Marlon David was separated from accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes and later released on 18 February 2000; that when accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes blindfold was removed, he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila.
xxxx
To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he was arrested in Brgy. Manggahan,
Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop Bar and Restaurant in Mandaluyong City,
respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claros spouse submitted a certified true xerox copy of barangay
blotter of Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000 made by Mrs. Delos
Reyes, on the incident reported to by Marlon David thus:
"BLOTTER"
"Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng. Virginia Delos Reyes, upang ipagbigay alam ang
pagkawala ng kanyang asawa na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa 17 ng Pebrero taong dalawang
libo (2000) na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si Marlon David, ay hinuli ng mga hindi kilalang lalaki sa
Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang alamin kung ang nasabing insidente ay coordinated
dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng Barangay."
(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes
Nagpapahayag"
The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia] Delos Reyes of the incident
upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another witness, one Joel Navarro, claims having seen the actual
incident confirming the events as narrated to by accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and Marlon
David.

80
Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife, respondent Lantion-Tom, submitted
their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly denying the charges and claiming that they were at the
Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk to respondent Lantion-Toms accountant Ms. Daisy Milan regarding
the Mayors Permit, Business Location Clearance issued by the Office of the Barangay Captain, insurance
documents, BIR Certificate of Registration of her business; that they were with accused/respondent
[Emmanuel] de Claros brother, Roberto and a friend, James, with the two remaining outside the
restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to accompany Ms. Milan, while accused/respondent
[Emmanuel] de Claro was left inside; that after Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly
surrounded by men who introduced themselves as police officers and were arresting them for being the
source of "shabu" in a drug deal; that all of them, accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro, Roberto and
James were likewise arrested and continuously questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they
were taken to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further investigation; that
Roberto and James were released the following day. Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the
arresting officers as to the circumstances on the alleged "drug deal" leading to their arrest are unfounded
and purely fabricated.
During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the arresting officers manifested that
they are going to submit reply-affidavit on 29 March 2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was
submitted.5
The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers failed to refute accusedappellant Rolando delos Reyes counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, as
corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn statements
(Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City Prosecutor also observed that
Lantion-Tom was "merely in the company of the other respondents without performing any overt act
showing her to be part of the illicit transaction" and her drug test revealed negative results. On the other
hand, it considered the conflicting claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he was illegally arrested and that
the drug deal was a mere fabrication) and the arresting officers (i.e., that Emmanuel de Claro was the
seller/pusher in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle) would be best ventilated during
the trial on the merits.
In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with leave of court
to admit amended information.
In its Order6 dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecutions motion. Contrary to the finding of the
Office of the City Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against accusedappellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well.
Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000,7 while Emmanuel de Claro was arraigned on July 12,
2000.8 All three pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 3 Virgilio Santiago,9 Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo Lectura,10 PO3 Angel Yumul,11 and SPO1 Benjamin David,12 members of the
Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National Capital Regional Police Office
(NCRPO) who apprehended and/or investigated the case against accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro,
and Lantion-Tom; and P/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, Jr.13 (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom on February
17. 2000. He testified that at around 10:30 a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold Aguilar, received
information from a confidential informant regarding an illegal drug deal that would take place between
Botong and Mac-Mac at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in Madaluyong City. Botong and Mac-Mac were
identified during the investigation as accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes, respectively.
As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was organized by Major Aguilar,
composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1 Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3 Elmer Corbe, PO3

81
Marcelo Arcancia, Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3 Edwin dela Cruz. At around 1:00
p.m. of the same day, the police team was dispatched, using four vehicles, to the location of the drug deal
and upon arrival, they waited for the confidential informant to arrive. When the confidential informant
arrived at around 3:30 p.m., he told the police team that the drug deal would possibly take place between
6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and that the suspects would utilize a red Toyota Corolla with plate number TRP868 and a white Toyota Corolla with plate number ULF-706. The police team then positioned their cars
strategically in such a way that they could see the vehicles coming from St. Francis Street and EDSA.
PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the suspected vehicles arrived, both stopping
along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked to each other. The
confidential informant recognized the driver of the white Toyota car as Mac-Mac and the driver of the red
Toyota car as Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a call on his cellular phone and then proceeded
inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. Inside the restaurant, Botong talked to another
person, who was identified during the investigation as Emmanuel de Claro alias Cocoy. PO3 Santiago was
about three to five meters away. Thereafter, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached
a car parked right outside. The person at the back seat of the car, later on identified as Lantion-Tom,
handed to Cocoy a white plastic bag containing a box. Cocoy gave the bag to Botong, who, in turn, handed
the same bag to Mac-Mac. In the meantime, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant.
PO3 Santiago related that their team leader "sensed" that the drug deal had already been consummated,
so the police team immediately effected the arrest of the suspected drug dealers. PO3 Santiago and PO3
Yumul arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura and the remaining police team members
arrested Botong and Mac-Mac. The plastic bag containing the box was seized from Mac-Mac. The arrested
suspects were brought to the police office for investigation. The plastic bag, the box, and the 10 heatsealed sachets of white crystalline substance inside the box, were marked for identification and physical
examination at the police office.
According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents of each of the 10 heat-sealed sachets
yielded positive test results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Santiago then signed a
Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together with the other arresting police officers, namely,
SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes, and PO3 Nelson Gene Javier.
On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the plastic bag
and that he did not even see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From PO3 Santiagos position,
he could not conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal drug deal as he had no prior knowledge
of the contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the other arresting officers just relied on the information
relayed by the confidential informant. Also, the police team did not recover any money from the arrested
suspects. The confidential informant merely informed the police the following morning that the money for
the illegal drugs was already deposited in the bank. The police, however, failed to make further queries
from the confidential informant about the bank.
SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a confidential informant about an
illegal drug deal involving Cocoy, Botong, and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong
City on February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was designated as the leader of the team that will bust said
illegal drug deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lecturas team proceeded to the subject location.
The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lecturas team at around 3:30 p.m. SPO1 Lectura
conducted a short briefing then positioned his team strategically within the vicinity. The confidential
informant told the police team that the drug deal would take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. At
around 10:00 p.m., the confidential informant identified the suspected drug dealers Botong and Mac-Mac,
who were arriving in two cars. After conversing for a moment with Mac-Mac, Botong went inside Whistle
Stop Restaurant to talk to Cocoy. Botong and Cocoy then went outside the restaurant and approached
another car. Cocoy took a white plastic bag from the car, which he handed to Botong. Thereafter, Cocoy
went back inside the restaurant, while "[Botong] proceeded to his car near [Mac-Mac]." SPO1 Lectura was
positioned at the other lane of the road, approximately 10 to 15 meters away from the suspects. At that
moment, SPO1 Lectura "sensed" that the drug deal had been consummated, so he decided to already
arrest the suspects. SPO1 Lectura arrested Mac-Mac, from whom he seized the white plastic bag. PO3

82
Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3 Santiago apprehended Cocoy. The police team brought
the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation.
SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat-sealed plastic
sachets inside. In front of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1 David marked the said articles with his initials. After physical
and chemical examinations revealed that the contents of the sachets were shabu, SPO1 Lectura signed the
Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.
During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon David was with Botong when the latter
was arrested, but he later admitted that the police also arrested Marlon David. Marlon David was brought
to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other arrested suspects, for "verification," and was
released the following day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted that during the preliminary investigation, he and
PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Javier, answered that it was PO3 Santiago who seized the shabu from
Mac-Mac; but SPO1 Lectura explained that what the investigating prosecutor actually asked during
preliminary investigation was who saw where the shabu came from and that he signed the minutes of the
preliminary investigation without reading the same. SPO1 Lectura maintained that it was he who recovered
the shabu from Mac-Mac. Lastly, SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team heavily relied on the
information given by the confidential informant in identifying the suspects in the illegal drug deal, who
were eventually arrested.
PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that of PO3 Santiago and SPO1 Lectura.
On February 17, 2000, he was assigned at the Intelligence Investigation Division of the RMG based in
Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Padpad,
and several other police officers at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City, conducting
surveillance operation regarding the tipped-off illegal drug deal. He was with SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Padpad in the car parked in front of Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and their
confidential informant were in another car also parked along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3
Santiago, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Corbe were in the car stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant. PO3
Yumul could not recall where the other members of the team were located.
At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in separate cars, stopping in front of
Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-Mac alighted from their cars and talked to each other. At that time, PO3
Yumul was about five meters away from the two suspects. Moments later, Botong called someone on his
cellular phone, and then went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. PO3 Yumul followed
Botong inside the restaurant and saw the latter talking to Cocoy. PO3 Yumul though did not hear the
conversation between Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and
approached a parked car. From his position about three meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the passenger at the
back seat of the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the window and handing over "a white plastic bag with carton
inside" to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the plastic bag to Botong. Cocoy then returned inside the restaurant
and "[Botong] went back to [Mac-Mac]." PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside the restaurant. A few minutes
later, PO3 Santiago also went inside the restaurant informing PO3 Yumul that they would be arresting
Cocoy, and that Botong and Mac-Mac were already arrested outside the restaurant. PO3 Santiago, assisted
by PO3 Yumul, approached Cocoy and arrested him. The police team proceeded to the police office with all
the arrested suspects for further investigation. PO3 Yumul, however, failed to join the other arresting
officers in signing the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.
SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the RMG at Camp Bagong
Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned to the instant case following the arrests of accused-appellants, Emmanuel
de Claro and Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for inquest to the Office of the City Prosecutor.
SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from SPO1 Lectura a plastic bag containing a
box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu inside. SPO1 Lectura told SPO1 David that the articles
were seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1 David marked his initials "BSD" on the confiscated
articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination of the specimens. SPO1
David disclosed that he prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of the arresting officers.

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The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Insp. Cruto was the
forensic chemist who conducted the physical, chemical, and confirmatory examinations of the contents of
the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the RMG-NCRPO on February 18, 2000.
P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents of each sachet, revealing that
two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each; two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet, 99.2 grams; two
sachets, 98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9 grams; and one sachet, 93.5 grams.
P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative sample from each plastic sachet and proceeded with his chemical
and confirmatory examinations. The contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets all tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. P/Insp. Cruto recorded the result of the
examinations in his Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000. 14
The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence: the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest15 dated February 18, 2000 signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3
Dela Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura; 16 the 10 heat-sealed plastic
sachets recovered from the possession of accused-appellants;17 the PNP-RMG Request for Laboratory
Examination of the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets; 18 the PNP Crime Laboratory Physical
Sciences Report No. D-097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which revealed that the contents of the 10 heatsealed plastic sachets positively tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride; 19 and the Letter (Referral of
the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor)20dated February 18, 2000. The RTC admitted all the
aforementioned evidence for the prosecution in its Order21dated March 1, 2001.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon David, 22 accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes,23 Emmanuel de Claro,24 Roberto de Claro,25 and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom.26 Accused-appellant
Reyes did not testify.
Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student of Rizal High School in Pasig City. He
recalled that on February 17, 2000, at about 1:00 p.m., he accompanied accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes, whom he referred to as Kuya Botong, to the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, to collect some money.
While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were inside their car at the parking area of
said market, another car suddenly arrived, from which an armed male passenger alighted and approached
them. Four other armed men followed and poked their guns at accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and
Marlon David. The armed men, in civilian attire, were carrying an SM plastic shopping bag and questioned
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes if he knew the owner of said plastic bag. Accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic bag. Marlon David was also asked and he
answered that he knew nothing about the plastic bag.
Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police officers, pulled accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes from the driver seat of the latters car, transferred him and Marlon David to the back
seat of said car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed men sat in the front seats of the car, while
one of them sat at the back, beside accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed
men drove the car around (paikot-ikot). The armed men then separated accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes from Marlon David. They ordered Marlon David to alight from the car and transfer to another vehicle.
While in the other car, the armed men boxed and mauled Marlon David to force him to admit to be the
source of the plastic bag. Each question was accompanied with one punch. Marlon David remained
blindfolded until they arrived at the police camp in Bicutan, Taguig, where he again saw accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon David was released the following morning, leaving accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes behind at the police camp. Marlon David went home and told Virginia delos Reyes, the wife of
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, about the incident.
Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any person with the name Mac-Mac. Marlon
David additionally relayed that he was told by accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes that the latter was
likewise mauled by the armed men.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar account of the incident that took place at
1:00 p.m. on February 17, 2000, while he and Marlon David were at the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal.

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Their car was surrounded by four armed men. The armed men poked their guns at him and Marlon David,
shouting at them to open the car doors. He lowered the car window and the armed men opened the car
door. The armed men forced him and Marlon David to get down from the front seats of the car and to
transfer to the back seat, blindfolded them, and asked them who were the owners of the SM plastic bag.
After they left Buenas Market, he noticed that they were just driving around. The car stopped only when
Marlon David was taken out and transferred to another car. It was already late in the evening when the car
finally stopped. He then realized, after his blindfold had been removed, that he was at Camp Bagong Diwa
in Bicutan, Taguig.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the police that he was selling or
delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted that he was not arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant in
Mandaluyong City, rather, he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal. Accused-appellant
Reyes or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed him money. He and accused-appellant Reyes agreed to meet at
Buenas Market for the settlement of the latters loan, but the meeting did not take place because the
armed men arrived. He further claimed that he only met Emmanuel de Claro at Camp Bagong Diwa in
Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de Claro before that time, and he found out the latters name
only when they were already detained at the Mandaluyong City Jail.
Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at around 10:00 a.m., he was at the
Department of Trade and Industry in Buendia, Makati City, with his common-law wife Mary Jane LantionTom to follow up their application for business permit. At around 1:00 p.m., they had lunch at Glorietta.
Emmanuel de Claro was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-Tom passed by the house of his brother
Roberto de Claro to request the latter to drive for them. James, Roberto de Claros friend, also went with
them.
The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because his own car was in the auto shop.
Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, Roberto de Claro, and James first went to Las Pias City to check on
Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop. From there, they proceeded to Libertad in Pasay City and ate
dinner at the Duty Free Philippines. Afterwards, the group made their way to Mandaluyong City where
Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with Daisy Milan (Milan), her accountant. Emmanuel de Claro
and Lantion-Tom met Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant located at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Milan and Lantion-Tom discussed matters pertaining to the business permit. Emmanuel de Claro stepped
outside the restaurant for a moment to smoke a cigarette, then, returned inside to wait for the meeting
between Lantion-Tom and Milan to finish. After their meeting, Lantion-Tom walked Milan outside the
restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro waited for Lantion-Tom inside.
Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and introduced themselves as police
officers. They warned Emmanuel de Claro not to make a scene and just go with them peacefully.
Emmanuel de Claro obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant and was forced to get into a waiting
car. For about three hours inside the car, he was punched, handcuffed, blindfolded, and told to bow down
his head. He was likewise being forced to admit something about the shabu, but he denied knowing
anything about it. He heard from the radio inside the car that the police officers were waiting for another
car. After three hours of traveling, the car finally stopped and when his blindfold was removed, he learned
that they were already at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.
Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for almost an hour, until he was called into
another room where he met his co-accused for the first time. He later saw Lantion-Tom at the office of one
of the police officers. They were interrogated by the police and being forced to admit that the drugs being
shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer but their plea was ignored. The police told
Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom that somebody should be held responsible for the shabu so they were
made to choose whether both of them or only one of them would be charged. Emmanuel de Claro was
compelled to choose the latter option.
Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claros testimony. On February 17, 2000, Roberto de Claro
was at home playing video games when his brother Emmanuel de Claro and the latters wife, Lantion-Tom,
arrived and requested him to drive their car because Emmanuel was not feeling well. James, Roberto de
Claros friend, rode with them. They first went to Las Pias City to check on Emmanuel de Claros car at the
auto shop, then they proceeded to Libertad, Pasay City, where they had dinner at Duty Free Philippines.

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They next drove to Whistle Stop Restaurant at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet "Ms. Milan."
Only Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom went inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro and James stayed in
the car.
Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and "Ms. Milan" walking towards them. As the two
women were approaching, armed men suddenly appeared, surrounded their car, and pointed guns at
them. Roberto de Claro got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery ("hold-up") was taking place. The armed
men knocked at the car window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro opened the window, then the door of the car.
Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom were made to sit at the back seat of the car. Two of the armed
men sat on the front seats of the car, while one sat at the back with Roberto de Claro, James, and LantionTom. The armed men introduced themselves as police officers.
Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo) Roberto de Claro, James, and LantionTom, all the while ordering them to keep their heads bowed down. The police officers drove the car for two
hours, stopping at a gas station for about five minutes. At this moment, Roberto de Claro was able to raise
his head but was immediately told to bow down his head again. Roberto de Claro also heard from the
police officers radio that they were still waiting for somebody. They travelled again for quite a long time
and stopped in a dark place. The police officers took Roberto de Claros wallet containing P7,000.00 cash.
Early in the following morning, they arrived at the police station where Roberto de Claro saw his brother
Emmanuel de Claro once more. They stayed in one room until Roberto de Claro and James were released
by the police the next day.
When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the defense agreed to consider her Counter
Affidavit dated March 23, 2000 and Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000 as her direct
examination.
On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among those arrested on February 17, 2000 at
the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in an illegal drug deal. At
the time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de Claro, and James. She was also
brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was interrogated without a lawyer. She was shown a
box containing shabu which she had never seen before. Lantion-Tom insisted that she was in Mandaluyong
City to meet her accountant, Milan, regarding her application for a business permit. Lantion-Tom pointed
out that the charge against her was eventually dismissed.
The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de Claros Counter Affidavit dated
March 23, 2000,27 Lantion-Toms Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,28 Emmanuel de Claro and LantionToms Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,29 Roberto de Claros Witness Affidavit dated March 29,
2000,30Marlon Davids Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,31 Virginia delos Reyes Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,32 Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,33 accusedappellant Rolando delos Reyes Sinumpaang Kontra Salaysay dated March 14, 2000, 34 and a Barangay
Blotter dated February 19, 2000 by Virginia delos Reyes.35 The RTC admitted all these documentary
evidence for the defense in its Order36dated September 13, 2002.
In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
for unlawfully possessing/selling, delivering, transporting and distributing methamphetamine hydrochloride
otherwise known as shabu, a regulated drug, without lawful authority in violation of Sections 15 and 16 of
Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 each and the costs of suit.
Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and seized from the accused during the
aforesaid operation are forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government shall be turned over to the
PDEA pursuant to law for proper disposal without delay.37

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Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal38 on October 23, 2003. Accused-appellants Roberto delos
Reyes and Reyes each filed his notice of appeal39 on October 29, 2003 and December 30, 2003,
respectively.
Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his notice of appeal, 40 instead, filing before
the RTC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings Pursuant [to] Section 24, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court41 on October 30, 2003, and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration42 on
November 3, 2003. Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to review its judgment of conviction based on the
following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACCUSED DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP
IS A MERE ALIBI AND HAS THUS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ALL
THE THREE (3) ACCUSED WERE PICKED-UP AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA SHANGRI-LA PLAZA HOTEL.
II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS
LAWFUL SINCE THE ACCUSED WERE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG
THE THREE (3) ACCUSED IN THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SALE,
DELIVERY AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION ON THE BASIS MAINLY OF A
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.
V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT
ACCUSED EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS NOT AFFORDED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.43
Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was engaging in an illegal drug deal,
levied against him by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul was suspicious, if
not incredible. Emmanuel de Claro pointed out that although these police officers testified that LantionTom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of shabu, the prosecution
still dropped the criminal charges against Lantion-Tom. Emmanuel de Claro also strongly argued that the
prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported alibi that he, his wife, and his brother went to Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet his wifes accountant, so they could attend to several documents
pertaining to a business permit. Emmanuel de Claro further insisted that the RTC should have highly
regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testimony which directly contradicted the police officers
statements.
In its Order44 dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted Emmanuel de Claros motion to withdraw his
notice of appeal and required the prosecution to comment to his motions for reconsideration.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition45 on December 19, 2003, objecting to Emmanuel de Claros
motions for reconsideration and maintaining that its police-witnesses categorical, consistent, and straightforward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de Claro.
In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC, in its Order 46 dated January 12,
2004, acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly admitted that it erred in
giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and
PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense. Thus, the RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is hereby GRANTED and a new one
entered, ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. Consequently, his immediate release from detention is
hereby ordered unless he is detained for other cause or causes.47

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Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants, the RTC forwarded the
complete records of the case to us on March 29, 2004, and we gave due course to the said appeals in our
Resolution48dated June 21, 2004.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellants Brief 49 on September 15, 2004, while accusedappellant Reyes filed his Appellants Brief50 on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to our pronouncement in
People v. Mateo,51 we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.52 Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed before the appellate court its Consolidated Brief 53 on January 21, 2005.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the conviction of accused-appellants,
and merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.
According to the appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than accusedappellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption that the police
officers regularly performed their official duties.
The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our Resolution54 dated January 31, 2007, we required
the parties to submit their supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellants Rolando delos
Reyes and Reyes filed their manifestations55 on March 14, 2007, April 10, 2007, and April 13, 2007,
respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already filed before the Court of Appeals.
In his Appellants Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes assigned the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY AS TO THE
PLACE OF THE ARREST IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE] TESTIMONIES OF PO3 VIRGILIO SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.
III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WHICH
WAS PREVIOUSLY CATEGORIZE[D] AS WEAK WHEN THE COURT A QUO GRANTED BAIL TO THE
ACCUSED.56
Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellants Brief:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
RAYMUNDO REYES AS UNLAWFUL.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS VALID, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425. 57
Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against them by the police
is a complete fabrication and frame-up. Accused-appellants called attention to the material inconsistencies
in the prosecutions evidence. PO3 Santiago testified during direct examination that accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes handed the "plastic bag with box inside" to accused-appellant Reyes, but he admitted
during cross-examination that he did not see such transfer. The prosecution was unable to present any
evidence to prove the source of the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of shabu, and the money
paid as consideration for the illegal drugs. The prosecution likewise failed to rebut accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated by Marlon David, that
he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions version of the arrests of the suspects
and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were effected in violation of accused-appellants
fundamental rights. The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional
circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested
without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not because of any apparent
criminal activity. A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure
incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.

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Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants, maintaining that:
I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAVE
ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS VALID SINCE IT FALLS SQUARELY
UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN SUFFICE TO CONVICT
APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
V. MERE DENIAL AND "HULIDAP," WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT EXCULPATE APPELLANTS FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER SECTION
3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT HAD NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY DEFENSE
EVIDENCE.
VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES COMMANDS
GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION.58
Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers statements, as pointed out by
accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect the weight of their testimonies; while accused-appellants
defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus, should be looked upon with disfavor.
Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for the illegal drug deal, since consideration is not an
element of the crime charged.
Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a crime or in
flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of distributing, without legal
authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of February
17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the absence of
satisfactory proof to the contrary, the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers enjoy the
presumption that "official duty has been regularly performed."
We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the facts
surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and reinvestigation,
recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom from the criminal
charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the Office of the City Prosecutor: dropping
the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding probable cause against accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes.59
Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its Decision 60 dated September 23, 2003,
the RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on Emmanuel de Claros
motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order61 dated January 12, 2004, totally reversed itself
and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight to the evidence presented by the
defense.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by
the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to the

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testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. Despite
the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its assailed decision that
"when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts assessment is entitled to great
weight."62
Guided by the settled rule that "where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to meet
the test of moral certainty,"63 we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its subsequent
Order64 dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in keeping with the
evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were presented against
Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it is
also insufficient to convict the latter.
Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul are
unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly observed
that:
Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the insistence by the accused-movant
[Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or reassessment of the evidence by the prosecution be
considered, this court has decided to revisit the evidence put forward by the prosecution through the
crucible of a severe testing by taking a more than casual consideration of every circumstance of the case.
It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense are
diametrically opposed to each other. While this court had already made its conclusion that the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Yumul are given full faith and credit and
reject the frame-up and alibi story of the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro], nonetheless, upon
reassessment of the same it appears that the court erred.
In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police officers,
with regard to the material facts of how the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt as to their
credibility. Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave identical testimonies of the events that
happened from the moment they arrived at 2 oclock in the afternoon until the arrest of the accused at
10:30 oclock in the evening at the EDSA Shangri-La premises. This uniform account given by these
witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were
integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated story. Because of the close camaraderie of these
witnesses who belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them to make the same story.
Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which shows only too clearly that they testified uniformly
only as to material facts but have not given the particulars and the details having relation with the
principal facts. While they testified that they were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in the
evening, they were not able to tell the court how their group positioned strategically at the premises
without being noticed by their target. They could not also gave (sic) an explanation how their confidential
informant was able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that was supposed to take place on that
date involving several personalities. Except for their bare allegation that they have that information
regarding the drug deal they were not able to present any proof of such report, say, entry in their logbook
of such confidential report and a spot report. Even their operation is not recorded as no documentary
evidence was presented. Worth remembering in this regard is People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, where it is
said that: . . . "[i]t often happens with fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been thought of."
It has also been said that "an honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a
material one, cannot be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case
incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness may be honest,
but his testimony is not reliable."65 (Emphasis supplied.)
There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements following accusedappellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC. The police officers attested in their Joint Affidavit of
Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that "upon sensing suspicious transactions being undertaken thereat, team
leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and introduced themselves as Police
Officers and after that, subject persons deliberately admitted that they have in their possession illegal
drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned arresting officers thus they were placed

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under arrest."66 Yet, during trial before the RTC, the police officers uniformly testified that they brought
accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom to the police office after arresting the four
suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention at all of the suspects purported admission.
We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement even when,
according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu. This
seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.
In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their defenses,
which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testified that he
was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for possession of
shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids testimony and Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de Claro consistently testified
that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan, Lantion-Toms accountant, regarding documents for a
business permit (photocopies of the said documents were presented during trial); and that they were
illegally arrested without warrant and forced to admit criminal liability for possession of shabu. These
pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the
performance by the arresting police officers of their official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accusedappellants favor.
Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on the night of
February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante delicto
arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their arrests,
resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3, paragraph 2 of
Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
thus:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations. 67
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an

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offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). 68
In People v. Molina,69 we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto arrests preceding the search and
seizure that were held illegal, to wit:
In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed
in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds
of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side . . . [while]
holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y
no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers']
presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act
of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes
'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' In declaring the
warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble . . .

92
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.70 (Emphases supplied.)
Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify the in
flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the arrests.
A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal that they
simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal was to
take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Without any other
independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to another a white plastic bag
with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude that the box contained shabu and
"sensed" that an illegal drug deal took place.
SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows:
Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?
A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir.
Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do after briefing?
A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of the subject, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza, what
happened next, if any?
A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified by the informant that they were the
personalities involved.
xxxx
Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next?
A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir.
xxxx
Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong?

93
A: Through our informant, sir.
Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next?
A: According to my other companion he talked to another person then after that they went out, sir.
xxxx
Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant?
A: One (1) minute, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you say they who is the companion?
A: Cocoy, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next after they went out to the car?
A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car and handed to Botong, sir.
xxxx
Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car?
A: White plastic bag, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir.
Q: With the bag?
A: No, it was left with Botong, sir.
Q: What happened next after that?
A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: What happened next after that?
A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted him.
xxxx
Q: What did you do?
A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir.
xxxx

94
Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos Reyes?
A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.
Q: How about De Claro?
A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?
A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir. 71 (Emphases supplied.)
PO3 Santiagos testimony also did not offer much justification for the warrantless arrest of accusedappellants and search of their persons:
Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to the place where blue Mazda car was
parked, what happened next?
A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a white plastic bag with a box inside to
Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy], sir. Then, Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando Delos Reyes
[Botong], sir.
Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy] from inside that Mazda car?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?
A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what happened after that?
A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De Claro [Cocoy] returned back inside the
said restaurant, sir.
Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?
A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.
Q: After that what happened next?
A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with box inside to Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been consummated, we apprehended them, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that particular place and time?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.

95
Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a drug deal?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there will be a drug-deal, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what did you do?
A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.
Q: At your office, what else did you do?
A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for laboratory examination was made and
other pertaining papers regarding the arrest of the accused.
Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that confiscated evidence that you are saying?
A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?
A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were confiscated from Mac-Mac?
A: They were placed inside the box, sir.72 (Emphases supplied.)
PO3 Yumuls narration of events was not any different from those of SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Santiago:
Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?
A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.
Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the confidential informant?
A: The identities of the persons, sir.
Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet the confidential informant at the
vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?
A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived together with their car, sir.
xxxx
Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you the information?
A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically positioned ourselves in the place
where the drug-deal will occur, sir.

96
xxxx
Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza and Whistle Stop
restaurant, what happened next after that?
A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .
Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?
A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.
Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived?
A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any?
A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then, what happened next, if any?
A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.
Q: When you say "nag-usap sila" to whom are you referring?
A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other?
A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir.
Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?
A: No, sir.
xxxx

97
Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also what was the subject of their
conversation?
A: No, sir.
Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation with each other?
A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop?
A: He talked to somebody inside, sir.
xxxx
Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.
Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside the Whistle Stop?
A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them went to the side of Whistle Stop in
front of the blue car, sir.
xxxx
Q: What did you do then?
A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir.
Q: And then what happened next, if any?
A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir.
xxxx
Q: And who received that item or article from the car?
A: Cocoy, sir.
xxxx
Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed to Cocoy the white plastic bag?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
xxxx

98
Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed to Cocoy, what did you do?
A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then they walked in different direction,
Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Stop and then Botong went back to Mac-Mac, sir.
xxxx
Q: And then what happened next after that?
A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what did you do then?
A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago went inside and told me that we will
going to get them, sir.
Q: Why are you going to get them?
A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop, Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?
A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3 Santiago to avoid commotion, sir.
Q: Then what did you do next after that?
A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.
Q: And then what did you do, if any?
A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the office, sir. 73 (Emphases supplied.)
Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched the
latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily
conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed
from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to
accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of a
felonious enterprise." SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects
identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None
of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the confidential
informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the
arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their
possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance
that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accusedappellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity of the
shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants.

99
In People v. Sy Chua,74 we questioned whether the shabu seized from the accused was the same one
presented at the trial because of the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the place where it was
taken, to wit:
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the
very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test where the
items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. The
items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck
down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the
place where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted
at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the
item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in
their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.75 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the RTC that
they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Santiago
were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white plastic bag,
immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding to the police
office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination 76 that he saw the shabu for the first time at
the police office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted that the shabu was marked by SPO1
Benjamin David only at the police office.
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of accusedappellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accusedappellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence as
fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accusedappellants is inevitable.
As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua77 :
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more
cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the
presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In People v. Nubla, we clearly
stated that:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption.
Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly
disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the
rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as
such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence.78
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are

100
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from custody,
unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.

101
G.R. No. 131492

September 29, 2000

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble
between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated December 11, 1994,
petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to
the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men
went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and
Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It
appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their
fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor,
counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their
intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. 1 However, criminal
charges were filed later against the two student suspects.2
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu,
Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with
violation of P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that:
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely:
ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO Asst.
Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of their respective
official functions, taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to
their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did
then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension
of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal
killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of
Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous
case by harboring and concealing said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects
Narag and another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the
above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were
implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest,
prosecution and conviction.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But
the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the
Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the
Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.

102
Petitioners contend that:
I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED
THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829
INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE
FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE
CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC
TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 5
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the
NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting
petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after
finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this
case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor
prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a
crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag
and Taparan were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course
of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the
crime.6 They invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Jr. 7 in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accusedappellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a
person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting
the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of
his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the
presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station, the accused was
asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the
admissibility of the maongpants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case.
First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, the
arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that
the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the

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arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the crime had
"just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two
students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two
alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.8
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.
When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing
anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking
part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant
the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested
committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary
citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime.
Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to
protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order
the arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that
their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c), the Office of the
Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the
SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually
leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively
identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive
identification. In fact, respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged
participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina.
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ
members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec.
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest.

104
While this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that
they had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the
heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses.
Besides, the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on
respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and
investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified.
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests. It is in
this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not
the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule on this
matter. Of course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise
availed of or resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been
arrested, without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed
against the arresting NBI agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in
a manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement
agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses
as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina.9
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty.
The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court,
considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in
Rule 113, 5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest
without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the
question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As the Special
Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case
against petitioners:
All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the
accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police
headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on
campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of
illegal arrests of students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is
defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has
been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section
1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable
ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any
law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to
charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused,
in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law. 10
Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:
SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal
laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

105
The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. 11 But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely
more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution."12 As we held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto: 13
Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through
a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to
file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled
exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et
al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano,
supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil.
202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil.
62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty,
33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil.
1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No.
4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.
Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962;
Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134
SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) cited in
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D.
No. 1829, 1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of
Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have
interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI
for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had
asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard
constitutional requirements.

106
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape
of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the
students the following day.14 Hence, the information against them charged that petitioners willfully
obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these
students and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta. 15 The student suspect mentioned by
both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of
the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover,
whether or not petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is
immaterial. In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their undertaking.
In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and
Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents
themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the
information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before
making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they chose not to and
were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone. Petitioners could
not be held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to
justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by law enforcement agencies to
effect immediate arrests and produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that
the need to enforce the law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable
cause for the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot be
indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other recourse but to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge
to P.D. No. 1829, 1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon
a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground such as the application of a statute or general law. 16
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in
Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case
No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

107
G.R. Nos. 138934-35

January 16, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases are before this Court for review from the decision, 1 dated February 26, 1999, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-appellant Anthony Escordial guilty of robbery with
rape and sentencing him to death and to pay private complainant Michelle Darunday the amounts of
P3,650.00 representing the amount taken by him, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 97-18117, the information against accused-appellant charged him with the crime of
rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against the latter's will.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed in
the dwelling of the said party during nighttime while [she] was asleep inside her room.
Act contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 97-18118, the information charged accused-appellant with robbery with rape as
follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation on the person, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00, belonging
to said offended party and [on] the occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the complainant
Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and inside her room wherein she was temporarily
residing as a boarder.
All contrary to law and with aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed inside
the dwelling of the offended party and during nighttime the latter not having given provocation for
the offense.
Act contrary to law.3
When arraigned on February 25, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon
the two cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda, Erma Blanca, 4 Dr. Joy
Ann Jocson, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, Leo Asan, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and Michelle Darunday. Their testimonies
are as follows:
Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda testified that at around 8 o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1996,
they and Mark Lucena were playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita
Aguillon5 at No. 17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of
them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man sitting inside the jeepney to go

108
home lest they would meet an accident. The man was later identified by Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda
as accused-appellant.6
Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca,
and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. They stayed in a bedroom on the ground floor. That same night, December 27,
1996, Teresa went to sleep at around 9:30 p.m., while Michelle and Erma watched television for a while
before going to bed. They slept beside each other on two beds placed side by side, with Teresa nearest the
wall, Michelle in the middle, and Erma on the other side.
While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head
covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He warned Erma
not to shout or he would kill her. He then asked Erma where her money was, and the latter pointed to the
wall where she had hung the bag which contained her money. Michelle, who by then was already awake,
told Erma to give the man her money so he would leave. Erma gave the man P300.00, but the latter said
to give him all her money. He told Erma that he would look for more money and, if he found more, he
would kill her. For this reason, Erma gave the rest of her money. Afterwards, she was told to lie on her side
facing the wall. The man then turned to Michelle and Teresa. Michelle gave him her money, but Teresa said
her money was in the other room. However, she was not allowed to leave the bedroom. The man was able
to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle.
After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to
blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body.
He ordered her to take off her t-shirt, threatening to kill her if she did not do as he commanded. He then
went on top of Michelle and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he had difficulty doing so, he
instead inserted his two fingers. He tried once more to insert his penis, but again failed. The man then rose
from the bed and took some soapy water, which he proceeded to insert into Michelle's vagina. He finally
succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle's vagina. Michelle felt great pain and pleaded with the man
to stop, but the man paid no heed, and only stopped after satisfying his lust.
Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no
cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he
placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough.
On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man's
face because of the light coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window
had panes through which the light filtered in.
After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the three women. He told
Michelle that he used to make catcalls at her and called her a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his
place but Michelle had ignored him. He told them that he was from Hinigaran, but later took back his
statement when Teresa told him that she was from Binalbagan, which was near Hinigaran. Michelle then
told him that she worked at the City Engineer's Office and graduated from the Central Mindanao University.
The man cussed when he learned that Michelle was from Mindanao. As he spoke to Michelle, he leaned
over the bed and mashed the breasts of Erma and Teresa.
After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again. Michelle pleaded with him, but
the man threatened to call his companions and said it would be worse for her if his companions would be
the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then inserted his penis into her anus.
When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and returned to her a pair of earrings
which he had taken from her. He then left, but not before warning the women not to report the matter to
anyone or he would kill them.7
Mark Esmeralda testified that he was in his bedroom on the second floor of their house, toying with a
flashlight, when he saw from his bedroom window a man wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding
house. It was around 12:30 in the morning then. The man was nibbling something. Mark saw the man jump
over the fence. After 30 minutes, Mark went down from his room and told his parents what he had seen.

109
His parents then went out to check what had happened. Mark identified accused-appellant as the man he
saw that night.8
Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after
the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed
them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported
the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the assailant, but
she told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three
women looked for the man around the Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa
were taken to the police station at Bac-Up 6 for investigation. But, at Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa
did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by their attacker.
Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt and told her about her
ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk
to report the rape. They were able to go home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6 o'clock in
the evening.9
PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly after the commission of
the crime, also testified for the prosecution. He said that the assailant was described to him as wearing
long hair and having a rough projection on the back of his neck, small eyes, a slim body, and a brown
complexion. Later on, Michelle Darunday, accompanied by Allan Aguillon, returned to the police station to
report the rape committed against her. Tancinco entered her complaint in the police blotter and referred
Michelle to the Women's Desk.
In the morning of December 28, 1996, Tancinco returned to the boarding house. He found that the intruder
was able to gain entry to the house through the window of the bathroom. He noticed that the room beside
those of the three women had been ransacked, with the cabinets opened and the clothes in disarray.
The following day, on December 29, 1996, Tancinco went around Margarita Extension and learned about
the children playing on the street around the time the intruder entered the boarding house. He was told by
Mark Esmeralda and Jason Joniega that they saw a man inside the jeepney where they were playing at the
time of the incident. Tancinco was likewise informed by Esmeralda that the person he saw inside the
jeepney was the same person he saw coming out of the boarding house later that night. According to
Tancinco, the children said that they could identify the man if he was shown to them. At around 8 o'clock
that evening, Tancinco questioned a certain Tiyo Anong and Ramie about the identity of the suspect.
Ramie said that the description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a caf called Coffee Break Corner,
about two houses away from the boarding house.
Thus, on January 2, 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break Corner and
interviewed the security guard, who told them that a certain Fidel Hinolan owned the caf. When
interviewed by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that accused-appellant was his helper
and that the latter had gone home on December 27, 1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental.
Based on the information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday,
Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10
o'clock in the morning of January 3, 1997 and asked the assistance of the police there to locate accusedappellant. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the Pontevedra police to accompany
Tancinco and his companions. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court and "invited" him to go
to the police station for questioning.10
Michelle Darunday remained at the Pontevedra police station. When accused-appellant was brought there,
he saw Michelle and blushed. Michelle looked at him and recognized him as the man who had robbed and
raped her on December 27, 1996. Accused-appellant was asked to take off his t-shirt. Michelle said that
she just kept quiet while accused-appellant tried to talk to her. However, according to Tancinco, Michelle
confirmed to him that accused-appellant was the man who had attacked her, identifying him through a
rough projection, or a keloid, on the back of his neck and his voice. At the time of his arrest, accused-

110
appellant had a short haircut. He was transferred to the Bacolod police station for further
investigation.11 Allan Aguillon took a picture of accused-appellant (Exh. F) at the Pontevedra police
station.12
At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were
asked whether accused-appellant was the same person they saw on the night of the incident. They were
taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person that they had seen that night. They
picked accused-appellant out of four people who were inside the jail cell. 13
Michelle Darunday executed an affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, identifying accused-appellant as the
person who had robbed and raped her.14 She testified that she and her friends had gone to the Coffee
Break Corner sometime in September or October 1996. On the way home, she was approached by
accused-appellant. He asked Michelle what her name was, and she gave it to him, albeit reluctantly. She
usually passed by the said caf when going home and accused-appellant would often whistle at her and
call her a beautiful girl. Michelle had simply ignored him and gone on her way. 15
Dr. Joy Ann C. Jocson, Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Department, examined Michelle
Darunday and made the following findings and remarks:
1. Abrasions noted on the right and left Labia Minora and on the posterior fourchette.
2. New Lacerations noted on the hymenal ring on the following location 1 o'clock position, 3 o'clock
position, and 9 o'clock position.
3. Vaginal introitus admits 2 fingers but with pain.
4. Presently, patient with menstruation.
In my opinion, the patient would need a urinalysis (since she complains of pain upon urination) and
possible Medical treatment if necessary, for about 7 to 10 days. And if necessary, psychiatric
evaluation & management is also recommended.16
Testifying in court, Dr. Jocson said there was penetration of the victim's vagina as shown by the fact that
the hymenal rim had lacerations at the 1, 3, and 9 o'clock positions. Since the edges of the lacerations
were sharp, she concluded that these lacerations were less than a week old at the time of the examination.
According to Dr. Jocson, these were caused by abrasions due to force or pressure applied on the vaginal
area. When asked during cross-examination whether the victim had abrasions or contusions on her body at
the time of her examination, Dr. Jocson said that she could not remember. She could not remember either
whether there was sperm in the victim's vagina when she examined the latter. She said that no sperm
specimen had been taken from the victim. She testified that it could not be determined how many times
the victim had previously engaged in sexual intercourse because this would depend on the elasticity of the
victim's hymen. She opined, however, that it would be less than 10 times in the case of the victim. Dr.
Jocson stated it was possible the victim agreed to have sexual intercourse voluntarily based on the lack of
marks of violence on the latter, although it was also possible that she was merely forced to have sex
because she was threatened. On re-direct examination, she stated it was possible that seminal fluid was
not found on the victim's private parts because the victim was having her monthly period. She said the
lacerations on the victim's vagina would result whether the sexual intercourse was voluntary or involuntary
on the part of the victim.17
Leo Asan, an employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod, testified that the medical certificate presented
by the prosecution, which was undated, was a faithful reproduction of what was written by Dr. Joy Ann
Jocson on January 3, 1997 in the logbook.18
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo
Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, accused-appellant Anthony Escordial, Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These
witnesses gave a different account of the events that led to the arrest of accused-appellant. Their version
is as follows:

111
Accused-appellant testified that he was employed by Fidel Hinolan on January 21, 1996. He said he started
on August 6, 1996 as a dishwasher and was later made cashier. Accused-appellant said that he went home
to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 24, 1996, arriving there at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
Hinolan paid him P500.00, which he gave to his mother as his Christmas gift. He dropped by the house of
Aaron Lavilla. At 5:30 p.m., he returned to Coffee Break Corner in Bacolod City.
In the evening of December 26, 1996, accused-appellant asked permission from Hinolan to go home to
Pontevedra to stay there until January 1997 as the restaurant would be closed anyway during this period.
Hinolan gave accused-appellant his permission and paid the latter his salary of P600.00 as well as a
P200.00 bonus. Hence, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of December 27, 1996, accused-appellant took the bus
home, arriving in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental an hour later. He went straight home
to his mother and gave her P600.00, telling her to use P400.00 for New Year's Day. 19
Accused-appellant also saw Elias20 Sombito, who told him to look for Aaron Lavilla because a cockfight
derby was being held that day in their barangay. Accused-appellant, therefore, looked for Aaron Lavilla and
found him at the basketball court. Aaron's mother asked accused-appellant to help her bring to the cockpit
some cases of beer which she planned to sell there. Accused-appellant obliged.
At the cockpit, Elias Sombito asked him to take care of his cocks. Accused-appellant asked Aaron Lavilla to
go with him to the cockpit, but the latter continued playing basketball and only proceeded to the cockpit
after the game was finished. The derby ended at around 9 o'clock in the evening.
At about 10 o'clock that night, accused-appellant and Aaron Lavilla went to the latter's house and slept
there. The following day, December 28, 1996, accused-appellant helped Aaron Lavilla's mother with the
household chores, cutting the grass and feeding the cocks. He stayed in Barangay Miranda until January 3,
1997.21 Accused-appellant's testimony as to his whereabouts from December 27, 1996 to January 3, 1997
was corroborated by Elias Sombito22 and Aaron Lavilla.23
As to the circumstances of accused-appellant's arrest, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino and Ricardo Villaspen
testified that at around 11 o'clock in the morning of January 3, 1997, three members of the Bacolod police,
led by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, went to the headquarters of the Pontevedra police to ask for help in locating a
person named Anthony Escordial, said to be a resident of Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, who was wanted in connection with a case for robbery with rape. Although Tancinco and his
companions showed their mission order to Gemarino, they did not show a warrant for accused-appellant's
arrest. Nonetheless, Gemarino told PO2 Gella of the Pontevedra police and Ricardo Villaspen, the tanod
commander of Barangay Miranda, to help the Bacolod policemen look for accused-appellant. The group left
the police station, although Tancinco's other companions, Michelle Darunday and Pacita Aguillon, stayed in
the headquarters.24
The arresting party, composed of Tancinco, PO2 Gella, and Villaspen, proceeded to the house of accusedappellant in Barangay Miranda, but the latter was not there. They found accused-appellant at the
basketball court watching a game. After informing him that he was a suspect in a robbery case, the group
invited accused-appellant to go with them to the police headquarters.
Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of Barangay Miranda, was at the police station. He testified that when
accused-appellant, together with Tancinco and his companions, arrived at the police station, he (Nestor
Dojillo) followed them to the investigating room. Inside the room were Michelle Darunday, three members
of the Bacolod police, Villaspen, and Gemarino. Gemarino asked Michelle if she could identify accusedappellant as her attacker, but the latter said that she could do so only if she could see a lump on his back.
Gemarino told accused-appellant to take off his t-shirt. When accused-appellant did as Gemarino ordered,
Michelle looked at his back for identifying marks, while Allan Aguillon took his photograph. Gemarino then
asked Michelle whether accused-appellant was her attacker, but she replied that she was not sure because
the attacker was wearing a mask when she was raped. The Bacolod policemen requested Gemarino to
allow them to bring accused-appellant to Bacolod City as they still had some witnesses who could identify
the suspect there. Accused-appellant was allowed to go with them after Dojillo and Gemarino asked the
Bacolod policemen not to harm him.25 Dojillo's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino,26 Ricardo Villaspen,27 and accused-appellant.28

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Accused-appellant further testified that on the way to Bacolod City, PO3 Tancinco began beating him and
hitting him with the butt of a shotgun to force him to admit liability for the crime. Because accusedappellant refused to do so, he was taken by Tancinco and his companions to a lodging house where he was
subjected to torture. Accused-appellant was told to take off his clothes and to lie down. PO3 Tancinco and
his companions then proceeded to hit him with a belt. Afterwards, they covered his mouth and took him to
the bathroom. Tancinco put a knife to his neck, telling him that he would be killed if he refused to admit
that he was the culprit. As he continued to deny liability for the crime, accused-appellant was subjected to
further torture. Later on, the driver entered the room and brought with him a child, whose head was
covered, who was instructed to identify accused-appellant. The child, however, did not react upon seeing
accused-appellant, who was thus brought back to the headquarters where he was again maltreated.
Accused-appellant said that he was left alone in his cell and tied to a chair. He also said that at around 8
o'clock that evening, two of the complainants arrived and the police told them to identify accusedappellant as their attacker. But these two complainants just kept looking at accused-appellant and even
asked the policemen if he was the suspect.
After the two women had left, PO3 Tancinco took accused-appellant to a house so that he could be
identified by another complainant. But this complainant likewise said that he was not the assailant, as the
latter had a heavier build and longer hair. Accused-appellant was returned to the police headquarters.
At the headquarters, PO3 Tancinco talked to accused-appellant and told him that he would help him if
accused-appellant confessed to the crime. But accused-appellant again refused because he said he had
not done anything wrong. The police then began beating him up again. PO3 Tancinco burnt accusedappellant's lips and tongue with a lighted cigarette.29
At around 12:00 noon of January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen, together with accusedappellant's grandfather, a certain Inspector Tamayo, and reporters from Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod
police station to visit accused-appellant. They found him tied to a chair. When they entered the cell,
accused-appellant, thinking that they were members of the Bacolod police, held up his hands and asked
for pity. The visitors assured accused-appellant that they would not hurt him. Accused-appellant had a limp
because his feet were injured. For this reason, Dojillo and his companions asked the Bacolod police to let
them take accused-appellant to the hospital for treatment. Accused-appellant was thus brought to the
provincial hospital in Bacolod for x-ray and medical treatment. He was taken back to the police station
thereafter.30
Lucila Jocame, Records Officer of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional Hospital (CLMMH),
identified in court31 the medical certificate (Exh. 12) issued by the said hospital, showing the injuries
sustained by accused-appellant, to wit:
# 5 CM LINEAR ABRASION WITH CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 1 CM LINEAR ABRASION RIGHT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 4 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT LATERAL CHEST LEVEL OF T12.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT LEG ANTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 4 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT KNEE LATERAL ASPECT.
# 3 x 3 CM SWELLING AND TENDER LEFT ANKLE.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA D/3 RIGHT LEG POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT THIGH POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT PERI AURICULAR AREA.

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X-RAY # 280 dated January 6, 1997: SKULL APL: CHEST BUCKY RIGHT THIGH: APL: RIGHT AND LEFT
FOOT APO.
"No Radiographic evidence of fracture in this examination."32
The last witness presented by the defense was Jerome33 Jayme, General Manager of Royal Express
Transport, Inc., who testified that the last bus trip from Kabankalan to Bacolod on December 27, 1996 left
at 6 o'clock in the evening. The trip from Kabankalan to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental
would take one hour. On cross-examination, Jayme stated that the said bus would reach Bacolod City by
7:40 to 8:00 p.m. if it left Kabankalan at 6:00 p.m. His company's buses were not allowed to pick up
passengers along the way to Bacolod City because of the incidence of highway robbery. Jayme identified in
court a certification (Exh. 12-a) he issued which stated that the last bus trip of their company on December
27, 1996 was at 6:00 p.m.34
On February 26, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, it is the well-considered view of this court, after a thorough, painstaking and
exhaustive review and examination of the evidence adduced in this case, that the accused
ANTHONY ESCORDIAL y GALES, is GUILTY, beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Rape, punished under Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
commission of the crime was attended by three aggravating circumstances of nighttime, that the
crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and that craft, fraud and disguise were
employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Art. 14
of the Revised Penal Code. There is no mitigating circumstance. Applying Article 63, paragraph 1,
the accused is hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH.
He is also condemned to pay private complainant the sum of P3,650.00, representing the money
taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the
costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED TO THE EFFECT
THAT ANTHONY ESCORDIAL CAN NEVER BE THE ROBBER-RAPIST WHO RAVISHED MICHELLE
DARUNDAY ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, AS THE FORMER (ESCORDIAL) DID
NOT HAVE THE QUALITIES, CHARACTER AND EXPERTISE OF THE LATTER (ROBBER-RAPIST).
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT AS
DESCRIBED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES FIT WITH THAT OF HEREIN ACCUSED, THE
TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THERE WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT EVER MADE BY
ANYBODY PRIOR TO THE "WARRANTLESS ARREST" OF THE ACCUSED. THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES WERE IN FACT DRAFTED, EXECUTED AND SIGNED ONLY
SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE ACCUSED WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE BACOLOD POLICE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES PO2 RODOLFO
GEMARINO (DEP. CHIEF OF POLICE OF PONTEVEDRA), BRGY. CAPT. NESTOR DOJILLO (BRGY. CAPT. OF
MIRANDA AND THEN MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PONTEVEDRA), AND RICARDO
VILLASPEN (THEN COMMANDER OF BARANGAY TANOD IN PONTEVEDRA) TO THE EFFECT THAT
MICHELLE DARUNDAY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER IN
PONTEVEDRA POLICE STATION.
4. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCES, TESTIMONIAL AND
DOCUMENTARY, OBTAINED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED AND THE LATTER'S SUBJECTION TO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT LETTING HIM
KNOW OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE.

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5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE ABLE TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED IN A POLICE LINE UP DESPITE THE FACT THAT OF THE PERSONS
BEING LINED UP ONLY THE ACCUSED WAS HANDCUFFED.
6. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE ASSAILANT BY FACE THAT
VERY EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996 AMIDST THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DOING THE SAME, GIVEN
THE DISTANCE, THE INTENSITY OF LIGHT, AND THE TERRIFYING SITUATION, WHICH ALL OBSCURE, IF
NOT DESTROY, THE CLARITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND PERCEPTION.
7. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENSE FAILED TO SHOW THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED TO GO TO BACOLOD THAT EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, DESPITE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, BY SIMPLY RELYING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED
TAKING A CARGO TRUCK FROM PONTEVEDRA TO BACOLOD.
8. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ANTHONY ESCORDIAL HAD MOTIVE
TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON A WRONG PREMISE THAT THE DEFENSE ALLEGEDLY
DID NOT REFUTE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO BE
ACQUAINTED WITH THE COMPLAINANT AND WHISTLED AT THE LATTER SEVERAL TIMES. 36
The issues raised by accused-appellant concern (1) the alleged violations of his constitutional rights and
the consequent admissibility of the evidence against him and (2) the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
I. Alleged Violations of Accused-appellant's Constitutional Rights
A. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco
admitted that he and his companions had arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a
judge.37Art. III, 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
To implement this provision, Rule 113, 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his arrest,
accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the police on
that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant.

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The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just
committed a crime. The phrase "personal knowledge" in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officer making the
arrest.38
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested only on
January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when
the crime was committed, they could not have "personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
commission of the crime" so as to be justified in the belief that accused-appellant was guilty of the crime.
The arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant.
However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged against him
during his arraignment on February 25, 1997 without questioning his warrantless arrest. 39 He thus waived
objection to the legality of his arrest.40 As this Court has held in another case:
[The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that
they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their
arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is
not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from
error. The technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right
to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused. 41
B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel." He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation
without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his
choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such
interrogation for violation of accused-appellant's rights under this provision.1wphi1.nt
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding
him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point,
even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was
charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should
have been excluded as evidence against him.
C. Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of his
own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental
to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accused-appellant made no
statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-ofcourt identification of accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma
Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.

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As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is
usually not a part of the custodial inquest.42 However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accusedappellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie
as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court
identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified
by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution"
which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial
proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." 44 We have
thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for
that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. 45
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma
Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after
his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-ofcourt identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these
witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of
the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'" 46
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses were presented by the
prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132,
36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to the
admissibility of these testimonies.47
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court
identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree." 48 This in-court
identification was what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not
derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, 49 it is admissible
as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
II. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellant contends that: (1) he does not possess the character, qualities, and expertise of the
assailant who robbed and raped Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver; (2) the records
are bereft of any description of the assailant made by these prosecution witnesses prior to his arrest as the
affidavits of Darunday, Blanca, Joniega, and Esmeralda were executed only after his arrest; (3) the
testimonies of the defense witnesses, namely, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Barangay Captain Nestor Dojillo,
and Ricardo Villaspen, show that Michelle Darunday failed to identify accused-appellant when the latter
was presented to her at the Pontevedra police station; (4) Tancinco's testimony that Michelle Darunday
properly identified accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station could not be believed as the said
witness had motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant; (4) the identification of accused-appellant
at the Bacolod police station was tainted because only accused-appellant was handcuffed among the
persons presented to the prosecution witnesses; and (5) it was highly improbable for the prosecution
witnesses to identify the assailant by face considering the distance, the intensity of light, and the
circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime.
A. Jason Joniega50 and Mark Esmeralda51 pointed to accused-appellant as the man they saw on the night of
December 27, 1996 and the person they identified inside a jail cell at the Bacolod police station. Erma
Blanca, on the other hand, testified that she saw through her blindfold accused-appellant raping Michelle
Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in court as their assailant and as the man whom she saw inside
the jail cell at the Bacolod police station.52 Ma. Teresa Gellaver53 and Michelle Darunday54 identified
accused-appellant as the suspect brought before them at the Bacolod police station and the Pontevedra
police station, respectively.

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The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the line-up
identification.55 As held inUnited States v. Wade:56
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that quoted in Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 US 471, 488, 9 L ed 2d 441, 455, 83 S Ct 407, "'[W]hether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.' Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)." See also Hoffa v United States,
385 US 293, 309, 17 L ed 2d 374, 386, 87 S Ct 408. Application of this test in the present context
requires consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act, the existence of any pre-line-up description and the defendant's actual description,
any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant
prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time
between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts
which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet the test as laid down in that
case.
1. Michelle Darunday testified that her assailant's face was covered with cloth when he entered the room
and that she was blindfolded when she was raped.57 She could thus only see the assailant's eyes, which
Michelle described as chinito (chinky),58 although she testified that she could also identify his
voice.59 Otherwise, Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she immediately recognized
accused-appellant as the assailant when she saw him at the Pontevedra police station. Michelle stated:
PROS. CARDINAL:
Madam Witness, a few days thereafter, can you recall any development of your case?
WITNESS:
That was in January 3, when somebody told us to identify a suspect in the City Hall of
Pontevedra.
PROS. CARDINAL:
Who was with you when you went to Pontevedra?
WITNESS:
My aunt and my uncle and the police investigators.
....
PROS. CARDINAL:
Upon arrival at Pontevedra, what happened?
WITNESS:
We waited for a while because they will find the suspect and I was there in the room of the
police sitting.
....

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PROS. CARDINAL:
So, you stayed behind and the policemen pick up the suspect?
WITNESS:
I and my aunt waited in the police of the policemen, and then later the suspect arrived.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that suspect arrived inside the room where you were, can you tell us what was the
reaction of the suspect?
WITNESS:
When the suspect arrived, at first, he was not able to see me because I was behind the desk
after the door, and then he was so fresh saying that he was a good man, but when he saw
me he blushed and moving his head asking, "Ano ang sala ko sa imo? (What did I do to
you?), I did not do anything." But when I looked at his eyes and heard his voice, I was sure
that he was the man.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that person said, what did I do to you, I did not do anything, what was [your] reaction?
WITNESS:
I just looked at him and he was so fresh that he has not done anything, but the policeman
said that his case is rape. Then, he was asked to take off his t-shirt and I just looked at him
and then later, the policeman asked to borrow the man for investigation and while the
policeman was recording, that suspect approached me and told me that, "You do not know
me.", and asked, "Do you know me?"
PROS. CARDINAL:
What was your reaction?
WITNESS:
I just [kept] quiet but my aunt reacted by saying, "You think you cannot be identified
because you covered yourself?"
PROS. CARDINAL:
And then what did he answer?
WITNESS:
He just stand outside while we went ahead to go back to our home. 60
A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of accused-appellant by
Michelle Darunday, has been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for "being pointedly
suggestive, generat[ing] confidence where there was none, activat[ing] visual imagination, and, all told,
subvert[ing] their reliability as [an eyewitness]."61 In these cases, Michelle knew that she was going to
identify a suspect when she went to Pontevedra. Upon seeing accused-appellant escorted by Tancinco and

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his colleagues in the Bacolod police, she knew that he was the suspect she was supposed to identify. When
accused-appellant was thus shown to her, there could be no doubt as to what was expected of her. Further
aggravating the situation were the reply of the policeman to accused-appellant's protestations of
innocence that he was being held for rape and Michelle's aunt's obvious assumption of his guilt. Michelle's
immediate conclusion, therefore, that accused-appellant was her attacker was understandable. As has
been explained:
Social psychological influences. Various social psychological factors also increase the danger of
suggestibility in a lineup confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be
correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced their belief
that they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot
identify anyone and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty. Moreover, the
need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime to find a likely target
for feelings of hostility.
Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around them. This desire to conform
produces an increased need to identify someone in order to show the police that they, too, feel that
the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed
by the police or other witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime. . .62
Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the apparent suggestiveness of the
show-up places in doubt her credibility concerning the identity of accused-appellant. The possibility that
her identification of accused-appellant was merely planted in her mind both by the circumstances
surrounding the show-up and her concomitant determination to seek justice cannot be disregarded by this
Court.
Michelle's identification of accused-appellant is further rendered dubious by the disparity between her
description of her attacker and the appearance of accused-appellant. In her affidavit, dated January 4,
1997, Michelle described her attacker as follows:
P
Sadtong tinion nga ginahimoslan ikaw sining suspetsado nakita mo bala ang iya hitsura?
(At the time that you were abused by the suspect, did you see what he looked like?)
S
Wala, kay tungod nga may tabon ang akon mata, apang matandaan ko guid ang iya
tingog, mata, ang iya malaka nga biguti, ang structure sang iya lawas, ang supat sang iya kamot,
ang iya bibig, ang madamo nga "kelloid" sa iya lawas kag ang iya baho. (No, because I was
blindfolded but I can remember his voice, his eyes, his thin mustache, his body structure, the
smoothness of his hands, his mouth, and the numerous keloids on his body, and his smell.)63
Michelle's affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on the back of her assailant when the latter
was raping her. But, when she testified in court, Michelle admitted that she did not see keloids on accusedappellant although she said that his skin was rough.64 This is corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Rodolfo
Gemarino who said that he did not see any lump on the back of accused-appellant when he tried to look
for it.65 In fact, it would appear that accused-appellant had no such markings on his back but had only
small patches which could not even be readily seen. 66
In dismissing the disparity between accused-appellant's appearance and Michelle's description of her
attacker, the trial court dwelt on the apparent roughness of accused-appellant's skin and the probability
that Michelle might have felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her assailant. 67 However, mere speculations
and probabilities cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt required by law to be established
by the prosecution.68 Michelle Darunday was a civil engineer in the City Engineer's Office in Bacolod City.
Considering her educational attainment and professional status, it is improbable that she was mistaken as
to what she felt on her attacker's back at the time she was raped. A mere protrusion on the back of the
neck of the assailant could not possibly have been mistaken for keloids.
Another circumstance casting doubt on the credibility of Michelle's identification is her lack of reaction
upon seeing accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police headquarters. Defense witnesses PO2 Rodolfo

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Gemarino,69 Ricardo Villaspen,70 and Nestor Dojillo71 testified that Michelle failed to see any identifying
marks on accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in pinpointing the latter as the culprit. With
Gemarino being a policeman, Villaspen a barangay tanod, and Dojillo a barangay captain, these witnesses
were all, in one form or another, connected with law enforcement. The prosecution having failed to ascribe
any ill motive on the part of these defense witnesses, who are without doubt respectable members of the
community, their testimonies that Michelle showed no reaction in seeing accused-appellant at the show-up
in Pontevedra police station deserve greater credence than the testimony of Tancinco that Michelle
confirmed to him that accused-appellant was her attacker. The defense evidence established that Tancinco
was an abusive policeman who had made up his mind as to accused-appellant's guilt and who had no
compunction in doing whatever means necessary, legal or illegal, to ensure his conviction. We note further
that the testimonies of these defense witnesses coincide with Michelle's testimony that she kept quiet
when she saw accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station on January 3, 1997. This being so, her
reaction to the show-up at the Pontevedra police station upon seeing accused-appellant, the man who
supposedly raped her twice in an ignominious manner, is contrary to human nature. 72 It may be that she
was filled with rage so that upon seeing accused-appellant she was unable to show any emotion. But it is
equally possible that, as defense witnesses Gemarino, Villaspen, and Dojillo testified, Michelle did not
immediately recognize accused-appellant as her attacker and only pointed to him as her assailant upon
promptings by the police and her companions. "[W]here the circumstances shown to exist yield two (2) or
more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence, while the other or others
may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction." 73
For the foregoing reasons, we find both the out-of-court and in-court identification of Michelle Darunday to
be insufficient to establish accused-appellant as the person who robbed and raped her and her
companions on the night of December 27, 1996.
2. Erma Blanca testified that she saw through her blindfold the assailant when he was raping Michelle
Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in open court as the person whom she saw that night. 74 Certain
circumstances in these cases lead us to believe, however, that Erma Blanca did not really see the assailant
and that her testimony otherwise was a mere afterthought. These are:
First, the police blotter, dated December 28, 1996,75 prepared by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, referred to an
"unknown suspect" who allegedly entered the boarding house of Pacita Aguillon and robbed Ma. Teresa
Gellaver and Michelle Darunday. This casts doubt on Erma's credibility because she testified that she had
known accused-appellant for a long time prior to December 27, 1996. During her testimony, Erma claimed
that accused-appellant approached her and Michelle sometime in September or October 1996 to ask for
the name of the latter. In addition, Erma said she had seen accused-appellant whenever he passed by their
boarding house or stayed in her Tiyo Anong's store nearby. 76 It would thus seem that Erma was familiar
with accused-appellant. But, if she had actually seen him on that night of the robbery, why did she not
report this to the police immediately? Being a victim herself, Erma had every motive to reveal the identity
of the robber that same night the crime was committed. But she did not do so. We are therefore left with
the conclusion that the police blotter referred to an unknown suspect because the identity of the assailant
had not been determined at the time the crime was reported to the police.
Second, Erma was not the one who accompanied the Bacolod police when the latter sought accusedappellant in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. PO3 Tancinco testified that he took Michelle Darunday along
with his other companions when they went to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental so that she could identify if
the suspect was the person who had raped her. But Michelle admitted that she did not see the face of the
assailant. Erma Blanca, who claimed she recognized accused-appellant, was not taken along by the police
to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Why not? Why did they bring instead Michelle Darunday?
Third, the affidavit of Erma Blanca77 was prepared on January 4, 1997, a day after the arrest of accusedappellant. This delay belies Erma's claim that she saw the assailant through her blindfold on the night of
the incident. For the normal reaction of one who actually witnessed a crime and recognized the offender is
to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity. 78 In these cases, the crime took place on
December 27, 1996, but Erma Blanca executed her affidavit only on January 4, 1997, more than a week
after the occurrence of the crime. Delay in reporting the crime or identifying the perpetrator thereof will
not affect the credibility of the witness if it is sufficiently explained. 79 But here, no explanation was given by

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the prosecution why Erma Blanca executed her affidavit one week after the crime took place and one day
after accused-appellant's arrest. The most likely explanation for such lapse is that Erma Blanca was used
merely to corroborate what would otherwise have been a weak claim on the part of Michelle Darunday. The
same may be said of the testimonies of Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda.
B. Accused-appellant's testimony that he was at the cockpit in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental on December 27, 1996 is corroborated by Aaron Lavilla, 80 Elias Sombito,81 and Nestor
Dojillo.82 Considering the improbabilities and uncertainties surrounding the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the defense of alibi by accused-appellant deserves credence. 83
To summarize, we find that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt
required in criminal cases. The acquittal of accused-appellant is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-appellant
guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to death, is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released unless
there are other legal grounds for his continued detention.1wphi1.nt
The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court immediately the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

122
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly
of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads
that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was
therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly
received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless
lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto
Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away
but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith
and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper
authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery
to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made
no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that
the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted
over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to

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Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have
been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged
robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution.
This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only
in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not
applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the
revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when
he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.

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Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them
the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have
been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no
reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning
and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being
on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion
was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus
and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in
the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain
marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the
ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other
than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed,
or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no
less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even
acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested,
dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it.
All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared

125
at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed
involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the
policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed
that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos,

this Court declared:

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police,
80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro,

10

thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime?
There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is
sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his
illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial
evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only
in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the
constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no
expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their overzealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.

126
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal
of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has
not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

127
G.R. No. 186529

August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425
affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y
Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for
the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence
group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. 4 The agent gave the
police appellants name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would
arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt.
The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00
p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the
confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus,
appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As
appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on
suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands
from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug.5
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was
turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants
name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs,
the accusatory portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any permit or license from the
proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did
then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or
4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.

128
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to
inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no
shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers,
through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze
Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation. 9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10 convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article
II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to
mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time,
the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the
admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and
fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected
the case.13
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu
and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his
arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the
evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial
and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1 This Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary
in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered.
This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.14
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find
that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him
during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In
fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active
participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant,
having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality
of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16

129
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 19
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act
of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending
officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu. 20 Consequently, the warrantless
search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search;
generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.21 Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had
probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it
ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.22
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the
established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone
with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called
up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora
anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along
the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited
him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his
pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing
the suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the
confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations
on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by
the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to
another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest.

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The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. 24 We find no
cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v. Nuevas.27
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police
assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a
man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then
carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked
about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City,
received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were
complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the
report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and
learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police
that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At
around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At
8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers
approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana
leaves.29
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54"
in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and
maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag.
The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the
plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue
cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a
delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and
Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected
the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves. 30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no
adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest,
appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in
any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and
conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by
the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a
search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil, Jr.,31 People v. Bagista,32 People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People v.
Valdez,36 and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless
searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that
the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly

131
observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the
rule against warrantless searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the
requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day
(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. 39
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier
mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.40
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people
to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and
judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude
condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid
breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of
society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means. 42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the
reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. Nos. 133570-71

January 15, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
NERIO SUELA y HEMBRA, EDGAR SUELA y HEMBRA and EDGARDO BATOCAN, appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In this Decision, the Court visits and applies existing jurisprudence on the right to competent and
independent counsel of persons under custodial investigation. It also reiterates the long-standing judicial
policy that procedural laws which are favorable to the accused shall be given retroactive effect. Inasmuch
as the aggravating circumstance of disguise was not alleged in the Information, it cannot now be
appreciated to increase the penalty to death, notwithstanding the fact that the new rule requiring such
allegation was promulgated only after the crime was committed and after the trial court had already
rendered its Decision.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated January 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, (Branch 95), finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
simple robbery. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
"1. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071, the Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y
Hembra and Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide defined in and penalized by paragraph I, Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and, there being one aggravating circumstance of disguise
(par. 14, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code) and no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, each of
them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and are ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the late Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero the amount of P50,000.00, as death indemnity; P20,000.00
as exemplary damages;P125,250.00, as actual and compensatory damages; and P2,8[8]0,000.00,
as loss of earnings based on the formula (2/3 x (80-44) or 24 years life expectancy by P120,000.00
reasonable average net annual earnings.
"The three accused are further ordered to return to John Doe (not his real name) the three (3)
cameras worth P25,000.00; assorted jewelry worth P120,000.00 and cash money in the amount
of P500,000.00. If the three (3) cameras and the assorted jewelry can no longer be returned, the
three (3) accused are hereby ordered to instead pay the value thereof in the total amount
of P145,000.00;
"2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-64618, the Court finds the accused Edgar Suela y Hembra GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Robbery defined in and penalized by paragraph 5,
Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum, as the minimum penalty to
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum
penalty; and,
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64617 and Q-96-65072, the Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y
Hembra, Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan NOT GUILTY of the Crime of Carnapping as
defined in and penalized by Rep. Act. 6539, as amended by Rep. Act 7659, and hereby ACQUITS
them for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
"The Sony TV set (Exh. 'E') and the Citizen gold wrist watch (Exh. 'T-1') are hereby ordered returned
to John Doe (not his real name) upon the final disposition of the cases.

133
"The motorcycle (Exh. 'FF') under the name of the accused Edgardo Batocan shall be kept by the
Court until the final disposition of the cases.
"All the three (3) accused are ordered to pay the costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."2
The Information3 against Nerio Suela and Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64616 reads as follows:
"That on or about the 26th day of July 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with another person whose true name, identity and whereabouts have
not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, by means of force upon things, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned said accused managed to enter the
house of complainant located at No. 95 B-5 A. Melchor St., Xavierville Subd., Loyola Heights, this
City, by barging into the door of said house and once inside took, robbed and carried away the
following, to wit:

one (1) 14" Sony Trinitron colored TV

P12,000.0
0

three (3) cameras

25,000.00

assorted jewelries

120,000.0
0

cash money

500,000.0
0

all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said Robbery,
the said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and employed
personal violence upon the person of said GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO, by stabbing him,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Geronimo Gabilo y
Hostallero, in the total amount aforementioned."
The Information4 against Edgardo Batocan in Criminal Case No. Q-96-65071 reads as follows:
"That on or about the 26th day of July, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with NERIO SUELA Y HEMBRA and EDGAR SUELA Y HEMBRA who are
being charged with the same offense at Regional Trial Court Branch 79 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-64616, and mutually helping one another, by means of force upon things, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one John Doe (not his real name) in the following
manner, to wit: on the date and place afor[e]mentioned said accused entered the house of
complainant located at 95 Melchor St. Xavierville Subd., Loyola Heights, this City, by barging into
the door of said house and inside took, robbed and carried away the following, to wit:

134

one (1) 14" Sony Trinitron colored TV

P12,000.0
0

three (3) cameras

25,000.00

assorted jewelries

120,000.0
0

cash money

500,000.0
0

all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of John
Doe (not his real name) in the aforementioned amount of P657,000.00, and on the occasion of said
Robbery, the said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and
employed personal violence upon the person of said GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO, by
stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Geronimo
Gabilo y Hostallero."
The Information5 against Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 reads as follows:
"That on or about the 18th day of January 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to gain, and by means of intimidation against person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob/extort one John Doe (not his real name) in the manner as follows: on the date
and place aforementioned, the said accused called up by phone the Executive Secretary of said
complainant and demanded the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, in exchange for the
information regarding the robbery case and slaying of Geronimo Gabilo on July 26, 1995, as in fact
said accused, took, robbed and carried away the aforesaid amount of P200,000.00, Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party."
When arraigned on September 24, 1996, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not
guilty."6 In due course, they were tried and found guilty by the court a quo.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise: 7
"On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant John Doe (not his
real name) was at the master's bedroom located at the second floor of his townhouse residence at
#95 B-5 A. Melchor Street, Xavierville Subdivision, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. He was watching
television thereat, together with his adopted son, Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and
good friend, Geronimo 'Gerry' Gabilo, who at that time was engaged in the real estate business.
Suddenly, three persons sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a knife,
barged into the room. The tallest of the three, with a height of about five feet and five inches,
reached for the light switch and turned it off. The three intruders then shouted 'dapa, dapa.' So John

135
Doe (not his real name), Gerry Gabilo, and Norman Rosas dropped to the floor with their faces
facing the bed. Two of the malefactors turned off the television set, and tied their hands at their
backs, with the use of hankies and telephone cord. The room remained illuminated by the light
coming from a walk-in closet and from the lamp post outside fronting the room, and from the lights
of the neighboring townhouses.
"The shortest of the three malefactors, about five feet tall, poked the barrel of his gun on the chin of
John Doe (not his real name), then inside John Doe (not his real name)' mouth. At the same time,
using his free hand, the same malefactor poked a knife on the right side of John Doe (not his real
name)' neck. The other man, who was the second to the tallest, with a height of about five feet
three inches, while holding a penlight in one hand, and a gun on the other, threateningly told John
Doe (not his real name), 'Nakikita mo ba iyan? Nararamdaman mo ba iyan?', to which John Doe (not
his real name) replied 'Opo, opo.' The two then ordered John Doe (not his real name) to 'ilabas ang
iyong mga pera.' All that time, while the two were with John Doe (not his real name), the other man,
the tallest of them, stood in front of the mirror by the side of the door, facing and brandishing a gun
towards Norman Rosas. John Doe (not his real name) did not heed the order to bring out the money
even though Gabilo advised him, saying 'John Doe (not his real name) ilabas mo na.' However,
Gabilo stood up, and even with his hands tied at the back, went towards the second compartment
of the television rack and reached for an envelope containing his money. He handed the envelope
to the shortest of the three fellows, who, upon seeing the money inside the envelope, closed it. John
Doe (not his real name) knew that the envelope contained P200,000.00 as Gabilo had informed him
of the amount earlier that evening. Forced to reveal that his money was in the walk-in closet, the
second tallest of the three malefactors poked a gun on John Doe (not his real name)' neck, forced
him to get up, kicked and pushed him towards the closet. When the fellow could not open the
closet, he asked John Doe (not his real name) for the key. When he was informed that the key was
inside his wallet which was on top of the drawer beside his bed, the fellow opened the wallet and
took all the money he found in it: two (2) $100.00 bills and ten (10) P1,000.00 bills. With the key, he
thereafter opened the closet. He then asked where the money was. When John Doe (not his real
name) told him that it was inside his suitcase, the fellow tried opening it but failed. So he ordered
John Doe (not his real name) to open it but the latter also failed as he had difficulty doing so since
his hands were still tied at his back. The fellow, however, subsequently opened the suit case himself
and got all the money in it amounting to P300,000.00. He also took the valuables he found inside
the suit case, viz., a gold-plated Citizen wristwatch engraved at the back with 'John Doe (not his
real name)' and some rings and bracelet valued at P20,000.00, more or less. The malefactors also
took with them three (3) automatic cameras valued at P25,000.00 each, and bottles of cologne
costing about P10,000.00. While leaving John Doe (not his real name) lying on the floor near the
closet, the second tallest of the three, together with the shortest fellow, went to Gabilo and dragged
and pushed him. They demanded that Gabilo give them his car key, which he did. They then
dragged Gabilo out of the room and proceeded downstairs. The second tallest fellow went back to
John Doe (not his real name) and said 'Mabait ka, mabait ka' but warned him not to follow them
downstairs because 'puputok ang granada sa daanan mo.' He then placed a gag inside John Doe
(not his real name)' mouth, tying it with a piece of cloth. Upon sensing that the three were already
downstairs, John Doe (not his real name) tried to follow them but his adopted son, Norman Rosas,
pleaded 'Daddy, daddy, huwag kang sumunod, baka patayin ka nila.' After about two (2) minutes, a
long moaning sound was heard coming from downstairs, which sound resembled Gabilo's voice.
After a while, he heard the engine of Gabilo's car, a Nissan Sentra car with plate no. TEB-258,
running and he later found out that they had also carted away his Sony Trinitron colored television
set. Sensing that the malefactors had left, he went downstairs and saw Gabilo slump[ed] on the
floor in his blood. When he saw that Gabilo was motionless, he went back to the second floor and
told his son to rouse their housemaid, Pinky Maalac, who was asleep on the third floor of their
townhouse. They then sought help from their neighbors. The first to assist them was a medical
doctor who, upon examining Gabilo, informed them that the latter was already dead. At the Quezon
City Medical Center where Gabilo was subsequently brought, he was pronounced dead-onarrival.1wphi1.nt
"Early morning, the following day, July 27, 1995, upon receiving the report from the Quezon City
Medical Center regarding the stabbing incident which resulted to the death of Gerry Gabilo, Captain
Alejandro Casanova, SPO3 Jesus Patriarca, and SPO2 Reynato Resurrecion, all of the Quirino District
Police Station, Station 9, Anonas Road, Quezon City, proceeded to the crime scene. SPO3 Jesus

136
Patriarca was assigned as lead investigator of the case. The autopsy conducted on Gabilo showed
that he died of hemorrhage due to multiple (five) stab wounds. To shed light on the incident, several
persons, including private complainant John Doe (not his real name), his adopted son, Norman
Rosas, his brother, Romulo Rosas, their housemaid, Pinky Maalac, William Hostillero, Ruben
Pacuntad, Joven Maalac and Rodito Gabilo, were summoned and interviewed by the police. The
same, however, did not result to any breakthrough for the case. When they were subjected to a lie
detector test by the NBI, the results were negative.
"Gabilo's Nissan Sentra vehicle was recovered by the operatives of the Western Police District as it
was found abandoned at P. Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. At the back seat floor of the car, a
black bonnet was found.
"After almost five (5) months of no leads towards solving the case, on January 15, 1996, Araceli
Tubaga, John Doe (not his real name)' executive secretary at his DECS office at Misamis Street,
Bago Bantay, Quezon City, received a call from a male person who requested to speak with John
Doe (not his real name). When Tubaga requested to get his message as the director could not go to
the phone, he told her to relay to John Doe (not his real name) that he has information as to the
identity and whereabouts of those responsible for the death of his friend, Gabilo. He told her that he
is willing to give the information in writing in exchange for P200,000.00. He then said that he will
call again for John Doe (not his real name)' response to his offer. In reaction, John Doe (not his real
name), accompanied by Tubaga, went to the Quirino District Police Station to inform Capt.
Casanova about the call. Capt. Casanova came up with the plan to entrap the caller. At noon the
following day (January 16, 1996), the unidentified caller called again. When told that John Doe (not
his real name) was accepting his offer, he instructed Tubaga to meet him the following day (January
17, 1996) at noon at the Ninoy Aquino Park, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. He told her to bring with
her the amount of P200,000.00 which should be placed in a plastic bag, and to bring flowers with
her so he could easily identify her. John Doe (not his real name) informed Capt. Casanova about the
conversation.
"On January 17, 1996, about 10:00 A.M. Tubaga went to the Max's Restaurant at the Quezon City
Circle and met Capt. Casanova and the other policemen, in preparation for the entrapment.
Carrying with her the boodle money in a Unilane Food Mart plastic bag, she proceeded to the Ninoy
Aquino Park and waited but the caller did not appear. About 5:00 P.M. that afternoon, the caller
called her at the office and informed her that he will meet her the following day (January 18, 1996)
at the same time and place. Thus, the following day, she waited for him at the designated spot.
Shortly after, a male person approached her and asked if she was the one with whom he talked with
over the phone. When she answered in the affirmative, he handed her an envelope while she
handed him the plastic bag containing the boodle money. While he was untying the plastic bag to
check its contents, the police officers who were posted in the vicinity pounced on him and effected
his arrest. He was brought to Police Station 9. This person was later identified as appellant Edgar
Suela.1wphi1.nt
"While on board the vehicle on their way to the police station, in the presence of appellant Edgar
Suela, Capt. Casanova, and the other policemen, SPO3 Patriarca opened the envelope which Tubaga
had earlier received from appellant Edgar Suela. It contained a handwritten note which reads:
1. Nerio Suela ang utak nang pag-paslang
2. TV color and ibedensia nasa bahay niya. Ang tunay na pangalan National ngayon ay
pinalitan nang Panasonic.
3. Ang knife na ginamit nasa bahay niya 8 [sic].
When he asked Edgar Suela who wrote it, he answered 'Ako po, sir.' When he further asked as to
who is Nerio Suela, Edgar answered that he is his brother and is the driver of John Doe (not his real
name).

137
"With that information, appellant Nerio Suela was immediately arrested at John Doe (not his real
name)' office. When Nerio confirmed the contents of his brother Edgar's letter, Capt. Casanova
directed SPO1 Carlos Nicolas and PO2 Orlin Comia to accompany Nerio to his residence at Kaibigan
Street Street, Kalayaan B, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Thereat, they recovered the Sony
Trinitron TV, and a knife with a wooden scabbard.
"While under detention, the Suelas expressed their desire to give an extra-judicial confession.
Hence, on January 19, 1996, between 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, SPO3 Patriarca,
together with Capt. Casanova and another police officer, brought the Suelas to the office of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), located at the second floor, Hall of Justice, Quezon City.
When they arrived there, Atty. Confesor Sansano and Atty. Florimond Rous were manning the IBP
office. When the police informed them of their purpose, Atty. Sansano separately interviewed each
of the Suelas first, informed them of their constitutional rights, insured that they understood the
import of their confession, physically examined them for any sign of maltreatment or force, and
after satisfying himself that the suspects' intention was voluntary on their part and that it was his
legal assistance that they were willing to secure, he allowed the police to take down their individual
extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Sansano was present all throughout the time that the Suelas were
individually propounded with questions. Thereafter, both were brought before the Assistant City
Prosecutor where they affirmed their confessions under oath in the presence of Atty. Sansano who
assisted them. The following morning, January 20, 1996, the Suelas were again brought before
Assistant City Prosecutor Ibuyan for inquest investigation where they again affirmed under oath the
contents of their extra-judicial confessions.
"In their extra-judicial confessions, the Suelas mentioned appellant Edgardo Batocan, their
townmate, as a participant in the crime. Thus, his name was included in the criminal informations,
and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
"Sometime in the second week of March 1996, a team composed of SPO3 Patriarca, Capt. Nestor
Abalos, and SPO2 Jesus Casica, together with the father of the Suela brothers, went to Jaro, Leyte,
to serve the warrant of arrest on appellant Batocan. In coordination with Sr./Insp. Benjamin Labadia,
the Chief of Police in Jaro, Leyte, the arrest of appellant Batocan was effected. He was immediately
brought to Manila and was detained at the Quezon City Police Station 9. The operatives were able
to recover the gold-plated Citizen watch of John Doe (not his real name) from Batocan's girlfriend at
Barangay San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. The brand-new Honda motorcycle registered in appellant
Batocan's name was shipped from Leyte to Quezon City as Batocan had admitted that he had
bought it sometime in July 1995 with his share from the loot of the robbery. While in police custody,
appellant Batocan also indicated his desire to give an extra-judicial confession. Thus, on March 31,
1996, about 3:30 P.M., he was brought by SPO2 Reynato Resurreccion to the same IBP office and
gave his confession in the presence and with the assistant of Atty. Flormind [sic] Rous, which
statement he subscribed before an Assistant City Prosecutor and later re-affirmed before an inquest
Fiscal." (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) summarized appellants' version of the incident as
follows:8
"On July 26, 1995, Edgardo Batocan was in his hometown in Jaro, Leyte where he worked as a
farmer. Sometime in March 1996, and while on board his motorcycle, he was arrested by the police.
He bought the motorcycle from an uncle with the money that his sister gave him. No citizen gold
wristwatch was seized from him upon his arrest.
"After his arrest he was brought to Quezon City and investigated. He had no knowledge nor any
participation in the crime that occurred on July 26, 1995, at the residence of John Doe (not his real
name). He was forced and threatened by the police officers to admit and confess to the crimes. He
was also forced to sign a typewritten extrajudicial confession, the contents of which he did not
know as he was not allowed to read it nor was it read to him. No lawyer was present at that time
and he only met Atty. Rous for the first time in court. He recalled however, that during his brief visit

138
at the IBP-Quezon City Chapter office, in the afternoon of March 13, 1996, he saw, but did not talk
to Atty. Rous, the one who limps, whom he recognized when the latter testified in Court. He was
brought before the Assistant City Prosecutor for inquest but the fiscal did not explain to him the
contents of his written statement. He was not adept at reading because he only reached first year
high school. No copy of his supposed statement was given him. He did not complain to the fiscal
nor to any government agency about the alleged coercion and threats of the police. He only told his
lawyer, Atty. Tabang and his brother Jimmy Batocan about it. He is not angry at the Suelas for
falsely implicating him. In jail, he confronted the brothers and was told that they were merely forced
by the police officers so that they could be freed. The Suelas had many friends but they pointed to
him because they thought that the police will no longer bother to pursue him because he lived in a
very far place in Leyte. He knew the Suela brothers because they were his barriomates in San
Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. Although he came to Manila in 1992 to work until 1994, he did not visit the
Suelas or any of his friends from his barrio. He could not recall his exact Manila address.
"Nerio Suela worked as a driver of John Doe (not his real name) at DECS 1993 up to 1995. Geronimo
Gabilo was formerly his co-employee thereat as the latter was the one responsible for his
employment with John Doe (not his real name). In the months of June and July 1995, he was mostly
at home because he was recuperating from an operation (for appendectomy). He was on leave and
reported back to work only on July 30, 1995. It was then that he learned about the untimely demise
of Gerry Gabilo. The police and the NBI did not investigate him, not until after his arrest on January
18, 1996 by the Quezon City police.
"He had no knowledge nor participation in the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor in the robbery that
occurred at the residence of John Doe (not his real name) on the night of July 26, 1995. After his
arrest, he was brought to Danarra Hotel where he was manhandled and boxed and his head
submerged in the toilet bowl. He was forced to sign a piece of paper. He also met his brother Edgar
at the same hotel. He was not allowed to read the paper which he was forced to sign. He found out
later on that this was the statement or his supposed extra-judicial confession. From the hotel, he
was brought to his house where the police took away his television set (TV) and a knife with
scabbard. John Doe (not his real name) gave him the tv set after Gabilo's death. At that time, he did
not notice why the 'Sony' brand name was scrapped and replaced by the name 'National'. The next
day, he was brought to the City Hall where he was given a lawyer whom he does not know and
whose name he could not even recall. The lawyer showed him a paper and asked him if the
signature thereon was his. The lawyer did not ask him anything more. The former did not explain to
him that said paper was his alleged admission to the crimes for which he was arrested and
detained. He met Atty. Sansano for the first time in the court room during the hearing of these
cases and not on January 19, 1996. He could not recall if Atty. Sansano was the same one who was
presented to him when he was brought to the City Hall after his arrest. After this, he was brought
before the Assistant City Prosecutor.
"He sustained hematomas (pasa) from the man-handling by his police captors but he did not show
them to the Assistant City Prosecutor or the lawyer at the IBP, Quezon City office nor did he file any
complaint against the police. He recanted his confession in his counter-affidavit.
"He knew Edgardo Batocan well because they grew up together in the same town in Leyte. On July
26, 1995, he was at home at Batasan Hills, Quezon City, the whole time. He was playing chess with
his neighbor Mang Tancio during the time of the incident.
"While inside the prison cell, he was convinced by his officemates at the DECS-NCR and by Capt.
Casanova to write John Doe (not his real name) a letter on January 31, 1996. The contents of this
letter was merely dictated to him by the police.
"Edgar Suela admits to having called up the office of John Doe (not his real name) and in proposing
a trade off of P200,000.00 in exchange for the information he would give about the identities and
whereabouts of the robbers. He learned from his brother Nerio that John Doe (not his real name)
placed a reward money for whoever can provide such an information. At the agreed time and date
of the 'trade off', the police apprehended him and changed the original note he gave with another
written note the contents of which, the police forced and dictated to him. During his investigation,

139
the police employed threats, intimidation and physical force to make him admit to the crime, and to
sign a statement or confession. Together with his brother, he was brought to the office of the IBP in
Quezon City, a lawyer talked to him and he identified this person in court as Atty. Sansano. At the
IBP office, he was asked to sign his supposed extrajudicial confession. Later on, he executed a
Counter-Affidavit wherein he assailed the voluntariness of his forced confession and recanted the
contents thereof.
"He has no knowledge about the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor about the robbers who invaded John Doe
(not his real name)' house.
"On July 26, 1995, he was on his tour of duty as security guard of Hoctagon Security Agency at his
assigned post at Northridge Elementary School, along Mother Ignacia Street, Timog Avenue, Quezon
City. Edgardo Batocan was his acquaintance since childhood and the last time he saw the latter was
in 1990 at Jaro, Leyte. He did not see Batocan in his hometown when he got married in November
1995. He did not implicate Batocan. He learned about the death of Gerry Gabilo when he came
back to Manila after his wedding.
"Joselito Jacinto testified that Nerio Suela wanted him to repair the latter's television set. The defect
of said tv, pertain only to the channeling. He asked Suela for money to buy the spare parts. On
August 19, 1995, he met Nerio Suela and his boss, John Doe (not his real name) at the SM parking
lot. John Doe (not his real name) gave Nerio some money which the latter in turn gave him for the
TV spare parts and repair.
"Dionesio Ador had seen Edgardo Batocan in Jaro, Leyte on July 26, 1995. The motorbike of Batocan
is an old red Honda. He saw Batocan used a new motorbike in December 1995 in their barrio. He
does not know the Suela brothers. Batocan had been in their barrio all his life and had not left their
place." (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo ruled that appellants had been assisted by competent and independent counsel during the
execution of their extrajudicial confessions. It gave credence to the testimonies of Atty. Sansano and the
police officers and thus admitted in evidence the said confessions.
The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to John Doe (not his real name) asking for forgiveness, as well as the
discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former's house, further convinced the trial court of
appellants' guilt. Finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no mitigating
circumstance to offset it, the trial court sentenced them to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.9
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, Appellant Edgardo Batocan ascribes to the trial court the following alleged errors: 10
"I. The trial court gravely erred in considering Edgardo Batocan's extra judicial confession as
admissible evidence against him.
"II. The trial court erred in admitting and appreciating the wristwatch as evidence against Edgardo
Batocan.
"III.The trial court erred in convicting Appellant Batocan of robbery with homicide."
Appellants Nerio and Edgar Suela, on the other hand, fault the trial court with the following supposed
errors:11

140
"I. The court a quo erred in considering the extr[a]-judicial confessions of Edgar Suela and Nerio
Suel[a] are admissible against them;
"II. The court a quo erred in considering the letter of Nerio Suela to John Doe (not his real name) as
evidence against him;
"III. The court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela for simple robbery under Art. 294, no. 5, of the
Revised Penal Code.
"IV. The court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela and Nerio Suela [of] robbery with homicide."
Basically, the assigned errors boil down to four: (1) whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants are
admissible in evidence; (2) whether the wristwatch and the letter (of Nerio Suela) are admissible in
evidence; (3) whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide; and (4) whether Edgar Suela
is guilty of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxx

xxx

x x x."

In People v. Labtan,12 we explained that "[t]he right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not
a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused." Furthermore, an effective and vigilant counsel
"necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from
the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent." 13
True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from confessing. But
his bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the nature and consequences of an
extrajudicial confession.
In People v. Deniega,14 the Court explained:

141
"The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the
lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is
impaired. If the lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a preprepared document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accused's constitutional rights,
the constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1) is not met. The process abovedescribed fulfills the prophylactic purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding the 'pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense' and ensuring that the accused's waiver
of his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an informed one in all aspects."
The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the
need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an
informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. 15
With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school. 16 Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by
the prosecution as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave his
confession -- for only around "five minutes."17 After this initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened
nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was
not even sure that he had explained to appellant the consequences of his extrajudicial confession.
Furthermore, Atty. Rous' attention was divided while attending the custodial investigation as he was also
looking over another paper work on his desk.18
In view of these proven circumstances, we are not convinced that counsel had fully explained to Batocan
his constitutional rights and what they entailed or the nature and the consequences of an extrajudicial
confession -- explanations that would have enabled him to make an informed judgment on whether to
confess; and if so, on what matters. There is no showing that Atty. Rous properly explained the choices or
options open to appellant, a duty expected of any counsel under the circumstances. In sum, he did not
turn out to be the competent and independent counsel envisioned by the Constitution.
We now go to the extrajudicial confessions of Edgar and Nerio Suela. Atty. Sansano supposedly stood as
counsel for the Suela brothers during their custodial investigation. He testified on how he discharged his
duties as follows:
"Q:
Did you also inform them of the nature of the charge against them and the circumstances
s[u]rrounding the taking of their statement?
A:
I did not have the opportunity to inform them about the nature of their charge because at
that time, when they introduced to me, I have not yet informed them what they are going to do and
what being took their statement.
Q:
In other words, Mr. Witness, you did not inform the[m] that the [imposable] penalty in this
crime is death?
A:
Well, during my personal interview as I said, at that time, I don't even know that they are
charged for Murder and Homicide.
Q:
But anyway, Mr. Witness, when this case was brought to you by the police officer, you really
informed that the crime charged was robbery-homicide, Carnapping and extortion?
A:
Nobody informed me about the nature of the charge as they stated. They were just brought
before me there. I was asked to provide the free legal assistance other than the investigation
conducted by the police officer.
Q:

Did you not ask the police why these people were brought to you?

142
A:
They told me that they are going to be asked questions, to be investigated in connection with
that incident in John Doe (not his real name) home.
Q:

And did you not ask the police what was that incident?

A:
The police told me already that the two boys were going to give statement in connection with
that incident in John Doe (not his real name) house where one was killed in the house of John Doe
(not his real name).19
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:
But, nevertheless, Mr. Witness, it was the policeman who choose you to be the lawyer to
assist?
A:
No, sir, the police only thru their duties, to suggest or provide where counsel can be sought,
now, it happened that under our agreement, with the police, if the two boys were going to give their
statement and if the declarant got no lawyer that they will bring them to the IBP because we even
provide the assistance that are needed in order to be able to conduct an investigation."20 (Italics
supplied)
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Q:
Anyway, you already knew that the incident of robbery and killing of a person was involved,
is that right?
A:

Yes sir, after the investigation.

Q:
So when you already knew the possible charge based on the testimony of the two
declarants?
A:

Yes sir, it was robbery with homicide.

Q:
You said a while ago that your duty as assisting counsel was only to advise the suspects one
of which is to advise them that they can if they do not want to answer those questions that they
would think damaging then they can do that?
A:

Yes sir, and the best evidence is the evidence that they gave in their statements.

Q:
Now, since you advised them about damaging testimonies, did you not advise them that to
make a confession would be damaging to themselves as assisting counsel?
A:
The confession became clearly damaging only after the answers were given following the
question but as I said, at that stage I did not stop the declarant from giving his answer because if I
objected then that would be an obstruction in the investigation itself." 21
Evidently, Atty. Sansano did not understand the exact nature of appellants' rights to counsel and to remain
silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to answer as an obstruction in the
investigation. This shows that he was incapable or unwilling to advise appellants that remaining silent was
a right they could freely exercise without fear of any untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have
stopped his clients from answering the propounded questions and advised them of their right to remain
silent, if they preferred to do so. That the process of investigation could have been "obstructed" should not
have concerned him because his duty was to his clients and not to the prosecution or to the police
investigators.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, when he interviewed appellants, he did not even bother to find out the gist of their proposed
statements in order to be able to inform them properly of the nature and consequences of their

143
extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly, appellants were not accorded competent and independent
counsel whom they could rely on to look after their interests.
"In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that 'a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by
deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law.'" 22
Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence
that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the
extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value.23
The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Wristwatch and Letter
Wristwatch
Edgardo Batocan allegedly confessed in Leyte that the stolen Citizen wristwatch had been given to his
girlfriend. When he rendered this confession, he did not execute any written waiver of his right to remain
silent or of his right to counsel. "Any admission wrung from the accused in violation of his constitutional
rights is inadmissible in evidence against him."24 Therefore, his alleged statement as to the location of the
wristwatch is inadmissible.
Furthermore, the prosecution's claim that the wristwatch was recovered from his girlfriend is hearsay and
hence, has limited probative value.25 The prosecution did not present anyone who had actually witnessed
the alleged recovery of the wristwatch from the girl. S/Insp. Benjamin Labadia recounted the incident in
this plainly insufficient manner:
"Q:
Alright Mr. Witness, you said that a wrist watch was also a part of the loot and that Batocan
told your team that it was in the custody of his sweetheart. When so informed that this wrist watch
was in the custody of his sweetheart, what did the police operatives do?
A:
The police operatives together with Edgardo Batocan went to the place and when they came
back, I did not go with them, the wrist watch was already in the possession of the Quezon City
Police operative, Sir.
Q:
Did you actually see, Mr. Witness when the team proceeded to the place where the
sweetheart of accused Edgardo Batocan was staying, give this wrist watch to the Quezon City Police
operatives?
A:

I said, Sir. I did not accompany them."26

As for the wristwatch itself, we agree with appellant that its seizure, if it was really taken from Batocan's
girlfriend, was irregular. As succinctly explained in Batocan's Brief:
"x x x. Clearly, the watch was taken without a search warrant and not as an incident of a valid
arrest. The seizure was irregular. There is also no evidence on record that it was taken under any of
the exempting circumstances where a warrantless seizure is permissible. It was not shown if the
girlfriend voluntarily and validly consented to the taking x x x. Lacking such evidence, no
presumption of regularity can be assumed.

144
'Where the search was conducted with irregularity, i.e. without a warrant, the Court cannot
appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of
duty.' (People vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72).
"The wristwatch is clearly a fruit of a 'fruit of a poisonous tree.' As such, it should not have been
admitted and appreciated against the accused." 27
Letter
Nerio Suela also contends that his January 31, 1996 letter to John Doe (not his real name) is inadmissible in
evidence. The letter reads as follows:

"Jan-31-96

"Dearest Sir John Doe (not his real name)

"Sir matagal kona sana ito ipagtapat sa iyo dahil tuwing kitay nakikita na lumoloha ka parang hindi
ako maka hinga ng sisikip and aking dibdib. Tuwing tayo'y nasa simbahan homihinge ako ng tawad
sa panginoon ang nagawa kong ito nararamdaman ko na parabang hinde niya tinatanggap.
"Sir napakalaki ng nagawa kong kasalanan sa iyo at sana bigyan mo pa ako ng isang pagkakataon
pagsisihan ko lahat ang pagkakasala sa iyo babagohin ko na ang buhay ko maglilingkod ako sa
diyos.
"Sir nandito ako sa likod ng bakal na rihas halos lahat ng oras ng dadasal ako bigyan mo pa ako ng
isang pagkakataon patawaring mo ako.
"Sir alam ng diyos na hindi ako ang kriminal may kinalaman lang ako inamin ko na lang. Para
naman magkaroon ng lonas yong problima mo hindi narin ako makatiis hindi pa makatolog. Lalo na
nakikita kita na ng hihirap ang inyong katawan lalo na ang in kalooban sana sir bigyan mo pa ako
ng isang pagkakataon patawarin mo ako isa rin ako na anak ng diyos na naligaw ng langdas ngayon
pinagsisihan ko lahat ang nagawa kong kasalanan sir ayaw ko pang mamatay maliliit ang aking
mga anak mahal ako ng aking asawa.
"Sir. Edgardo Batokan ang pumatay kay Sir JERRY sangayon nandoon siya sa Jaro Leyte Bo. San
Agostin. Sir hinde ko maggawang pomatay ng tao somama lang ako dahil baka kayo ang patayin
nang doon lang ako sa may pito. Yung kapatid ko namana siya ang may baril siya and nanotok si
Edgardo Batokan siya ang komoha ng pira tapos omalis na kami ako ang ng drive ng kotse. Tapos
inewan namin sa Ricto tapos ng hiwalay hiwa na kame yon tike. Dian ng kapatid ko.
"Sir patawarin mo na ako hinde naman akong masamang tao na pasama lang ako.
"Sana po & sir babaan mo naman ang aking sintinesia ayaw ko pang mamatay.

Nerio Suela
(signed)
Quezon City Jail

Sir. Sagotin mo naman

145

itong sulat ko
(signed)"28

This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation when he wrote it. In
open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary to his contention, the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities.29Hence, the letter is admissible in evidence.
Third Issue:
Liability for Robbery with Homicide
Without the wristwatch and the uncounseled extrajudicial confessions, are the remaining pieces of
evidence still sufficient to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Fortunately for the
prosecution, our answer is "Yes."
Excluding the wristwatch and the written extrajudicial confessions, the material evidence on record are as
follows:
1) The testimony of the medicolegal officer in conjunction with the medico legal Report 30 which
proved the existence of five stab wounds on the cadaver of Geronimo Gabilo;
2) The stolen colored Sony television set and the knife used in stabbing Geronimo Gabilo, which
were recovered from the house of Nerio Suela;
3) The handwritten letter of Nerio Suela asking for forgiveness and admitting his participation in the
crime;
4) The handwritten tip on the identity of the malefactors voluntarily handed by Edgar Suela to
Araceli Tubaga, which -- in open court -- he admitted having written. It states:
'1. Nerio Suela ang utak ng pagpaslang
'2. TV color and evidencia nasa bahay niya ang tunay na pangalan national ngayon ay
pinalitan ng Panasonic
'3. Ang knife na ginamit nasa bahay niya 8 inc.'
5) The testimony of John Doe (not his real name) who narrated how three hooded men brandishing
guns and a knife barged into his room on the night of January 18, 1996, and hogtied him, Gabilo
and Norman.31They were then threatened and intimidated into giving the location of their money
and valuables, which the criminals eventually took.32 The malefactors then dragged Gabilo
downstairs.33 Shortly, thereafter, he followed them and found Gabilo in a pool of his own blood. 34 He
observed that the height and built of the three malefactors were the same as those of appellants; 35
6) The oral admissions made by Nerio Suela and Edgardo Batocan to John Doe (not his real name)
and his officemates. John Doe (not his real name) testified as follows:
"Q
After Nerio Suela was told that somebody will be talking with him thru the phone, what
happened next, if any?

146
A
Nerio Suela pale faced, admitted the commission of the crime and he was very apologetic to
me and he said: "Sir, patawarin mo po ako sa aking nagawa, nagkamali lang po ako, tulungan
naman po ninyo ako", those were the statements of Mr. Nerio Suela as he was being interrogated by
Mr. Patriarca.
Q

What else did he tell you?

Those were the only statements that I actually heard from Nerio Suela. 36
xxx

xxx

xxx

Again, do you know a person by the name of Edgardo Batocan?

A
I learned about him only from the letter of Nerio Suela and also when I met him on March 13,
1996, sir.
Q:

Where did you meet this Edgardo Batocan for the first time, Mr. Witness?

A:

I met him in the second floor of station 9 along Anonas Street.

Q:

Under what circumstances were you able to meet him?

A:
Upon his arrest on March 13, 1996 at around 3:00 in the afternoon, I was called by the
Station Commander of Station 9 to meet Mr. Edgardo Batocan and present also during that time
were the relatives of Gerry Gabilo, sir.
Q:
What transpired when you met Edgardo Batocan in the office of the Station Commander of
Station 9?
A:
We talked about the crime and he mentioned to us that it was Nerio Suela who planned the
whole thing at their place and the plan was hatched three days before the commission of the crime
on July 26, 1995.
Q:

What else did he tell you, Mr. Witness, at that time?

xxx

xxx

xxx

A:
He insisted that it was actually Mr. Nerio Suela who masterminded because on the way down
from the second floor, Mr. Gerry Gabilo was pleading with him for them not to harm him and felt
quite remorseful when he was already about to stab my friend but it was Nerio Suela who pushed
him to kill Gerry and then one of my staff even asked him "how many times did you stab, Mr.
Gabilo?"
xxx

xxx

Q:

What did Edgar Batocan answer to one of your staff?

A:

He answered that he hit him five times, sir.

xxx

COURT:
Q:

You were present when your staff member asked Edgardo about the question?

A:

Yes, I was there.

147
Q:

You were also present when Edgardo Batocan gave the answer?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:
Was there any investigation being conducted by the police at that time you were talking with
Edgardo Batocan?
A:

There was none, Your Honor.

Q:

Or you were alone with Edgardo Batocan together with your staff member?

A:
We were left alone at the second floor with some of my staff member together with the
family of Gerry Gabilo, so we were asking him the circumstances on how he did it and so forth and
so on.
Q:

Did he ask for forgiveness?

A:

No, he did not Your Honor.37

Edgardo Batocan's confession to John Doe (not his real name) who is not a police officer is admissible in
evidence.38 The Rules state that "the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him."39 Batocan's verbal declarations are not covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution,40 because they were not extracted while he was under custodial investigation.
In People v. Tawat,41 the Court declared:
"The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard is he heard and understood all of it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance."
"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person
who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the
conversation or statement made by the accused."
These pieces of evidence sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Identities of Appellants As Malefactors
Edgardo Batocan's oral admission to John Doe (not his real name) that he stabbed Gabilo five times
dovetails on material points with the letter of Nerio. In turn, Nerio's letter to John Doe (not his real name)
asking for forgiveness and admitting his participation in the crime, taken together with the recovery from
his house of the stolen TV and knife used in killing Gabilo; plus the oral admission of Batocan and the
written tip of Edgar Suela pointing to him as the mastermind prove beyond reasonable doubt his identity
as one of the malefactors.
The evidence showing the identity of Edgar Suela are circumstantial in character. It is basic that an
accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone, provided that: (a) there is more
than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 42 In the
present case, all these requirements are satisfied.

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These circumstances may be summarized, thus: (1) Edgar's intimate personal knowledge of the details of
the crime which he wrote down as tips; (2) as a security guard, he possessed a gun on the night of the
incident; (3) he was the brother of one of the malefactors and a friend of the other; (4) the interlocking
admissions to John Doe (not his real name) of Batocan and his brother Nerio point to Edgar as their cohort;
(5) John Doe (not his real name) also identified him as one of the malefactors. These are duly proven
circumstances which sufficiently establish beyond reasonable doubt his identity as one of the malefactors.
Conspiracy
The three malefactors arrived together at the house of John Doe (not his real name). They were all wearing
ski masks and were all sporting weapons. While one was threatening John Doe (not his real name), the
other was intimidating Gabilo and the third was pointing his weapon on Norman. After getting the money
and valuables of Gabilo and John Doe (not his real name), all three went downstairs together, two of them
dragging Gabilo with them. Upon the instruction of Nerio, Batocan stabbed Gabilo five times. They finally
left together in the same car, with Nerio driving. These acts of the three appellants before, during and after
the crime clearly indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Where the acts
of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable
as principals.43
Hence, although Nerio and Edgar Suela did not themselves stab Gerry Gabilo, they are still liable for his
death as principals because the existence of conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all. 44 Moreover,
whenever the complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven to have been committed, all those who
took part in the robbery are liable as principals even though they did not actually take part in the killing. 45
Proper Penalty
The current Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating circumstances must be
alleged in the Information. Thus, Section 9 of new Rule 110 states:
"Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
In People v. Mauricio,46 the Court elucidated:
"The use of the word 'must' indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to comply
with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial,
cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the information.
It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they
benefit the accused."
In the present case, the aggravating circumstance of disguise which was appreciated by the court a
quo was not alleged in the Informations against appellants. Following the above-cited new rule and current
jurisprudence, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of disguise against appellants. The
special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There
being no appreciable aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, in People v. Catubig,47 we held that while a non-alleged but proven aggravating circumstance
cannot be used to increase the penalty, nonetheless it can be the source of civil awards. Hence, we retain
the trial court's civil grants in this regard.
Fourth Issue:
Robbery

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On the trial court's sentence of robbery in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618, we agree with the
recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General that Edgar Suela should be acquitted. The OSG
explained:
"Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons as
distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or intimidation does
not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code) [p. 175, Criminal Law, Book II, Vol. IV,
Ambrosio Padilla, 1990].
"Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant Edgar Suela
employed force or intimidation on private complainant John Doe (not his real name) by instilling
fear in his mind so as to compel the latter to cough out the amount of P200,000.00. Instead, what
was established was that he had agreed to give the P200,000.00 in exchange for information
regarding the identity and whereabouts of those who robbed him and killed his friend (TSN,
November 4, 1996, p. 7; TSN, November 5, 1996, pp. 4-9). There was no showing that appellant
Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so as to leave him no choice but to give the money.
Instead, what is clear was that the giving of the money was done not out of fear but because it was
a choice private complainant opted because he wanted to get the information being offered to him
for the consideration of P200,000.00 (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 5-17; ibid., Decision, p. 15). In
fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly having a lead in
solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements of simple
robbery have not been established in the instant case, hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be
acquitted of that charge."48
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed Decision MODIFIED.
We AFFIRMthe judgment insofar as it refers to Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071
but REDUCE the penalty toreclusion perpetua. The award of civil indemnities is also AFFIRMED. In
Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 for simple robbery, Edgar Suela y Hembra is ACQUITTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 158763

March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December
2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order
dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2)
Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered
UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated
July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest
for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao
who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben
B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused
and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we,
on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao.

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Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado
Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate,
and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint
Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the
warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and
Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao
moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition
was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this
Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17
August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary
restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the
aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two
Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents
cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we
referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and
ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of
error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint
Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding,
affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.

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SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the
warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of
Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to
issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become
final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the
court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may
invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November
6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act
on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio
cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the
time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or
quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such
jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for
their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail,
petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause
without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court
was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of
Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102 5), the Court ordered the case transferred
from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in
Santiago v. Vasquez7:

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The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused,
as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become
obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in
the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the
processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the
application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in
civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the
custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release
and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is
that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just
send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This
is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal
are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except

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in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of
the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases
best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the
law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of
these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction
over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of
arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the
records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding
with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the
criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not
present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the
custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and
could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other
hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be
very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the
same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in
his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find
probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and
effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and
night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination
of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require
one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy
of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before
its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice
and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad
seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the
standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political
climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed
the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so

155
two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with
the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the
assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming
office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x
prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper." 24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking
in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because
the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice.
But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains
that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the
warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the
information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true:
violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and
to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised,
this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant,
Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge
Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the
resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from
the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the
certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge.
No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it
was based only on the fiscals certification.28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely
on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the
existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]

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The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No.
97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article
III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section,
i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years
in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself
untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a "politically
charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda
camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary
Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of
probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of
the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,
while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

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Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a
petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after
the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two
criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and
based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the
other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court
absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies"
and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel
Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees
with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected
the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is
supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the
probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the
summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in
People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in
effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed. 34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it
to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao
case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the
basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge
Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt.
We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence,
which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as
there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill
respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent
Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now beyond
doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an
acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version
of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to
issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with
the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case
was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the
informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions
about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the
nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate
the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently
new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done
so, without a personal determination of probable cause.

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We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely
ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of
scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the
merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, 37 which
issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted
by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it
the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the
warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed
unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of
the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this
Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and
not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v.
Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had
resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a
finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of
dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14,
2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge
Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the
Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14,
2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because
we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October
2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001
Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent
in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder."
On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of
respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

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Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14
November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge
Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had
ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001,
antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001
Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount
of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful
orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of
opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and
for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon
his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite
for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number
of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of
Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao, 41 by transferring the venue of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12
June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 363523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this
connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,
Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to
this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10)
days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance
with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with
reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused
Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

160

161
G.R. No. 178947

June 26, 2013

VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS-DIO, as authorized representative of H.S. EQUITIES, LTD., and

WESTDALE ASSETS, LTD., Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE RAMON S. CAGUIOA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, and TIMOTHY J.
DESMOND, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 179079
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TIMOTHY J. DESMOND, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing the November 8, 2006
Decision2and July 19, 2007 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88285, upholding the
validity of the trial courts dismissal of separate criminal informations for estafa against private respondent
Timothy J. Desmond (Desmond) due to lack of probable cause.
The Facts
In 2001, petitioner Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS
Equities) and authorized representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), 4 was introduced to Desmond,
the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and
the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority
shareholder of SBMEI.5After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS Equities,
decided to invest a total of US$1,150,000.006 in SBMEIs Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure),
a theme park to be constructed at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase
live performances of false-killer whales and sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to
believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be
used in Ocean Adventure,7 and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment. 8 Desmond even
presented a Business Plan, indicating that: (a) Ocean Adventures "attendance will rise from 271,192 in
2001 to just over 386,728 in 2006, with revenues rising from US$4,420,000.00 million to US$7,290,000.00
million in the same time frame"; (b) "early investors are expected to reap an annual return of 23% in 2001,
rising to 51% in 2006"; and (c) "fully priced shares would yield a 19% return] in 2001, rising to 42% in
2006."9 Thus, on January 18, 2002, a Subscription Agreement 10 was executed by Desmond, as
representative of SBMEI and JV China, and Dio, as representative of HS Equities.
While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS Equities was expressly granted
minority protection rights in a subsequent Subscription and Shareholders Agreement 11 dated March 12,
2002, stating that there shall be "a nominee of the Subscriber to be elected as Treasurer/Chief Financial
Officer, who may not be removed by the Board of Directors without the affirmative vote of the
Subscriber."12 Accordingly, Dio was elected as a member of SBMEIs Board of Directors and further
appointed as its Treasurer.13 The parties later executed two (2) Investors Convertible Promissory Notes
one dated April 4, 200114 and another dated May 8, 200115 covering HS Equities infusion of a total of
US$1,000,000.00 for the purpose of purchasing machinery, equipment, accessories, and materials to be
used for the construction of Ocean Adventure.

162
In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another US$1,000,000.00 16 in a separate
business venture, called the Miracle Beach Hotel Project (Miracle Beach), which involved the development
of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said investment would be
used to settle SBMEIs P40,000,000.00 loan obligation to First Metro Investment Corporation and for the
construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas.17 However, when the corresponding subscription agreement was
presented to Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a clause stating that the "funds in the Subscription
Bank Account" were also to be used for the "funding of Ocean Adventures Negative Cash Flow not
exceeding US$200,000.00."18 This was in conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent of Westdales
investment in Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign the subscription agreement.
Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmonds representations, SBMEI actually had no
capacity to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses amounting
toP62,595,216.00.19 She likewise claimed to have discovered false entries in the companys books and
financial statements specifically, its overvaluation of the marine animals and its non-disclosure of the
true amount of JV Chinas investment20 which prompted her to call for an audit investigation.
Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain
disbursements from Westdales special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures (special
account), and diverted a total of US$72,362.78 therein for the operating expenses of Ocean
Adventure.21 When Desmond refused to execute an undertaking to return the diverted funds, Dio, in her
capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the release of the remaining funds in the aforesaid special
account.22
Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, 23 she filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2)
criminal complaints24 (subject criminal complaints) for estafa (a) through false pretenses under Article
315(1)(b)25 of the Revised Penal Code26 (RPC); and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion under Article 315(2)(a)27 of the RPC, both against Desmond before the
Olongapo City Prosecutors Office (City Prosecutors Office), docketed as IS Nos. 04-M-992 and 04-M-993.
In defense, Desmond maintained that his representation of himself as Chairman and CEO of SBMEI was not
a sham and that Dio has not even proven that he did not have the expertise and qualifications to double
her investment. Among others, he also denied having been fired from Beijing Landa Aquarium Co. Ltd. for
his supposed incompetence and mismanagement. He further asserted that it was not deceitful to value the
marine mammals at US$3,720,000.00 as equity contribution of JV China in SBMEI, notwithstanding the fact
that two (2) false killer whales had already perished before the company could start operations. This is
because the said valuation, in any case, would be based on the collective income-earning capacity of the
entire animal operating system derived from revenues generated by marine park attendance and
admission fees.28
In reply, Dio insisted that SBMEI, at the outset, never had sufficient assets or resources of its own because,
contrary to Desmonds claims, the total amount of US$2,300,000.00 it purportedly invested in buildings
and equipment actually came from the investments Dios company made in SBMEI. 29
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution 30 dated August 26, 2004, finding
probable cause against Desmond for the abovementioned crimes, to wit:
The foregoing clearly applies in the instant two (2) cases as borne out by the following facts, to with [sic]:
(1) Desmond, as the Chairman and Chief Executive Office of SBMEI and in order to persuade Dio to invest,
represented that he possessed the necessary influence, expertise and resources (in terms of credit and
property) for the project knowing the same to be false as he never had the capital for the project as borne
out by his correspondences with Dio; and (2) Dio fell for these misrepresentations and the lure of profit
offered by Desmond, thereby being induced to invest the amounts of $1,150,000.00 and $1,000,000.00 to
the damage and prejudice of her company.
The elements of the crimes charged were thus established in these cases, namely Dio parted with her
money upon the prodding and enticement of respondent on the false pretense that he had the capacity
and resources for the proposed project. In the end, Dio was not able to get her money back, thus causing
her damage and prejudice. Moreover, such defraudation or misappropriation having been committed by
Desmond through his company SBMEI involving funds solicited from Dio as a member of the general public

163
in contravention of the public interest, the probable cause clearly exists to indict Desmond for the crime of
Estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) and (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to PD No. 1689. 31
In view of the foregoing, corresponding criminal informations32 (subject informations) were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 516-2004 and 5152004. The accusatory portions thereof read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 516-200433
That in or about and sometime in early 2001, in Olongapo City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being the officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc.
(SBMEI), acting as a syndicate and by means of deceit, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud H.S. EQUITIES LIMITED, represented in this case by Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which he made to said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio to the effect that he had the expertise
and qualifications, as well as the resources, influence, credit and business transaction with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and other financing institutions to ensure the viability of the Subic Bay
Marine Exploration Ocean Adventure Project (SBMEOA), which he represented to be a qualified and legally
existing investment enterprise with capacity to solicit investment from the general public, by submitting
documents for the purpose, which representations he knew to be false and fraudulent and the supporting
documents are similarly spurious and were only made in order to induce said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio
to invest and deliver as in fact she invested and delivered a total amount of One Million One Hundred Fifty
Thousand US Dollars ($1,150,000.00) to the said accused on the strength of said manifestations and
representations and supporting documents, and said accused, once in possession of the said amount,
misapplied, converted and misappropriated the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of H.S. Equities Limited in the amount of US $1,150,000.00 or Php57,500,000.00 Pesos, the
dollar computed at the rate of Php 50.00 to [US]$1.00 which was the prevailing rate of exchange of a dollar
to peso at the time of the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 515-200434
That in or about and sometime during the period from June 2002 to July 2002, in Olongapo City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Westdale Assets, Limited represented in this case by
Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio in the following manner to wit: the said accused received in trust and for
administration from the said Virginia S. Delos Santos-Dio the amount of One Million US Dollars
($1,000,000.00) under the express obligation of using the same to pay the loan facility of the Subic Bay
Marine Exploration, Inc. (SBMEI) with First Metro Investment Corporation and to fund the construction and
development of the Miracle Beach Project but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount,
with grave abuse of confidence and with intent to defraud, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the
same for his own use and benefit by devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon and
despite repeated demands made upon him to account for and to return the said amount, he failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Westdale Assets,
Limited in the amount of US $1,000,000.00 or its equivalent to FIFTY MILLION (Php 50,000,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, the dollar being computed at the rate of Php50.00 to $ 1.00 which was the prevailing
rate of exchange at the commission of the offense, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Aggrieved, Desmond filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 35 as well as a Motion to Withdraw Filed
Informations.36He also filed before the RTC a Motion to Defer Further Proceedings and to Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest37but subsequently withdrew the same and filed, instead, a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause.38

164
The RTC Ruling
In an Order39 dated October 21, 2004, the RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable
cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all present, to wit:
First, the element of misrepresentation or deceit found in par. 2 (a) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
absent. It must be emphasized that the promises allegedly made to the complainant by the accused that
her companys investment will significantly increase, clearly appeared in the Subic Bay Marine Exploration,
Inc.s ("SBMEI", for brevity) printed business plan dated January 12, 2001 (Annex "A", Complaint-Affidavit
dated 19 April 2004). Verily, this is SBMEIs representation or "come on" to would-be investors and not a
personal assurance of the accused. The fact that accused was the companys Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman of the Board of Directors is of no moment in the absence of any evidence to show that accused
personally prepared the business plan thereby making the alleged "rosy picture" his own personal
enticements to the complainant. Therefore, there being a dearth of evidence pointing to the accused as
author of the SBMEIs business plan, any misrepresentation or deceit committed cannot be personally
attributed to him.
Furthermore, the court cannot find any sufficient evidence that the accused personally assured the
complainant about his so-called power, influence and credit with the SBMA and other financial institutions
that would supposedly insure the viability and profitability of the project. Note that nowhere in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the private complainant are there specific factual allegations that would show that
the accused had personal business meetings with the SBMA and said financial institutions. As to how and
in what manner and scope accused exercised such alleged power, influence and credit over these juridical
entities remain a bare and self-serving averment in the absence of any factual detail or account.
Finally, it cannot be gainsaid [sic] that accused was the one who personally valuated the marine mammals
contributed by JV China Incorporated to the Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc. as capital amounting to
US$3.724 Million. Evidence clearly point to an independent valuation done by a third party namely Beijing
Landa Aquarium that valued the marine mammals under the Buy-Out Agreement dated September 9,
1998. Needless to state, the onus is on complainant to controvert this valuation. Again, however, no
adequate proof was adduced along this line.
Second, the element of personal misappropriation by the accused under par. 1(b) Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code is likewise not present. While it may be conceded that there was money utilized to pay
salaries of expatriates and staff as well as the cost of utilities amounting to US$72,272.00 complainant
failed to show that said money was taken from her companies investments in SBMEI. It must be pointed
out that other than complainants bare allegation, there was no document presented categorically stating
that the investment of complainants companies were earmark for a particular payment or project. Hence,
when the investment entered SBMEIs financial coffers, the same presumably were co-mingled with other
monies of the corporation.
Moreover and more revealing, is the fact that again there was no showing that it was accused who
personally caused the payment of these expenses allegedly in violation of the objective of the investment.
It must be noted that SBMEI is a corporation and not a single proprietorship. Being a corporation, expenses
paid of such a kind as utilities and salaries are not authorized personally and solely by the President nor
the Chief Executive Officer nor even by the Chairman of the Board for that matter. These are corporate
acts that are passed through board resolutions. Hence, these corporate acts can in no way be considered
personal acts of the accused. Yet, he was singled out among all 5 members of the Board of Directors who
presumably, in the ordinary course of business, approved by resolution the payments of such utilities and
salaries. Consequently, there is again insufficiency of evidence that the accused alone caused the payment
of these salaries and utilities for the sole purpose of pocketing the money thereby using the same for
personal gain.40
Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold departure order against
Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases against him:

165
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the subject motion for judicial determination of probable cause is
favorably granted. There being no probable cause, the cases against the accused must be dismissed as
they are hereby DISMISSED. The motions to issue warrant of arrest and Hold
Departure Order as well as the prayer for provisional remedy are necessarily DENIED.
SO ORDERED.41
Given the RTCs dismissal of the foregoing criminal cases, the City Prosecutors Office filed motion for
reconsideration which was, however, denied. As such, it filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus42 before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Relatedly, Dio also filed a petitionin-intervention43 before the CA, praying for the reinstatement of the subject criminal complaints.
The CA Ruling
In its November 8, 2006 Decision,44 the CA upheld the RTCs authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the
process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record
insufficient to establish probable cause. It explained that such dismissal is an exercise of judicial discretion
sanctioned under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this score, the CA
evaluated the evidence presented and agreed with the RTCs conclusions that there was no sufficient basis
showing that Desmond committed estafa by means of false pretenses. Neither was it established that the
money sourced from petitioner Dio was converted by respondent Desmond for some other purpose other
than that for which it was intended. Pertinent portions of the CA Decision restated the RTCs observations
in this wise:
In the instant case, the alleged false representations by Desmond which allegedly induced private
complainants H.S. Equities, Ltd. ("H.S. Equities") and Dio, to part with their money are not supported by
the facts on record. First, the alleged false representation employed by Desmond with respect to his
expertise and qualifications in the form of influence, credit and business transactions with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and financial institutions and such resources to enable private complainants
to double its investment with SBMEI has not been shown to be false.
Indeed, nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by private complainants that allegedly contained
the above false representations does it show that it was private respondent himself who made such
representation. Notably, the SBMEIs Business Plan dated January 12, 2001 to which private complainants
anchor such allegation does not indicate that the representations made therein came personally from
Desmond. In addition, neither does it appear from such document that the statements therein were used
as a form of a personal assurance coming from Desmond that private complainants would indeed double
the amount they had invested with SBMEI. If at all, we agree with the trial court that statements made in
the said business plan were merely a form of enticement to encourage would-be investors from [sic]
investing in such kind of business undertaking.
Moreover, we likewise agree with the trial court that no factual allegations were made by private
complainants as to how such false pretense of power and influence was made upon them by Desmond and
which convinced private complainants to part with their money. It bears stressing that the allegations of
false pretense of power and influence in a case of estafa are mere conclusions of law which must be
substantiated at the very least by circumstances which would show that the person accused of committing
estafa did indeed commit acts of false representations. As the records show, there was no
misrepresentation on the part of Desmond that he is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SBMEI
which is a corporation engaged in the business of developing marine parks. Significantly, the records
likewise show that SBMEI did indeed build and develop a marine park in Subic Bay (Ocean Adventure) for
the purposes stated in its business plan and had entered into a long-term lease agreement with SBMA.
Documentary evidence in the form of the Report of Independent Auditors to SBMEI shows the amount of
investment the corporation had invested in the said business undertaking. For instance, the corporation
had invested the amount of P106,788,219.00 in buildings and equipment alone. It has also assets
consisting of marine mammals which are necessary for the operation of the marine park. In this respect,
we cannot subscribe to private complainants contention that there was misrepresentation on the part of

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private respondent that he had overvalued the worth of the marine mammals it had purchased from
Beijing Landa Aquarium Co., Ltd. of the Republic of China. This claim of private complainants of the
deceitful acts employed by Desmond in overpricing the value of the marine animals for US$3.724 Million
when in fact the sea animals were only valued for one U.S. dollar was not corroborated by the evidence on
hand.
xxxx
In the same manner, the facts in the case at bar that would allegedly constitute a criminal charge of estafa
under par. 1(b) are wanting. Be it noted that under the said paragraph, estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse
of confidence through misappropriation or conversion of the money, goods or any other personal property
must be received in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other obligation which involves
the duty to make delivery thereof or to return the same. It is not amiss to note that a perusal of private
complainants Complaint-Affidavit shows that subject money in the amount of US$1,000,000.00 to be used
for the Miracle Beach Project was placed in a special account with Equitable-PCI Bank. As the records show,
the said funds were placed by Dio under the control of Fatima Paglicawan, an employee of Westdale, such
that, no money can be withdrawn from the special account without the signature of the said employee,
Desmond and a certain John Corcoran. Therefore, at such time, it cannot be said that the funds were
received for administration or already under the juridical possession of Desmond. Meanwhile, we would like
to emphasize that to constitute conversion, it presupposes that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon. Verily, a facial examination of the Journal Voucher and Check Voucher
pertaining to the withdrawals made on such account clearly shows that the disbursements were not only
authorized by Paglicawan but likewise indicated that the purpose for such withdrawals was to cover
payments for BIR taxes and the salaries of local employees and expatriates.
To repeat, these withdrawals as well as the purpose thereof were known to Paglicawan when [sic] she
authorized the disbursements. Paglicawan, who was designated by private complainant Dio to control the
release of the said funds is presumed to have acted under the latters authority. Such miscommunication
between Dio and Paglicawan with respect to the purpose of the funds does not make out a case of estafa
there being no abuse of confidence or conversion to speak of taking into account that the said funds were
released under the presumed authority of private complainants through Paglicawan, and which were
indeed used for the purpose for which it was withdrawn. That being the case, there can be no damage or
prejudice to Westdale and Dio as there was no disturbance in the property rights of Westdale and Dio in
the said funds since the same were used for the purpose for which it was disbursed.
Then again, we agree with the trial court that there is no sufficient evidence adduced to support the
criminal charges of estafa against Desmond. As pointed out by the trial court, while private respondent is
the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SBMEI, there is no showing that he had personally and solely
authorized the application of the above funds for the payment of expenses not directly connected with the
Miracle Beach Project. Nor does it appear that as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Desmond has been
appointed to execute, on his own, such corporate acts.45 (Citations omitted)
The City Prosecutor and Dio filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied in a
Resolution46 dated July 19, 2007.
Hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject informations for lack of probable cause.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

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The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in
court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the
trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. 47
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. In this respect, the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there
is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. 48 Notably,
since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause becomes a mere superfluity,49 if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the
process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-blown trial.
In the case of Co v. Republic,50 the Court emphasized the settled distinction between an executive and a
judicial determination of probable cause, viz:51
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for
the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.1wphi1 The second kind of
preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge.
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation and must himself ascertain from the latters findings and
supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. This
prerogative is granted by no less than the Constitution which provides that "no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."52
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing
arrest warrants, Section 5(a),53 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a
judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause,54 viz:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused had already been arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutors authority, it must be stressed that the judges
dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if
the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the
parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order
the presentation of additional evidence.55

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In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task
of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable
cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause;
and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable
cause.56
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was
improper as the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed. In this case, records show that
certain essential facts namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false representations that induced
Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely
for the Miracle Beach Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon remain controverted. As
such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)
(a)57 and 315(1) (b)58of the RPC had already been established, thereby rendering the RTCs immediate
dismissal of the case highly improper.
Lest it be misconceived, trial judges will do well to remember that when a perceived gap in the evidence
leads to a "neither this nor that" conclusion, a purposeful resolution of the ambiguity is preferable over a
doubtful dismissal of the case. Verily, a judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of
the information in court is appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly
inferred from the evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it cannot be
expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all
the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-conducted
preliminary investigation being merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground, to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.59 In this light, given that the lack of probable cause had not been clearly
established in this case, the CA erred, and the RTC gravely abused its discretion, by ruling to dismiss
Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 516-2004. Indeed, these cases must stand the muster of a full-blown trial
where the parties could be given, as they should be given, the opportunity to ventilate their respective
claims and defenses, on the basis of which the court a quo can properly resolve the factual disputes
therein.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The November 8, 2006 Decision and July 19, 2007 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 88285 which affirmed the October 21, 2004 Order of Dismissal
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 are SET ASIDE. The two (2) criminal
informations for estafa against respondent Timothy J. Desmond in Criminal Case Nos. 515-2004 and 5162004 are hereby REINSTATED. Accordingly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the arraignment of
the accused and the trial of the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995
DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL
INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of LAWRENCE A.
LARKINS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity, 1 was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. 2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief from
illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them
from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a
person is detained. 3
Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. 4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, it extends, except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. It is not available, however, under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of
the said Rule which reads:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of 1 February 1995
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273, 5 a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately release Lawrence A.
Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the alternative relief of certiorari.
The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the pleadings of the parties
are neither complicated nor disputed.
On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos.
101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against
her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal. 6
Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion and
Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and

170
arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist.
detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.

Larkins was then

On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge
Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September
1993 and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless
otherwise detained for some other cause."
Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for
another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest.
On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. 8 It contains a
certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of
his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC. .
. ." The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 94-11794, and assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.
On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for
Bail 9 wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had
no carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither
lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going
out of the country or hiding away from the law.
On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 9411794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate
Release, 10 principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous
opposition from the private complainant.11
In the order of 5 January 1995, 12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, thus:
After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the Court
finds no legal or valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to grant
him bail. The filing of this case against the accused, which is [a] very serious offense,
justifies the grant of the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a hold departure
order.
WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit, and as prayed
for by the prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to
include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in its hold order departure list until
further order from this Court.
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals
a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and
Judge Felix S. Caballes.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution 13 ordering the respondents therein to appear and
produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why
Larkins' liberty is being restrained.
On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at the
hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General
representing the People of the Philippines made no appearance. 15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had
not received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein, Felicitas S. Cuyag,
appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the court order the release of Larkins the
alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. 16

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After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision, holding
that:
From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate release of
Larkins from his present confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the NBI
by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant
of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court.
Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately after the NBI
was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in connection with the BP
22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information had been filed or pending in any court.
It was only sometime between November 25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint was
approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on
the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the
complaint for rape was filed with the Antipolo RTC.
The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus because
Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for
bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the
mere filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which
are the only two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of Judge
Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does not qualify as such. She asserts that the
petitioners have miscomprehended Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan 17 because that case did not rule that the
writ is no longer available after an information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this case) is filed
against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court
which has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan
vs. Ponce Enrile, 18 adverted to in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance
of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."
We find for the petitioners.
But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve into the propriety of the
petition for habeas corpus and certiorari filed by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.
Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common-law spouse,
Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term
"some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally
justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization
to make the application. 20 She is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the
petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for
bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.
It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas
corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there
is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available
in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which
glorify form over substance. 21 It must be kept in mind that although the question most often considered in
both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction,
the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while
the latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body." 22

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And now on the merits of the petition.
The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest of
Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court." It could have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application
for a writ ofhabeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process
preventing the discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 23 this Court
held:
[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is
hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
court of justice. (emphasis supplied)
Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in
the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows:
"Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense
in the Philippines."
Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 24 where petitioners Macario Herce and Celso Almadovar claimed
to have been illegally detained for more than one year without any complaint or information filed against
them, this Court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the petition they
had already been charged with the crime of treason and confined by reason thereof. Harvey vs. DefensorSantiago 25 reiterates Matsura.
In Cruz vs. Montoya, 26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having become academic
because the information for estafa against the party whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had
already been filed and a warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have
originally infected his detention had been cured.
In Umil vs. Ramos 27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ
of habeas corpusshould not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any
court. Thus:
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or
if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from
imprisonment under lawful judgment. 28 (emphasis supplied)
It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the
court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero, 29 this Court stated:
De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower
court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on
arraignment, to the information filed against him. (emphasis supplied)

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The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import
and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting
of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case
of Carrington vs.Peterson, 30 this Court declared:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction
of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very
earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or
pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
In United States vs. Grant, 31 this Court held:
Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no
probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights
to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.
While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail,
Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for
Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere
afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over
his person.
Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal
assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of
the wordorder under the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . .
by virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."
The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule in Ilagan
vs. Enrile 32 which must govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that
there are only two recognized processes which justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment order and
(2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its
application to the first part of the first sentence and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and
unwarranted restriction of the term process. A commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species of
judicial process.
In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 this Court stated:
Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing
issued by authority of law; also, the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and orders of courts of justice or judicial
officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in a judicial proceeding
to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.
In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe, 34 this Court quoted Corpus Juris' definition of the term "process," to
wit:
As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and many
meanings. In its broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with "proceedings" or
procedure and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement
to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a court
compels a compliance with its demands. (50 C.J. 441)

174
We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process within the
meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102.
Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will
not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the
complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents
relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose
that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112;
and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by
an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a
municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though
the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994
that the said complaint was actually filed in court.
Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions merits
nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit
to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities should make no
shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of
accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld. What this Court said in Beltran
vs. Garcia 35 needs to be repeated:
It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a person
deprived of his liberty had to go to court before his rights are respected. The good name of
the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part, by such inefficiency or
inattention to duty. Every precaution should be taken against its repetition. Otherwise, the
parties responsible for this state of affairs would justly lay themselves open to the
accusation that the greatest danger to constitutional rights comes from public officials, men
of zeal, concededly well-meaning, but without sufficient understanding of the implication of
the rule of law.
We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court's
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised
after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose. 36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order
would be defective and voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would
ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. 38 It was thus
incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail.
For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after
the scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge
was out of the country. 39
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 1 February 1995
in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184467

June 19, 2012

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EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of
proof that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
[the government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give
information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3
This petition for review on certiorari4 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC5 challenges the
July 24, 2008 Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition
for Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation 8 (Asian Land)
arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision,
Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and
Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she
saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where
they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben
should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for
theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.9
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also
located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10 The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia
(Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a
certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a
lamp from a post in said subdivision.11 The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio
to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian
Land security department. Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising
entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio
and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where
Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with
them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the
lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. 12 Soon, Navia
arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation.
Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a
statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. 13 His
mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or
entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the reported
loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben

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to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that
he was released unharmed and without any injury. 14
Upon Navias instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook
as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry
in the logbook where she was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on
her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein. After
which, the guards left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15 from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to
appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing
husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police
Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the same invitation, the meeting
was reset to April 22, 2008.16
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and
that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.17 They assured Virginia though that they will
cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband. 18
Version of the Respondent
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved
into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the
security office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?" 19 and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben
begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on
different parts of his body.20 Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at
wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben."21
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house
is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision
to install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp
from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong
got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no longer pursued
his plan. 22
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to allow
Ben to stay in her house anymore.23 Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolitas
inquiry as to why she had to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son
Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latters case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since she
has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with Bong. 24 At that
juncture, Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia,
Lolita and Bong left the security office at once leaving Ben behind. 25
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook
again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the
headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bongs release. Since it
was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buisings word and signed the logbook without, again,
reading what was written in it.26
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to
be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for
Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported
the matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Bens disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took
advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they

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already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she
saw Ben was when she left him in petitioners custody at the security office. 27
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparo28before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo
court issued an Order29 dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and
the production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also
known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of amparo be issued, as follows:
(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the Asian Land
Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on
Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the aforementioned date and
time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally appear thereat;
(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to file, within a nonextendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ, a verified written return with
supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten with
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or
omission;
b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and
c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the threat, act
or omission against the aggrieved party.
(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the [petitioners], or any
persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing or
inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and any [member] of his household.
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at their address
indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together with copies of the petition and its
annexes.30
A Writ of Amparo31 was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27, 2008. 32 On June 30,
2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33 praying for the denial of the petition for lack of merit.
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of Buising, while
Virginia submitted the sworn statements34 of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness
stand.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision 35 granting the petition. It disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and
appropriate, as follows:

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(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and
thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in
connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in
the process, as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who
testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their safety and security; and
(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the
circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this
case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions
forming part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor Mantaring, and
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.36
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration37 which was denied by the trial court in an Order38 dated
August 29, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT
IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBANDS RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY,
OR SECURITY.
4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE
OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.39
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state
with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a
violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the
evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance.
On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent
proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the
trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.
Our Ruling
Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the
reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective

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relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." 40
Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as
the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners security office on the night of March 31, 2008.
Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life,
liberty and security. Article 641 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 42 recognizes every
human beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 43 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty
and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be
impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against
deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental
law.44
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as alleged in Virginias petition
and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage, said Rules does not, however, define extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress. 45 Then, the budding
jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis46 when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law."47
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines
enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion that
with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not
only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory
definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance is." 50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs
reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.

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From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that
the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben
and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious
character of Navia at that time, his threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben," cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time.
In addition, there is nothing on record which would support petitioners assertion that they released Ben on
the night of March 31, 2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded
into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information
petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never
identified or presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.1wphi1
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not
present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the
evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in
Virginias amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons. 51 Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed
to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the
government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This
hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a
missing person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

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SO ORDERED.