DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE

1. MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the

Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE
CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, G.R. No. L-20392,
December 18, 1968
Facts:
At about 5:30 in the morning, Marcial Caedo was driving his
Mercury car on his way to the airport. With them in the car were
Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite
direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home
to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf.
The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering
the condition of the road and the absence of traffic and their
headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a
certain Pedro Bautista. Instead of slowing down, Bernardo, veered
to the left to overtake and in so doing the car hit the carratellas left
wheel and skidded obliquely hitting the on coming car of Caedo
who despite slackened speed to avoid the collision was hit resulting
to the injuries of Caedo and his passengers.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the

driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the
exercise of due diligence.
No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to
his master, since Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thais driver since
1937, during that time, there was no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any,
must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the
accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence
may be imputed.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code
is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not
held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are
professional drivers.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily
with Rafael Bernardo, is an error.
2. KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. ANGEL CORONADO, LOPE
GRAJERA, DIONISIO SHINYO, and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 85331, August 25, 1989

Issue:

Facts:

WON negligence of the driver, Bernardo, may be imputed upon his

employer, Yu Khe Thai.

The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila,
Laguna and traversing the old highway towards Sta. Cruz collided
with a KAPALARAN BUS LINE (KBL), a bus driven by its regular
driver Virgilio Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad
who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta.
Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at
the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. The
sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed
the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious
that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which
is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging from the
testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'),
the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the
intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the
jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move

Ruling:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It
is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.

forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the
intersection to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no more
room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the
vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to
gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven
by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the
center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus.
The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate
of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for
another 50meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post.
Issue:
WON KAPALARAN BUS LINE (KBL) is liable for damages from the
collision;
Ruling:
Yes, KBL is liable for the damages in the collision.
The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner
Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as
employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the
supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for
damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own
negligent employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in
maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its
own driver, it should have appealled from that portion of the trial
court's decision which had failed to hold the bus driver is not
"merely subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the
employee "cannot pay his liability" nor are private respondents
compelled first to proceed against the bus driver. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was
unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The
award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only
entirely in order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio
Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death
hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained
by him in the violent collision.

The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise

extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their passenger
safely "as far as human care and foresight can proved, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
circumstances." In requiring the highest possible degree of
diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of
negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of
the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the
passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they
are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common
carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary
diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but
simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers
of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and
convenient use of our roads and highways. The law seeks to stop
and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether
passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight
or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which
seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the
Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary
damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with
gross negligence."
Thus, we believe that the award of exemplary damages by the trial
court was quite proper, although granted for the wrong reason, and
should not only be restored but augmented in the present case.
The Court is aware that respondent Shinyo did not file a separate
petition for review to set aside that portion of the Court of Appeals'
decision which deleted the grant by the trial court of exemplary
damages. It is settled, however, that issues which must be resolved
if substantial justice is to be rendered to the parties, may and
should be considered and decided by this Court even if those issues
had not been explicitly raised by the party affected.
In the instant case, it is not only the demands of substantial justice
but also the compelling considerations of public policy noted above,
which impel us to the conclusion that the trial court's award of
exemplary damages was erroneously deleted and must be restored
and brought more nearly to the level which public policy and
substantial justice require.
3. JONAS AONUEVO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
JEROME VILLAGRACIA, G.R. No. 130003, October 20, 2004

Facts:

Issue:

As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the

accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in
the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive
in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni
Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite
lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car
was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of
making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which
necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced
him to undergo 4 operations.

WON Article 2185 should apply by analogy to non-motorized

vehicles.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages

against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the
RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter
was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. Trial on the civil
action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC
rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo,
ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of P150, 000.00 for
actual damages, P10,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for
attorneys fees, as well as legal costs. Both defendants appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the factual findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was
Aonuevos vehicle which had struck Villagracia; that Aonuevos
vehicle had actually hit Villagracias left mid-thigh, thus causing a
comminuted fracture; that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo
Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Aonuevo was umaarangkada, or
speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad; that considering
Aonuevos claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his
path as he made the turn. Aonuevo had enough warning to control
his speed; and that Aonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary
precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the
accident could have been avoided. Notably, Aonuevo, in his
current petition, does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct
on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on
the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Aonuevo proffers no
exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he dispute the
conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction
with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code. Its applicability is
expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
presume that the law intended a broader coverage. At the time
Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of nonmotorized vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on
wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as
calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more
prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today,
yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of
the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously contends that
the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater
interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts
historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to nonmotorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than
as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data,
assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons
over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road
dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more
apropos to the past than to the present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Aonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as
applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the
relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent
basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of
these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor
engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a
direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical
exertion is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than nonmotorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more
capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an
accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar
to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater

bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they
use. There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar
dangers posed by the motor vehicle.
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the
natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and nonmotorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or
ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were
indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the
framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include
non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that
was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities
attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel.
The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence
and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special
nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize
such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to
motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply
to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual and
legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to
adopt Aonuevos thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place. However, the existence of negligence in a given case
is not determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given
situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be
reckless or negligent. The generally accepted view is that the
violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a
matter of law, or negligence per seShould the doctrine of
negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of
an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for
requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to
promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road
accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracias mishap was
precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance
he violated. Aonuevo argues that Villagracias violation should bar
the latters recovery of damages, and a simplistic interpretation of
negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.

But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we

consider as proven, that Aonuevo was speeding as he made the
left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the
accident. This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone
unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into
the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or
cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have
avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety
regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was already
speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia.
Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because
the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the
cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow
down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may
arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it
seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to
perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when
in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation
and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient,
are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all,
tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation
for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded
owing to the conduct of others. The failure of the bicycle owner to
comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by
ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery
unless a causal connection is established between such failure and
the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in
Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic
statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that
it substantially contributed thereto. Aonuevo had the burden of
clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the
proximate or contributory cause of the latters injury. Neither can
we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence. The
leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf
clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant in
conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury. To
hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health

and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to

establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.

islands fencing rather the pedestrian overpass. Also, the

complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of
petitioners negligence.

The petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed.

Issue:

4. FLORDELIZA MENDOZA vs. MUTYA SORIANO and Minor

JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her natural mother
and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO, G.R. No. 164012,
June 8, 2007

Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?

Facts:
On July 14, 2007, Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth
Avenue, was hit by a speeding FX driven by Lomer Macasasa.
Macasasa fled the scene. Soriano was brought by a school bus to
East Avenue Medical Center where he later died.
On August 20, 1997, respondents (Sorianos wife and daughter)
filed a complaint for damages against Macasasa and petitioner
Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle. In her answer,
petitioner maintained that she was not liable as owner of the
vehicle, because she had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family over her employee, Macasasa.
Upon respondents motion, the complaint for damages against
Macasasa was dismissed.
After trial, trial court dismissed the complaint. It found Soriano
negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a gap in the

CA reversed trial courts decision.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for
the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed
negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless
they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. In this case, petitioner failed to
prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in supervising Macasasa.
However, Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not
using the pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth
Avenue. Hence, the reduction by 20% of the damages awarded,
based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads: When the
plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
Petition denied for lack of merit. Decision of CA affirmed.