CRIMINAL LAW CASES

1. us vs caballero 4 phils 350

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 4654. March 21, 1910. ]
LEON CABALLERO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESTEFANIA ABELLANA ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Filemon Sotto, for Appellants.
Rodriguez del Rosario, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LOSS OF PROPERTY BY REASON OF ADVERSE POSSESSION. The loss of
possession enumerated in article 460 of the Civil Code, by reason of which a
person may be deprived of his right to property after it has been possessed by
another for more than one year, means possession de facto and not de jure.
(Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. Rep., 286.)
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
This suit involves the possession of a piece of land a and the issuance of an
injunction. The lower court decided the case in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendants appealed from the judgment to this court.
The text of the judgment appealed from, in the part thereof necessary to
quote, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The court finds that along in the year 1899 the plaintiff, Leon Caballero,

obtained possession of the said land and continued possessing it until the year
1904. Since then, by mutual agreement between him and the defendants, he
utilized the services of the latter for the cultivation of the said land, in the
character of tenants on shares, the products obtained therefrom to be divided
by halves.
"From the year 1899 the defendants, in their capacity above expressed,
cultivated the land in question and sowed it to rice and, until the year 1904,
shared its products with the plaintiff in the manner covenanted by them.
"The court finds that since the crop of the year 1905, the defendants,
notwithstanding their continuing to cultivate the aforesaid land as tenants on
shares of the plaintiff, refused until 1906 to give him the part of the crop that
corresponded to him and, taking advantage of the fact that they held the land
under their control as employees of the and against his will, and refused not
only to deliver to him the part of the products that corresponded to him during
the said two years, but also deliver to the plaintiff the possession of the land.
x

"The court finds that the crops mentioned (those of 1905 and 1906) were
regularly produced, and that the plaintiff having received as his share of the
last crop, that is, in the year 1904, some 60 cavanes of unhulled rice, the
share that should correspond to him of the crops appropriated by the
defendants in the two years mentioned ought to be adjusted according to the
amount of the last annual crop. The price of unhulled rice in the municipality of
Minglanilla during the said two years was 3 pesos a cavan. The most
approximate calculation shows that Estefania Abellana obtain a crop of 60
cavanes the last year that she gave a share of it to the plaintiff, the half of
which amount, or 30 cavanes, corresponded to the latter. During the same
period, Serapio Mabunay ought to have delivered to the plaintiff about 12
cavanes, Gervasio Pakada 10 cavanes, and each one of the last two defendants
4 cavanes; and in this proportion they should have delivered to the plaintiff
annually his proper share of the last two crops.
"The defendants allege in their answer that they hold exclusive possession of
the land in question. The court finds that they had such possession only in
their capacity of laborers or tenants on shares of the plaintiff.
"The plaintiff, Leon Caballero, in view of the facts set forth, is the possessor of
the land in litigation; and the defendants having taken such possession from
him illegally and without any right, he should be reinstated in the possession

and exclusive usufruct of the said land.

x

"And as the defendants are impeding the plaintiff from cultivating the said land
and from exercising over it all the possessory acts to which he is entitled, it is
proper that this court issue in his favor a permanent injunction against the
defendants.
"By reason of all the foregoing, and in accordance with the findings of fact and
law above given, the court orders that judgment be entered against the
defendants, sentencing them to restore to the plaintiff the land at issue, as
described in the complaint, and to deliver to the plaintiff 120 cavanes of
unhulled rice in the following proportion: Estefania Abellana must deliver 60
cavanes; Serapio Mabunay, 24 cavanes; Gervasio Pakada, 20 cavanes; and
each one of the last two defendants, 8 cavanes; and in the event of default,
they shall pay to the plaintiff the equivalent price therefor at the rate of 3
pesos a cavan, in the proportion indicated. The costs of this action shall be
paid by the defendants severally and in solidum, and it is further ordered that
an injunction shall issue against the said defendants prohibiting them from this
date from hindering the plaintiff in his work on the land in question and his
exercise over the save of any possessory acts whatsoever to which he has a
right."cralaw virtua1aw library
Having carefully examined the evidence, we find that the weight thereof is not
against the findings of facts recorded in the judgment appealed from, although
the defendants also presented evidence to support their allegations. The
judgment therefore must be affirmed, since the findings therein contained are
merely the legal conclusions based upon the facts deemed to have been
established.
The appellants, however, allege the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"According to the judgment appealed from, the acts negatory of the
possessory right claimed by the plaintiff commenced, on the part of the
defendants, in the year 1905, and as the action was instituted in January,
1907, this case undoubtedly falls under No. 4 of article 460 of the Civil Code,
according to which the possessor may lose his possession of another, if the
new possession has lasted for more than one year."cralaw virtua1aw library
The true meaning of this legal provision has been already extensively
discussed and stated in the case of The Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron (6 Phil.
Rep., 286). In short, it possession de facto and not possession de jure,

wherefore it is not applicable to the present case which involves the lastmentioned kind of possession.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the Appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 1352, U.S. v. Caballeros et al., 4 Phil. 350

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 29, 1905
G.R. No. 1352
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the
crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American
school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest
Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to
conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto
Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it
appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of
the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the
way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when
the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group
who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property

gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that
he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that
the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced
him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by
reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he
took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been
charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of
the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was
he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The
confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the
division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter
states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the
defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from
the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that
the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to
him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily,
without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof
on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of
the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which
the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the
Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable
according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the
costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
2. US VS ROMULO 4 PHILS 408

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5502. March 7, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUILLERMO ROMULO ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Jose M. Memije, for Appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MURDER; PRINCIPALS IN CRIME; ACCESSARIES. Under the oftrepeated doctrine of this court, the mere fact that a person is present when a
crime is committed, but at the time has no knowledge of the intention to
commit the crime and takes no part therein, he can not be convicted as
either principal or accomplice. If, however, he afterwards aids in concealing
the crime, as by giving false information tending to mislead the public
authorities, he is guilty as accessary after the fact, or encubridor.
DECISION
CARSON, J. :
In the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Laguna, Guillermo
Romulo, Celerino de la Cruz, Buenaventura Canape, and Fidel Veloz, were
charged with the crime of assassination in an information couched in the
following terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the said accused, on the 16th day of April, 1909, in the municipality of
Majayjay, Province of La Laguna, P. I., voluntarily, unlawfully, feloniously, with
treachery, premeditation, vindictiveness, and nocturnity, murdered Mr. Adrian
Herren, a surveyor of the Bureau of Public Lands, inflicting upon him several
blows with a cutting instrument, causing numerous wounds on his shoulder,
arm, neck, hand, and other parts of his body, severing his head from his

body and his left arm from the shoulder, and cutting him in the middle of the
right forearm; all contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon arraignment, the defendants pleaded not guilty. Before entering on the
trial, the information against Fidel Veloz was dismissed on the motion of the
provincial fiscal, for the purpose of using him as a witness for the
prosecution. The trial court found each and all of the other defendants guilty
of the crime of assassination, and sentenced Romulo and Canape to death,
and De la Cruz to life imprisonment, together with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law. The record is before us now on the appeal duly taken by
these three defendants from the judgment of conviction and sentenced
imposed by the lower court.
About half past 4 oclock on the evening of the 16th of April, 1909, one
Adrian Herren, a surveyor in the Bureau of Public Lands, set out from a place
called Malinao, where he was engaged at work, for the town of Majayjay,
where he was accustomed to pass the night. He was accompanied by his four
native assistants, the defendants in this action, the party walking in single
file, Herren in front followed in order by Romulo, Canape, De la Cruz, and
Veloz. When the party arrived at a clump of cane, near the River Dalitiwan,
Romulo stepped up alongside Herren and struck him a blow with a hatchet
which felled him face downward to the ground. Immediately thereafter
Canape struck the fallen man a number of blows on his head and body with a
heavy stick, and both assailants slashed and cut the helpless and
unconscious man with their bolos. The body of the deceased was at once
hidden in the nearby of cane, and the whole party immediately set out for
the town of Majayjay.
The evidence fails to disclose what participation, if any, was taken in the
commission of the crime by De la Cruz and Veloz; and as to De la Cruz, we
think that the weight of the testimony tends to sustain his counsels
contention that while he was present when the crime was committed, he took
no part therein, and in nowise a died or abetted the assassins either by word,
act, or deed. There is no evidence which would support a finding that he had
any warning or knowledge that the sudden and unexpected attack was about
to take place, or that he could have prevented it had he desired so to do;
and while it affirmatively appears that Romulo and Canape bore bitter enmity
and resentment against the deceased because of his alleged brusque and
overbearing manner toward them, the evidence tends to disclose that De la
Cruz and the deceased were on friendly terms at the time of the murder, and
that De la Cruz had worked for the deceased for many years and had his
confidence. It appears, however, that after the crime was committed, De la
Cruz, who was foreman of the native party, was present when the body was

concealed in the clump of cane, accompanied the murderers back to

Majayjay, slept in the same house with them on arriving there, and the
following morning, manifestly for the purpose of concealing the commission
of the crime, and aiding the murderers, his companions, to escape detection
and capture, voluntarily presented himself to the president of Majayjay, and
after inquiring whether the president knew where Herren could be found,
said that "while they were putting out boundary posts or marks in Malinao
about 4 oclock of the afternoon of the day before, the American had gone
ahead of them, so that the capataz and his workmen were left there until the
termination of the work which had been ordered by the American."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of Romulo and
Canape of the crime of assassination of which they were convicted, but we do
not think that it sustains a finding of the guilt of Celerino de la Cruz, as
principal or accomplice. It does not appear beyond a reasonable doubt that
he took any part either direct or indirect in the commission of the crime
beyond the mere fact that he happened to be present during its execution. It
does not appear that he was aware of the existence of the criminal
conspiracy between Romulo and Canape before the commission of the crime,
nor that there was any understanding between De la Cruz and the other
members of the party in this regard. Without some previous concert or
conspiracy as to the execution of the proposed crime, we do not think that
the mere fact that De la Cruz happened to be present at the time when it
was executed establishes his guilt as principal or as accomplice in its
commission, there being nothing in the surrounding circumstances which
would justify us in assuming that he in fact aided or abetted the murderers,
or gave to them the moral support of his sympathy and advice, or in any way
countenanced their act.
In its sentence of the 7th day of September, 1885, the supreme court of
Spain held that "The simple fact that a person accompanied another who
intended to set fire to a straw deposit, which intention was unknown to the
former; that he remained on one of the streets of the town while the other
was setting the place on fire, and that he fled after the perpetration of the
crime, is not sufficient to show the culpability of said person as a
coprincipal."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its sentence of the 22d of December, 1883, the same court held "That
direct instigation to commit a crime, by reason of which the instigator is
considered as a principal, the same as the person who actually commits the
crime, should be recognized only in a case involving acts of command, of
advice sometimes, of agreement, or excitation so explicit that they may

effect the criminal act, none of which are found in the words of Miguel Perez,
which are alleged to have been the efficient cause of the death, both because
important circumstances simultaneous with the affair are not clearly known
(such as the respective position of the deceased and the murdered at the
moment the words were pronounced, and the degree reached in the quarrel
between them), and because the decision appealed from does not furnish
any facts sufficiently expressed to show that Miguel might have foreseen the
use of a firearm by his son, nor that, therefore, he might excite the latter to
use it; consequently the trial court in so holding has not violated the legal
provision cited by the appellant prosecutor, etc." And again in its sentence of
March 13, 1884, that "the fact that a person witnessed the murder,
committed by his brother, of a person who was an enemy common to both of
them, with whom they had had some trouble previously; that, during the
perpetration of the crime, he said some threatening words, the words not
being known nor against whom they were directed, is not sufficient to prove
his participation in the crime on the ground that, although the accused
supplied a cause for the first trouble, and later on accompanied the
aggressor and was present at the perpetration of the crime, pronouncing
some threatening words, all as stated above; these isolated facts, without
any other preceding ones explaining them, can not be considered as of great
importance without grave danger of error, nor can we deduce from them any
participation or cooperation in the criminal act, which is the fact that legally
constitutes complicity in the case of a crime."cralaw virtua1aw library
So in its sentence of the 20th of March, 1885:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The said supreme court based its decision reversing the said judgment on
the fact that, it being an indispensable element of the liability of an
accomplice that he, by means of previous or simultaneous acts, should aid,
facilitate, or protect the execution of the acts constituting the crime
perpetrated by another, it does not appear from the facts stated in the
decision that the shot fired by the aggressor at the offended party was either
advised, assisted, or induced by the appellant, whose acts were merely those
of intimidation or offense; therefore the trial court, by declaring the latter an
accomplice of the complex crime of shooting firearms and of lesiones menos
graves, acted in violation of article 15 of the Penal Code" (art. 14 of that of
the Philippines.)
And in its sentence of June 25, 1886, it formally announced the doctrine as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Considering, in the matter of the appeal of Jose Martinez Atalaya, that the
trial court finds him guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes

solely for the reason that he was present at the place where they were
committed, at the same time acknowledging that he took no part in their
commission; considering that the liability of an accomplice is determined by
acts of assistance knowingly rendered to the principal before or at the time;
and that the fact of being present during the commission of the crime not
falling within this category, when it is not shown, and, for the effects of the
appeal, when the lower court does not find, that such presence has for its
object the encouragement of the principal, or to pretend, or to actually lend
additional help: the declaration of the responsibility of Martinez Atalaya can
not be thereby sustained, after it has been fully shown that between him and
Juan Gomez no agreement existed, because, as held by the trial court, there
are no prior or simultaneous acts which would demonstrate, beyond
peradventure of doubt, his intention of doing or assisting in doing any
damage in the house he entered, and thus perhaps incurring criminal liability
of another kind; and considering the absence of voluntary cooperation on the
part of Martinez Atalaya and of any appropriate overt act which would
establish his liability, the conjunction of which circumstances forms the basis
of liability of the indirect principal of the crime, the lower court has
committed an error and has violated article 15 of the Penal Code."cralaw
virtua1aw library
This court, discussing the same question, has held as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The mere presence of the defendant at the time and place of the
commission of the crime is not of itself sufficient to show such an act of
simultaneous cooperation as to make such a defendant an accessary to the
crime." (U. S. v. Guevara, 2 Phil. Rep., 528.)
"Where one of two persons jointly engaged in a quarrel with others stabs and
kills one of his opponents, his companion can not be held as principal or
accomplice where it does not appear that there was some concerted action
leading up to the striking of the fatal blow, or that said companion had any
reason to believe that a deadly attack was to be made on the deceased." (U.
S. v. Manayao, 4 Phil. Rep., 293; see also U. S. v. Cabonce, 6 Off. Gaz.,
1340; 1 U. S. v. Flores, 6 Phil. Rep., 383; U. S. v. Maquiraya, 7 Off. Gaz.,
1666, 2 citing U. S. v. Empeinado, 9 Phil. Rep., 613; U. S. v. Dasal, 3 Phil.
Rep., 6).
"One of the defendants, Reyes, suddenly and unexpectedly inflicted mortal
injuries with a club upon a man named Legaspi, while Legaspi was being held
by the other defendant, Javier: Held, That Javier was neither principal nor
accomplice in the commission of the crime of homicide of which Reyes was

convicted, it appearing that there was no concerted action between him and
his codefendant, that he had no reason to believe that a homicidal attack was
about to be made, and that, in holding Legaspi, he was not voluntarily
cooperating therein." (U. S. v. Reyes, 7 Off. Gaz., 1359. 3)
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in these decisions, it is clear that we can
not and should not sustain the finding of the trial court of the guilt of De la
Cruz of the crime with which he was charged, either as principal or
accomplice.
We think, however, that the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt as
encubridor (accessary after the fact) of the crime with which he was charged
as principal, not because he was present with the murderers when the crime
was committed and when they concealed the body of the deceased, and
continued in their company until the following day, nor because he failed to
denounce the crime to the local authorities; but because he went to the
municipal president of the town of Majayjay and volunteered false
information which tended affirmatively to deceive the prosecuting authorities
and thus to prevent the detection of the guilty parties and to aid them in
escaping discovery and arrest. In the case of the United States v. Caballeros
(4 Phil. Rep., 350) we said that the mere fact that one does not denounce the
perpetration of a crime to the authorities is not a punishable offense under
the Penal Code; but it is one thing to refrain from denouncing the accused,
and another to affirmatively aid him in escaping the vigilance of the
prosecuting authorities. Article 15 of the Penal Code provides that
"Accessaries after the fact (encubridores) are those who, having knowledge
of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein
either as principals or accomplices, subsequently take part in its execution in
any of the following manners:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

"3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the culprit,

provided any of the following circumstances are attendant:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
x

"(2) When the delinquent is guilty of treason, regicide, parricide,

assassination, attempt against the life of the Governor-General, or known to
be an habitual criminal in any other crime."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of all the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment of conviction
as principal in the commission of the crime of assassination and the sentence
imposed therefor upon De la Cruz should be reversed, and that this court
should find him guilty as accessary after the fact (encubridor) of the crime of
assassination with which he was charged, and that for that offense he should
be sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of presidio mayor,
together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay his
proportionate share of the costs of the proceedings in both instances. The
guilt of the defendants Guillermo Romulo and Buenaventura Canape as
principals of the crime of assassination, of which they were convicted,
marked with the aggravating circumstances, as found by the trial court, and
no extenuating circumstances, is established by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the judgment of conviction and the sentenced
imposed upon them by the trial court should therefore be affirmed, with their
respective shares of the costs in this instance against them. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., concur as to the conviction of Guillermo, Romulo
and Buenaventura Canape only.
Endnotes:

3. US VS CALLAPAG 21 PHILS 262

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7041

January 23, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO CALLAPAG, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.

CARSON, J.:
In this case Juan Queja, Lino Barbaran, Eduardo Castaeda, Melecio
Antonio, and Francisco Callapag were charged by the fiscal of Isabela
Province with having assassinated one Geronimo Canmayo.
Before pleading to the complaint and on motion of the fiscal in charge
was dismissed as to Eduardo Castaeda and Melecio Antonio for lack of
evidence against them. After pleading to the complaint and before entering
upon the trial, the fiscal entered a motion to dismiss the case against Juan
Queja and Lino Barbaran, in order that they might be used as a witness for
the prosecution. This motion was granted by the court, and of the five
defendants originally accused of this murder only Francisco Callapag was
actually placed in trial. He was found guilty as accessory after the fact
(encubridor), and was sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal and to the payment of the costs of the proceedings. From this
judgment of conviction he has now appealed to this court.
It appears that Geronimo Canmayo on July 1, 1910, was
appointed a corporal of police of the municipality of San Pablo,
Isabela Province, and that he was killed by wounds inflicted upon him
with cutting instruments on the night of July 5, 1910. The motive for
the crime, suggested, but not quite satisfactorily established, was
jealousy and enmity between the deceased and the accused, who
were policemen in that municipality.
The prosecution introduced four witnesses, two of whom were
codefendants of the appellants. A careful examination of the testimony of
these witnesses satisfies us that the appellant, jointly with these two
witnesses, and perhaps others, attacked and killed the deceased on the
night of the 5th of July, 1910. The statements of these witnesses are not
wholly consistent. Each of them was manifestly influenced in making his
statement by an anxious desire to minimize his own guilt, and to make his
participation in the commission of the crime appear as slight as possible.
As a result there are some contradictions in their evidence, and some
inconsistencies in the statement of each. But reading all of their testimony
together, and keeping in mind the admissions of the accused himself, we
are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the accused joined with them
in unlawfully doing the deceased to death.

The trail judge, although he appears to have been morally convinced

of the guilt of the accused, held that the defendant could not be found
guilty upon the uncorroborated testimony of his accomplices; the more so,
that their statements are somewhat contradictory and in some respects
inconsistent. He found that the defendant was not proven guilty as
principal. He, however, found him guilty as an accessory after the fact
(encubridor) and sentenced him to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, basing his conclusions strictly upon the admissions of the
appellant that he knew of the commission of the crime, was present
immediately after it had been committed, and did not report it to the
authorities.
The Attorney-General does not take issue with the judge of the lower
court in his finding that the evidence was not sufficient to convict the
defendant as principal, the testimony of the accomplices not having been
corroborated; not does he question the finding of the trial judge that the
defendant should have been convicted as an accessory after the fact
(encubridor). But he suggests that the penalty of twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal is not the penalty prescribed by law to an accessory
after the fact, and asks that it be reduced to two years eleven months and
twelve days of prison correccional. In his recommendation the fiscal is
manifestly correct if the defendant was properly convicted as an accessory
after the fact. This court has on a number of occasions, however, decided
that the mere silence of one knowing of the commission of a crime is not
an offense under the Penal Code and does not in itself make the person an
accessory after the fact. In the case of the United Statesvs. Romulo (15
Phil. Rep., 408) we considered at some length this precise question. In the
case of the United States vs. Caballeros (4 Phil. Rep., 350) we stated that
it was not an offense punishable under the Penal Code to refrain from
reporting an offense to the property authorities. We held in the case of U.
S. vs. Romulo (supra) that if a party actually and actively deceives the
authorities with reference to the commission of the crime of murder, or
offers assistance to the perpetrators of the crime, enabling them to escape
the vigilance of the authorities, then such a person is an accessory after
the fact, but as we have before observed there is a distinction between
such conduct as this and mere silence and nothing more. Adhering to the
doctrine previously established and followed by this court, we do not think

that the defendant could be held as an accessory after the fact merely
because he did not report the offense to the proper authorities.
As we have said, however, we are of opinion that the evidence is
sufficient to establish defendant's guilt as principal. This court has
frequently discussed the question of the admissibility of the testimony of
accomplices and the relative weight to be given to their testimony, and
while we have announced that the testimony of an accomplice should be
received with great caution and weighed with scrupulous care we have
nevertheless definitely held that it is competent and admissible. (U.
S. vs. Ocampo, 4 Phil. Rep., 400.) This case was again before the court
upon a motion for rehearing. (See U. S. vs. Ocampo, 5 Phil. Rep., 339.) In
our decision upon this motion the court said: "It is contended, however,
that the evidence in this case rests on the uncorroborated testimony of
accomplices, and this court is requested to lay down the rule that a finding
of guilt can however, that the lack of corroboration merely affects the
credibility of the witness, and in no wise affects his competence, and that if
his testimony satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is sufficient."
In the present case, the testimony of the witnesses Lino Barbaran
and Juan Queja, together with the admissions made by the defendant
himself and the statements of Dominga Bulan, satisfy us, beyond any
reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused.
The defendant acknowledges that he was in the neighborhood of the
crime; he claims that he left his house and followed Lino Barbaran and
Juan Queja down to the river bank when they came and reported that "the
thing had been terminated;" he offers no satisfactory explanation of his
conduct in this connection. He was present when the body was disposed of
and full knowledge of the whole affair. Upon a consideration of the whole
case and of the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, we conclude
that he acted as principal jointly with others, was present when the crime
was committed, and took part therein, and we so find. We do not
undertake, however, to lay down the precise conditions under which the
crime was committed, nor to hold that there were any qualifying
circumstances other than that of nocturnity.

We therefore convict the defendant of the crime of homicide, with the

aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and, reversing the judgment and
sentence of the court below, we impose upon him the penalty of seventeen
years four months and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and the costs in both instances.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 7041, U.S. v. Callapag, 21 Phil. 262

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
January 23, 1912
G.R. No. 7041
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO CALLAPAG, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
In this case Juan Queja, Lino Barbaran, Eduardo Castaeda, Melecio Antonio,
and Francisco Callapag were charged by the fiscal of Isabela Province with
having assassinated one Geronimo Canmayo.
Before pleading to the complaint and on motion of the fiscal in charge was
dismissed as to Eduardo Castaeda and Melecio Antonio for lack of evidence
against them. After pleading to the complaint and before entering upon the
trial, the fiscal entered a motion to dismiss the case against Juan Queja and
Lino Barbaran, in order that they might be used as a witness for the

prosecution. This motion was granted by the court, and of the five defendants
originally accused of this murder only Francisco Callapag was actually placed in
trial. He was found guilty as accessory after the fact (encubridor), and was
sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and to the
payment of the costs of the proceedings. From this judgment of conviction he
has now appealed to this court.
It appears that Geronimo Canmayo on July 1, 1910, was appointed a corporal of
police of the municipality of San Pablo, Isabela Province, and that he was killed
by wounds inflicted upon him with cutting instruments on the night of July 5,
1910. The motive for the crime, suggested, but not quite satisfactorily
established, was jealousy and enmity between the deceased and the accused,
who were policemen in that municipality.
The prosecution introduced four witnesses, two of whom were codefendants of
the appellants. A careful examination of the testimony of these witnesses
satisfies us that the appellant, jointly with these two witnesses, and perhaps
others, attacked and killed the deceased on the night of the 5th of July, 1910.
The statements of these witnesses are not wholly consistent. Each of them was
manifestly influenced in making his statement by an anxious desire to minimize
his own guilt, and to make his participation in the commission of the crime
appear as slight as possible. As a result there are some contradictions in their
evidence, and some inconsistencies in the statement of each. But reading all of
their testimony together, and keeping in mind the admissions of the accused
himself, we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the accused joined
with them in unlawfully doing the deceased to death.
The trail judge, although he appears to have been morally convinced of the guilt
of the accused, held that the defendant could not be found guilty upon the
uncorroborated testimony of his accomplices; the more so, that their
statements are somewhat contradictory and in some respects inconsistent. He
found that the defendant was not proven guilty as principal. He, however, found
him guilty as an accessory after the fact (encubridor) and sentenced him to

twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, basing his conclusions strictly
upon the admissions of the appellant that he knew of the commission of the
crime, was present immediately after it had been committed, and did not report
it to the authorities.
The Attorney-General does not take issue with the judge of the lower court in
his finding that the evidence was not sufficient to convict the defendant as
principal, the testimony of the accomplices not having been corroborated; not
does he question the finding of the trial judge that the defendant should have
been convicted as an accessory after the fact (encubridor). But he suggests that
the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal is not the penalty
prescribed by law to an accessory after the fact, and asks that it be reduced to
two years eleven months and twelve days of prison correccional. In his
recommendation the fiscal is manifestly correct if the defendant was properly
convicted as an accessory after the fact. This court has on a number of
occasions, however, decided that the mere silence of one knowing of the
commission of a crime is not an offense under the Penal Code and does not in
itself make the person an accessory after the fact. In the case of the United
States vs. Romulo (15 Phil. Rep., 408) we considered at some length this
precise question. In the case of the United States vs. Caballeros (4 Phil. Rep.,
350) we stated that it was not an offense punishable under the Penal Code to
refrain from reporting an offense to the property authorities. We held in the
case of U. S. vs. Romulo (supra) that if a party actually and actively deceives
the authorities with reference to the commission of the crime of murder, or
offers assistance to the perpetrators of the crime, enabling them to escape the
vigilance of the authorities, then such a person is an accessory after the fact,
but as we have before observed there is a distinction between such conduct as
this and mere silence and nothing more. Adhering to the doctrine previously
established and followed by this court, we do not think that the defendant could
be held as an accessory after the fact merely because he did not report the
offense to the proper authorities.

As we have said, however, we are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient to

establish defendant's guilt as principal. This court has frequently discussed the
question of the admissibility of the testimony of accomplices and the relative
weight to be given to their testimony, and while we have announced that the
testimony of an accomplice should be received with great caution and weighed
with scrupulous care we have nevertheless definitely held that it is competent
and admissible. (U. S. vs. Ocampo, 4 Phil. Rep., 400.) This case was again
before the court upon a motion for rehearing. (See U. S. vs. Ocampo, 5 Phil.
Rep., 339.) In our decision upon this motion the court said: "It is contended,
however, that the evidence in this case rests on the uncorroborated testimony
of accomplices, and this court is requested to lay down the rule that a finding of
guilt can however, that the lack of corroboration merely affects the credibility of
the witness, and in no wise affects his competence, and that if his testimony
satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt, it
is sufficient."
In the present case, the testimony of the witnesses Lino Barbaran and Juan
Queja, together with the admissions made by the defendant himself and the
statements of Dominga Bulan, satisfy us, beyond any reasonable doubt, of the
guilt of the accused.
The defendant acknowledges that he was in the neighborhood of the crime; he
claims that he left his house and followed Lino Barbaran and Juan Queja down
to the river bank when they came and reported that "the thing had been
terminated;" he offers no satisfactory explanation of his conduct in this
connection. He was present when the body was disposed of and full knowledge
of the whole affair. Upon a consideration of the whole case and of the evidence
of the witnesses for the prosecution, we conclude that he acted as principal
jointly with others, was present when the crime was committed, and took part
therein, and we so find. We do not undertake, however, to lay down the precise
conditions under which the crime was committed, nor to hold that there were
any qualifying circumstances other than that of nocturnity.

We therefore convict the defendant of the crime of homicide, with the

aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and, reversing the judgment and
sentence of the court below, we impose upon him the penalty of seventeen
years four months and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and the costs in both instances.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 7041. January 23, 1912. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO
CALLAPAG, Defendant-Appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis, for Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PENAL CODE; SILENCE CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF CRIME. The mere
silence of one knowing of the commission of a crime is not an offense under the
Penal Code, and does not in itself make the person who thus guards silence an
accessory after the fact.
2. ID.; ID.; SILENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM DECEIT. The conduct of one who
keeps silent and does nothing more, distinguished from that of one who actually
and actively deceives the authorities with reference to the commission of the
crime of murder.
3. WITNESSES; TESTIMONY BY ACCOMPLICE NOT CORROBORATED;
COMPETENCY AS EVIDENCE. The lack of corroboration of the testimony of an
accomplice affects his credibility as a witness; but it does not affect his
competence; and if his testimony satisfied the court beyond a reasonable doubt
it is sufficient.

DECISION
CARSON, J. :
In this case Juan Queja, Lino Barbaran, Eduardo Castaeda, Melecio Antonio,
and Francisco Callapag were charged by the fiscal of Isabela Province with
having assassinated one Geronimo Canmayo.
Before pleading to the complaint and on motion of the fiscal the charge was
dismissed as to Eduardo Castaeda and Melecio Antonio for lack of evidence
against them. After pleading to the complaint and before entering upon the
trial, the fiscal entered a motion to dismiss the case against Juan Queja and
Lino Barbaran, in order that they might be used as witnesses for the
prosecution, is motion was granted by the court, and of the five defendants
originally accused of this murder only Francisco Callapag was actually placed on
trial. He was found guilty as accessory after the fact (encubridor), and was
sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and to the
payment of the costs of the proceedings. From this judgment of conviction he
has now appealed to this court.
It appears that Geronimo Canmayo on July 1, 1910, was appointed a corporal of
police of the municipality of San Pablo, Isabela Province, and that he was killed
by wounds inflicted upon him with cutting instruments on the night of July 5,
1910. The motive for the crime, suggested, but not quite satisfactorily
established, was jealousy and enmity between the deceased and the accused,
who were policemen in that municipality.
The prosecution introduced four witnesses, two of whom were the abovementioned Juan Queja and Lino Barbaran, former codefendants of
the Appellant. A careful examination of the testimony of these witnesses
satisfies us that the appellant, jointly with these two witnesses, and perhaps
others, attacked and killed the deceased on the night of the 5th of July, 1910.
The statements of these witnesses are not wholly consistent. Each of them was
manifestly influenced in making his statement by an anxious desire to minimize
his own guilt, and to make his participation in the commission of the crime
appear as slight as possible. As a result there are some contradictions in their
evidence, and some inconsistencies in the statements of each. But reading all of
their testimony together, and keeping in mind the admissions of the accused
himself, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused joined
with them in unlawfully doing the deceased to death.

The trial judge, although he appears to have been morally convinced of the guilt
of the accused, held that the defendant could not be found guilty upon the
uncorroborated testimony of his accomplices; the more so, that their
statements are somewhat contradictory and in some respects inconsistent. He
found that the defendant was not proven guilty as principal. He, however, found
him guilty as an accessory after the fact (encubridor) and sentenced him to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, basing his conclusions strictly
upon the admissions of the appellant that he knew of the commission of the
crime, was present immediately after it had been committed, and did not report
it to the authorities.
The Attorney-General does not take issue with the judge of the lower court in
his finding that the evidence was not sufficient to convict the defendant as
principal, the testimony of the accomplices not having been corroborated; nor
does he question the finding of the trial judge that the defendant should have
been convicted as an accessory after the fact (encubridor). But he suggests that
the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal is not the penalty
prescribed by law for an accessory after the fact, and asks that it be reduced to
two years eleven months and twelve days of prision correccional. In this
recommendation the fiscal is manifestly correct if the defendant was properly
convicted as an accessory after the fact. This court has on a number of
occasions, however, decided that the mere silence of one knowing of the
commission of a crime is not an offense under the Penal Code and does not in
itself make the person an accessory after the fact. In the case of the United
States v. Romulo (15 Phil. Rep., 408) we considered at some length this precise
question. In the case of the United States v. Caballeros (4 Phil. Rep., 350) we
stated that it was not an offense punishable under the Penal Code to refrain
from reporting an offense to the proper authorities. We held in the case of U. S.
v. Romulo (supra) that if a party actually and actively deceives the authorities
with reference to the commission of the crime of murder, or offers assistance to
the perpetrators of the crime, enabling them to escape the vigilance of the
authorities, then such a person is an accessory after the fact, but as we have
before observed there is a distinction between such conduct as this and mere
silence and nothing more. Adhering to the doctrine previously established and
followed by this court, we do not think that the defendant could be held as an
accessory after the fact merely because he did not report the offense to the
proper authorities.
As we have said, however, we are of opinion that the evidence is sufficient to
establish defendants guilt as principal. This court has frequently discussed the
question of the admissibility of the testimony of accomplices and the relative
weight to be given to their testimony, and while we have announced that the

testimony of an accomplice should be received with great caution and weighed

with scrupulous care we have nevertheless definitely held that it is competent
and admissible. (U. S. v. Ocampo, 4 Phil. Rep., 400.) This case was again before
the court upon a motion for a rehearing. (See U. S. v. Ocampo, 5 Phil. Rep.,
339) In our decision upon this motion the court said: "It is contended, however,
that the evidence in this case rests on the uncorroborated testimony of
accomplices, and this court is requested to lay down the rule that a finding of
guilt can not be sustained upon such evidence. We are of opinion, however, that
the lack of corroboration merely affects the credibility of the witness, and in no
wise affects his competence, and that if his testimony satisfies the court as to
the guilt of the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sufficient."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the present case, the testimony of the witnesses Lino Barbaran and Juan
Queja, together with the admissions made by the defendant himself and the
statements of Dominga Bulan, satisfy us, beyond any reasonable doubt, of the
guilt of the accused.
The defendant acknowledges that he was in the neighborhood of the crime; he
claims that he left his house and followed Lino Barbaran and Juan Queja down
to the river bank when they came and reported that "the thing had been
terminated;" he offers no satisfactory explanation of his conduct in this
connection. He was present when the body was disposed of and had full
knowledge of the whole affair. Upon a consideration of the whole case and of
the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, we conclude that he acted as
a principal jointly with others, was present when the crime was committed, and
took part therein, and we so find. We do not undertake, however, to lay down
the precise conditions under which the crime was committed, nor to hold that
there were any qualifying circumstances other than that of nocturnity.
We therefore convict the defendant of the crime of homicide, with the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and, reversing the judgment and
sentence of the court below, we impose upon him the penalty of seventeen
years four months and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and the costs in both instances.

4. PEOPLE VS SILVESTRE 56 PHILS 353

PEOPLE VS. SILVESTRE AND ATIENZA

56 Philippine Reports 353 (1931)Defendant and Appellants:Romana Silvestre

and Martin
AtienzaPlaintiff and Appellee:People of the Philippine IslandsPonente:J. VillarealFACTS:It was on the month of March, 1930 in the barrio of Masocol in
Paombong, Bulacan,when Romana Silvestre, with husband Domingo Joaquin by
her second marriage, cohabited withher codefendant, Martin Atienza. Domingo Joaquin, as her husband, filed a complaint
of adultery against the two with the justice of peace in the
said municipality, by which thecomplaint is supported by the affidavits of
Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz. On the samedate, the justice of peace
issued a warrant and arrested Romana Silvestre and Martin
Atienza. Not long after, on the 20
th
day of the month, the two were released on bail paying P 6,000.00each for the
personal bond. The two defendants begged and asked for the help of
FranciscoSuerte Felipe, the municipal president of Paombong, to speak to the
complainant to urge him towithdraw the said complaint, promising that they will
discontinue cohabitation and will leave thesaid barrio. Domingo Joaquin, upon
receiving the petition, agreed and filed for a motion of dismissal of
his complaint. Doing what the accused had promised, Romana Silvestre and
MartinAtienza left the barrio Masocol and went to Santo Nio in the same
municipality. November 20 on the same year, Romana Silvestre upon meeting h
er son by her firstmarriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, followed him home in the barrio
of Masocol and remained there.The accused, Martin Atienza, followed Romana
Silvestre and lived in the house of Nicolas de laCruz. In a gathering attended by
Nicolas de la Cruz, his wife Antonia de la Cruz, and the twodefendants, Martin
Atienza told Nicolas to take their furniture out of the house because he willset
up a fire to it. He claimed that it is the only way he could take revenge from the
people of Masocol, to which he was instigated the charge of adultery with
Romana Silvestre. Since MartinAtienza was armed with a pistol that time, no
one was able to say anything or forbid him, noteven Romana Silvestre who was
about a meter away from him. The couple, upon hearing whatMartin Atienza
had said, ran away to communicate the intention of the accused to
BuenaventuraAnia, the barrio lieutenant. Not long after, they heard the cries of
the people, Fire! Fire, andsaw their house burning. However, Tomas
Santiago, Tomas Gonzales and Felipe Clemente sawMartin Atienza and Romana

Silvestre going away from the house where the fire started. The saidfire had
assumed considerable proportions and had destroyed about forty-eight houses.
ISSUES:
1.Whether Romana Silvestre was properly convicted of presidio mayor by the
lower courtof Bulacan , for being an accomplice of the accused, Martin Atienza,
by mere presence atthe commission of the crime
2.Whether Martin Atienza was criminally liable for the crime of arson and be
penalized of cadena temporal
DECISION:
1.
No. The case of Romana Silvestre poses no evidence of moral or material coope
rationwith the accused and none of an agreement to commit the crime in
question. Her mere passive presence, silence and failure to give the alarm does
not constitute the cooperationand therefore does not make her qualify to be an
accomplice, as stated and required byArticle 14 of the Penal Code.
2. Yes. According to article 550, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code, any person who
shall setfire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are
accustomed to meettogether, without knowing whether or not such building or
house was occupied at thetime, which will cost damages, commits the crime of
arson and will be penalized Cadena temporal