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Milestone Farms vs Office of the President

FACTS:
Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the
raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import
cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and
other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare
property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth
rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and
swine raising from CARP coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.
DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular
inspection on petitioners property and recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422hectare property from the coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said
Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR
Secretary
Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the MCTC.
MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares
of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646
hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when
the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of
Director Garilao.
CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the
coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties
did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order
granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of
153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy
was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas
Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would
now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that the
subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectareagricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP
HELD:

No.
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in
respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and
effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not
exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said
property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising

LUZ Farm Vs DAR

ISSUE: Whether the term agriculture as used in the Constitution embraces raising livestock,
poultry and swine.
Transcript of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
agriculture clearly shows that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the Government.
Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and residential lands.
RULING: it is evident in the foregoing discussion that Sec 2 of RA 6657 which includes private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of
commercial farms is INVALID, to the extent of the aforecited agro-industrial activities are
made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
Sutton

Transcript of Central Mindanao University vs. Executive Secretary


CMU v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
DARAB ordered the segregation for distribution of lands 400 hectares of CMU site.
SC nullified DARAB order considering the inalienable character of subject land,
being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution.
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
RA 8371
Section 56: property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of RA 8371 shall be recognized and respected.
Underscore
Central Mindanao University (CMU)
chartered educational institution owned and
run by the State
1958 - Pres. Garcia issued "Proclamation 476"

Reserving 3401 ha for CMU site


3401 ha came from public dominion
1997 - RA 8371 enacted
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)
2003 - Pres. Arroyo issued "Proclamation 310"
Taking 670 ha from CMU site
To be distributed to Musuan, Bukidnon
pursuant to IPRA
RTC
CMU (Prohibition) vs. Exec. Sec., NCIP Et. al.
To stop Proc 310 and have it unconstitutional
Malaybalay RTC, Bukidnon
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) moved to dismiss - lack of jurisdiction
Manila RTC has jurisdiction of Malacanan
Proc 310 executed in Manila
Motion Denied; MR Granted; Case dismissed
PROCLAMATION 310 CONSTITUTIONAL. VALID STATE ACT.
ULTIMATE OWNER OF THE LANDS IS THE STATE AND CMU MERELY ACTING IN ITS
BEHALF.
CMU MR Denied
CMU Appealed to CA Dismissed; MR Denied
Environmental Law Issue

Is Presidential Proclamation 310 valid and constitutional?


Statement of FACTS
Statement of LAW
APPLICATION
of
LAW to FACTS
Central Mindanao University vs. Executive Secretary
THANK YOU!

Digest presentation by:


Leomard Silver Joseph C. Lim
G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 86
EXISTING PROPERTY RIGHTS
PRIOR TO EFFECTIVITY OF
RA 8371 SHALL BE RECOGNIZED
AND RESPECTED
Ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.
Transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in consonance
within IPRA's contemplation.
Supreme Court GRANTS petition, SETS ASIDE decision and resolution of Court of Appeals, and
DECLARES Presidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy.
WHAT DO YOU
THINK?

DAR as represented by its Secretary, Roberto M. Pagdanganan vs. DECS


G.R. No. 158228 (April 27, 2004)
Facts:

The subject of this controversy are Lot Nos. 2509 and 871-D of Hacienda Fe, Escalante,
Negros Occidental with an area of 189.2462 hectares. The lands were donated by the late
Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS on October 21, 1921 and consequently transferred to
DECS under TCT No. 167175.

DECS in turn, leased the subject landholdings to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years or from 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. Subsequently, the lease was
renewed for another 10 years from 1995-1996 until 2004-2005.

On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and
regular farmworkers therein filed a petition for Compulsory Coverage. A "Notice of
Coverage" was issued with the approval of the Regional Director. DECS appealed to the
Secretary of DAR who in turn affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.

DECS filed a petition for review with the CA to set aside the Decision of the DAR
Secretary. However, the CA affirmed the aforementioned Decision. Hence, this Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the properties (owned by DECS) are exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)

Held:

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of land which are exempted from the
coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz.:
c)

Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national

defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes, x x x x x x shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act

Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage:
1) the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary" and
2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."

The importance of the phrase "actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not
taking words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and
unambiguous. Thus, the"plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The ruling in Central Mindanao University vs. DAR Adjudication Board is inapplicable
in the case at bar. First, in the CMU case, the land involved is not alienable and disposable
land of the public domain because it was specifically reserved by the late President Carlos P.
Garcia for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (CMU) under Proclamation No. 476.
Second, x x x x x
"The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future
educational needs of CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this case were not actually
and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its
business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of
lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of
the schools in the locality."

Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the
Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk
of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss.
Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be
dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside.
They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of
possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated
that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the
approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the
amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private
respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department
of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land
use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain
the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial
court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR


FACTS:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July
27, 1987, theCongress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from
the President. This Congresspassed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed bythe President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on
June 15, 1988. Before the
laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988,
[Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to theprovisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory
acquisition by
DAR in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its President,
sent a letter to
theSecretary of DAR
withdrawing its VOS
of Hacienda Caylaway.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas
allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agriculturalto nonagricultural
As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of
PresidentialProclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND
TERNATE INCAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A
TOURISTZONE, ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application
for conversion of its three haciendas fromagricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption
that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu,Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified
them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding,the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to thefarmerbeneficiaries in the three
haciendas
including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983 hectares, the
subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an applicationfor exemption from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basisof PP
1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all lands

already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no


longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu
tourism zoneto nonagricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.s three
haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
RULING:PP 1520 DID
NOT
AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREEMUNI
CIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting
a tourism zone,reclassified all landstherein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to nonagricultural purposes.Theperambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the
sector comprising the [three Municipalitiesthat] havepotential tourism value" and mandated
the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" toachieve
its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority(PTA) to identify what
those potential tourismareas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones were to be wholly
converted to non-agricultural use, there would have been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to
identify whatthose "specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v.
CA,9 the Court made it clear thatthe "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico,Banilad and
Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exemptfrom the coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law] lies withthe [Department of Agrarian Reform], notwith this Court." The DAR, an
administrative body of special competence, denied, byOrder, the application for CARP exemption
of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands intheaffected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified
the"specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending tourism development
projects in theareas. Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated thatthe areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.11Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7,Series of 2004,12came up with
clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed thatB. Proclamations declaringgeneral areas such as
whole provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas astourist zones thatmerely:(1)
recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces,
municipalities, barangays,islands, or peninsulasto be with potential tourism value and charge the
Philippine Tourism Authority with the taskto identify/delineate specificgeographic areas within
the zone with potential tourism value and to coordinate said
areas development; or
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the general areadeclared as
tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the Philippine
Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas
development;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the
land areadeclared as tourist zone. This is sobecause "reclassification of lands" denotes their
allocation into some specificuse and "providing for the manner of their utilizationand disposition
(Sec. 20, Local Government Code) or the "actof specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in

the land use plan." A proclamation that merelyrecognizes the potential tourism valueof certain
areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend
theentirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does
said proclamation
directthatotherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than
agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for nonagricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities,barangays, islands, or peninsulas would
be unreasonable as it amounts toan automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in thename
of tourism development. The same wouldalso undermine the land use reclassification powers
vested in local governmentunits in conjunction with pertinentagencies of government.C. There
being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming[these] took effect
before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands
embraced therein from CARP coverageD. The DARs reading into
these general proclamations of tourism zonesdeserves utmost consideration, more especially in
thepresent petitions which involve vast tracts of agriculturalland. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely
recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the generalarea declared as
tourism zones It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use.A mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does notautomatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that
process of conversion before oneis permitted to use it for other purposes

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D.
No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131
and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood,
i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742


Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable
to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian
Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under
the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers
at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene
materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of
the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain