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' e : | z | _ afsaaqcascitar Sraerafeartaatart — | ss s | Isvarapratyabhij ‘Vimarsini, IPV in short, Critique of the Doctrine of Divine Recognition, is the most important work of the Pratyabhijiié School of Kashmir Saivism. This is a commentary by the great Abhinavagupta on the Isvarapratyabhijnia- Satra (or -Karika) of Utpala, expounded by acommentary Bhiskari of Bhaskara- kaptha. The original text with Vimarsini and the Bhaskari thereon was edited and published by Dr. K.C. Pandey and Profes- sor K.A. Subramania Iyer, along with English Translation of the IPV by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes under the title, Bhaskari, as the Princess of Wales Saras. wati Bhawan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively, These works were out of print for long and are now being re-issued under the general title of Isvara-Pratyabnijfia-VimarSini of Abhinavagupta, in three volumes, The Iévarapratyabhijfia of Utapalacdrya has four Adhikaras; Jiiana-, Kriya-, Agama- and Tattvasangraha-. The first volume contains the Jaanadhikara which has eight Ahnikas or chapters along with the Vimargini of Abhinavagupta and the Bhaskari of Bhaskarakaptha. The second volume completes the text and the com- mentaries in the remaining three Adhikaras, This also carries an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and philosophy of the Pratyabhijfia system along with various appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. III gives English transla- tion of the Isvarapratyabhijfia and the Vimaréini. ISBN: 81—208-0019-2 (for set) 2600-00 @ U/3/ kS-S5 tel —Se oe eek ee ae ee * wpe eee ee ad Lota afaraqeasaitar gsacoeatuataataay wieataa feat saat art: ararfirnre: eee Sito Fito Ho BARA Aeaz: sto alfiarsez ada: STOTT APIS: Sito Sto tiHaeg fEaat Hawa wgarrvalaa feet arameft seat aaa © MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Head Office: Bungalow Road, Delhi 110007 Branches: Chowk, Varanasi 221 001 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 6 Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600 004 First published : The Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Text No. 70, 1938 Reprint : Delhi, 1986 ISBN: 81-208-0020-6 Printed in India by Narendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra Press, A-45 Naraina, Phase I, New Delhi 110028 and published by Shantilal Jain for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 110007. GENERAL EDITOR’S NOTE Isvarapratyabhijfia-Vimarsint, IPV in short, (Critique of the Doctrine of Divine Recognition) is the most important work of the Pratyabhijiia school of Kashmir Saivism. This is a commen- tary by the great Abhinavagupta on the [svarapratyabhijiia-Siitra (or -Karik@) of Utpala, expounded by a commentary Bhdskart of Bhaskarakantha. The original text with Vimarsint and the Bhaskar! thereon was edited and published by my teachers, Dr. K. C. Pandey and Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, along with English translation of the JPV by Dr. Pandey, in three volumes under the title, Bhaskari, as the Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Texts Nos. 70, 83 and 84 in the years 1938, 1950 and 1954 respectively. These works were out of print for long and are now being re-issued under the general title of [vara-Pratyabhijha- Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta, in three volumes. An Outline of History of Saiva Philosophy given by Dr. Pandey in Vol. III of the Bhaskari will be issued separately for the sake of general readers and the scholars interested in the history of religions. Reprint of the rare and fundamental works of Kashmir Saivism will be wel- comed by the scholars concerned with the idealistic systems of Indian Philosophy. It was in the mid-9th century A.D., when the whole of India was fired with the Advaita Vedanta of Acirya Sankara that the beautiful land of Goddess Sarada, the Kashmir valley, produced a great 4carya, who systematized the philosophical postulates of the Saiva non-dualism on the basis of the monistic Saiva scriptures. His name is Somadeva, better known as Somananda. He was an older contemporary of another great Saiva acarya, Bhatta Kallata who wrote his Vrtti on the Spanda Sitras revealed to Vasugupta. The spanda system hardly differs in its philosophical thought from Somananda, Their real difference lies in prescribing different means of realizing the philosophical goal. Sivadrsfi or Vision from Siva by Somananda is the first systematic formulation of the philosophy of what is later on conveniently described as the Pratyabhijiia school of Kashmir Saivism, following the term occurring in the [svarapratyabhijia of Utpala. Somananda in C vi) his foundational work, the Sivadrsti, consisting of seven chapters of 700 verses, declared (I. 2) that Lord Siva is the essence and identity of all the beings. He shines in all the beings. He is bliss and consciousness whose free will nothing can impede and who manifests himself through his powers of knowledge and action. This concept of the highest reality is basically different from the Buddhistic idea of momentary vijfidna, from the nirguna (hence passive) Brahman of Saikara, from the dualistic conception of Purusa and Prakyti of the Sankhya and from the later schools of Vaisnava Vedanta. Somananda not merely propounded his theory of the ultimate reality, he refuted the grammarians’ theory of Sabda Brahman, the views of the Saktas, the dualistic Saivas, and the followers of the Yoga and demonstrated the lack of logic and consistency in their view of reality. Utpaladeva, Utpalacarya, or simply Utpala, built the great edifice of the Pratyabhijiia on the foundations laid by his teacher Somananda. He wrote his famous Usvarapratyabhijia Sitra or Karika by working out at great length the germinal ideas of the founder of the system (Utpala treats his Karika as the reflection of the Sivadysti) and by provid- ing a suitable fencing against the onslaughts of the counter systems of Indian philosophy. Utpala advocates the permanence and universality of the self and criticises the Vijinavadin’s theory of momentariness and individuality. He asserts that freedom of will, thought and action is basic essence of being. Being must have innate power to become at will. He vehemently opposes the passive Brahman of Vedanta and lack of integrality between Purusa and Prakyti of the Sarnkhya. Vasugupta had recognized three ways of final freedom of human beings: Sambhava, Sakta and dnava. These ways required an ascetic life of complete detachment and austere practice of Yoga. Somananda and Utpala show anew way to freedom and beatitude. The realization in the Pratyabhijiié system, to quote from the Introduction of Vol. II (pp. v-vi) by Dr. K. C. Pandey, “‘consists, not in the actualisation of the potential, nor in the attainment of something new, but in penetrating through the veil that makes the MaheSvara appear as the individual of which everyone is immediately aware and in recognising the Mahesvara in the individual.” The followers of this system daily recite the follow- ing verse which sums up the attitude of a Saiva: ( vii) fort erat farett atacn, fra: aafad oT 1 farety oof sara, a: fra: diseie fE 1 The following prayer for universal peace and happiness occur- ring at the end of the manuscript B of the Vivrtivimarsini of Abhinavagupta quoted by its editor in his Preface to Volume I explains the Saiva’s feelings for the world around him and for his fellow human beings : qaneg wdsrat oxfgahrean sarg ya | aor: wang mia ada getwag aa Utpala holds that the human being is essentially free; freedom is the very nature of the individual. However, the veil of ignorance covers this freedom of man and thus keeps him away from the God within him. Man must remove this ignorance; he must penetrate through the veil to recognize his real self, eternally free, omniscient and omnipotent. Recognition is the way to regain the lost freedom. Incidentally, it is significant to note that the philosophy of Utpala has intimate parallels in the Daksindmiir- tistotra of Acarya Saikara, as interpreted by his great disciple, SureSvara (See Abhinavagupta, pp. 151-52) and the lyrics of the Saundaryalahart. According to the tradition, Utpala lived near Vicharnaga to the north of Srinagar and belonged to the end of the 9th and first half of the 10thcentury A.D. Many of his works are lost, those surviving include Ajadapramatrsiddhi, Isvarasiddhi, Sam- bandhasiddhi and the commentaries on the latter two works. His commentary on the Sivadrsti is available only in part, His devo- tional lyrics are collected under the title Sivastotrdvali and quot- ations from his unknown works are found in the JPY. But he is justly famous for his J’varapratyabhijfia Siitra or Karika. This reveals sharpness of his intellect, original thinking and masterly exposition, intimate knowledge of the monistic tradition of the Saiva Agamas and the recognitive Sadhani to realize the Lord Maheévara. He wrote two auto-commentaries on his Karika: Vrtti and Vivyti or Tika. No complete MS of either of these two commen- taries by Utpala has so far been discovered. The available portion of the Vytti upto the 20th karika of the third adhikdra was published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series and the fragment of the ( viii) Vivrti is in the personal collection of Dr. K. C. Pandey, which remains unpublished. The fragment of the Vivti begins with the 6th Karika of the Jaanadhikara, Ahnika 3 and ends abruptly with the 3rd Karikd of the fifth Ahnika. Utpala imparted his new doct- rine to Laksmanagupta who transmitted it to his worthiest disciple, Abhinavagupta, an encyclopaedic writer on Indian aesthetics and Kashmir Saivism. Abhinava wrote a commentary on the Vivyti of Utpala, known as the Vivytivimarsint. This was published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Nos. LX (1938 A.D.), LXII (1941 A.D.) and LXV (1943 A.D.) in three volumes. Abhinava’s direct commentary on the text of Utpala’s Karika is also known as Vimarsini and described as Laghu Vimarsini, being shorter in length than the Vivrti-Vimarsint, which is described as the Brhativimarsini. They are also known as Catussdhasri and AstadaSasahasri respectively in accordance with the old method of calculation. The Sittras or Karikas of Utpala remain unintelligible without a commentary, like the Sitras of Panini or Badarayana. ‘Utpala’s own commentaries are more in the nature of independent exposition of the Pratyabhijfid system than actual explanation of the text. Abhinavagupta’s Vimarsint offers explanation of the Karikd and also reads like an independent work. It is available in full and it represents the systems comprehensively and correctly. Abhinavagupta’s VimarSini is thus the most authentic commentary of the Pratyabhijfia system, which enjoys the reputation of an original work, However, in spite of its clarity and lucidy and comprehensive treatment of the system, it does require a guide to understand the full implications of the words and the ideas of the Vimarsini. The commentary does not solve the problem fully particularly when the oral tradition of teaching the Sastras is lost and when we know that the original thinker like Abhinava will naturally make fresh points in promoting the tradition and in defending it against newly formulated counter-points in the Philosophical circles of India in the 10th century A.D. It was to obviate this difficulty that Dr. K. C. Pandey set on the search for a commentary on Abhinava’s VimarSini. He struck gold in 1931 when he discovered a commentary Bhdskari by Bhaskarakantha. He belonged to the later half of the 18th century A.D. According to the Bhaskari he was of the Dhaumya- yona Gotra and the names of his grand-father and father were Vaidiryakantha and Avatarakantha respectively. It was to teach (ix) his son Jaganntha (‘svasutadibodhanartham’) that Bhaskara wrote his learned commentary giving traditional interpretation of the Vimarsini or the Pratyabhijia school of Kashmir Saivism for that matter, which was handed down to him through unbroken chain of Acdryas. Besides this commentary, he translated the mystic sayings of Lallesvari, Lalla Vak, into Sanskrit, wrote a commentary, available in fragment, on the Yogavasistha and composed a poem, named Harsesvarastava, in singing the glory of the Lord on the occasion of his visit to the temple in Kashmir. Another anonymous commentary on the Vimarsini, Isvarapra- tyabhijfia-VimarSint-Vyakhyd procured by the late Dr. K. C. Pandey from the Government Manuscript Library, Madras and edited by him before his sad demise is under print and will be published before long by Messrs Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. According to Madhava (15th century A.D.), the author of the Sarvadarsana-Samgraha, (i) Sitrai.e. Isvarapratyabhijnakarika of Utpala and his two commentaries thereon, (ii) Vrtti and (iii) Vivrti and short and long commentaries of Abhinavagupta, namely, (iv) Vimarsint and Vivrtivimarsini constitute the Pratyabhijaiasastra which in essence is the exposition of the Sivadrsti (spoken of as a prakarana of the Saivasastra) of Somananda: ae afafagintedt qedtat faafaet sacnfarorsaaiafe aed caf: 1 (This verse also occurs in the Sastrapardmaréa of Madhuraja where the last word reads as ‘pratyabhijfakhyam’.) The Isvarapratyabhijia of Utpalacarya has four Adhikdras: Jitana-, Kriya-, Agama- and the Tattvasangraha-. The first volume contains the Jfianadhikara which has eight Ahnikas or chapters along with the VimarSini of Abhinavagupta and the Bhaskari of Bhaskarakantha. The second volume completes the text and the commentaries in the remaining three Adhikdras. This also carries an Introduction giving in brief the History and Literature and Philosophy of the Pratyabhijfia system along with various appendixes for Vol. I and Vol. II. Vol. II[gives English translation of the [svarapratyabhijfia and the Vimarsini, As these volumes are essentially photo-prints; the original edition has not been disturbed except in the formal matters where the change of title, publisher etc, is involved. In some cases it might create apparent difficulties, For example, the volumes, although now differently titled will (ix ) still be found under the old title of the Bhaskar? in the contents, Introduction etc. of Dr. K. C. Pandey. In our desire to place these volumes in the hands of readers at the earliest, we did not think it proper to make changes warranted by new circumstances of the publication. I crave the indulgence of the scholars in this matter and hope the reprint of the classic texts of the {‘varapratya- bhijfid system of Kashmir, for which real credit should go to Shri J. P. Jain, the publisher, will help in further promoting the growing interest of Indologists in this branch of Indian Philosophy. Department of Sanskrit, R. C. DWIVEDI University of Rajasthan, Jaipur INTRODUCTION. We need offer no apology for publishing, for the first time, a commentary on the Igvara Pratyabhijia Vimar- Sint of Abhinayagupta, the most important work on Kashmir Saiva Philosophy. The importance of this work cannot be overestimated. It is a mature work of Abhinavagupta, written after his other works. Tt gives the fundamentals of Savaism briefly and yet very clearly. Abhinava was influenced in his exposition of the theory of Rasa by the fundamentals of this system. A clear understanding of his theory of Rasa pre-supposes a good acquaintance with the Saiva Philosophy of Kashmir and anything which helps in understanding this philosophy, we think, would be welcome to scholars. While studying the Isvara Pratybhijia Vimaréini, we often felt very strongly the need of a traditional interpretation to help us and it was in our attempt to find such an interpretation that we tumbled upon the manuscript of the Bhaskari in Kashmir. The manuscript of the Bhaskart on which the edition is based, was di8covered by Dr. K. C. Pandey in Srinagar in the course of our search for manuscripts there in 1931. The original manuscript is in the possession of tho descen- dants of Bhaskara, he author, who are still living in Kashmir. The manuscript on which this edition is based is a copy of the original and is now in the possession of a friend of Pandit Mahoshwar Razdan of Srinagar. To the latter, we offer our thanks for helping in many ways. It would be out of place here to describe in detail all the difficulties which Dr. K. C. Pandey had in getting a copy made of this copy. But it was done. He had to copy out a good deal of it himself. To expedite work, many pages of the manuscript were photographed and the plates were later on copied out. The plates are still in our possession. The present edition is based on a copy so prepared. The reader can very well imagine the difficulty of preparing an edition of any Sanskrit work on the basis of one manuscript only. But we hope that he will find ( xii) enough evidence in this edition of the care whicn wo have taken to make it as true as possible to the text as Bhas- kara himself wrote it. Gaps in the manuscript. There is just one gap in the commentary. The portion on Kriyadhikara, th. 2, ka. 2-6 is missing, not only in the manuscript from which we have made a copy, but also in the original, as the owner has very kindly informed us. We at first thought of filling up the gap by writing a commentary of our own. But another commentary called “ gyumrafamgafaatatisarcat ” of an unknown author was found in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras. It is itself a copy of a manuscript in the collection of Manaveda Arjuna Raja, Pudukovilakam, Calicut. Professor P. P. S. Sastri, of the Presidency College, Madras, had a copy made for us under his supervision and we hereby express our thanks to him. After the discovery of this new commentary, we found it unnecessary to write our own and we have filled up the gap in the Bhaskari with the corresponding portion of this commentary. Smaller gaps. In addition to the big gap mentioned above, the manuscript shows smaller gaps here and there. These could not be filled up with the help of other manuscripts, as there is only one manuscript of the work available. The gaps have, therefore, been filled up with great caution, as shown in the footnotes. Fidelity to the manuscript, We have boon vory faithful to the manuscript even when we have felt tempted to introduce modifications which would decidedly improve the text. We have refrained from doing so because of the absence of manus- cript authority to do so. For example, on p. 28 Vol. I, there are the words ¢ quar wareaaa?, aTaea waTatan” would be more faithful to Abhinava, but we have not made the change. Here and there, however, we have made small inser- tions and in doing so, we have been guided by the clearly marked practice of the author. For example, on p. 42, ( xiii) Vol. I, vaq afi has probably been omitted in the manuscript after “ gadert mtr”. We have, however, inserted it. At other times, as on p. 3, Vol. I, we have been guided by our sense of probability. The teat of the Vimarsini. An edition of the Vimarsini was published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series in 1921. But the text in that edition differs in many places from the text as Bhaskara had it. In all such places, we have naturally preferred the text of Bhaskara. Although at places, from the doctrinal point of view, the reading given in the K. §. S. edition seems to be better than that of Bhaskara, yet we have followed Bhaskara. Bha., Vol. I, p. 161, has warfirarfazur aat. In accordance with this, we have altered the text of the K. S. S. edition “ sqrfraawat” to “aarfa- aifeaur at”. In view of Abhinava’s statement : afy famreamtgeat” no other experience than that of Sada- Siva can be represented by “sefiex”. The word ‘arfz,” therefore, seoms to be unnecessary. Another example is found on p. 142, Vol. 1, whore we have “ marfiat” instead of sree feet (p. 110, Vol. I,K. 8. 8. edition). The latter is better because itis in consonance with the Saiva principle of the reality of the manifested. Bhaskara’s reading is, however, distinctly better in some cases. For instance, the K. 8. S. edition has gy- mirada (p. 91, Vol. I), but Bhaskara has gamimacra (Vol. I, p- 128), which is, as explained by him in the commentary, very much better, because it fits in with “ aahatara aruga:” which precedes. Different readings of the Vimarsini. It appears that by the time of Bhaskara different readings had crept into the text of the Vimarsint. Bhas- kara refers to them at many places and often states the reasons for accepting a particular reading. For instance, for the very first word of the VimarSini SanTTaTg, eS he notes with approval Jayadratha’s reading “ Frrwaig ” (Bha. Vol. I, p. 6). Sometimes, however, he notes a reading with disapproval : denteaat gia g aaRgersa- a wa Bha, Vol. I, p. 29. Another instance of a different reading recorded by Bhaskara is: agat arafr (xiv ) mz: (Bha., Vol. I, p. 149). There are many others besides these and we have noted them all in the footnotes. Changes or omissions not recorded, When a text in the manuscript appeared to be an obvious case of scribal mistake, we have changed it or omitted it without recording the change or omission in the footnotes. On page 140, Vol. I “eyaesafaguirana wa” is printed, but the manuscript reading was Seaneadfeg - Urania om ranesdfyeraia wa. The last two words have been omitted in the printed text, as they are obviously repetitions. Sandhi. The purist reader will probably be a little shocked at finding that the rules of Sandhi have not been strictly observed by us between the words in a sentence. But: it is not carelessness or oversight on our part but inten- tional. We felt that the average reader would be able to understand the text more easily if he found the words in their original form rather than in a form modified by the observance of Sandhi rules. Wherever we felt that the observance of such rules would not mean any difficulty to the reader we have not failed to do so. Use of types. Three different types are used in the Bhaskari—the boldest for quotations from the Karika, the medium for those from the Vimargint and the small for the Bhaskari itself. Whenever there is a reference to a dis- tant karika, it is printed in the Bhaskart type. Similarly when a compound is dissolved, the component parts are put in the Bhaskari type. Fallen types. The reader will discover misprints here and there, particularly the omission of over some ofthe letters. This is not due to oversight. The attention of the printers was drawn to it several times and we know they did all they could to rectify it, But the delicacy of the types was such that some of them did break or fall off atthe time of printing. We have found by experience that this docs not cause any real inconvenience to the reader. 'There- fore, we have not felt the necessity of adding an errata. ( xv) Bhaskara as a commentator, The necessary information on Bhaskara’s date and antecedents, thé reader will find in the “ Abhinavagupta” of Dr. Pandey, on p. 151 ff. All that we need say here is somthing about his value as a commentator. Bhaskara strictly follows tradition. It has a great value for him. On some points, after having given his explanation, he concludes by making a final appeal to tradition. (Bha, Vol. I, p. 7-8). We, therefore, feel that Bhaskara’s interpretation of the Vimarsini is in strict accordance with tradition, because the Saiva tradi- tion was unbroken, as he himself says, up to his time. (Bha,, Vol. I, p. 7.) Strange notions of Bhaskara. Bhaskara’s ideas and explanations naturally breathe the atmosphere of eighteenth century Kashmir. His exposition of the text is very scholarly and rooted in tradition which was unbroken up to his time. Sometimes, however, his ideas cause us a little amusement, as, for instance, while proving that everything is ultimately consciousness, he argues quite seriously, not only that there is conscious- ness presont in trees, but also that when water finds its own level, it is also @ conscious activity. Throughout his work, he maintains a philosophical attitude and occasionally points out that words which have a particular meaning in ordinary usage have a different meaning in Saiva Philosophy. For instance, for the philosopher, Mahegvara means the innermost reality in all and not any decorated image which is only meant for helping the uninitiated. (Bha., Vol. I, p. 395.) Wo will just say a few words about Bhaskara’s language. It is difficult to write a commentary on such a work as the Vimarsini in easier language than that of Bhaskara. It is brief and lucid. Hardly any word of the original is loft tinexplained. But it is not merely a word for word commentary. He tries to bring out tho philosophical import of the original and, where necessary, he enlarges upon the real meaning of Abhinava. ( xvi) This being so, we are making no reflection on Bhas- kara as 8 commentator if we point out a few peculiarities in his language, which are bound to attract the attention of the reader. The following is a list of such peculiarities, but it is not exhaustive. (1) Bhaskara uses the word aaq by itself and not at the ‘end of a compound: mfaeqrafaamt g muy I Bha., Vol. I, p. 375. (2) Use of the word anata in the sense of waaw: e. g. aeH- fuaeda fresararatg 1 Bha., Vol. I, p. 6. (3) Use_of agit with aa: to express the idea of fg_e.g. aateqiaaaegyte: aa: ga Granta Paararqietes Th aga- gag twatg Bha., Vol. I, p. 6. (4) He explains saat by amr. This word is not used in this sense as an independent word. Bha., Vol. I, . 186. Z ¥ (5) The construction wu-areat aurea Bha., Vol. I, p.16 is peculiar, as a word ending in ava is not combined with aarfa. “il is ie (6) He usesaitaaare 0. g. migadart agateraucata Bha., Vol. I, p.161. (7) ‘He is sometimes careless about his language, e g. aarthacad | It should be either agualtiarag or agya— aaaaq Bha., Vol. I, p.191. His method of explanation. (1) Sometimes Bhaskara explains only one word of a compound. For instance, he explains on p. 20, only the word ‘sreaq ’ found in the compound ‘ afagareariarat on p. 19. In his explanation, the word naturally appears in the form which it has in the dissolution of the compound. As such words are parts of compounds, we have printed them in smaller typo. (2) Sometimes Bhaskara just quotes 2 word or words from the Vimarsint without any explanation. For instance, the words ‘a wazazr saz’ on p. 37, Vol. I. As for the ideas contained in the Bhaskari and the VimarSint, the reader will find a general exposition of the fundamental ideas in the “ Abhinavagupta.” We would, however, not like to close this introduction without saying a few words about one or two topics which could not be dealt with in the “ Abhinavagupta.” ( xvii +) Saiva Theory of Relation. Importance of Relation in experience, Philosophy primarily aims at oxplaining different types of experiences. Every experience involves some kind of relation among the experienced, and of the experienced with the experiencer. In fact, experience entirely depends upon the latter type of relation. No philosophy is, therefore, complete unless it explains the essential nature of the thing on which all experiences depend. If we take just the following experiences into considera- tion, we find that each of them involves a relation. (1) Father's son (fig: gx:). (2) The branch of a treo (gaea wrar). (3) Tho king’s servant (a=: gau:) (4) Man and horse (gyqrararza). (5) A blue lotus (#tegerrg) (6) Devadatitia cooks rice in a pot with wood ( 2q- QM ISS: CUeaArad Tafa ). (7) The jar does not exist (azermra:), (8) This is different from that (gzrente=7a). ‘The experiences often assumo a form quite opposite to those stated above, as follows : The son’s father, etc. The following are the relations involved : (1) Parental (faageta:) (2) Part and whole (maaqraafaara:) (3) Dependance (eazarfmtra:) (4) Co-ordination (gatacett:) (5) Substantive and adjective (fatagfairemta:) (6) Action and its accessories (fmarmrcndaea:) (7) Non-boing (snra:) (8) Difference (#a:) The difference of these relations from one another is fairly obvious, but in order to find out the essential nature of relation, it is necessary to understand the common ( xviii) point in all, which distinguishes relation from all other things. Taking all the above instances into consideration, we find that relation is ultimately based on two external realities. We cannot, however, dofine relation as that which is based on two co-existing external realities, beca- use then we cannot talk of any relation between the seed and the sprout that is yet to be. In actual life, we talk of relation as in “the sprout requires the seed for its being.” This statmont is made before the sprout actually comes into being. ‘Requirement (tat), therefore, is obviously relation that exists between a thing, that is to come into being, and its material cause. If relation is conceived as something that depends on two co- existing oxternal realities the conception would be too narrow to apply to this instance. The essential nature of Relation. Relation has no separate external reality, apart from the facts of experience. It is merely a dependent cate- gory of knowledge. It is based on the general category (ckanekaripo,rthah). The analysis of any oxperienco reveals the operation of the general category. The following illustration will clear the point : 2When a person hears the word wz:, the image that arises in his consciousness is that of the king. This image, however, does not satisfy the hearer, because it is associated with the fooling of incompleteness aroused APU BAT | a 4 aariafzocretaarataifa: S$. 8. 2 (K.S.8. Edition) "ert var ga feat agtasfe a carafaareor gerft ar sare far wet wa sardhrale, Jedisdaq, | A UT eT. zag ue Ua, saat: faarale aaraearren: qisfreeadfacrfass aa wa afendfafafasrng sariranmayaqrataerearart faoneat, sft v4 fraiet aareaheagerrcaraisty, ut afze- THT, TIT Teeter, aft daeaer S7q | I. P. V., adhi. II, ah, 2. ka 4, ( xix) by the genitive case-ending. At the next moment he hears the word yeu: and the image of a man arises in the consciousness. At this moment the image of the king has retired to the sub-conscious. A similar feeling of incompleteness, as was associated with the king, arises associated with the man now present in the consciousness. This consciousness of incompleteness brings the con- sciousness of the king from sub-consciousness to con- sciousness. The two images stand together. The two are looked upon as a whole, because there is no more in- completeness. In this conception of the whole the two re not merged in the subject. They stand apart from They are not conceived as merged in each other nor standing absolutely apart from each other. They represent unity in difference, both of which appear and disappear at the same time, and not one after another. The following are the special categories. Not only relation is based on the general category which is unity and multiplicity, but there are others, such as action, universal, object, space and time, though they are admitted to be external realities by the realists. Analysis of the special category of relation. ‘Relation is admittedly an elaboration of the general category. The two phases of the general category, the unity and multiplicity, are found in different objects or in the so-called different states of the same object. Multiplicity is associated with the objects as they exist outside the consciousness, independently of each other. Unity, however, is associated with them’ as they figure in the “consciousness joined together as one. “This unity is due to the independent unifying activity of the subject. OF the two phases of unity and plurality, unity is pre- dominant, plurality being only in the subconscious state, ‘Pardaraararazerleamaqaa: | wer. eater aera AAT: 1 I. P. V., adhi. II, ah 2, ka 1. Soguréaat wat watsqeTaarit aq ache area: watfererar: 11 I, P. V., adhi. II, ah 2, ka 3. Gx D) because of its having arisen in consequence of separate cognition of two things. The relation between the two related as they figure unified in the consciousness is similar to that of an object and its attributes. What relation involves. 58Unity and plurality both are involved in relation. Neither of the two by itself is sufficient. For, if plurality by itself were enough, the category of relation should operate (or things should appear rélated) independently of the unifying activity of the subject. Similarly, if unity by itself were enough, even a single independent object should be sufficient to arouse the consciousness of relation, SAll the special categories involve unity in difference. While in some cases both are without, in others cithor the eloment of unity or that of difference is only within. In the caso of relation, for instance, the unity is only within the subject, whereas plurality is both within and with- out. In the case of universal and the individual, both the unity and multiplicity are without as wll as within. Action. The following is the manner in which the category of action operates. The analysis of the psychological process involved reveals that. it also, like relation, implies the general category which is unity and multiplicity :— Saa dear ataciear wot, a cada artadt aft g saarentasras: dara: 1 aa ca a agate: dara: 1 ufe fg ataeraratacaara aT dae: Sta, az agarafe wHarcat umararrarafe ar ead, waarreaift a ea 8.8.,p.2—3 (K.8.S. Edition) Ssifazeraararat afexcawerart 1 spams aeaTae PaReTAT: 1 Waa aaa STA ST: aT aT: ETAT eal at Fad darracenr: CHetai afeearivetaaraed araafectr ataiamammta afata a aaqeareraararcarea wart IP. V., adhi II,. ah, 2. ka, 5. (xxi) 7When an object is seen for a certain duration of time. at any moment of that duration, difference in ity associ ations is visualized. Such Imowledge of an object gives rise to two ideas, the idoa of multiplicity because of multi- plicity in associations at different moments, and the idea of unity or sameness because of the consciousness of a persisting element in all the different associations, ‘Thus a set of successive cognitions gives rise to two ideas, unity and multiplicity. When these two ideas are unified in consciousness, there is awareness of unity in multiplicity which in its operation is called the general category. The special category of action is based on this. Thus the basis of tho dependent category of action is the genera: category which is discovered through an analysis of the facts of experience. Universal. 8It is a matter of common experience that when a number of cows is perceived, we perceive two things : (i) The difference of one individual cow from another which is responsible for our referring to them in the plural number. (ii) A non-varying and recurring clement which is responsible for our use of the word ‘‘cow” for all of them. Both of them have an independent reality, because we use the pronoun “these ” in reference to them. Object. °Tn our experience of any physical object, we perceive two things : (i) the parts of which that object is made Tareas Tadsterasht a carafe uperaarkeasraa fratea, @ vt Sarmaett st: Bear I. P. V., adhi. II, ah. 2, ka. 1 Sara. afe fe sferare qa a ar: afgetadat are aay age aaaa, waar areatnfs ag: aearfrafearicmatge:, Tat a aq afeta ee qaeqen freq I. P. V., adhi. IJ, ah. 2, ka. 5. aanart aaei fact a aa: asad I. P.V., adhi. IT, ah 2, ka. 4. ( xxii) up, (ii) the object as a whole, apart from the parts, which is referred to by one name, e.g “jar.” (i) stands for multiplicity and (ii) stands for unity, both of which are also outside. Relative Position (Dik) 0Two oxternal objects are seen at successive moments. But the human mind as we know from experience, never stops at seoing things as such only. It relates them in such a mannor that they form one object of apprehension. These objects are often conceived as occupying different relative positions. For instance, we talk of one object being in front of another, or to the right or to the left of another. Both the objects appoar simultaneously in the consciousness. In this case, one appears as having different sides to it, and the other as existing on one of its sides. Accordingly we talk of one as occupying a position relative to the other. Often, however, we talk of one object being near an- other or far from it. In this case, there is perception, not only of two distinct external objects, but also of the things that come between them. When all thoso objects figure simultaneously in the consciousness, consequent on successive perceptions, we talk of distance or proximity of the two in question, according as the number or size or both are small or great. Time. Time is also a special category which is based on the general category that is unity in multiplicity. We Macafet we ot gt etd afehtacar cemperaradinia- Tees einenisieard a agate afefreg- saat. aa fe att: qarsaaafaiormaie:: sega qacfsiteta: datndqatettrerafesteaes area 1 I. P. V., adhi. IT, ah 2, ka. 6. ae: Gatfedare: Tee aT | afater art qewea: aa Ua aT aca | LP. V., adhi. II, ah. 1, ka. 3 uw ( xxiii.) observe certain phenomena happening in a regular order. We accept thom as standards of measure. There are other things which happen without any regularity. The lattor we measure in terms of the former. The judgment consequently reached is “4 is six years old.” Taking a concrete instance to make the point clear, we would put the proposition as follows : _X soes the sun rising at a particular spot and setting at another. This happens with absolute regularity. He sees other events which lack this regularity, for instance, he soos a student going to college. It means his sooing the student as associated with different places. Such association is, howover, not invariable. But he wants to got a correct ides of the irregular succession involved in going. He, therefore, puts it before his mind’s eye by the side of the regular succession involved in the movement of the sun, measures it in terms of the latter and says : “ he takes two hours to roach college.” Thus we find that the Special category of time is based upon a genoral category which is unity and multiplicity, the latter inasmuch as it is made up of the successive manifestations of the sun as associated with different spots and those of X as appearing at different points of space, and the former because the whole forms one object of approhension. ‘Thus we find that in-the case of time multiplicity is observed in the facts appre- hended, while the unity is in the act of apprehension. We talk of time in a number of ways. We talk of hours, days, weeks, ete. We also talk of quickness and slowness, priority and posteriority, and present, past and future. These notions are also like the special category of time based on the general category. For instaneo, when a person says : “X studies for two hours,” he is calculating the activity of X in terms of that of the sun. The only thing to be remembored in this connexion is that because of long-established convention, the move- ment of the latter over a fixed distanco is called “hour.” Similarly, when one says, “ X will go,” ono relates the possible activity of one’s own vital airs with that of the possible movement of X. Thus in all experiences of time, it is found that the activities of two things are related. (xxiv) The ideas of number, measure, soparateness conjuction and disjunction are all applications of the special category of relation. The conclusion might be stated as follows :— The human mind is so constituted that mental acti- vity does not cease till the knowledge assumes a determinate form. 18When the mind perceives an object its activity does not stop till the meaning is complete. It is its nature” to conneet the percept with other facts.” Thus the general category is implied in the special categories in soveral ways. In some casos the aspect of unity is innate in tho act of apprehension while the multiplicity is in the facts experienced. In other cases both the aspects are implied in the knowing processes. In spite of these differences all the special categories invariably imply the category of relation. The Buddhist objections against relation. (i) Against its being. 14Sambandha” orrelation as represented by tho Saivas involves unity in multiplicity. This means the co-existonco of unity and multiplicity. As unity is a negation of multiplicity and vice versa it is unreasonable to ‘talk of their ¢ istence. 15It is fa Marya qfereaakqhateatet warrit amr aera 4 aq aad daraeta fag fry | I. P. V., adhi. IT, ah. 2, ka 4. Bead umeaaiaradstaarresay | ATTY, 7 g mercdema verrarng sear | reerePaaqoiaat or aarerst Uarenarersararera 1 8.8. p. 8 (K.S.S. Edition). Maqunaained a Teered watea aegft carary | aazard araasraaea: eaaleoAT ATE: 1 I, P. V., adhi. IT, ah. 2, ka. 2. Sa qmmeanataantad wea asa wraraTaer aT faearaq | 8.8. p. 4 (K.S.8. Edition). (xxv ) experience because they are contradictory by nature. Boing and not being, for instance, cannot co-exist in the samo thing. (Hi) Against its ew perience. We have seen that for the Saiva relation is based on unity in difference. To this the Bauddha objects. The objection is based on two fundamental assumptions of the Bauddha: (i) that everything is momentary and, therefore, cannot be the object of more than one expe- rience, (ii) that which figures in the determinate conscious- ness has no reality (argrr). Analysing the process psychologically we find that unity and diversity are exporioncod at different moments. As everything is momentary the two experiences cannot. refer to the same abject. How can then unity and diversity be exporienced as co-existing in the same object? Therefore, the con- ception of object as identity in difference is against a psvchological fact.. 1WSecondly, reality (agra) not being attributable to that which merely figures in the determinate conscious- ness how can the object, even if it be admitted to have identity in difference, be experienced? Fo, the indeter- minate knowledge is incapable of knowing the attributes unity oni diversity. As for detormina’e knowledge, it does not come in direct touch with the external object and, therefore, knowing any such attlibute as unity or difference, as associated with independent reality is out of the question. Thus even if, for the sake of argument, it be admitted that such an object exists, it is psychologically impossible to know it. Maredatado at fafaataa: cord, I aaaraT- waiftstant area tans fererrer ore, ahaa aera varaeanfeng: 1 frat amie sang aed ta epee ef at fear seg cariaed qeqt 1 IP. V., adhi. IT, ah. 2, ka. 3. ( xxi) Buddhist position. _ The Buddhist view, therfore, of relation is that it is a mere concept of unity imposed by the mind on real plurality existing outside. Thus, according to this theory, unity and multiplicity do not subsist together in relation but are associated with two distinct ordors of facts, one outside and the other within. ¥Theie is thusa want of correspondence between the mental process and the facts outside. But they draw a distinction betweon relation so viewed and error. It is an error because of the want of correspondence noted above. But it is not the same as ordinary erroneous perception. In this case the knowledge itself, has more correspondence with what occasions it than our appre- hension of silver has with mother-of-pearl. Saiva answer. The Saiva answers that the theory of momentariness is perfectly all right as far as the object is concerned. Vag sete earmarnfeaaraadteronrgd 9 sata wrearaafia serdin sfas 1 mer alerts at a fe “afer: eat arar: art atorafr BertarTg: | S. S.; p. 3 (K.S.8. Edition): Sag ca sofas va araraeta sara: | ART wenfartaat a adifa: ata anifafaria, tad areasqaraft sraritrarnereriadarairardomtcarer wreraatarr eta ha gfe: arrrad | aa ca areteorem: dafertar arseer: 1 S. S., p. 4 (K.S.S. Edition) Ure aera aargraet: eadaeaTeaT THAT Sith ae: fe Sratfed sry at a esas geal reff t..... afmerarratintrteareer «9 oearquifad eaaard freaarat fared aqerterearest faraaerarcoiarg faat- darafefarery dareafs 1 & a fanen: aertartace trae- an, a fe factg sforaaanaeg aq ef fe sat saad sega | I. P. V., adhi. IT, ah. 2, ka 3- ( xxvii) But the subject is permanent. Further, the subject retains the residual tracos of previous exporiences and has tho capacity of unifying a number of experiences and presenting them in a new form at a subsequent time. ‘This new presentation is no less real ( aeq) than what exists outside consciousness. Because, according to aivas, it is not the causal efficiency which constitutes the essential nature of a thing, but the mere fact of shining in the consciousness without being contradicted. Thus, according to the Saivas, the experience of an object as identity in difference is not psychologically impossible. This experience is not immediate experionce (it is not a point, it is not atomic). It is a synthesis of past experi- ences, it isa mental construction made of the revived residual traces of past experiences. The following are the points involved : 2(i) Unity and multiplicity in the same thing are not inexplicable—the universe itself is unity and multiplicity. 21(ji) Differenco in relation is due to the difference in the rolata. 22(jii) Only one thing is apprehended at a time, but worldly transactions depend upon the knowledge of rela- tion that one thing has with another. Hence, in tho absence of the consciousness of relation they would cease. Cafes fad teRITeTaa Tt darareqatrface: eft arectart ataaT | 8.8. p. 6 (K.8.8. Edition), “ena va adafafe saacrarata dae ett aaamtietiae Fart: TIT UeTyedireRiaaes: dare: frerpatrenittsanfaset Ca | ae cat ATarearetareataas wararat aaerTaTaagaT a: | 8. S., p. 6. (K.S.S. Edition). “raft a area aati Peanpastfar arf are sate arr. aisit Perattr adarary | arf darrqeeala afr dararitad fear stwarar | I. P. V., adhi. II, ah. 2, ka. 4.