2nd Reading

July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

International Game Theory Review

Vol. 15, No. 3 (2013) 1340021 (10 pages)
c World Scientic Publishing Company


DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400215

COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY IN SPORTS

CONRADO MANUEL , ENRIQUE GONZALEZ-ARANG

UENA

and MONICA DEL POZO

Escuela Universitaria de Estadistica

Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Av. Puerta de Hierro s/n 28040 Madrid, Spain
conrado@estad.ucm.es
egaran@estad.ucm.es
mpozojuan@telefonica.net
Received 31 August 2011
Revised 30 March 2012
Accepted 18 March 2013
Published 9 July 2013
This paper contains a survey of cooperative game theory applied to a sports environment.
The variety of these applications serves us as a proof of the strength of cooperative game
theory introducing successful strategies in sports and explaining the behavior of dierent
actors.
Keywords: Sports; cooperative game theory.
Subject Classication: 22E46, 53C35, 57S20

1. Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in applying the ideas of game
theory to analyze the environment of sports. The seminal work on the economics of
sport is debt to Rottemberg (1956). Since that date it is frequent to model problems
related to sports using an economic approach and specially the game theory tools
which are now standard in most of the economic literature. The Handbook on the
Economics of Sport (Andre and Szymanski, 2006) contains an excellent collection
of papers devoted to analyze the environment of sports from an economic point of
view.
Ordinary people, and not only scientists, are interested in sports. Moreover,
game theory is based on a set of ideas that can be explained to the layman. So
it is not surprising that the use of game theory to analyze or to explain problems
related to sports appears frequently in the popular press and on the Internet. See
for example Ronfeldt (2000), Islam (2000), Waters (2001), Varma (2004) or Gupta
(2005).
1340021-1

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

C. Manuel, E. Gonz
alez-Arang
uena & M. del Pozo

Most of previous cited works use noncooperative models of game theory to

analyze sports. This is so because sport has traditionally been described in terms
of competition. Games are often called battles and fans frequently say that the rival
team must be demolished, using aggressive vocabulary. Nevertheless the cooperative
game theory has something to say in describing the sport environment. From now
on, this paper is devoted to describe those scientic papers that use cooperative
models to analyze some particular aspects in sports, emphasizing the particular
model used. Section 2 deals with the applications to sports that use cooperative
games and digraphs, these digraphs representing domination in competitions or
passes inside a team in dierent plays in team sports. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 are
respectively devoted to applications using status games, team games, multi-choice
games and competitive-cooperative games. The paper ends with a brief section of
conclusions.
2. Cooperative Games and Directed Communication Networks
In this section, we deal with the applications of game theory to the sports eld in
which the framework can be modeled with a directed graph. In a directed network
each relationship has an initiator and a respondent. These networks have been used
in the context of sports to describe all type of sport competitions or to describe
plays among players in team sports. Cooperative games with restrictions given
by a digraph have contributed to obtain measures of performances of teams in
such sports tournaments or to measure centrality of players in matches of soccer,
basketball, handball, and so on.
Let us recall that a game in characteristic function form (a coalitional game or
a TU game) is a pair (N, v) where v (the characteristic function) is a real function
dened on 2N , the set of all subsets of N (coalitions), that satises v() = 0.
For each S 2N , v(S) represents the utility that players in S can obtain if they
decide to cooperate. Sometimes, the formation of coalitions is a process in which
not only the members of the coalitions are important but also the order in which
they appear. As an example we have the order in which players participate, in a
particular play of soccer. Obviously this order is very relevant when trying to obtain
a goal. A game in generalized characteristic function form (Nowak and Radzik,


1994) is a pair (N, w), w being a function dened on (N ) = SN (S), with
(S) the set of all permutations of players in S, for all S N , and satisfying
w() = 0.
If we denote G N the vector space of all generalized cooperative games with
players set N , the set GN of all TU games can be identied with the subspace of
G N consisting of all games w G N for which w(S) = w(T ) if players in S are those
in T . A family of point solutions for generalized games is:

i (N, w) =

ti(T )
w (T ) t1 ,
t! l=0 l
T (N ),iT
1340021-2

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

Cooperative Game Theory in Sports

where i(T ) is the position of i in the ordered coalition T , [0, 1] and w (T ) =



w(T ) RT,R=T w (R) = RT (1)tr w(R). For all [0, 1], extends
the classical Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for games in GN . For 0 is dened in
nos (1997).
Nowak and Radzik (1994) and 1 is dened in Sanchez and Berganti
A directed network (directed graph or digraph) is a pair (N, d), N = {1, 2 . . . , n}
being a set of nodes and d a subset of the collection of all ordered pairs (i, j), i = j
of elements in N . Each pair (i, j) d is called an arc. It is said that i is a predecessor
of j and that j is a successor of i. For our purposes, a successor of team i in sport
competitions is a team that has been beaten by i, whereas a predecessor is a team
that defeated i. When nodes represent players in team sports, the arc (i, j) models
a pass from i to j in a particular play of a match. We will denote DN for the set of
all possible digraphs with nodes set N .
Given d DN and i N , d(i) is the set of i-successors (those beaten by i or
those to which i pass the ball during a sequence of passes in a given play) and
d1 (i) is the set of i-predecessors. An ordered set of nodes in N , (i1 , i2 , . . . , ir ), is
connected in d if the arcs (ik , ik+1 ) are all in d for k = 1, 2, . . . , r 1. Given d DN ,
d(i) for all i N and |d1 (i)| = 1 for
d DN is a simple subnetwork of d if d(i)

every dominated player i d(N ) = {j N | d1 (j) = }.

2.1. Cooperative games and domination networks
Domination networks have been used to describe sports competitions. A domination
network is a digraph in which each arc represents the victory of the initiator node
(team) over the receiver one.
Cooperative game theory allows us to measure how well dierent teams perform
in sport competition which is represented via a directed network. We will describe
two measures here. The rst one and the simplest one is the degree of a player
in the network. The second one, the -measure, was introduced by van den Brink
and Gilles (1994) and later analyzed in van den Brink and Gilles (2000). As for the
measuring of the performance, the dominance over a player beaten by many other
players weights less than the dominance over a player who has only few dominators.

2.1.1. The degree measure

The degree measure is probably the most traditional representation of scorings in
sport competitions. It measures the dominance of each player by the number of wins
the player obtains. It is dened as the map : DN Rn such that i (d) = |d(i)|
for each (N, d) G N and each i N .
Van den Brink and Gilles (2000) characterize this measure in terms of the following properties for an arbitrary measure, m, dened for the collection of all directed
networks:
degree normalization: for every d DN it holds that
1340021-3


iN

mi (d) = |d|

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

C. Manuel, E. Gonz
alez-Arang
uena & M. del Pozo

dummy position property: for all d DN and all i N such that d(i) = , it
holds that mi (d) = 0.
symmetry: for all d DN and all i, j N such that d(i) = d(j) and d1 (i) =
d1 (j) it holds that mi (d) = mj (d).
additivity over independent partitionsa : for all d DN and every independent
partition {d1 , . . . , dr } DN it holds:
m(d) =

r


m(dk ).

k=1

Of course, it can be said that apparently there is no relationship between previous results on the degree measure and game theory. This relation is established
in what follows.
2.1.2. The -measure
The -measure is the function : DN Rn dened: i (d) =

|
jd(i) |d1 (j)|

for

each i N . The idea is that in any tournament the value of a teams victory is
decreasing with the number of defeats suered by the beaten team. Besides the
degree measure has interesting properties and in fact is very used to score the
performance in competitions, the -measure is more related to the cooperative
game theory tools. In particular, given d DN , consider the following two TU
games:
the optimistic successor game vd GN , dened






vd (S) = 
d(i),


iS

for all S N . Thus, the value of a coalition is the number of teams that has
been beaten by teams in the coalition (van den Brink and Gilles, 2000)
the conservative successor game ud GN dened
ud (S) = |{j N | d1 (j) S}|,
for every S N . The value of a coalition of teams is the number of teams that
have been beaten for all the members in the coalition.
Van den Brink and Gilles (2000) proved that the -measure of each d DN is
equal to the Shapley value of the optimistic successor game vd and van den Brink
and Borm (2002) showed that it coincides as well with the Shapley value of the
conservative successor game ud .
a An

independent partition
of a directed network d is a partition {d1 , . . . , dr } D N such that for
S
all i N , (a) d(i) = rk=1 dk (i), (b) dk (i) dl (i) = , k = l and (c) each player is dominated at
most in one subnetwork in this position.
1340021-4

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

Cooperative Game Theory in Sports

Moreover, the -measure of each d DN is proportional to the sum of the degree

measures of all simple subnetworks of d. All previous results can be extended to
the modied -measure. See, for details, van den Brink and Borm (2002) or Gilles
(2010). To show the implications of that measure, authors apply it to rank teams
in the group C of the UEFA European Soccer Championship (EURO 2000). This
group consisted of the following national teams: Spain, Yugoslavia, Norway and
Slovenia. As it is known, the UEFA ranks the teams by rewarding them 3, 1 and 0
points for a win, a draw and a loss, respectively (in the digraph authors represent
a draw with two opposite arcs). Because of the dierent matches results the UEFA
ranking was: Spain, 6 points; Yugoslavia, 4 points; Norway, 4 points and Slovenia,
2 points. The -measure ranks Norway higher than Yugoslavia and even equal to
Spain, as Norway won the match from the stronger team in the group, Spain. Of
course, it will be very dicult to convince the UEFA to apply such a ranking. The
UEFA is a very conservative organism, even if several years ago they changed the
ranking to promote a more oensive play. Moreover, the clubs probably would refuse
a system of ranking under which dierent victories have dierent reward. We think
that it is not clear if this ranking system would aect the behavior of teams during
matches. There are dierent theories supporting every side: some people think that
teams play very motivated and they do their best, when they play against a very
good team; other people think that in many situations, weak teams save energy
and even their best players to play against strong teams so that they can be fresh
and have their best players when they play against equal strong teams.
2.2. Centrality of players in team sports
Let us consider now the situation in which the digraph represents connections or
passes among players in team sports. Then the arc (i, j) will model the situation
in which player i passes the ball to player j in a particular play of a match of
soccer, basketball, handball or a similar team sport. Dierent plays give us dierent digraphs. Del Pozo et al. (2011a, 2011b) develop a game-theoretical centrality measure that, in particular, can be used to measure centrality of players in
team sports and to describe the type of strategy used in order to win matches.
Given a game v GN representing the interests among players, v can be expressed
as a linear combination of games in the unanimity basis {uS }=SN as follows:

v = =SN v (S)uS . The coecients {v (S)}SN are known as Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi, 1963). Authors propose to assign for each digraph d DN and
each unanimity game uS , = S N , the restricted game udS G N (the game of
to connect S in d) dened by:

wT .
udS =
T (S),T connected in d
The idea behind this denition is that the connection of players in S admits dierent
possible orders that correspond to the dierent sequences of passes among players
1340021-5

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

C. Manuel, E. Gonz
alez-Arang
uena & M. del Pozo
d
in S. The centrality for player i in a particular play d is dened as
i (N, uS ). In this
case [0, 1] is a parameter that measures the relative diculty of passing the ball
with respect to controlling it. In general, it is assumed that to pass is easier than to
receive because of the pressing of the defenders. The total centrality of a player can
be obtained as some weighted combination of his centralities in dierent plays dk . To
obtain a measure for all games, authors extend previous denition using linearity.
The so dened measures are stable (nondecreasing for both incident players when
adding an arc) for almost positive games and can be characterized in terms of
component eciency and -directed fairness (except for = 0). Embedded in the
centrality of each play, it can be distinguished a part caused by its communication
activity (to pass the ball and to receive it) and another one explained by its control
on others activity. As a consequence, the centrality of each player is the city-block
modulus of the three-dimensional vector of emission, betweenness and reception
centralities. If we apply this to players in a soccer match we obtain a description of
the type of participation in the game for dierent positions in the team. Typically
the centrality of defenders will be higher for the emission component as they usually
start plays. A middle eld player will have grater betweenness centrality (as his job
generally consists of connecting defenders with forwards, and these ones have more
reception centrality because they tend to nish the dierent plays. The total sum
of centralities of players in a team gives us some idea of the strategy followed by
that team. For teams that dominate the game and the ball possessing time the total
centrality will be higher than the corresponding total one for teams with a more
direct style based on long passes or in fast counterattacks.
In a related context, Amer et al. (2010) establish conditions on cooperative
games so that they can be used to measure accessibility to the nodes in a directed
graph. In their model, they use generalized TU games (games in generalized characteristic function form) as they were introduced by Nowak and Radzik (1994)
and studied later by S
anchez and Berganti
nos (1997) and del Pozo et al. (2011b).
Moreover, a detailed study of accessibility in a concrete example, the European
Basketball Championship (EUROBASKET 2009), is oered.

3. Status Games
With the aim of analyzing status using the mathematical tools of game theory,
Quint and Shubik (1999) introduced the status games: n-player cooperative games
in which the outcomes are orderings of the actors within a hierarchy, i.e., permutations of N . In many frameworks the amount of money that receives an actor is
less important than his position or rank in relation to others. Sports appear in the
paper as examples of the importance of the position relative to others. In general,
tennis players place more importance on their position in ATP ranking than on
the amount of money they earn. Sometimes a soccer player leaves a team because
he wants to be the highest paid player (when Etoo left the FC Barcelona, it was
said that he wanted to earn more money than Messi). The theory of status-games
1340021-6

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

Cooperative Game Theory in Sports

analyzes the status, instead of the wealth, using the mathematical tools of game
theory. In a status game with set of players N , outcomes are represented by permutations of N where, if i occupies the position j in the permutation, this means that
player i attains the jth best position, and it is assumed that players will always
desire to be placed as far up as possible in the hierarchy, i.e., the closer to the rst
place, the more possible.
Later, Quint and Shubik (2001) distinguish two classes of status games based
on what is assumed about the capabilities of a coalition S N : exo-status games
and endo-status games. In exo-status games, it is assumed that such a coalition is
capable of enacting orderings over all n players. In endo-status games, each coalition
S is only capable of guaranteeing certain positions for its s members, but it has
no control over the positions that the remaining n s players can occupy in the
hierarchy. In these games each coalition has an exogenously given set S of rankings
of positions (matrices) that its members can enforce. Authors dene a condition
of balance on the family {S }SN to guarantee that the core of the game is
nonempty.
In this last paper, authors also dene another class of games: the one-to-one
ordinal preference (OOP) games. This is to be the largest possible class of games
in which players may express their preferences ordinary over a set of single objects
with which they are to be matched. This broader class includes the exo- and endostatus games. Formally an OOP game is a quadruple (N, J, R, {(S)}SN ), in
which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the players set, J = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of individual
objects (physical goods, as cars, or else positions in a hierarchy), R is a matrix
of rankings and (S) is the set of all orderings that S can eect. Authors make
certain consistency assumptions about the sets {(S)}SN : (i) disjoint coalitions
cannot both have the power to assign objets to the same player, (ii) they cannot
both assign the same object, (iii) super-additivity (if PS1 (S1 ), PS2 (S2 ) and
S1 S2 = , then PS1 + PS2 (S1 S2 ).
Finally, authors dene the core of an OOP game and prove that this core is
nonempty.

4. Team Games
Section 4 in Hern
andez-Lamoneda and S
anchez-Sanchez (2010) deals with team
games. They dene a team game as a game that vanishes on all coalitions S N
but those of a certain xed cardinality. For example, if we think of N as the set of
all players in the Spanish Soccer League and v(S) is the worth of a soccer team on
the ground then only makes sense to consider v(S) for coalitions of cardinality 11.
Then, they look at the power indices ranking of the players for these team games,
and show that there is essentially one possible power index ranking (up to sign) for
them. Authors use results in Hernandez-Lamoneda and Ju
arez (2007), in which the
space of games was decomposed as a direct sum of three orthogonal subspaces: the
subspace of symmetric games, another subspace that they call U (and that does
1340021-7

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

C. Manuel, E. Gonz
alez-Arang
uena & M. del Pozo

not have a natural denition in terms of well-known game theoretic considerations),

and the common kernel of all linear symmetric solutions.
To illustrate their results, authors use the basketball example, with n basketball
players and s = 5 for the cardinality of the only relevant coalitions. They dene a
theoretical team game of ve players for basketball which then implies a ranking
for the players, and they provide, in this way, an answer to The Michael Jordan
problem (Saari and Sieberg, 2001): how it is possible that, even though everyone
agrees Michael Jordan is the best basketball player in the NBA, dierent indices
when applied to all the players rank them dierently and not all of them ranks
Michael Jordan on the top?
5. Multi-Choice Games
Chou and Hsiao (2010) use multi-choice games to provide some sport applications
on the 21st Summer Deaympics. A multi-choice game (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993)
is a generalization of standard cooperative TU game. For TU games the activity
level of each player is dichotomous: he is fully or not at all involved in the game.
In a multi-choice TU game, each actor has a nite set of dierent activity levels.
The duplicate core (Hwang and Liao, 2009) for multi-choice games is an extension
of the core solutions for TU games.
Then, Chou and Hsiao (2010) relate some of the critical factors that Chen and
Chen (2009) cite as primordial in the success of Taiwan holding international sport
games (political situation, political operation, the sponsor plan and the arrangement
experience) to the axioms of the duplicate core.
Chen and Lin (2010) also use the multi-choice TU games and the duplicate core
to analyze the sport management: as an example, they propose the setting of sport
leagues such as Major League Baseball (MLB) or National Basketball Association
(NBA). This problem can be modeled as a multi-choice game in which players are
the sport teams and the activity levels, the family of marketing strategies available
to each one.
6. Competitive-Cooperative Games
In a recent paper (Sindik and Vidak, 2008), externally competitive (competition
between two teams) but internally cooperative (inside the same team) team sports
are analyzed. These are the so-called sport games (basketball, football, soccer, volleyball, etc). Authors apply game theory in the analysis of the consequences of
making a decision on tactical performance of an individual player in a team sport
for both the players and opponents teams. The problem of cooperation between
the players in the same team during the sport competition (between two teams) is
simultaneously considered.
The central part of the article is devoted to analyzing hypothetical situations
in relation to the predictability of a players tactical performance during a game,
and the eect onto the tactical performance eciency of the players of his own or
1340021-8

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

Cooperative Game Theory in Sports

opponent team. It is assumed that predictability in team sports can be explained

as an asymmetric (individuals do not have the same importance in team performance), nonzero sum, sequential game of imperfect information (all players have
some knowledge about the moves previously made by all other players, but not all
their moves). A player cannot make decisions only depending on opponent team
tactical performances (competitive game). He must simultaneously consider the
tactical performance of his co-players in the same team (cooperative game). Four
dierent possible situations during team sport competition appear when considering predictability or nonpredictability (for the individuals tactical and technical
actions) in relation with players in the same team or opponents (players in the
opponents team). From the (very simplied) hypothesis made by the authors, predictability will generally be better than unpredictability. This is so for the players
in the same team and for the ones in the opponents team.
To sum up, in spite of the authors claims, we think, cooperative game theory
does not play a relevant role in their model.
7. Conclusion
We hope that readers take some advantage from our eort. Of course, there are
probably papers that have been omitted and deserve to be heard. We apologize
to their authors for this. Our goal is mainly to provide the examples we know in
which the models of cooperative game theory apply to the analysis of the sports
environment. The variety of applications is useful as a proof of the strength of
game theory introducing successful models to explain the behavior of sportsmen,
coaches and teams in many situations. Nevertheless, because of the versatility of
game theory we hope that, in the future, more contributions based on the use of
cooperative games appear.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This
work has been supported by the Plan Nacional de I+D+i of the Spanish Government, under the project MTM2008-06778-C02-02/MTM.
References
Amer, R., Gimenez, J. M. and Maga
na, A. [2010] Nodes of directed graphs ranked by
solutions dened on cooperative games, Proc. XXXII National Meeting of Statistic
and Operation Reseatch, A Coru
na, Spain.
Andre, W. and Szymanski, S. (eds.) [2006] Handbook on the Economics of Sport (Edward
Elgal Publishing Ltd., Chentelhan, UK).
Chen, H. Y. and Chen, K. C. [2009] A study on critical succesful factors of holding international sport games in Taiwan, J. Taiwan Soc. Sport Manag. 8, 1733.
Chen, W. T. and Lin, H. L. [2010] Axiomatizations and applications of the duplicate core:
A case study on sport management, Far East J. Math. Sci. 42(2), 301312.
1340021-9

2nd Reading
July 8, 2013 13:53 WSPC/0219-1989 151-IGTR

1340021

C. Manuel, E. Gonz
alez-Arang
uena & M. del Pozo

Chou, H. and Hsiao, C. [2010] Applications between sport management and game theory: A case study on 21st Summer Seaympics, Proceedings of the 2010 Int. Symp.
Computer, Communication, Control and Automation, pp. 550553.
del Pozo, M., Manuel, C., Gonz
alez-Arang
uena, E. and Owen, G. [2011a] Game theory
and centrality in directed social networks, Cuaderno de trabajo 2/2011.
del Pozo, M., Manuel, C., Gonz
alez-Arang
uena, E. and Owen, G. [2011b] Centrality in
directed social networks. A game theoretic approach, Soc. Netw. 33, 191200.
Gilles, R. P. [2010] The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies (Springer).
Gupta, J. [2005] Footballs zero-sum game, The Indian Express, Bombay, 21 May.
Harsanyi, J. C. [1963] A simplied bargaining model for the n-person cooperative game,
Int. Econ. Rev. 4, 194220.
Hwang, Y. A. and Liao, Y. H. [2009] The core for multi-choice games: The replicated core
for TU games, J. Global optim., published online.
Hern
andez-Lamoneda, L. and Ju
arez, R. [2007] Discretion of solutions in cooperative game
theory using representation techniques, Int. Journal Game Theory 35, 395426.
Hern
andez-Lamoneda, L. and S
anchez-S
anchez, F. [2010] Rankings and values for team
games, Int. J. Game Theor. 39, 319350.
Hsiao, C. R. and Raghavan, T. E. S. [1993] Shapley value for multi-choice cooperative
games (I), Games Econ. Behav. 5, 240256.
Islam, F. [2000] Sold to the slyest bidder, The Observer, 23 April.
Nowak, A. and Radzik, T. [1994] The Shapley value for n-person games in generalized
characteristic function form, Games Econ. Behav. 6, 150161.
Quint, T. and Shubik, M. [1999] Games of status, Technical report, University of Nevada
and Yale University.
Quint, T. and Shubik, M. [2001] The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal
preference games, Math. Soc. Sci. 41, 89102.
Ronfeldt, D. [2000] Social Science at 190 MPH on NASCARs biggest speedways, First
Monday, 7 February.
Rottemberg, S. [1956] The baseball players labor market, J. Polit. Econ. 64, 242258.
Saari, D. G. and Sieberg, K. K. [2001] Some surprising properties of power indices, Games
Econ. Behav. 36(2), 241263.
S
anchez, E. and Berganti
nos, G. [1997] On values for generalized characteristic functions,
OR Spektrum 19, 229234.
Shapley, L. S. [1953] A value for n-person games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games,
Vol. 2, eds. Kuhn, H. W. & Tucker, A. W., Annals of Mathematics Studies, Volume 28 (Princeton University Press, Princeton), pp. 307317.
Sindik, J. and Vidak, N. [2008] Application of game theory in describing ecacy of decision making in sportsmans tactical performance in team sports, Interdisciplinary
Description Complex Syst. 6(1), 5366.
van den Brink, R. and Gilles, R. P. [1994] An axiomatic social power index for hierarchically structured populations of economic agent, in Imperfections and Behaviour
in Economic Organizations, eds. Gilles, R. P. & Ruys, P. H. M. (North Holland,
Amsterdam).
van den Brink, R. and Gilles, R. P. [2000] Measuring domination in directed networks,
Soc. netw. 22, 141157.
van den Brink, R. and Borm, P. [2002] Digraph competitions and cooperative games,
Theor. Decis. 53, 327342.
Varma, A. [2004] The humanising factor, Wisden Asia Cricket, 1 March.
Waters, D. [2001] NBA team as status symbol becoming more like an idol, goMemphis.com,
18 August.
1340021-10

Copyright of International Game Theory Review is the property of World Scientific

Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted
to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may
print, download, or email articles for individual use.