Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Rationalismvs.Empiricism
FirstpublishedThuAug19,2004substantiverevisionThuMar21,2013
Thedisputebetweenrationalismandempiricismconcernstheextenttowhichwearedependentupon
senseexperienceinourefforttogainknowledge.Rationalistsclaimthattherearesignificantwaysin
whichourconceptsandknowledgearegainedindependentlyofsenseexperience.Empiricistsclaim
thatsenseexperienceistheultimatesourceofallourconceptsandknowledge.
Rationalistsgenerallydeveloptheirviewintwoways.First,theyarguethattherearecaseswherethe
contentofourconceptsorknowledgeoutstripstheinformationthatsenseexperiencecanprovide.
Second,theyconstructaccountsofhowreasoninsomeformorotherprovidesthatadditional
informationabouttheworld.Empiricistspresentcomplementarylinesofthought.First,theydevelop
accountsofhowexperienceprovidestheinformationthatrationalistscite,insofaraswehaveitinthe
firstplace.(Empiricistswillattimesoptforskepticismasanalternativetorationalism:ifexperience
cannotprovidetheconceptsorknowledgetherationalistscite,thenwedon'thavethem.)Second,
empiricistsattacktherationalists'accountsofhowreasonisasourceofconceptsorknowledge.
1.Introduction
1.1Rationalism
1.2Empiricism
2.TheIntuition/DeductionThesis
3.TheInnateKnowledgeThesis
4.TheInnateConceptThesis
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1.Introduction
Thedisputebetweenrationalismandempiricismtakesplacewithinepistemology,thebranchof
philosophydevotedtostudyingthenature,sourcesandlimitsofknowledge.Thedefiningquestionsof
epistemologyincludethefollowing.
1. Whatisthenatureofpropositionalknowledge,knowledgethataparticularpropositionabout
theworldistrue?
Toknowaproposition,wemustbelieveitanditmustbetrue,butsomethingmoreisrequired,
somethingthatdistinguishesknowledgefromaluckyguess.Let'scallthisadditionalelement
warrant.Agooddealofphilosophicalworkhasbeeninvestedintryingtodeterminethe
natureofwarrant.
2. Howcanwegainknowledge?
Wecanformtruebeliefsjustbymakingluckyguesses.Howtogainwarrantedbeliefsisless
clear.Moreover,toknowtheworld,wemustthinkaboutit,anditisunclearhowwegainthe
conceptsweuseinthoughtorwhatassurance,ifany,wehavethatthewaysinwhichwedivide

uptheworldusingourconceptscorrespondtodivisionsthatactuallyexist.
3. Whatarethelimitsofourknowledge?
Someaspectsoftheworldmaybewithinthelimitsofourthoughtbutbeyondthelimitsofour
knowledgefacedwithcompetingdescriptionsofthem,wecannotknowwhichdescriptionis
true.Someaspectsoftheworldmayevenbebeyondthelimitsofourthought,sothatwecannot
formintelligibledescriptionsofthem,letaloneknowthataparticulardescriptionistrue.
Thedisagreementbetweenrationalistsandempiricistsprimarilyconcernsthesecondquestion,
regardingthesourcesofourconceptsandknowledge.Insomeinstances,theirdisagreementonthis
topicleadsthemtogiveconflictingresponsestotheotherquestionsaswell.Theymaydisagreeover
thenatureofwarrantoraboutthelimitsofourthoughtandknowledge.Ourfocusherewillbeonthe
competingrationalistandempiricistresponsestothesecondquestion.

1.1Rationalism
Tobearationalististoadoptatleastoneofthreeclaims.TheIntuition/Deductionthesisconcerns
howwebecomewarrantedinbelievingpropositionsinaparticularsubjectarea.
TheIntuition/DeductionThesis:Somepropositionsinaparticularsubjectarea,S,are
knowablebyusbyintuitionalonestillothersareknowablebybeingdeducedfrom
intuitedpropositions.
Intuitionisaformofrationalinsight.Intellectuallygraspingaproposition,wejustseeittobetrue
insuchawayastoformatrue,warrantedbeliefinit.(AsdiscussedinSection2below,thenatureof
thisintellectualseeingneedsexplanation.)Deductionisaprocessinwhichwederiveconclusions
fromintuitedpremisesthroughvalidarguments,onesinwhichtheconclusionmustbetrueifthe
premisesaretrue.Weintuit,forexample,thatthenumberthreeisprimeandthatitisgreaterthan
two.Wethendeducefromthisknowledgethatthereisaprimenumbergreaterthantwo.Intuitionand
deductionthusprovideuswithknowledgeapriori,whichistosayknowledgegainedindependently
ofsenseexperience.
WecangeneratedifferentversionsoftheIntuition/Deductionthesisbysubstitutingdifferentsubject
areasforthevariableS.Somerationaliststakemathematicstobeknowablebyintuitionand
deduction.Someplaceethicaltruthsinthiscategory.Someincludemetaphysicalclaims,suchasthat
Godexists,wehavefreewill,andourmindandbodyaredistinctsubstances.Themorepropositions
rationalistsincludewithintherangeofintuitionanddeduction,andthemorecontroversialthetruthof
thosepropositionsortheclaimstoknowthem,themoreradicaltheirrationalism.
Rationalistsalsovarythestrengthoftheirviewbyadjustingtheirunderstandingofwarrant.Some
takewarrantedbeliefstobebeyondeventheslightestdoubtandclaimthatintuitionanddeduction
providebeliefsofthishighepistemicstatus.Othersinterpretwarrantmoreconservatively,sayas
beliefbeyondareasonabledoubt,andclaimthatintuitionanddeductionprovidebeliefsofthat
caliber.Stillanotherdimensionofrationalismdependsonhowitsproponentsunderstandthe
connectionbetweenintuition,ontheonehand,andtruth,ontheother.Sometakeintuitiontobe
infallible,claimingthatwhateverweintuitmustbetrue.Othersallowforthepossibilityoffalse
intuitedpropositions.
ThesecondthesisassociatedwithrationalismistheInnateKnowledgethesis.
TheInnateKnowledgeThesis:Wehaveknowledgeofsometruthsinaparticularsubject
area,S,aspartofourrationalnature.
LiketheIntuition/Deductionthesis,theInnateKnowledgethesisassertstheexistenceofknowledge

gainedapriori,independentlyofexperience.Thedifferencebetweenthemrestsintheaccompanying
understandingofhowthisaprioriknowledgeisgained.TheIntuition/Deductionthesiscitesintuition
andsubsequentdeductivereasoning.TheInnateKnowledgethesisoffersourrationalnature.Our
innateknowledgeisnotlearnedthrougheithersenseexperienceorintuitionanddeduction.Itisjust
partofournature.Experiencesmaytriggeraprocessbywhichwebringthisknowledgeto
consciousness,buttheexperiencesdonotprovideuswiththeknowledgeitself.Ithasinsomeway
beenwithusallalong.Accordingtosomerationalists,wegainedtheknowledgeinanearlier
existence.Accordingtoothers,Godprovideduswithitatcreation.Stillotherssayitispartofour
naturethroughnaturalselection.
WegetdifferentversionsoftheInnateKnowledgethesisbysubstitutingdifferentsubjectareasforthe
variableS'.Onceagain,themoresubjectsincludedwithintherangeofthethesisorthemore
controversialtheclaimtohaveknowledgeinthem,themoreradicaltheformofrationalism.Stronger
andweakerunderstandingsofwarrantyieldstrongerandweakerversionsofthethesisaswell.
ThethirdimportantthesisofrationalismistheInnateConceptthesis.
TheInnateConceptThesis:Wehavesomeoftheconceptsweemployinaparticular
subjectarea,S,aspartofourrationalnature.
AccordingtotheInnateConceptthesis,someofourconceptsarenotgainedfromexperience.They
arepartofourrationalnatureinsuchawaythat,whilesenseexperiencesmaytriggeraprocessby
whichtheyarebroughttoconsciousness,experiencedoesnotprovidetheconceptsordeterminethe
informationtheycontain.SomeclaimthattheInnateConceptthesisisentailedbytheInnate
KnowledgeThesisaparticularinstanceofknowledgecanonlybeinnateiftheconceptsthatare
containedintheknownpropositionarealsoinnate.ThisisLocke'sposition(1690,BookI,Chapter
IV,Section1,p.91).Others,suchasCarruthers,argueagainstthisconnection(1992,pp.5354).The
contentandstrengthoftheInnateConceptthesisvarieswiththeconceptsclaimedtobeinnate.The
moreaconceptseemsremovedfromexperienceandthementaloperationswecanperformon
experiencethemoreplausiblyitmaybeclaimedtobeinnate.Sincewedonotexperienceperfect
trianglesbutdoexperiencepains,ourconceptoftheformerisamorepromisingcandidateforbeing
innatethanourconceptofthelatter.
TheIntuition/Deductionthesis,theInnateKnowledgethesis,andtheInnateConceptthesisare
essentialtorationalism:tobearationalististoadoptatleastoneofthem.Twoothercloselyrelated
thesesaregenerallyadoptedbyrationalists,althoughonecancertainlybearationalistwithout
adoptingeitherofthem.Thefirstisthatexperiencecannotprovidewhatwegainfromreason.
TheIndispensabilityofReasonThesis:Theknowledgewegaininsubjectarea,S,by
intuitionanddeduction,aswellastheideasandinstancesofknowledgeinSthatare
innatetous,couldnothavebeengainedbyusthroughsenseexperience.
Thesecondisthatreasonissuperiortoexperienceasasourceofknowledge.
TheSuperiorityofReasonThesis:TheknowledgewegaininsubjectareaSbyintuition
anddeductionorhaveinnatelyissuperiortoanyknowledgegainedbysenseexperience.
Howreasonissuperiorneedsexplanation,andrationalistshaveoffereddifferentaccounts.Oneview,
generallyassociatedwithDescartes(1628,RulesIIandIII,pp.14),isthatwhatweknowaprioriis
certain,beyondeventheslightestdoubt,whilewhatwebelieve,orevenknow,onthebasisofsense
experienceisatleastsomewhatuncertain.Anotherview,generallyassociatedwithPlato(Republic
479e484c),locatesthesuperiorityofaprioriknowledgeintheobjectsknown.Whatweknowby
reasonalone,aPlatonicform,say,issuperiorinanimportantmetaphysicalway,e.g.unchanging,
eternal,perfect,ahigherdegreeofbeing,towhatweareawareofthroughsenseexperience.

Mostformsofrationalisminvolvenotablecommitmentstootherphilosophicalpositions.Oneisa
commitmenttothedenialofscepticismforatleastsomeareaofknowledge.Ifweclaimtoknow
sometruthsbyintuitionordeductionortohavesomeinnateknowledge,weobviouslyreject
scepticismwithregardtothosetruths.RationalismintheformoftheIntuition/Deductionthesisisalso
committedtoepistemicfoundationalism,theviewthatweknowsometruthswithoutbasingourbelief
inthemonanyothersandthatwethenusethisfoundationalknowledgetoknowmoretruths.

1.2Empiricism
Empiricistsendorsethefollowingclaimforsomesubjectarea.
TheEmpiricismThesis:WehavenosourceofknowledgeinSorfortheconceptsweuse
inSotherthansenseexperience.
EmpiricismaboutaparticularsubjectrejectsthecorrespondingversionoftheIntuition/Deduction
thesisandInnateKnowledgethesis.Insofaraswehaveknowledgeinthesubject,ourknowledgeisa
posteriori,dependentuponsenseexperience.Empiricistsalsodenytheimplicationofthe
correspondingInnateConceptthesisthatwehaveinnateideasinthesubjectarea.Senseexperienceis
ouronlysourceofideas.TheyrejectthecorrespondingversionoftheSuperiorityofReasonthesis.
Sincereasonalonedoesnotgiveusanyknowledge,itcertainlydoesnotgiveussuperiorknowledge.
EmpiricistsgenerallyrejecttheIndispensabilityofReasonthesis,thoughtheyneednot.The
Empiricismthesisdoesnotentailthatwehaveempiricalknowledge.Itentailsthatknowledgecan
onlybegained,ifatall,byexperience.Empiricistsmayassert,assomedoforsomesubjects,thatthe
rationalistsarecorrecttoclaimthatexperiencecannotgiveusknowledge.Theconclusiontheydraw
fromthisrationalistlessonisthatwedonotknowatall.
Ihavestatedthebasicclaimsofrationalismandempiricismsothateachisrelativetoaparticular
subjectarea.Rationalismandempiricism,sorelativized,neednotconflict.Wecanberationalistsin
mathematicsoraparticularareaofmathematicsandempiricistsinallorsomeofthephysical
sciences.Rationalismandempiricismonlyconflictwhenformulatedtocoverthesamesubject.Then
thedebate,Rationalismvs.Empiricism,isjoined.Thefactthatphilosopherscanbebothrationalists
andempiricistshasimplicationsfortheclassificationschemesoftenemployedinthehistoryof
philosophy,especiallytheonetraditionallyusedtodescribetheEarlyModernPeriodofthe
seventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesleadinguptoKant.Itisstandardpracticetogroupthemajor
philosophersofthisperiodaseitherrationalistsorempiricistsandtosuggestthatthoseunderone
headingshareacommonagendainoppositiontothoseundertheother.Thus,Descartes,Spinozaand
LeibnizaretheContinentalRationalistsinoppositiontoLocke,BerkeleyandHume,theBritish
Empiricists.Weshouldadoptsuchgeneralclassificationschemeswithcaution.Theviewsofthe
individualphilosophersaremoresubtleandcomplexthanthesimplemindedclassificationsuggests.
(SeeLoeb(1981)andKenny(1986)forimportantdiscussionsofthispoint.)Lockerejectsrationalism
intheformofanyversionoftheInnateKnowledgeorInnateConcepttheses,buthenonetheless
adoptstheIntuition/DeductionthesiswithregardtoourknowledgeofGod'sexistence.Descartesand
Lockehaveremarkablysimilarviewsonthenatureofourideas,eventhoughDescartestakesmanyto
beinnate,whileLocketiesthemalltoexperience.Therationalist/empiricistclassificationalso
encouragesustoexpectthephilosophersoneachsideofthedividetohavecommonresearch
programsinareasbeyondepistemology.Thus,Descartes,SpinozaandLeibnizaremistakenlyseenas
applyingareasoncenteredepistemologytoacommonmetaphysicalagenda,witheachtryingto
improveontheeffortsoftheonebefore,whileLocke,BerkeleyandHumearemistakenlyseenas
graduallyrejectingthosemetaphysicalclaims,witheachconsciouslytryingtoimproveontheefforts
ofhispredecessors.Itisalsoimportanttonotethattherationalist/empiricistdistinctionisnot
exhaustiveofthepossiblesourcesofknowledge.Onemightclaim,forexample,thatwecangain
knowledgeinaparticularareabyaformofDivinerevelationorinsightthatisaproductofneither
reasonnorsenseexperience.Inshort,whenusedcarelessly,thelabelsrationalistandempiricist,as
wellasthesloganthatisthetitleofthisessay,Rationalismvs.Empiricism,canretardratherthan

advanceourunderstanding.
Nonetheless,animportantdebateproperlydescribedasRationalismvs.Empiricismisjoined
whenevertheclaimsforeachviewareformulatedtocoverthesamesubject.Whatisperhapsthemost
interestingformofthedebateoccurswhenwetaketherelevantsubjecttobetruthsabouttheexternal
world,theworldbeyondourownminds.Afullfledgedrationalistwithregardtoourknowledgeof
theexternalworldholdsthatsomeexternalworldtruthscanandmustbeknownapriori,thatsomeof
theideasrequiredforthatknowledgeareandmustbeinnate,andthatthisknowledgeissuperiorto
anythatexperiencecouldeverprovide.Thefullfledgedempiricistaboutourknowledgeofthe
externalworldrepliesthat,whenitcomestothenatureoftheworldbeyondourownminds,
experienceisoursolesourceofinformation.Reasonmightinformusoftherelationsamongour
ideas,butthoseideasthemselvescanonlybegained,andanytruthsabouttheexternalrealitythey
representcanonlybeknown,onthebasisofsenseexperience.Thisdebateconcerningourknowledge
oftheexternalworldwillgenerallybeourmainfocusinwhatfollows.
Historically,therationalist/empiricistdisputeinepistemologyhasextendedintotheareaof
metaphysics,wherephilosophersareconcernedwiththebasicnatureofreality,includingthe
existenceofGodandsuchaspectsofournatureasfreewillandtherelationbetweenthemindand
body.Majorrationalists(e.g.,Descartes1641)havepresentedmetaphysicaltheories,whichtheyhave
claimedtoknowbyreasonalone.Majorempiricists(e.g.,Hume173940)haverejectedthetheories
aseitherspeculation,beyondwhatwecanlearnfromexperience,ornonsensicalattemptstodescribe
aspectsoftheworldbeyondtheconceptsexperiencecanprovide.Thedebateraisestheissueof
metaphysicsasanareaofknowledge.Kantputsthedrivingassumptionclearly:
Theveryconceptofmetaphysicsensuresthatthesourcesofmetaphysicscan'tbe
empirical.Ifsomethingcouldbeknownthroughthesenses,thatwouldautomatically
showthatitdoesn'tbelongtometaphysicsthat'sanupshotofthemeaningoftheword
'metaphysics.'Itsbasicprinciplescanneverbetakenfromexperience,norcanitsbasic
conceptsforitisnottobephysicalbutmetaphysicalknowledge,soitmustbebeyond
experience.(1783,Preamble,I,p.7)
Thepossibilitythenofmetaphysicssounderstood,asanareaofhumanknowledge,hingesonhowwe
resolvetherationalist/empiricistdebate.Thedebatealsoextendsintoethics.Somemoralobjectivists
(e.g.,Ross1930)takeustoknowsomefundamentalobjectivemoraltruthsbyintuition,whilesome
moralskeptics,whorejectsuchknowledge,(e.g.,Mackie1977)findtheappealtoafacultyofmoral
intuitionutterlyimplausible.Morerecently,therationalist/empiricistdebatehasextendedto
discussions(e.g.,Bealer1999andAlexander&Weinberg2007)oftheverynatureofphilosophical
inquiry:towhatextentarephilosophicalquestionstobeansweredbyappealstoreasonorexperience?

2.TheIntuition/DeductionThesis
TheIntuition/Deductionthesisclaimsthatwecanknowsomepropositionsbyintuitionandstillmore
bydeduction.Manyempiricists(e.g.,Hume1748)havebeenwillingtoacceptthethesissolongasit
isrestrictedtopropositionssolelyabouttherelationsamongourownconcepts.Wecan,theyagree,
knowbyintuitionthatourconceptofGodincludesourconceptofomniscience.Justbyexaminingthe
concepts,wecanintellectuallygraspthattheoneincludestheother.Thedebatebetweenrationalists
andempiricistsisjoinedwhentheformerassert,andthelatterdeny,theIntuition/Deductionthesis
withregardtopropositionsthatcontainsubstantiveinformationabouttheexternalworld.Rationalists,
suchasDescartes,haveclaimedthatwecanknowbyintuitionanddeductionthatGodexistsand
createdtheworld,thatourmindandbodyaredistinctsubstances,andthattheanglesofatriangle
equaltworightangles,wherealloftheseclaimsaretruthsaboutanexternalrealityindependentofour
thought.SuchsubstantiveversionsoftheIntuition/Deductionthesisareourconcerninthissection.
OnedefenseoftheIntuition/Deductionthesisassumesthatweknowsomesubstantiveexternalworld

truths,addsananalysisofwhatknowledgerequires,andconcludesthatourknowledgemustresult
fromintuitionanddeduction.Descartesclaimsthatknowledgerequirescertaintyandthatcertainty
abouttheexternalworldisbeyondwhatempiricalevidencecanprovide.Wecanneverbesureour
sensoryimpressionsarenotpartofadreamoramassive,demonorchestrated,deception.Only
intuitionanddeductioncanprovidethecertaintyneededforknowledge,and,giventhatwehavesome
substantiveknowledgeoftheexternalworld,theIntuition/Deductionthesisistrue.AsDescartestells
us,allknowledgeiscertainandevidentcognition(1628,RuleII,p.1)andwhenwereviewallthe
actionsoftheintellectbymeansofwhichweareabletoarriveataknowledgeofthingswithnofear
ofbeingmistaken,werecognizeonlytwo:intuitionanddeduction(1628,RuleIII,p.3).
Thislineofargumentisoneoftheleastcompellingintherationalistarsenal.First,theassumption
thatknowledgerequirescertaintycomesataheavycost,asitrulesoutsomuchofwhatwecommonly
takeourselvestoknow.Second,asmanycontemporaryrationalistsaccept,intuitionisnotalwaysa
sourceofcertainknowledge.Thepossibilityofadeceivergivesusareasontodoubtourintuitionsas
wellasourempiricalbeliefs.Forallweknow,adeceivermightcauseustointuitfalsepropositions,
justasonemightcauseustohaveperceptionsofnonexistentobjects.Descartes'sclassicwayof
meetingthischallengeintheMeditationsistoarguethatwecanknowwithcertaintythatnosuch
deceiverinterfereswithourintuitionsanddeductions.Theyareinfallible,asGodguaranteestheir
truth.Theproblem,knownastheCartesianCircle,isthatDescartes'saccountofhowwegainthis
knowledgebegsthequestion,byattemptingtodeducetheconclusionthatallourintuitionsaretrue
fromintuitedpremises.Moreover,hisaccountdoesnottoucharemainingproblemthathehimself
notes(1628,RuleVII,p.7):Deductionsofanyappreciablelengthrelyonourfalliblememory.
AmoreplausibleargumentfortheIntuition/Deductionthesisagainassumesthatweknowsome
particular,externalworldtruths,andthenappealstothenatureofwhatweknow,ratherthantothe
natureofknowledgeitself,toarguethatourknowledgemustresultfromintuitionanddeduction.
Leibniz(1704)tellsusthefollowing.
Thesenses,althoughtheyarenecessaryforallouractualknowledge,arenotsufficientto
giveusthewholeofit,sincethesensesnevergiveanythingbutinstances,thatistosay
particularorindividualtruths.Nowalltheinstanceswhichconfirmageneraltruth,
howevernumeroustheymaybe,arenotsufficienttoestablishtheuniversalnecessityof
thissametruth,foritdoesnotfollowthatwhathappenedbeforewillhappeninthesame
wayagain.Fromwhichitappearsthatnecessarytruths,suchaswefindinpure
mathematics,andparticularlyinarithmeticandgeometry,musthaveprincipleswhose
proofdoesnotdependoninstances,norconsequentlyonthetestimonyofthesenses,
althoughwithoutthesensesitwouldneverhaveoccurredtoustothinkofthem(1704,
Preface,pp.150151)
Leibnizgoesontodescribeourmathematicalknowledgeasinnate,andhisargumentmaybe
directedtosupporttheInnateKnowledgethesisratherthantheIntuition/Deductionthesis.Forour
purposeshere,wecanrelateittothelatter,however:Wehavesubstantiveknowledgeaboutthe
externalworldinmathematics,andwhatweknowinthatarea,weknowtobenecessarilytrue.
Experiencecannotwarrantbeliefsaboutwhatisnecessarilythecase.Hence,experiencecannotbethe
sourceofourknowledge.Thebestexplanationofourknowledgeisthatwegainitbyintuitionand
deduction.Leibnizmentionslogic,metaphysicsandmoralsasotherareasinwhichourknowledge
similarlyoutstripswhatexperiencecanprovide.Judgmentsinlogicandmetaphysicsinvolveformsof
necessitybeyondwhatexperiencecansupport.Judgmentsinmoralsinvolveaformofobligationor
valuethatliesbeyondexperience,whichonlyinformsusaboutwhatisthecaseratherthanaboutwhat
oughttobe.
Thestrengthofthisargumentvarieswithitsexamplesofpurportedknowledge.Insofaraswefocus
oncontroversialclaimsinmetaphysics,e.g.,thatGodexists,thatourmindisadistinctsubstancefrom
ourbody,theinitialpremisethatweknowtheclaimsislessthancompelling.Takenwithregardto
otherareas,however,theargumentclearlyhaslegs.Weknowagreatdealofmathematics,andwhat

weknow,weknowtobenecessarilytrue.Noneofourexperienceswarrantsabeliefinsuchnecessity,
andwedonotseemtobaseourknowledgeonanyexperiences.Thewarrantthatprovidesuswith
knowledgearisesfromanintellectualgraspofthepropositionswhichisclearlypartofourlearning.
Similarly,weseemtohavesuchmoralknowledgeasthat,allotherthingsbeingequal,itiswrongto
breakapromiseandthatpleasureisintrinsicallygood.Noempiricallessonabouthowthingsarecan
warrantsuchknowledgeofhowtheyoughttobe.
ThisargumentfortheIntuition/Deductionthesisraisesadditionalquestionswhichrationalistsmust
answer.Insofarastheymaintainthatourknowledgeofnecessarytruthsinmathematicsorelsewhere
byintuitionanddeductionissubstantiveknowledgeoftheexternalworld,theyoweusanaccountof
thisformofnecessity.Manyempiricistsstandreadytoarguethatnecessityresidesinthewaywe
talkaboutthings,notinthethingswetalkabout(Quine1966,p.174).Similarly,ifrationalistsclaim
thatourknowledgeinmoralsisknowledgeofanobjectiveformofobligation,theyoweusanaccount
ofhowobjectivevaluesarepartofaworldofapparentlyvaluelessfacts.
Perhapsmostofall,rationalistdefendersoftheIntuition/Deductionthesisoweusanaccountofwhat
intuitionisandhowitprovideswarrantedtruebeliefsabouttheexternalworld.Whatisittointuita
propositionandhowdoesthatactofintuitionsupportawarrantedbelief?Theirargumentpresents
intuitionanddeductionasanexplanationofassumedknowledgethatcan'ttheysaybeexplained
byexperience,butsuchanexplanationbyintuitionanddeductionrequiresthatwehaveaclear
understandingofintuitionandhowitsupportswarrantedbeliefs.Metaphoricalcharacterizationsof
intuitionasintellectualgraspingorseeingarenotenough,andifintuitionissomeformof
intellectualgrasping,itappearsthatallthatisgraspedisrelationsamongourconcepts,ratherthan
factsabouttheexternalworld.Moreover,anyintellectualfaculty,whetheritbesenseperceptionor
intuition,providesuswithwarrantedbeliefsonlyifitisgenerallyreliable.Thereliabilityofsense
perceptionstemsfromthecausalconnectionbetweenhowexternalobjectsareandhowweexperience
them.Whataccountsforthereliabilityofourintuitionsregardingtheexternalworld?Isourintuition
ofaparticulartruepropositiontheoutcomeofsomecausalinteractionbetweenourselvesandsome
aspectoftheworld?Whataspect?Whatisthenatureofthiscausalinteraction?Thatthenumberthree
isprimedoesnotappeartocauseanything,letaloneourintuitionthatitisprime.
Theseissuesaremadeallthemorepressingbytheclassicempiricistresponsetotheargument.The
replyisgenerallycreditedtoHumeandbeginswithadivisionofalltruepropositionsintotwo
categories.
Alltheobjectsofhumanreasonorinquirymaynaturallybedividedintotwokinds,to
wit,RelationsofIdeas,andMattersofFact.Ofthefirstarethesciencesof
Geometry,Algebra,andArithmetic,and,inshort,everyaffirmationwhichiseither
intuitivelyordemonstrativelycertain.Thatthesquareofthehypotenuseisequaltothe
squareofthetwosidesisapropositionwhichexpressesarelationbetweenthesefigures.
Thatthreetimesfiveisequaltohalfofthirtyexpressesarelationbetweenthesenumbers.
Propositionsofthiskindarediscoverablebythemereoperationofthought,without
dependenceonwhatisanywhereexistentintheuniverse.Thoughthereneverwerea
circleortriangleinnature,thetruthsdemonstratedbyEuclidwouldforeverretaintheir
certaintyandevidence.Mattersoffact,whicharethesecondobjectsofhumanreason,are
notascertainedinthesamemanner,norisourevidenceoftheirtruth,howevergreat,ofa
likenaturewiththeforegoing.Thecontraryofeverymatteroffactisstillpossible,
becauseitcanneverimplyacontradictionandisconceivedbythemindwiththesame
facilityanddistinctnessasifeversoconformabletoreality.(Hume1748,SectionIV,
Part1,p.40)
Intuitionanddeductioncanprovideuswithknowledgeofnecessarytruthssuchasthosefoundin
mathematicsandlogic,butsuchknowledgeisnotsubstantiveknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Itis
onlyknowledgeoftherelationsofourownideas.Iftherationalistshiftstheargumentsoitappealsto
knowledgeinmorals,Hume'sreplyistoofferananalysisofourmoralconceptsbywhichsuch

knowledgeisempiricallygainedknowledgeofmattersoffact.
Moralsandcriticismarenotsoproperlyobjectsoftheunderstandingasoftasteand
sentiment.Beauty,whethermoralornatural,isfeltmoreproperlythanperceived.Orif
wereasonconcerningitandendeavortofixthestandard,weregardanewfact,towit,the
generaltasteofmankind,orsomeotherfactwhichmaybetheobjectofreasoningand
inquiry.(Hume1748,SectionXII,Part3,p.173)
Iftherationalistappealstoourknowledgeinmetaphysicstosupporttheargument,Humedeniesthat
wehavesuchknowledge.
Ifwetakeinourhandanyvolumeofdivinityorschoolmetaphysics,forinstanceletus
ask,Doesitcontainanyabstractreasoningconcerningquantityornumber?No.Doesit
containanyexperimentalreasoningconcerningmatteroffactandexistence?No.Commit
itthentotheflames,foritcancontainnothingbutsophistryandillusion.(Hume1748,
SectionXII,Part3,p.173)
Anupdatedversionofthisgeneralempiricistreply,withanincreasedemphasisonlanguageandthe
natureofmeaning,isgiveninthetwentiethcenturybyA.J.Ayer'sversionoflogicalpositivism.
Adoptingpositivism'sverificationtheoryofmeaning,Ayerassignseverycognitivelymeaningful
sentencetooneoftwocategories:eitheritisatautology,andsotruesolelybyvirtueofthemeaning
ofitstermsandprovidesnosubstantiveinformationabouttheworld,oritisopentoempirical
verification.Thereis,then,noroomforknowledgeabouttheexternalworldbyintuitionordeduction.
Therecanbenoaprioriknowledgeofreality.Forthetruthsofpurereason,the
propositionswhichweknowtobevalidindependentlyofallexperience,aresoonlyin
virtueoftheirlackoffactualcontent[Bycontrast]empiricalpropositionsareoneand
allhypotheseswhichmaybeconfirmedordiscreditedinactualsenseexperience.[Ayer
1952,pp.869394]
Therationalists'argumentfortheIntuition/Deductionthesisgoeswrongatthestart,accordingto
empiricists,byassumingthatwecanhavesubstantiveknowledgeoftheexternalworldthatoutstrips
whatexperiencecanwarrant.Wecannot.
Thisempiricistreplyfaceschallengesofitsown.Ourknowledgeofmathematicsseemstobeabout
somethingmorethanourownconcepts.Ourknowledgeofmoraljudgmentsseemstoconcernnotjust
howwefeeloractbuthowweoughttobehave.Thegeneralprinciplesthatprovideabasisforthe
empiricistview,e.g.Hume'soverallaccountofourideas,theVerificationPrincipleofMeaning,are
problematicintheirownright.Invariousformulations,theVerificationPrinciplefailsitsowntestfor
havingcognitivemeaning.AcarefulanalysisofHume'sInquiry,relativetoitsownprinciples,may
requireustoconsignlargesectionsofittotheflames.
Inall,rationalistshaveastrongargumentfortheIntuition/Deductionthesisrelativetooursubstantive
knowledgeoftheexternalworld,butitssuccessrestsonhowwelltheycananswerquestionsabout
thenatureandepistemicforceofintuitionmadeallthemorepressingbytheclassicempiricistreply.

3.TheInnateKnowledgeThesis
TheInnateKnowledgethesisjoinstheIntuition/Deductionthesisinassertingthatwehaveapriori
knowledge,butitdoesnotofferintuitionanddeductionasthesourceofthatknowledge.Ittakesoura
prioriknowledgetobepartofourrationalnature.Experiencemaytriggerourawarenessofthis
knowledge,butitdoesnotprovideuswithit.Theknowledgeisalreadythere.
PlatopresentsanearlyversionoftheInnateKnowledgethesisintheMenoasthedoctrineof

knowledgebyrecollection.Thedoctrineismotivatedinpartbyaparadoxthatariseswhenweattempt
toexplainthenatureofinquiry.Howdowegainknowledgeofatheoremingeometry?Weinquire
intothematter.Yet,knowledgebyinquiryseemsimpossible(Meno,80de).Weeitheralreadyknow
thetheorematthestartofourinvestigationorwedonot.Ifwealreadyhavetheknowledge,thereis
noplaceforinquiry.Ifwelacktheknowledge,wedon'tknowwhatweareseekingandcannot
recognizeitwhenwefindit.Eitherwaywecannotgainknowledgeofthetheorembyinquiry.Yet,
wedoknowsometheorems.
Thedoctrineofknowledgebyrecollectionoffersasolution.Whenweinquireintothetruthofa
theorem,webothdoanddonotalreadyknowit.Wehaveknowledgeintheformofamemorygained
fromoursoul'sknowledgeofthetheorempriortoitsunionwithourbody.Welackknowledgeinthat,
inoursoul'sunificationwiththebody,ithasforgottentheknowledgeandnowneedstorecollectit.In
learningthetheorem,weare,ineffect,recallingwhatwealreadyknow.
PlatofamouslyillustratesthedoctrinewithanexchangebetweenSocratesandayoungslave,inwhich
Socratesguidestheslavefromignorancetomathematicalknowledge.Theslave'sexperiences,inthe
formofSocrates'questionsandillustrations,aretheoccasionforhisrecollectionofwhathelearned
previously.Plato'smetaphysicsprovidesadditionalsupportfortheInnateKnowledgeThesis.Since
ourknowledgeisofabstract,eternalFormswhichclearlyliebeyondoursensoryexperience,itisa
priori.
ContemporarysupportersofPlato'spositionarescarce.Theinitialparadox,whichPlatodescribesasa
trickargument(Meno,80e),ringssophistical.Themetaphysicalassumptionsinthesolutionneed
justification.Thesolutiondoesnotanswerthebasicquestion:Justhowdidtheslave'ssoullearnthe
theorem?TheIntuition/Deductionthesisoffersanequally,ifnotmore,plausibleaccountofhowthe
slavegainsknowledgeapriori.Nonetheless,Plato'spositionillustratesthekindofreasoningthathas
causedmanyphilosopherstoadoptsomeformoftheInnateKnowledgethesis.Weareconfidentthat
weknowcertainpropositionsabouttheexternalworld,butthereseemstobenoadequateexplanation
ofhowwegainedthisknowledgeshortofsayingthatitisinnate.Itscontentisbeyondwhatwe
directlygaininexperience,aswellaswhatwecangainbyperformingmentaloperationsonwhat
experienceprovides.Itdoesnotseemtobebasedonanintuitionordeduction.Thatitisinnateinus
appearstobethebestexplanation.
NoamChomskyarguesalongsimilarlinesinpresentingwhathedescribesasarationalistconception
ofthenatureoflanguage(1975,p.129).Chomskyarguesthattheexperiencesavailabletolanguage
learnersarefartoosparsetoaccountfortheirknowledgeoftheirlanguage.Toexplainlanguage
acquisition,wemustassumethatlearnershaveaninnateknowledgeofauniversalgrammarcapturing
thecommondeepstructureofnaturallanguages.ItisimportanttonotethatChomsky'slanguage
learnersdonotknowparticularpropositionsdescribingauniversalgrammar.Theyhaveasetof
innatecapacitiesordispositionswhichenableanddeterminetheirlanguagedevelopment.Chomsky
givesusatheoryofinnatelearningcapacitiesorstructuresratherthanatheoryofinnateknowledge.
HisviewdoesnotsupporttheInnateKnowledgethesisasrationalistshavetraditionallyunderstoodit.
Asonecommentatorputsit,Chomsky'sprinciplesareinnateneitherinthesensethatweare
explicitlyawareofthem,norinthesensethatwehaveadispositiontorecognizetheirtruthasobvious
underappropriatecircumstances.AndhenceitisbynomeansclearthatChomskyiscorrectinseeing
histheoryasfollowingthetraditionalrationalistaccountoftheacquisitionofknowledge
(Cottingham1984,p.124).
PeterCarruthers(1992)arguesthatwehaveinnateknowledgeoftheprinciplesoffolkpsychology.
Folkpsychologyisanetworkofcommonsensegeneralizationsthatholdindependentlyofcontextor
cultureandconcerntherelationshipsofmentalstatestooneanother,totheenvironmentandstatesof
thebodyandtobehavior(1992,p.115).Itincludessuchbeliefsasthatpainstendtobecausedby
injury,thatpainstendtopreventusfromconcentratingontasks,andthatperceptionsaregenerally
causedbytheappropriatestateoftheenvironment.Carruthersnotesthecomplexityoffolk
psychology,alongwithitssuccessinexplainingourbehaviorandthefactthatitsexplanationsappeal

tosuchunobservablesasbeliefs,desires,feelingsandthoughts.Hearguesthatthecomplexity,
universalityanddepthoffolkpsychologicalprinciplesoutstripswhatexperiencecanprovide,
especiallytoyoungchildrenwhobytheirfifthyearalreadyknowagreatmanyofthem.This
knowledgeisalsonottheresultofintuitionordeductionfolkpsychologicalgeneralizationsarenot
seentobetrueinanactofintellectualinsight.Carruthersconcludes,[Theproblem]concerningthe
child'sacquisitionofpsychologicalgeneralizationscannotbesolved,unlesswesupposethatmuchof
folkpsychologyisalreadyinnate,triggeredlocallybythechild'sexperienceofitselfandothers,
ratherthanlearned(1992,p.121).
Empiricists,andsomerationalists,attacktheInnateKnowledgethesisintwomainways.First,they
offeraccountsofhowsenseexperienceorintuitionanddeductionprovidetheknowledgethatis
claimedtobeinnate.Second,theydirectlycriticizetheInnateKnowledgethesisitself.Theclassic
statementofthissecondlineofattackispresentedinLocke1690.Lockeraisestheissueofjustwhat
innateknowledgeis.Particularinstancesofknowledgearesupposedtobeinourmindsaspartofour
rationalmakeup,buthowaretheyinourminds?Iftheimplicationisthatweallconsciouslyhave
thisknowledge,itisplainlyfalse.Propositionsoftengivenasexamplesofinnateknowledge,even
suchplausiblecandidatesastheprinciplethatthesamethingcannotbothbeandnotbe,arenot
consciouslyacceptedbychildrenandthosewithseverecognitivelimitations.Ifthepointofcalling
suchprinciplesinnateisnottoimplythattheyareorhavebeenconsciouslyacceptedbyallrational
beings,thenitishardtoseewhatthepointis.Nopropositioncanbesaidtobeinthemind,whichit
neveryetknew,whichitneveryetwasconsciousof(1690,BookI,ChapterII,Section5,p.61).
Proponentsofinnateknowledgemightrespondthatsomeknowledgeisinnateinthatwehavethe
capacitytohaveit.Thatclaim,whiletrue,isoflittleinterest,however.Ifthecapacityofknowing,be
thenaturalimpressioncontendedfor,allthetruthsamanevercomestoknow,will,bythisaccount,
beeveryoneofthem,innateandthisgreatpointwillamounttonomore,butonlyanimproperway
ofspeakingwhichwhilstitpretendstoassertthecontrary,saysnothingdifferentfromthose,who
denyinnateprinciples.Fornobody,Ithink,everdenied,thatthemindwascapableofknowingseveral
truths(1690,BookI,ChapterII,Section5,p.61).LockethuschallengesdefendersoftheInnate
Knowledgethesistopresentanaccountofinnateknowledgethatallowstheirpositiontobebothtrue
andinteresting.Anarrowinterpretationofinnatenessfacescounterexamplesofrationalindividuals
whodonotmeetitsconditions.Agenerousinterpretationimpliesthatallourknowledge,eventhat
clearlyprovidedbyexperience,isinnate.
DefendersofinnateknowledgetakeupLocke'schallenge.Leibnizresponds(1704)byappealingtoan
accountofinnatenessintermsofnaturalpotentialtoavoidLocke'sdilemma.ConsiderPeter
Carruthers'similarreply.
Wehavenotedthatwhileoneformofnativismclaims(somewhatimplausibly)that
knowledgeisinnateinthesenseofbeingpresentassuch(oratleastinpropositional
form)frombirth,itmightalsobemaintainedthatknowledgeisinnateinthesenseof
beinginnatelydeterminedtomakeitsappearanceatsomestageinchildhood.Thislatter
thesisissurelythemostplausibleversionofnativism.(1992,p.51)
Carruthersclaimsthatourinnateknowledgeisdeterminedthroughevolutionaryselection(p.111).
Evolutionhasresultedinourbeingdeterminedtoknowcertainthings(e.g.principlesoffolk
psychology)atparticularstagesofourlife,aspartofournaturaldevelopment.Experiencesprovide
theoccasionforourconsciouslybelievingtheknownpropositionsbutnotthebasisforourknowledge
ofthem(p.52).CarruthersthushasareadyreplytoLocke'scounterexamplesofchildrenand
cognitivelylimitedpersonswhodonotbelievepropositionsclaimedtobeinstancesofinnate
knowledge.Theformerhavenotyetreachedtheproperstageofdevelopmentthelatterarepersonsin
whomnaturaldevelopmenthasbrokendown(pp.4950).
AseriousproblemfortheInnateKnowledgethesisremains,however.Weknowapropositiononlyif
itistrue,webelieveitandourbeliefiswarranted.Rationalistswhoasserttheexistenceofinnate
knowledgearenotjustclaimingthat,asamatterofhumanevolution,God'sdesignorsomeother

factor,ataparticularpointinourdevelopment,certainsortsofexperiencestriggerourbeliefin
particularpropositionsinawaythatdoesnotinvolveourlearningthemfromtheexperiences.Their
claimisevenbolder:Inatleastsomeofthesecases,ourempiricallytriggered,butnotempirically
warranted,beliefisnonethelesswarrantedandsoknown.Howcanthesebeliefsbewarrantedifthey
donotgaintheirwarrantfromtheexperiencesthatcauseustohavethemorfromintuitionand
deduction?
Somerationaliststhinkthatareliabilistaccountofwarrantprovidestheanswer.Accordingto
Reliabilism,beliefsarewarrantediftheyareformedbyaprocessthatgenerallyproducestruebeliefs
ratherthanfalseones.Thetruebeliefsthatconstituteourinnateknowledgearewarranted,then,
becausetheyareformedastheresultofareliablebeliefformingprocess.Carruthersmaintainsthat
Innatebeliefswillcountasknownprovidedthattheprocessthroughwhichtheycometobeinnateis
areliableone(provided,thatis,thattheprocesstendstogeneratebeliefsthataretrue)(1992,p.77).
Hearguesthatnaturalselectionresultsintheformationofsomebeliefsandisatruthreliableprocess.
AnappealtoReliabilism,orasimilarcausaltheoryofwarrant,maywellbethebestwayfor
rationaliststodeveloptheInnateKnowledgethesis.Theyhaveadifficultrowtohoe,however.First,
suchaccountsofwarrantarethemselvesquitecontroversial.Second,rationalistsmustgiveanaccount
ofinnateknowledgethatmaintainsandexplainsthedistinctionbetweeninnateknowledgeanda
posterioriknowledge,anditisnotclearthattheywillbeabletodosowithinsuchanaccountof
warrant.Supposeforthesakeofargumentthatwehaveinnateknowledgeofsomeproposition,P.
WhatmakesourknowledgethatPinnate?Tosharpenthequestion,whatdifferencebetweenour
knowledgethatPandaclearcaseofaposterioriknowledge,sayourknowledgethatsomethingisred
basedonourcurrentvisualexperienceofaredtable,makestheformerinnateandthelatternot
innate?Ineachcase,wehaveatrue,warrantedbelief.Ineachcase,presumably,ourbeliefgainsits
warrantfromthefactthatitmeetsaparticularcausalcondition,e.g.,itisproducedbyareliable
process.Ineachcase,thecausalprocessisoneinwhichanexperiencecausesustobelievethe
propositionathand(thatPthatsomethingisred),for,asdefendersofinnateknowledgeadmit,our
beliefthatPistriggeredbyanexperience,asisourbeliefthatsomethingisred.Theinsightbehind
theInnateKnowledgethesisseemstobethatthedifferencebetweenourinnateandaposteriori
knowledgeliesintherelationbetweenourexperienceandourbeliefineachcase.Theexperiencethat
causesourbeliefthatPdoesnotcontaintheinformationthatP,whileourvisualexperienceofared
tabledoescontaintheinformationthatsomethingisred.Yet,exactlywhatisthenatureofthis
containmentrelationbetweenourexperiences,ontheonehand,andwhatwebelieve,ontheother,
thatismissingintheonecasebutpresentintheother?Thenatureoftheexperiencebeliefrelation
seemsquitesimilarineach.ThecausalrelationbetweentheexperiencethattriggersourbeliefthatP
andourbeliefthatPiscontingent,asisthefactthatthebeliefformingprocessisreliable.Thesameis
trueofourexperienceofaredtableandourbeliefthatsomethingisred.Thecausalrelationbetween
theexperienceandourbeliefisagaincontingent.Wemighthavebeensoconstructedthatthe
experiencewedescribeasbeingappearedtoredlycausedustobelieve,notthatsomethingisred,
butthatsomethingishot.Theprocessthattakesusfromtheexperincetoourbeliefisalsoonly
contingentlyreliable.Moreover,ifourexperienceofaredtablecontainstheinformationthat
somethingisred,thenthatfact,nottheexistenceofareliablebeliefformingprocessbetweenthetwo,
shouldbethereasonwhytheexperiencewarrantsourbelief.ByappealingtoReliablism,orsome
othercausaltheoryofwarrant,rationalistsmayobtainawaytoexplainhowinnateknowledgecanbe
warranted.Theystillneedtoshowhowtheirexplanationsupportsanaccountofthedifference
betweeninnateknowledgeandaposterioriknowledge.

4.TheInnateConceptThesis
AccordingtotheInnateConceptthesis,someofourconceptshavenotbeengainedfromexperience.
Theyareinsteadpartofourrationalmakeup,andexperiencesimplytriggersaprocessbywhichwe
consciouslygraspthem.Themainconcernmotivatingtherationalistshouldbefamiliarbynow:the

contentofsomeconceptsseemstooutstripanythingwecouldhavegainedfromexperience.An
exampleofthisreasoningispresentedbyDescartesintheMeditations.Descartesclassifiesourideas
asadventitious,inventedbyus,andinnate.Adventitiousideas,suchasasensationofheat,aregained
directlythroughsenseexperience.Ideasinventedbyus,suchasourideaofahippogriff,arecreated
byusfromotherideaswepossess.Innateideas,suchasourideasofGod,ofextendedmatter,of
substanceandofaperfecttriangle,areplacedinourmindsbyGodatcreation.ConsiderDescartes's
argumentthatourconceptofGod,asaninfinitelyperfectbeing,isinnate.OurconceptofGodisnot
directlygainedinexperience,asparticulartastes,sensationsandmentalimagesmightbe.Itscontent
isbeyondwhatwecouldeverconstructbyapplyingavailablementaloperationstowhatexperience
directlyprovides.Fromexperience,wecangaintheconceptofabeingwithfiniteamountsofvarious
perfections,one,forexample,thatisfinitelyknowledgeable,powerfulandgood.Wecannothowever
movefromtheseempiricalconceptstotheconceptofabeingofinfiniteperfection.(Imustnotthink
that,justasmyconceptionsofrestanddarknessarearrivedatbynegatingmovementandlight,somy
perceptionoftheinfiniteisarrivedatnotbymeansofatrueideabutbymerelynegatingthefinite,
ThirdMeditation,p.94.)Descartessupplementsthisargumentbyanother.Notonlyisthecontentof
ourconceptofGodbeyondwhatexperiencecanprovide,theconceptisaprerequisiteforour
employmentoftheconceptoffiniteperfectiongainedfromexperience.(Myperceptionofthe
infinite,thatisGod,isinsomewaypriortomyperceptionofthefinite,thatismyself.Forhowcould
IunderstandthatIdoubtedordesiredthatislackedsomethingandthatIwasnotwhollyperfect,
unlesstherewereinmesomeideaofamoreperfectbeingwhichenabledmetorecognizemyown
defectsbycomparison,ThirdMeditation,p.94).
AnempiricistresponsetothisgenerallineofargumentisgivenbyLocke(1690,BookI,ChapterIV,
Sections125,pp.91107).First,thereistheproblemofexplainingwhatitisforsomeonetohavean
innateconcept.Ifhavinganinnateconceptentailsconsciouslyentertainingitatpresentorinthepast,
thenDescartes'spositionisopentoobviouscounterexamples.Youngchildrenandpeoplefromother
culturesdonotconsciouslyentertaintheconceptofGodandhavenotdoneso.Second,thereisthe
objectionthatwehavenoneedtoappealtoinnateconceptsinthefirstplace.ContrarytoDescartes'
argument,wecanexplainhowexperienceprovidesallourideas,includingthosetherationaliststake
tobeinnate,andwithjustthecontentthattherationalistsattributetothem.
Leibniz(1704)offersarationalistreplytothefirstconcern.WhereLockeputsforththeimageofthe
mindasablanktabletonwhichexperiencewrites,Leibnizoffersustheimageofablockofmarble,
theveinsofwhichdeterminewhatsculptedfiguresitwillaccept.
ThisiswhyIhavetakenasanillustrationablockofveinedmarble,ratherthanawholly
uniformblockorblanktablets,thatistosaywhatiscalledtabularasainthelanguageof
thephilosophers.Forifthesoulwerelikethoseblanktablets,truthswouldbeinusinthe
samewayasthefigureofHerculesisinablockofmarble,whenthemarbleiscompletely
indifferentwhetheritreceivesthisorsomeotherfigure.Butiftherewereveinsinthe
stonewhichmarkedoutthefigureofHerculesratherthanotherfigures,thisstonewould
bemoredeterminedthereto,andHerculeswouldbeasitwereinsomemannerinnatein
it,althoughlabourwouldbeneededtouncovertheveins,andtoclearthembypolishing,
andbycuttingawaywhatpreventsthemfromappearing.Itisinthiswaythatideasand
truthsareinnateinus,likenaturalinclinationsanddispositions,naturalhabitsor
potentialities,andnotlikeactivities,althoughthesepotentialitiesarealwaysaccompanied
bysomeactivitieswhichcorrespondtothem,thoughtheyareoftenimperceptible.(1704,
Preface,p.153)
Leibniz'smetaphorcontainsaninsightthatLockemisses.Themindplaysaroleindeterminingthe
natureofitscontents.Thispointdoesnot,however,requiretheadoptionoftheInnateConceptthesis.
RationalistshaverespondedtothesecondpartoftheempiricistattackontheInnateConceptthesis
theempricists'claimthatthethesisiswithoutbasis,asallourideascanbeexplainedasderivedfrom
experiencebyfocusingondifficultiesintheempiricists'attemptstogivesuchanexplanation.The

difficultiesareillustratedbyLocke'saccount.AccordingtoLocke,experienceconsistsinexternal
sensationandinnerreflection.Allourideasareeithersimpleorcomplex,withtheformerbeing
receivedbyuspassivelyinsensationorreflectionandthelatterbeingbuiltbythemindfromsimple
materialsthroughvariousmentaloperations.Rightatthestart,theaccountofhowsimpleideasare
gainedisopentoanobviouscounterexampleacknowledged,butthensetaside,byHumein
presentinghisownempiricisttheory.Considerthementalimageofaparticularshadeofblue.If
Lockeisright,theideaisasimpleoneandshouldbepassivelyreceivedbythemindthrough
experience.Humepointsoutotherwise.
Supposethereforeapersontohaveenjoyedhissightforthirtyyearsandtohavebecome
perfectlyacquaintedwithcolorsofallkinds,exceptoneparticularshadeofblue,for
instance,whichitneverhasbeenhisfortunetomeetwithletallthedifferentshadesof
thatcolor,exceptthatsingleone,beplacedbeforehim,descendinggraduallyfromthe
deepesttothelightest,itisplainthathewillperceiveablankwherethatshadeiswanting
andwillbesensiblethatthereisagreaterdistanceinthatplacebetweenthecontiguous
colorsthaninanyother.NowIaskwhetheritbepossibleforhim,fromhisown
imagination,tosupplythisdeficiencyandraiseuptohimselftheideaofthatparticular
shade,thoughithadneverbeenconveyedtohimbyhissenses?Ibelievetherearebut
fewwillbeoftheopinionthathecan(1748,SectionII,pp.2930)
Evenwhenitcomestosuchsimpleideasastheimageofaparticularshadeofblue,themindismore
thanablankslateonwhichexperiencewrites.
Considertooourconceptofaparticularcolor,sayred.CriticsofLocke'saccounthavepointedoutthe
weaknessesinhisexplanationofhowwegainsuchaconceptbythementaloperationofabstraction
onindividualcases.Foronething,itmakestheincorrectassumptionthatvariousinstancesofa
particularconceptshareacommonfeature.Carruthersputstheobjectionasfollows.
Infactproblemsariseforempiricistseveninconnectionwiththeverysimplestconcepts,
suchasthoseofcolour.Foritisfalsethatallinstancesofagivencoloursharesome
commonfeature.Inwhichcasewecannotacquiretheconceptofthatcolourby
abstractingthecommonfeatureofourexperience.Thusconsidertheconceptred.Doall
shadesofredhavesomethingincommon?Ifso,what?Itissurelyfalsethatindividual
shadesofredconsist,asitwere,oftwodistinguishableelementsageneralredness
togetherwithaparticularshade.Rather,rednessconsistsinacontinuousrangeofshades,
eachofwhichisonlyjustdistinguishablefromitsneighbors.Acquiringtheconceptredis
amatteroflearningtheextentoftherange.(1992,p.59)
Foranotherthing,Locke'saccountofconceptacquisitionfromparticularexperiencesseemscircular.
Asitstands,however,Locke'saccountofconceptacquisitionappearsviciouslycircular.
Fornoticingorattendingtoacommonfeatureofvariousthingspresupposesthatyou
alreadypossesstheconceptofthefeatureinquestion.(Carruthers1992,p.55)
ConsiderinthisregardLocke'saccountofhowwegainourconceptofcausation.
Inthenoticethatoursensestakeoftheconstantvicissitudeofthings,wecannotbut
observe,thatseveralparticulars,bothqualitiesandsubstancesbegintoexistandthat
theyreceivethistheirexistencefromthedueapplicationandoperationofsomeother
being.Fromthisobservation,wegetourideasofcauseandeffect.(1690,BookII,
Chapter26,Section1,pp.292293)
Wegetourconceptofcausationfromourobservationthatsomethingsreceivetheirexistencefrom
theapplicationandoperationofsomeotherthings.Yet,wecannotmakethisobservationunlesswe
alreadyhavetheconceptofcausation.Locke'saccountofhowwegainourideaofpowerdisplaysa

similarcircularity.
Themindbeingeverydayinformed,bythesenses,ofthealterationofthosesimpleideas,
itobservesinthingswithoutandtakingnoticehowonecomestoanend,andceasesto
be,andanotherbeginstoexistwhichwasnotbeforereflectingalsoonwhatpasses
withinitself,andobservingaconstantchangeofitsideas,sometimesbytheimpression
ofoutwardobjectsonthesenses,andsometimesbythedeterminationofitsownchoice
andconcludingfromwhatithassoconstantlyobservedtohavebeen,thatthelike
changeswillforthefuturebemadeinthesamethings,bylikeagents,andbythelike
ways,considersinonethingthepossibilityofhavinganyofitssimpleideaschanged,and
inanotherthepossibilityofmakingthatchangeandsocomesbythatideawhichwecall
power.(1690,ChapterXXI,Section1,pp.219220)
Wecomebytheideaofpowerthoughconsideringthepossibilityofchangesinourideasmadeby
experiencesandourownchoices.Yet,toconsiderthispossibilityofsomethingsmakingachange
inotherswemustalreadyhaveaconceptofpower.
Onewaytomeetatleastsomeofthesechallengestoanempiricistaccountoftheoriginofour
conceptsistoreviseourunderstandingofthecontentofourconceptssoastobringthemmoreinline
withwhatexperiencewillclearlyprovide.Humefamouslytakesthisapproach.Beginninginaway
reminiscentofLocke,hedistinguishesbetweentwoformsofmentalcontentsorperceptions,ashe
callsthem:impressionsandideas.Impressionsarethecontentsofourcurrentexperiences:our
sensations,feelings,emotions,desires,andsoon.Ideasarementalcontentsderivedfromimpressions.
Simpleideasarecopiesofimpressionscomplexideasarederivedfromimpressionsby
compounding,transposing,augmentingordiminishingthem.Giventhatallourideasarethus
gainedfromexperience,Humeoffersusthefollowingmethodfordeterminingthecontentofanyidea
andtherebythemeaningofanytermtakentoexpressit.
Whenweentertain,therefore,anysuspicionthataphilosophicaltermisemployed
withoutanymeaningoridea(asisbuttoofrequent),weneedbutinquirefromwhat
impressionisthatsupposedideaderived?Andifitbeimpossibletoassignany,thiswill
confirmoursuspicion.(1690,SectionII,p.30)
Usingthistest,Humedrawsoutoneofthemostimportantimplicationsoftheempiricists'denialof
theInnateConceptthesis.Ifexperienceisindeedthesourceofallideas,thenourexperiencesalso
determinethecontentofourideas.Ourideasofcausation,ofsubstance,ofrightandwronghavetheir
contentdeterminedbytheexperiencesthatprovidethem.Thoseexperiences,Humeargues,areunable
tosupportthecontentthatmanyrationalistsandsomeempiricists,suchasLocke,attributetothe
correspondingideas.Ourinabilitytoexplainhowsomeconcepts,withthecontentstherationalists
attributetothem,aregainedfromexperienceshouldnotleadustoadopttheInnateConceptthesis.It
shouldleadustoacceptamorelimitedviewofthecontentsforthoseconcepts,andtherebyamore
limitedviewofourabilitytodescribeandunderstandtheworld.
Consider,forexample,ourideaofcausation.Descartestakesittobeinnate.Lockeoffersan
apparentlycircularaccountofhowitisgainedfromexperience.Hume'sempiricistaccountseverely
limitsitscontent.Ourideaofcausationisderivedfromafeelingofexpectationrootedinour
experiencesoftheconstantconjunctionofsimilarcausesandeffects.
Itappears,then,thatthisideaofanecessaryconnectionamongeventsarisesfroma
numberofsimilarinstanceswhichoccur,oftheconstantconjunctionoftheseeventsnor
canthatideaeverbesuggestedbyanyoneoftheseinstancessurveyedinallpossible
lightsandpositions.Butthereisnothinginanumberofinstances,differentfromevery
singleinstance,whichissupposedtobeexactlysimilar,exceptonlythatafterarepetition
ofsimilarinstancesthemindiscarriedbyhabit,upontheappearanceofoneevent,to
expectitsusualattendantandtobelievethatitwillexist.Thisconnection,therefore,

whichwefeelinthemind,thiscustomarytransitionoftheimaginationfromoneobjectto
itsusualattendant,isthesentimentorimpressionfromwhichweformtheideaofpower
ornecessaryconnection.(1748,SectionVII,Part2,p.86)
Thesourceofourideainexperiencedeterminesitscontent.
Suitablytothisexperience,therefore,wemaydefineacausetobeanobjectfollowedby
another,andwherealltheobjects,similartothefirstarefollowedbyobjectssimilarto
thesecondWemay,therefore,suitablytothisexperience,formanotherdefinitionof
causeandcallitanobjectfollowedbyanother,andwhoseappearancealwaysconveys
thethoughtoftheother.(1748,SectionVII,Part2,p.87)
Ourclaims,andanyknowledgewemayhave,aboutcausalconnectionsintheworldturnout,given
thelimitedcontentofourempiricallybasedconceptofcausation,tobeclaimsandknowledgeabout
theconstantconjunctionofeventsandourownfeelingsofexpectation.Thus,theinitialdisagreement
betweenrationalistsandempiricistsaboutthesourceofourideasleadstooneabouttheircontentand
therebythecontentofourdescriptionsandknowledgeoftheworld.
Likephilosophicaldebatesgenerally,therationalist/empiricistdebateultimatelyconcernsourposition
intheworld,inthiscaseourpositionasrationalinquirers.Towhatextentdoourfacultiesofreason
andexperiencesupportourattemptstoknowandunderstandoursituation?

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