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ST.

THOMAS AQUINAS
READING SUMMARY NO. 1
PREPARED BY: ISRAEL, PATRICIA KAREENA A.
SUBMITTED ON: 29 JANUARY 2015
MORALITY AND NATURAL LAW (ST. AQUINAS SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES; SUMMA THEOLOGICA)
THEODORE DENISE ET AL
Thesis Statement: As the Aristotle of Theology, Aquinas completes Aristotles
theory of morality with the concepts of the beatific vision of God as humanitys final
goal, a special doctrine of free will, and a theory of natural law. He states that:
Human actions are directed towards ends, and such ends, when they are achieved,
become means for attaining still other ends. On the basis of this teleological thesis,
both Aristotle and Aquinas argue that not only are an individuals activities related
as a succession of ends becoming means but also that such a succession can occur
only if there is a final end. Both point to happiness as the final end: 1) it is desirable
for us for its own sake; 2) it is sufficient of itself to satisfy us; and 3) it is attainable
by the wise among us. Happiness can only be the fulfillment of the highest potential
of human naturebeing naturally happy and also becoming supernaturally happy
upon coming to see God as he isunder the direction of reason, which should
develop both of mans sources of truth: those that human faculties provide and
those that God reveals.

However, our direct realization of natural and supernatural happiness on earth is


systematically limited, because few among us sustain the intellectual activity of
philosophers or the spiritual intensity of saints.
Moreover, good character is necessary for both the intellectual virtues and for our
social lives.
Aquinas subsumes the Aristotelian analysis of choice under his own concept of free
will. This includes Aristotles basic corollary that people bear responsibility for their
actions unless they are physically compelled to do them or are inadvertently
ignorant about what they involve.
- 3 Components of Voluntary Acts (all are morally relevant -> bring about
different measures of moral worth for nominally identical acts)
1. Kind of overt act that it is
2. Kind of motive prompting it
3. Set of consequence-bearing circumstances
Aquinas ascribes the source and authority of the principles determining proper
choice to the natural laws God makes available to humans.
- Traces ultimate principles to which we refer to in moral judgments back to our
intuitive knowledge of the natural law -> back to our experience as rational
beings of the eternal law -> Gods plan for rationally ordered movements and
actions in the created universe
- Recognizes gap between (knowing and assenting to the authority of the
principles of natural law) and (interpreting and applying them to concrete
situations)

Conscience -> cannot be infallible, but has moral authority

I.

God, Who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all
things with being, must needs be ruler of all, Himself ruled by none, nor is
anything to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there anything that
does not owe its being to Him. Therefore as He is perfect in being and
causing, so He is perfect in ruling.
For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a
resemblance to Him and reflect His image they are directed and they direct
themselves to their appointed end by their own actions in thus directing
themselves, they are subjected to divine ruling they are admitted by divine
ruling to attainment of their last end

II.

III.

Every agent, by its actions, intends an end, that towards which the
movement of the agent tends; for when this is reached, the end is said to
be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended movement of
an agent tends to something determinate
1. If action terminates in something made then the movement of the
agent tends by that action towards the thing made
2. If action does not terminate in something made then the movement
of the agent tends to the action itself
In the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent
does not desire to go, or else the action would tend to infinity, which is
impossible it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium, so the
agent would never even begin to act = NOTHING MOVES TOWARDS WHAT IT
CANNOT REACH
Every agent acts for a good that to which an agent tends definitely
must needs be befitting to that agent, since the agent would not tend to it
save because of some fittingness thereto that which is befitting to a
thing is good for it
End is that wherein appetite of the agent comes to rest, as also the appetite
of that which is moved it is the very notion of good to be the term of
appetite, since = GOOD IS THE OBJECT OF EVERY APPETITE
All action and movement is for some perfection
1. If the action be itself the end then it is a second perfection of the agent
2. If the action consist in the transformation of external matter then the
mover intends to induce some perfection in the thing moved, towards
which perfection of the movable also tends, if the movement be natural
TO BE GOOD = TO BE PERFECT
1. Intellectual agent: acts for an end, as determining for itself its end + does
not determined end for itself except under aspect of the good + does not
move except it be considered as a good, which is the object of the will
2. Natural agent: though it acts for an end, does not determine its end for
itself, since it knows not the nature of end, but is moved to the end
determined for it by another + not moved + does not act for an end,
except insofar as this end is a good, since the end is determined for the
natural agent by some appetite
SUPEREME GOOD = END OF ALL = GOD

IV.

V.
-

VI.

Aristotles account of our quest for happiness is overly optimistic: 1) our


nature makes it difficult for us to achieve the moral and intellectual virtues
while trying to avoid corruption; 2) the higher wisdom cannot be found
within the confines of our natural life
We need freedom from disturbances caused by passions, which is achieved
by means of moral virtues and of prudence also need freedom from
external disturbances, to which the whole governance of civil life is directed.
MANS ULTIMATE HAPPINESS = WISDOM = CONSIDERATION OF DIVINE
THINGS CONTEMPLATION OF GOD
God is the lawgiver + humans, being in Gods image, possess the rational
and volitional capacities to comprehend and obey eternal law.
Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than
unchangeable and eternal law as dictate of practical reason emanating
from ruler who governs a perfect community world ruled by divine
providence + whole community of the universe is governed by divine reason,
whose conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal = ETERNAL
LAW
2 ways law can be in a person:
1. As in him that rules and measures
2. As in that which is rules and measured, since a thing is ruled and
measured insofar as it partakes of the rule/measure
ALL THINGS ARE RULED AND MEASURED BY ETERNAL LAW + ALL THINGS
PARTAKE IN ETERNAL LAW (insofar as they derive their respective inclinations
to their proper acts and ends)
Rational creature: subject to divine providence in a more excellent way
insofar as itself partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for
itself and for others it has a share of eternal reason, whereby it has a
natural inclination to its proper act and end = PARTICIPATION IN ETERNAL
LAW = NATURAL LAW WHEREBY WE DISCERN WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS
EVIL FUNCTION OF NATURAL LAW IS NOTHING ELSE THAN AN IMPRINT ON
US OF THE DIVINE LIGHT
Eternal law = Gods idea of an ordered universe pre-exists and control
ass animate and inanimate things in it | Natural law = rational creatures
participation in eternal law humans, though subject to natural
tendencies to act and react in certain ways, possess a natural inclination
to know and choose
Thing is self-evident in 2 ways: 1) in itself; 2) in relation to us
1st indemonstrable principle: the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied
at the same time being is the first thing that fails under the apprehension
absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the
practical reason, which is directed to action
o Nature of good GOOD IS THAT WHICH ALL THINGS SEEKS AFTER
FIRST PRECEPT OF LAW: GOOD IS TO BE DONE AND PROMOTED + EVIL
IS TO BE AVOIDED
o All other precepts of natural law are based upon this all things which
the practical reason naturally apprehends as mans good belong to the
precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be
done/avoided

VII.

Rejected common view that moral responsibility is obviated when one is


overcome by fear/overwhelmed by desire. to be human, an act must be
voluntary: 1) initiated by the agent; and 2) done for a rationally
ascertained end
1. Compulsion: will does not consent but is moved entirely counter to that
which is done through compulsion involuntary = WILL DOES NOTHING
INWARDLY
2. Fear: will moved towards end, in order to avoid an evil which is feared
voluntary = WILL DOES SOMETHING
Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness but makes something
voluntary inclined the will to desire the object of concupiscence has
reference to good, unlike fear which references to evil with fear, will retains
repugnance to that which he does, considered in itself INCONTINENT MAN
OF CONCUPISCENCE DOES NOT RETAIN HIS FORMER WILL WHEREBY HE
REPUDIATED OBJECT OF HIS CONCUPISCENCE will is changed

VIII.

IX.

Order of the precepts of the natural law is according to the order of


natural inclinations
1. Inclination to good in accordance with nature which he has in
common with all substances, inasmuch, namely, as every
substance seeks the preservation of its own being
2. Inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to
that nature which he has in common with other animals; and in
virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the
natural law which nature has taught to all animals
3. Inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which
nature is proper to him
MAN HAS NATURAL INCLINATION TO KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT
GOD + TO LIVE IN SOCIETY = WHATEVER PERTAINS TO THIS
INCLINATION BELONGS TO THE NATURAL LAW SHUN
IGNORANCE + AVOID OFFENDING THOSE AMONG WHOM ONE
HAS TO LIVE

Knowledge is a necessary condition for involuntariness. Ignorance has a


threefold relationship to the act of the will: 1) concomitantly, there is
ignorance of what is done, but so that even if it were known, it would be
done, so act is voluntary still; 2) consequently, ignorance itself is
voluntary; and 3) antecedently, ignorance is not voluntary and yet is the
cause of mans willing what he would not will otherwise.

Virtue is a habit through which men wish for good things. A good will is
one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore, the goodness of the will
is from the fact that a man wills that which is good. And good and evil in
the acts of the will is derived from the objects. evil: will desires that
which is not suitable as an end
Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstance can
make the act evil
When a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, then:

X.

XI.

1. If this circumstance is referred to as the thing willed act of the will is not
fixed on something good, since the will to do something when it ought not
be done is not to will something good
2. If this circumstance is referred to the act of willing impossible to will
something good when one ought not to because one ought always to will
what is good
o Except accidentally, insofar as man, by willing some particular good, is
prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought
to will at that time evil results not from willing that particular good
but from not willing the other
Wills object is proposed to it by the reason
If ones conscience (kind of dictate of the reason, since its an application
of knowledge to action) is in fundamental errorthat is, ones conscience
is mistaken about a moral principle rather than being ignorant of specific
facts in a situationthen the will in following errant conscience is evil.
accidental evil vs. absolute evil (will is unresponsive to conscience) =
INCONTINENT MAN IS ONE WHO DOES NOT FOLLOW RIGHT REASON +
ALSO THE ONE WHO DOES NOT FOLLOW FALSE REASON
1. If reason/conscience tell us to do something which is of its nature good,
there is no error and the same is true if it tells us not to do something
which is evil of its nature
2. If it tells us we are bound by precept to do what in itself is evil, or that
what in itself is good is forbidden, then it errs conscience does not
bind, so will which is at variance with erring reason/conscience is not
evil
3. If it tells us that what is in itself indifferent is forbidden or commanded
then it errs conscience binds so that will which is at variance with
that erring reason is evil, sinful
Ignorance causes act to be involuntary = takes away character of moral good
and evil
Willed ignorance = does not cause act to be involuntary
1. If reason/conscience err voluntarily, either directly or through negligence,
so that one errs about what one ought to know, then such an error of
reason/conscience does not excuse the will, which abides by that erring
reason/conscience, from being evil
2. If error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any
negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of
reason/conscience excuses the will, which abides by the erring reason,
from being evil
What is good or evil about an act is what the agent intends and not the
consequences the act produces. consequences do not make a good act
evil, or vice-versa, or increase its goodness/evilness, unless they are
foreseen unforeseen: 1) if they follow from nature of action, and in the
majority of cases, then consequences increase goodness/malice of act; 2)
if they follow from accident and seldom, then they do not increase
goodness/malice of an act (we do not judge a thing according to that
which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs
to it essentially)

Full Citation of the Article: St. Thomas Aquinas. Morality and Natural Law,(Summa Contra
Gentiles and Summa Theologica). In Great Traditions in Ethics, edited by Theodore Denise et al.,
87-101(Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 1999).

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