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THOMAS AQUINAS
READING SUMMARY NO. 1
PREPARED BY: ISRAEL, PATRICIA KAREENA A.
SUBMITTED ON: 29 JANUARY 2015
MORALITY AND NATURAL LAW (ST. AQUINAS SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES; SUMMA THEOLOGICA)
THEODORE DENISE ET AL
Thesis Statement: As the Aristotle of Theology, Aquinas completes Aristotles
theory of morality with the concepts of the beatific vision of God as humanitys final
goal, a special doctrine of free will, and a theory of natural law. He states that:
Human actions are directed towards ends, and such ends, when they are achieved,
become means for attaining still other ends. On the basis of this teleological thesis,
both Aristotle and Aquinas argue that not only are an individuals activities related
as a succession of ends becoming means but also that such a succession can occur
only if there is a final end. Both point to happiness as the final end: 1) it is desirable
for us for its own sake; 2) it is sufficient of itself to satisfy us; and 3) it is attainable
by the wise among us. Happiness can only be the fulfillment of the highest potential
of human naturebeing naturally happy and also becoming supernaturally happy
upon coming to see God as he isunder the direction of reason, which should
develop both of mans sources of truth: those that human faculties provide and
those that God reveals.
I.
God, Who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all
things with being, must needs be ruler of all, Himself ruled by none, nor is
anything to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there anything that
does not owe its being to Him. Therefore as He is perfect in being and
causing, so He is perfect in ruling.
For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a
resemblance to Him and reflect His image they are directed and they direct
themselves to their appointed end by their own actions in thus directing
themselves, they are subjected to divine ruling they are admitted by divine
ruling to attainment of their last end
II.
III.
Every agent, by its actions, intends an end, that towards which the
movement of the agent tends; for when this is reached, the end is said to
be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended movement of
an agent tends to something determinate
1. If action terminates in something made then the movement of the
agent tends by that action towards the thing made
2. If action does not terminate in something made then the movement
of the agent tends to the action itself
In the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent
does not desire to go, or else the action would tend to infinity, which is
impossible it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium, so the
agent would never even begin to act = NOTHING MOVES TOWARDS WHAT IT
CANNOT REACH
Every agent acts for a good that to which an agent tends definitely
must needs be befitting to that agent, since the agent would not tend to it
save because of some fittingness thereto that which is befitting to a
thing is good for it
End is that wherein appetite of the agent comes to rest, as also the appetite
of that which is moved it is the very notion of good to be the term of
appetite, since = GOOD IS THE OBJECT OF EVERY APPETITE
All action and movement is for some perfection
1. If the action be itself the end then it is a second perfection of the agent
2. If the action consist in the transformation of external matter then the
mover intends to induce some perfection in the thing moved, towards
which perfection of the movable also tends, if the movement be natural
TO BE GOOD = TO BE PERFECT
1. Intellectual agent: acts for an end, as determining for itself its end + does
not determined end for itself except under aspect of the good + does not
move except it be considered as a good, which is the object of the will
2. Natural agent: though it acts for an end, does not determine its end for
itself, since it knows not the nature of end, but is moved to the end
determined for it by another + not moved + does not act for an end,
except insofar as this end is a good, since the end is determined for the
natural agent by some appetite
SUPEREME GOOD = END OF ALL = GOD
IV.
V.
-
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
Virtue is a habit through which men wish for good things. A good will is
one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore, the goodness of the will
is from the fact that a man wills that which is good. And good and evil in
the acts of the will is derived from the objects. evil: will desires that
which is not suitable as an end
Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstance can
make the act evil
When a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, then:
X.
XI.
1. If this circumstance is referred to as the thing willed act of the will is not
fixed on something good, since the will to do something when it ought not
be done is not to will something good
2. If this circumstance is referred to the act of willing impossible to will
something good when one ought not to because one ought always to will
what is good
o Except accidentally, insofar as man, by willing some particular good, is
prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought
to will at that time evil results not from willing that particular good
but from not willing the other
Wills object is proposed to it by the reason
If ones conscience (kind of dictate of the reason, since its an application
of knowledge to action) is in fundamental errorthat is, ones conscience
is mistaken about a moral principle rather than being ignorant of specific
facts in a situationthen the will in following errant conscience is evil.
accidental evil vs. absolute evil (will is unresponsive to conscience) =
INCONTINENT MAN IS ONE WHO DOES NOT FOLLOW RIGHT REASON +
ALSO THE ONE WHO DOES NOT FOLLOW FALSE REASON
1. If reason/conscience tell us to do something which is of its nature good,
there is no error and the same is true if it tells us not to do something
which is evil of its nature
2. If it tells us we are bound by precept to do what in itself is evil, or that
what in itself is good is forbidden, then it errs conscience does not
bind, so will which is at variance with erring reason/conscience is not
evil
3. If it tells us that what is in itself indifferent is forbidden or commanded
then it errs conscience binds so that will which is at variance with
that erring reason is evil, sinful
Ignorance causes act to be involuntary = takes away character of moral good
and evil
Willed ignorance = does not cause act to be involuntary
1. If reason/conscience err voluntarily, either directly or through negligence,
so that one errs about what one ought to know, then such an error of
reason/conscience does not excuse the will, which abides by that erring
reason/conscience, from being evil
2. If error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any
negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of
reason/conscience excuses the will, which abides by the erring reason,
from being evil
What is good or evil about an act is what the agent intends and not the
consequences the act produces. consequences do not make a good act
evil, or vice-versa, or increase its goodness/evilness, unless they are
foreseen unforeseen: 1) if they follow from nature of action, and in the
majority of cases, then consequences increase goodness/malice of act; 2)
if they follow from accident and seldom, then they do not increase
goodness/malice of an act (we do not judge a thing according to that
which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs
to it essentially)
Full Citation of the Article: St. Thomas Aquinas. Morality and Natural Law,(Summa Contra
Gentiles and Summa Theologica). In Great Traditions in Ethics, edited by Theodore Denise et al.,
87-101(Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 1999).