Crim 1 Digests Compilation 2nd Set

Criminal Law I Case Digests
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Pastor
---------------------------------------------------------------------Art. 8 Conspiracy- Levels of Conspiracy

Fernan Jr. et. Al v. People
SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 145927
24, 2007
August
VELASCO, JR., J.:

86 million highway scam; 119 criminal cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36
former officials and employees of the then Ministry of
Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of
construction materials for defalcation of public funds
arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu
First Highway Engineering District in 1977.
FACTS:
Accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia
Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget
Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH
Region VII came up with the plan to steal large sums
of money from government treasury. Mangubat
had found a way to withdraw government money
through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other
documents and to conceal traces thereof with the
connivance of other government officials and
employees. In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved
the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount
covered by each general voucher is less than
P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the
Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to
unliquidated obligations due the previous year to

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provide the supposed source of funds; and the

manipulation of the books of account by negation or
adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through
journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of
the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect
such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to
the Regional Office.
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join
him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan.
o They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays.
o Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating
or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of
the gross amount.
o Preagido on her part manipulated the General
Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General Journal
thru negative entries to conceal the illegal
disbursements.
Thus, in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit
D), it was discovered that the doubtful
allotments and other anomalies escaped notice
due to the following manipulations:
LAAs were generally not signed by the Finance Officer
nor recorded in the books of accounts. Disbursements
made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to
the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400),
although the obligations being paid were not among
those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account
8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year.
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious
conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by
the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names
to be used and signed spurious documents.

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It was also made to appear that the payments were

made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable
to Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were not
properly funded.
The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando
Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH
Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and
were accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other
conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in
some of the cases, became a state witness in the
remainder. On the basis of her testimony and pertinent
documents, Informations were filed, convictions were
obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the
rest of the accused.
On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil
Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First
Highway Engineering District.
Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the
accused in 6 criminal cases (Criminal Case Nos.
2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918)
allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or
statements of deliveries of materials, used as
bases for the preparation of the corresponding
number of general vouchers. Fund releases were
made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees
based on these general vouchers.
On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was
one of the accused in 9 criminal cases (Criminal
Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910,
2914, 2919, and 2932.)
The Sandiganbayans Ruling
Petitioners were charged with the complex crime
of
estafa
through
falsification
of
public
documents.
The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of
petitioner Fernan, Jr. Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the

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same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal

cases, to wit:
Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo
to recall the adverse judgments against them which was
declined by the August 29, 2000 SB Resolution.
Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any
wrongdoing, they now interpose the instant petition to
clear their names.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are liable as coconspirators of the crimes committed.
HELD: YES. Petitioners guilt was established
beyond reasonable doubt
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that
they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery
receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and
materials, and other related documents which became
part of the supporting documents that led to the
issuance of general vouchers and eventually the
disbursement of public funds. The tally sheets are
statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the
specified quantities of materials for the construction and
maintenance of roads that have been delivered on
supposed project sites on given dates at specific places.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the
court a quo that all the essential elements of the
crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents were present. There is no question that
petitioners, at the time of the commission of the crime,
were public officers civil engineers assigned to the MPH.
Their signing of tally sheets and related
documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of
supplies for road repair and construction
constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage
of their official positions, especially considering
that they had the duty to inspect the purported
deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the
documents and the statements contained in
them.

Pastor
The essential elements of estafa through

falsification of public documents are present in the cases
against petitioners, as follows:
1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas
made it appear that supplies for road construction and
maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in
furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said
supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or
repair of road was implemented. In doing so, petitioners:
1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time
of the commission of the offenses;
1.2. Took advantage of their official position as
highway engineers; and
1.3. Made untruthful statements in several
narrations of fact.
2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP
146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in
the case of Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers
for the delivery of non-existent supplies.
By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally
sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to
genuine LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI.
Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not introduced
in evidence. It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges
something must prove it. Petitioners assertion that the
documents they signed were all genuine and duly
covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by
their own self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies.
We hesitate to give much weight and credit to their bare
testimonies in the face of clear, convincing,
overwhelming, and hard evidence adduced by the State.
If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense,
and they firmly believed that the documents were
indeed in the custody of the NBI, then petitioners could
have easily procured the compulsory process to compel
the production of said documents. However, petitioners
miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which
the court a quo could have readily granted. The inability

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to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of

evidence proved disastrous to petitioners cause. Their
conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense
evidence.
Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one
another
Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of
conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution.
Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the
existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no
need to prove it by direct evidence.
The Court finds that the conspiracy in the instant
cases resembles the wheel conspiracy. The 36 disparate
persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to
defraud the government were controlled by a single
hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant),
Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget
Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled
the separate spokes of the conspiracy. Petitioners
were among the many spokes of the wheel.
After a close re-examination of the records, the
Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the antigraft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the
other accused, headed by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat, who were similarly convicted in practically all
the 119 counts of estafa. Undisturbed is the rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence
of strong and compelling reasons or justifications,
it will accord finality to the findings of facts of the
SB. The feeble defense of petitioners that they
were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the
group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable
acts to defraud the government does not merit
any consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce
direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the
other accused, for such requirement, in many cases,
would border on near impossibility. The State needs to

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adduce proof only when the accused committed acts

that constitute a vital connection to the chain of
conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the
conspiracy.
In the case at bench, the signing of the fake
tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, and requests for supplies and
materials by petitioners on separate occasions is
vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in
siphoning off government funds. Without such
fabricated documents, the general vouchers
covering the supply of materials cannot be
properly accomplished and submitted to the
disbursing officer for the preparation of checks.
In sum, the required quantum of proof has been
adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the
accused including petitioners. The conviction of
petitioners must perforce be sustained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Art. 9 GRAVE, LESS GRAVE AND LIGHT FELONIES
No CASES ASSIGNED
---------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 10 OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CODE
GO-TAN V. TAN
G.R. No. 168852
FACTS: Sharica (petitioner) and Steven Tan are married
with 2 daughters. Petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer

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for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)

against Steven and her parents-in-law, alleging that
Steven, in conspiracy with her parents in law, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.
Respondents contended that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by Sec 3 of the said
law which explicitly provides that the offender should be
related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship
Petitioner argued that respondents were covered by R.A.
No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at
promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence. R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light
of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which
explicitly provides for the suppletory RPC and,
accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8
of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262
ISSUE: WON R.A No. 9262 may be liberally interpreted to
include the parents-in-law as an offender.
HELD: Yes. While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Pastor
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides

for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws,
shall have suppletory application.
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in
which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said
law.Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A.
No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals

Pastor
---------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 11 JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

A. SEL DEFENSE
PEOPLE V. ABRAZALDO
---------------------------------------------------------------------DOCTRINE OF RATIONAL EQUIVALENCE
DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------B. DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
PEOPLE V. APOLINAR
Facts: Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant
andappellant Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong was at
thattime the occupant of a parcel of land owned by
JoaquinGonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan,
Pangasinan.Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking
over said landwhen he observed that there was a man
carrying abundle on his shoulder.Believing that he was a
thief (of palay), the defendantcalled his attention but he
ignored him.The defendant fired in the air and then at
the person.The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was
able to getback to his house and consequently narrated
to AngelNatividad, the barrio chief, that he had been
woundedin the back by a shotgun.He then showed the
two wounds - one in each side of the spinal column which wounds were circular in formand a little bigger
10

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than a quarter of an inch, according tothe medical report

of Dr. Mananquil.Petras died of the wounds he
sustained.The
defendant
surrendered
to
the
authoritiesimmediately after the incident and gave a
swornstatement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of
Umingan on December 23, 1936.
Issue:
WON the killing of Petras was justified by
defenseof property
Held: No; the right to property is not of suchimportance
as right to life, and defense of property canbe invoked as
a justifying circumstance only when it iscoupled with an
attack on the person of one entrustedwith said property.
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ
121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder

(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and
Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence
that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house
and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he
heard sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things
over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot
Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was
placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the
company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal
battle with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of
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the shooting, the civil case was still pending for

annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting,
defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though
case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating
contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was
given 6 months to remove his house from the land.
Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendantappellant despite the fact that he acted in
defense of his person.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendantappellant although he acted in defence of his
rights.
3.
WON he should be liable for subsidiary
imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil
indemnity due to the offended party.
HELD:
1. NO. The courts concurred that the fencing and
chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was
indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim.
However, this aggression was not done on the person of
the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the
first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the
courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the
right of owners to close and fence their land.
12

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Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the

position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the government
was still pending, therefore putting ownership into
question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.
2. YES. However, the argument of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
a. Unlawful aggression - In the case at bar, there was
unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights.
Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should
have left him in peace before time was up, instead of
chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536
of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not
be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539
provides that every possessor has the right to be
respected in his possession
b. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent
or repel attack - In the case, killing was disproportionate
to the attack.
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person
defending himself. - Here, there was no provocation at
all since he was asleep.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited
with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide
(2 counts) not murder because treachery is not
applicable on account of provocation by the deceased.
Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill
since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no
13

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direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art.

249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
However, due to mitigating circumstances and
incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees
(Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. NO. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for
nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings.
Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused
who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.
Defendant was found guilty of homicide but with
mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance
of incomplete self defense. Appellant has already been
detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be
invoked when coupled with form of attack on person
defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so.
Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that, he should
be released.
--------------------------------------------------------------------BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (RA NO. 9262)

PEOPLE V. MARIVIC GENOSA
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben
Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
14

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During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived

happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the
couple would always quarrel and sometimes their
quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke
her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her
husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and
the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with
the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of
the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her
unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery
and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court,
appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and
finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in
the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the
case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded
the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered
woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert
witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra.
Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by
15

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the trial court and subsequently submitted to the

Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the
battered woman syndrome as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant
failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her
to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in
any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a
man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or,
at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of
self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome.
First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
16

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preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced

in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual
-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the
present case, however, not all of these elements were
duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the
cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the
past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the
third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a
relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must
still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled
in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts
to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and
the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal
Code provides that the following requisites of selfdefense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of
self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
17

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unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on

the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself,
there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to
bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and
passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of
appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same
set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and
the severity of the battery inflicted by the battererspouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings
over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing
the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result
of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1)
there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
18

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removed from the commission of the crime by a

considerable length of time, during which the accused
might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing
itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The
acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands
of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was
eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed
her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to
vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant
for parricide. However, considering the presence of two
(2)
mitigating
circumstances
and
without
any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum;
to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for
more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
19

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determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is

being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme
Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victimsurvivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered women syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence
of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
---------------------------------------------------------------------C. STATE OF NECESSITY
TY V PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]
Tys mother and her sister were confined at the
Manila Doctors Hospital for almost 2 years. Since the bill
reached 1,075,592.95, Ty drew 7 PDCs covering 30k
each
against
Metrobank
payable
to
the
hospital.
However, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of

funds.
Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital filed
7 counts of violation of B.P 22.
For her defense, Ty
claimed that she issued the checks because of an

uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that
she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for
her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly
20

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treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills

are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of
room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator
and television set, and subject to inconveniences such
as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of
her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown
and bedsheets. The hospital also suspended medical
treatment of her mother.
ISSUE:
WON the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code

may find application in this case.
HELD:
No.
The law prescribes the presence of three
requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this

paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than
the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other
practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated, thus, the defense is not
applicable.
Ty could have taken advantage of an
available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own

admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other
21

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forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure

her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be
availing, the greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more
so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by
Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. INSANITY
PEOPLE V. DOMINGO
---------------------------------------------------------------------B. MINORITY
RA 9344 (JUVENILLE JUSTICE AND WELFARE

LAW), AS AMENDED BY RA 10630
AM NO. 02-1-18-SC (NOVEMBER 24, 2009)
22

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RA 10630 (AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE

JUVENILE SYSTEM)
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS

OF RA 10630
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. ALCABAO
---------------------------------------------------------------------LLAVE V. PEOPLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------JOSE V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 162052 January 13,
2005)
Facts: On November 14, 1995, P/Supt Joseph Castro
received an information from an unnamed informant that
a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will
deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking. Acting on such
report,SPO1 Bonifacio Gueverra was assigned to act as a
poseur buyer. They positioned their cars at the parking
area where they had a commanding view of people
going in and out.
In the afternoon a Toyota Corolla arrived, Sonny Zarraga
was the driver, and with him was Alvin Jose. The
unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny
Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga
had with him100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Guevarra offered
23

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to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio

Guevarra if he had the money. Guevarra said yes. He
showed the aforecited bundle of "money bills." Sonny
Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and
handover to Guevarra. SPO1 Guevarra, inturn, handed
the bundle of "money bills. Then the other police
approached and introduced themselves as Narcom
Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose.
The RTC finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A.
6425.On appeal to the CA, the CA rendered judgment
affirming the decision appealed from with modification.
The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on
appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only
thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for
review on certiorari, alleging that under paragraph 3,
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine
(9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability.
Issue: Whether or not Alvin Jose can be exempt from
criminal liability underthe mitigating circumstances of
minority.
Ruling: Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal
Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony.
The law applies even if such minor is charged with a
crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In
such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age
in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The
reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is
presumed lacking the mental element of a crime.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was
thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was
24

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committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale

of shabu to the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out
and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga,
the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other
participation whatsoever in the transaction between the
accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no
evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the
plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he
handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseurbuyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their
transactions for illegal drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------US V. MARALIT
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. CORTEZANO & CORTEZANO
[G.R. No. 140732. January 29, 2002]
FACTS:
Lourney Cortezano had 3 children, one of
whom was Leah who was still 8 years old at that time.
She left her 3 children to the care of her parents-in-law
who were living under the same roof with their children,
accused - Joel (13), Butchoy (12), Tinggang (6), and their
nephew Boyet (6).
25

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Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and

Bernardo ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their
parents room. Joel threatened to whip her if she refused.
She was woken up by her uncles Joel and Butchoy who
were undressing her; she struggled as they raped her.
When Boyet arrived, Joel and Bernardo ordered him
to
rape
Leah
and
threatened
to
box
him
if
he
refused. Joel and Bernardo laughed as Boyet was having

his turn with Leah. Joel and Bernardo then called Leah
Lou and Lionel into the room, letting them see their
sister naked.
Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the
members of the family if she told anyone about what
happened to her. Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her
grandparents what happened to her. After that first
harrowing incident, Joel and Bernardo subjected her to
sexual abuse daily. Joel and Bernardo were charged with
4 counts of rape.
ISSUE:
WON the Joel and Bernardo, being minors, 12
and 13 years of age, respectively, should be exempt

from criminal liability.
HELD: NO. They are not exempt from criminal liability.
26

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Article 12. (3) The following are exempt from criminal

liability: (3). A person over nine years of age and under
fifteen, unless he acted with discernment, in which case,
such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen
years old at the time of the commission of the crimes is
exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor
acted without discernment. It is the burden of the
prosecution
to
prove
that
minor
acted
with
discernment when he committed the crime charged.

In determining if such a minor acted with discernment,
the Courts pronouncement in Valentin v. Duquea[34] is
instructive:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
27

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and behavior of said minor, not only before and during

the commission of the act, but also after and even
during the trial.
In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil
that the appellants acted with discernment when they
raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victims
vagina before they raped her; (b) one of them acted as a
lookout while the other was raping the victim; (c) they
threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her
parents what they did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to
rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping
the victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look
at their sister naked after the appellants had raped her.
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. CAPISTRANO
---------------------------------------------------------------------VALCESAR ESTIOCA V. PEOPLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------ROBERT SIERRA V. PEOPLE
----------------------------------------------------------------------
28

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RAYMUND MADALI V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 180380,
August 4, 2009)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: AAA, the victim, went with the three accused,
Rodel, Raymund, and Bernardino, and the witness,
Jovencio, near the Romblon National High School. The
group proceeded to climb the stairs leading to the
reservoir. As soon as they reached the reservoir,
Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of
Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted out, Join the rugby
boys. AAA replied, Thats enough. Bernardino then
struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut frond.
Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his
thighs with the same coconut frond. Before AAA could
recover, he received punches to his head and body from
Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. AAA lost
consciousness. Raymund then placed his handkerchief
around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog
chain, and then three malefactors pulled the body up a
tree. Before leaving the scene, the three assailants
warned Jovencio not to reveal the incident to anyone, or
he would be next. Out of fear for his life, did not divulge
the incident to anyone for the next few days.
Three days later, a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported
to the police authorities about a dead man found in
Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon National High School.
The policemen went there and found the hung cadaver,
along with paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, empty
bottles of gin and a coconut frond.
Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., who conducted the autopsy,
opined that the victim died due to head injuries and not
to asphyxiation by hanging, declaring that the victim
was already dead when he was tied to the tree, and that
29

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the variety of injuries sustained by the victim could be

attributed to more than one assailant.
Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and
pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the
perpetrators of the crime. Because of the threat made
on him by a certain Wilson, an uncle of Raymund and
Rodel, Jovencio executed a second affidavit repudiating
his first affidavit. Later he reverted to his first affidavit.
The accused advanced the defense of denial and alibi.
According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father
Rodolfo Madali in the house of a friend named Noel
Mindoro. Rodels testimony was corroborated by his
father and Noel Mindoro.
Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino declared that
they were in their respective houses on the night in
question. Bernardinos testimony was supported by his
father Bernardino Maestro, Sr. and by his neighbor Diana
Mendez. Raymunds friend, Pastor Mario Fajiculay backed
up the formers alibi.
The RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the three
accused. On account of the prosecutions failure to prove
the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, they were only convicted of homicide.
The RTC also appreciated the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority in favor of the three accused.
Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund
and Rodel elevated their convictions to the Court of
Appeals.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC but pursuant to
Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344 which exempts from
criminal liability a minor 15) years or below at the time
of the commission of the offense, Raymunds case was
dismissed. Rodels conviction was sustained but the
30

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imposition of said penalty was suspended pursuant to

Republic Act No. 9344.
Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals findings, which gave weight and
credence to the account of the incident given by
prosecution
witness
Jovencio,
whose
testimony
according to them was replete with patent and
substantial
inconsistencies.
Moreover,
petitioners
contend that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
erred in disbelieving the defense of alibi they interposed,
considering that the prosecution failed to muster the
required quantum of proof, and that said defense was
corroborated by testimonies of the other defense
witnesses.
ISSUE: What are the criminal liabilities of the accused?
HELD:
1. Raymond - Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14 years
of age at the time he committed the crime, should be
exempt from criminal liability and should be released to
the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to
Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child
31

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has the duty to immediately release the child to the

custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence
thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall
give notice to the local social welfare and development
officer who will determine the appropriate programs in
consultation with the child and to the person having
custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or
nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to
take custody, the child may be released to any of the
following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a
local social welfare and development officer; or, when
and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to
herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents
will not comply with the prevention program, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the
DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006,
the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of
Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal.
This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil
liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.
32

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2. Rodel Rodel was 16 years old at the time of the

commission of the crime. A determination of whether he
acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant
to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility -- A child
above 15 years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case.
The CA could not have been more accurate when it
opined that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel,
together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal
their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill
him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a
condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully
appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15
shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law, but always in the proper period. However, the
sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be
suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344, which states: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of
Sentence-- Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
33

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may have resulted from the offense committed.

However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of
the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided
in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law.
The petition is DENIED.
---------------------------------------------------------------------JOMAR ORTEGA V. PEOPLE

GR No. 151085 August 20, 2008
FACTS:
The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years
old, was charged with the crime of rape for allegedly
raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That the rape
happened in 3 occasions, the first one happened
sometime August 1999, when AAAs mother left her in
the care of the petitioner smother, Luzviminda. That the
petitioner woke up AAA and led her in the sala and raped
her. The second occasion happened the next day when
the petitioner led AAA into the bathroom and raped her
there. In all the instances, petitioner warned AAA to not
34

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tell her parents or he will spank her. The third and last
time happened in the house of AAA, where her brother
caught her and the petitioner naked waist down and
having intercourse. The brother then told the incident to
his mother. MMM testified that when she asked AAA
what happened, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his
fingers and penis into her vagina. And when MMM
examined the private part of her daughter, she noticed
that it was reddish and white fluid was coming out of it.
MMM called Luzviminda and confronted her about what
happened. Luzviminda then demanded that AAA should
be brought to a doctor for examination. The Rural Health
Officer, however, did not find any indication that AAA
was molested. Subsequently, the two families reached
an amicable settlement that requires the petitioner to
depart from their house and stay with a certain priest.
However, a year later, the family of AAA charged the
petitioner with 3 counts of rape, in which the petitioner
plead not guilty. The RTC ruled that the petitioner is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape and
is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the case
in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was
enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to
manage children in conflict with the law. At the case at
bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years
of age at the commission of the crime, he can be
relieved from criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail
exempting circumstance provided by the newly
enacted law on minors in conflict with law.
HELD: Yes
35

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RATIO: The petitioner can avail the exempting

circumstance that will relieve him from criminal liability
because the law enacted was favorable to the accused,
and is therefore retroactive in application. Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under 15
years of age in the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability, but is subject to an
intervention program. Exemption from criminal liability,
however, does not include exemption from civil liability.
Section 64 of the newly enacted law also provides that
cases of children under 15 years of age at the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer. The Court
therefore held that the case against Joemar Ortega is
hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the
local social welfare and development officer of the
locality for the appropriate intervention program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------REMIENDO V. PEOPLE
(GR 184874; October 9, 2009)
FACTS: Robert was charged with a crime of rape against
a minor allegedly committed on March and May 1997.
He waited for AAAs parents to leave the house before
defiling the latter and threatening to kick her if she
should shout for help. He was a minor whose age is
36

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above 15 but below 18 years old at the time of the

crime. He was then convicted of rape but on appeal
invoked a suspension of sentence pursuant to R.A. No.
9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial court
and before the case was elevated to the Court of
Appeals, he was already 22 years old.
ISSUE: WON RA 9344 may be given retroactive effect,
thus exempting the petitioner, who is convicted by RTC &
already 22 y/o before the case was elevated to CA.
HELD: NO. Pursuant to Sec. 38 and 40 of RA 9344,
the suspension of sentence can no longer be availed
since by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial
court, he was already 22 years old. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of
RA 9344, if a child is above 15 and below 18 years old,
the finding of discernment is necessary to determine if
he would be exempted from criminal liability. Culled from
the records of this case, it is manifested
that Robert acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully
well the consequences of his acts.
His act of waiting for the AAAs parents to leave the
house before defiling the latter and threatening to kick
her
if
she
should
shout
prove
that
Robert
can
differentiate what is right and wrong. He was born on
37

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January 21, 1982. The Joint Judgment was promulgated

on October 27,2004. Thus, at the time of the imposition
of his sentence, he was already 22 years old and could
no longer be considered a child for the purposes of the
application of R.A. No. 9344.
Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
burdened
to
discernment
prove
by
that
evidence
the
accused
of physical
acted
with
appearance,
attitude or deportment not only before and during the

commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.
The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that
the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature
of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. HERMIE JACINTO
---------------------------------------------------------------------C. ACCIDENT
PEOPLE V. BANDIAN
---------------------------------------------------------------------US V. TANEDO
38

Pastor
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLEV. FALLORINA
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. AYAYA
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. GENITA
[G.R. No. 126171. March 11, 2004]
FACTS:
One night, while the victims Reynaldo Timbal
and Jesus Bascon were loading firewood in a truck,

appellant who was drunk and armed with an M-14 rifle,
asked Reynaldo for a Christmas gift. He was told to come
back, and so he did. He soon returned and fired his gun
at Jesus feet, hitting his left leg. Appellant then went
near the trucks bumper and fired at the tire near the
chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun
and fired again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right
leg. Reynaldo ran away but appellant chased him and
fired at him, hitting his nape and right hand. The two
victims died.
Appellant contended that the incident was a mere
accident.
According to him, he was a member of the
CAFGU and was on his way to the camp, when, suddenly
39

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somebody grasped his neck. As a result, he accidentally

pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on his shoulder,
which automatically fired. Immediately he rushed to the
camp and reported the incident to Sgt. Montealto who
placed the camp on alert.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant should be exempted from
criminal liability given his contention that the incident

was an accident.
HELD: NO. Considering the number of gunshot wounds,
the
shooting
could
not
have
been
an
accident.
Appellants version that he accidentally shot the two

victims
is
incredible. Accident
is
an
exempting
circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal

Code. It must be stressed that in raising this defense,
appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was
incumbent upon him to establish that he was exempt
from criminal liability.[9] He must show with clear and
convincing proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act
with due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere
accident, and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing
the injury.
Considering appellants evidence, it is clear that the
requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance
were not proven. First, appellants manner of carrying
40

Pastor
his M-14 rifle negates his claim of due care in the

performance of an act. Knowing that his rifle was
automatic, he should have seen to it that its safety lock
was intact. Worse, he admitted that his finger was
constantly on the trigger. With the safety lock released
and his finger on the trigger, how can we conclude that
he acted with due care? We cannot accept his version
that he was just following his trainers instruction to
release the safety lock while in a critical area. [10] For one,
he never presented his trainer to corroborate his
statement; and for another, he was not in a critical
area. Second, the number of wounds sustained by the
victims
shows
accidental. Both
that
the
victims
shooting
sustained
was
not
more
merely
than
one
wound. While it could have been possible that the first

wound sustained by both victims was by accident,
however, the subsequent wounds sustained by them in
different parts of their bodies could not have been
similarly inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an
unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he re
loaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to
kill them. Jesus had already sought refuge by jumping
into
the
truck
when
another
bullet
hit
his
right
leg. Reynaldo was already running away when he was

shot on his nape and right hand. That appellant chased
the victims and shot them several times clearly show
41

Pastor
that he had the intent to kill them. [11] His defense must
necessarily fail.
Moreover,
if it were
true
that
someone
attacked
appellant, thus causing him to accidentally pull the

trigger of his rifle, then his natural reaction should have
been to defend himself. Instead, he rushed towards the
camp. Furthermore, he did not present any evidence to
support his allegation that the CAFGU was placed on
alert. And not a single witness corroborated his version
of accidental shooting, an indication that it is fabricated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------AMPLOYO V. PEOPLE
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. CASTILLO (G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts: Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated
in Court that in the evening of November 5, 1993,
between 9:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock, the accused
came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The
accused kicked the door and table, and then threw the
electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to
take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of
Guillermo as he took instead his sling and arrow from the
house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly,
Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of his
42

Pastor
daughter in-law Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the

victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused.
Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was
happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda
obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying
the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused,
and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no
avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the
fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a quarrel
between her and the accused. This spat negated the
accuseds version that he was practicing the use of the
weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends
credence to the prosecutions contention that the
shooting was intentional.
To sustain the accuseds assertion that he was practicing
the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is
patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut
Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused was
keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of those who
rushed the victim to the hospital and while on the way,
he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further
testified that while the victim was being attended to by
the medical personnel of said hospital, the accused
stayed outside the hospital premises, then he
disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police
authorities while hiding inside the comfort room of a
premises in an adjoining barangay. The accuseds
omission to surrender himself to the authorities is a clear
indication of guilt.
The trial court found Castillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. He then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
43

Pastor
alleging that the prosecution failed to sufficiently

establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, however the
CA denied appellants appeal and affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. Appellant
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied,
hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Among the appellants contention in the appeal is that if
indeed he was the one who killed his wife, the same was
accidental and not intentional.
ISSUE: WoN the exempting circumstance of accident is
attendant in this case
HELD: NO, the exempting circumstance of accident is not
applicable in the instant case.
Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is
burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge
its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this
exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
44

Pastor
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using
a deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a
"lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellants
defense of accident must be struck down because he
was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As
correctly found by the trial court: Furthermore, mere
possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the
law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into
consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no
legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon
other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon
cannot attain the standards as an instrument for archery
competitions. To sustain the accuseds assertion that he
was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the
incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to
rebut Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused
was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.
Furthermore,
accident,
by
claiming
appellant
has
that
the
the
killing
burden
of
was by
proof
of
establishing the presence of any circumstance which

may
relieve
him
of
responsibility,
and
to
prove
justification he must rely on the strength of his own

evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution,
for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after
the accused has admitted the killing.24 Other than his
claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to
adduce any evidence to prove the same.
45

Pastor
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. ABRAZALDO
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. LATOSA
---------------------------------------------------------------------D. UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
PEOPLE V. MORENO
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ARTICLE 13 - MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

A. PRAETER INTENTIONEM
PEOPLE V. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA

JAURIGUE
(C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946)
FACTS:
started
Amado Capina is Avelinas admired.

when
he
snatched
Avelinas
It all
handkerchief
bearing her nickname while it was washed by her cousin.

Later, Amado professed his love for her which was
46

Pastor
refused, and thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed

her
and
touched
her
breasts.
She
then
him, gave him fist blows and kicked him.
slapped
She armed
herself with a long fan knife whenever she went out.

Few days after, Amado climbed up the house of Avelina
and entered the room where she was sleeping. She felt
her forehead and she immediately screamed for help
which awakened her parents and brought them to her
side. Amado came out from where he had hidden and
kissed the hand of Avelinas father, Nicolas. Later, they
learned that Amado had been falsely boasting in the
neighbourhood of having taken liberties with her person.
One night, Avelina Jaurigue and her father went to the
chapel of Seventh Day Adventists. Amado went and sat
by Avelinas right side, and without saying a word,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
This prompted her to pull out the fan knife with the
intention of punishing Amados offending hand. Amado
seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife
on her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of
the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a mortal
wound (4 in deep). He died in a few minutes.
Avelina was found guilty of homicide. She appealed to
completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility
47

Pastor
for having acted in defense of her honor, to find in her

favour additional mitigating circumstances and omit
aggravating circumstance.
ISSUES:
WON
should
mitigating circumstances
find
of
the
additional
voluntary
surrender,
presence of provocation and absence of intent in her

favour.
HELD: YES. Mitigating circumstances are considered in
her favour. Circumstances include her voluntary and
unconditional
provocation
temporary
surrender
from
loss
the
to
the
barrio
deceased
of reason
and
lieutenant,
which
produced
self-control
of
the
defendant and lack of intent to kill the deceased

evidenced by infliction of only one single wound.
The
defendant
and
appellant
immediately
and
voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio

lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the
deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to
go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there
subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an
agent of the authorities; and the further fact that she
had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense committed against her a few moments before,
and upon such provocation as to produce passion and
48

Pastor
obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control,

should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her
favor.
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not
intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to
punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by
the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single
wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance
which should be considered in her favor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------B. VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
AS V. AMPAR
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. IGNAS
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. BENITO
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. DAVID
----------------------------------------------------------------------
49

Pastor
C. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
US V. HICKS
---------------------------------------------------------------------SANICO V. CA
---------------------------------------------------------------------US V. DELA CRUZ
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. RABAO
---------------------------------------------------------------------D. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
PEOPLE V. DAWATON
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. VIERNES
---------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE V. ABOLIDOR ET. AL
50

Pastor
51

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Criminal Law I Case Digests

Balderas|Candolita |Delabahan |Elizaga |Masanguid |Pacquiao |

---------------------------------------------------------------------Art. 8 Conspiracy- Levels of Conspiracy

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Criminal Law I Case Digests

provide the supposed source of funds; and the

Criminal Law I Case Digests

It was also made to appear that the payments were

Criminal Law I Case Digests

same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal

Criminal Law I Case Digests

The essential elements of estafa through

Criminal Law I Case Digests

to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of

Criminal Law I Case Digests

adduce proof only when the accused committed acts

Criminal Law I Case Digests

for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)

Criminal Law I Case Digests

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides

Criminal Law I Case Digests

---------------------------------------------------------------------ARTICLE 11 JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

Criminal Law I Case Digests

than a quarter of an inch, according tothe medical report

121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder

Criminal Law I Case Digests

the shooting, the civil case was still pending for

Criminal Law I Case Digests

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the

Criminal Law I Case Digests

direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art.

--------------------------------------------------------------------BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (RA NO. 9262)

Criminal Law I Case Digests

During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived

Criminal Law I Case Digests

the trial court and subsequently submitted to the

Criminal Law I Case Digests

preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced

Criminal Law I Case Digests

unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on

Criminal Law I Case Digests

removed from the commission of the crime by a

Criminal Law I Case Digests

determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is

However, they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of

Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital filed

7 counts of violation of B.P 22.

For her defense, Ty

claimed that she issued the checks because of an

Criminal Law I Case Digests

treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills

WON the justifying circumstance of state of

necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code

The law prescribes the presence of three

requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this

Ty could have taken advantage of an

available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own

Criminal Law I Case Digests

forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure

RA 9344 (JUVENILLE JUSTICE AND WELFARE

AM NO. 02-1-18-SC (NOVEMBER 24, 2009)

Criminal Law I Case Digests

RA 10630 (AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE