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In a recent foray into an ethnography of experimental cognitive psychology, I encountered firsthand what the historical
banishment of subjectivity from the experimental model
means. Because it was so difficult to gain ethnographic access
to any of the many psychology labs I approachedrun by
colleagues, neighbors, and even friendsI resorted to participating as a volunteer subject in various currently ongoing
experiments accessible through the websites of all major psychology departments. I was struck by how irrelevant my experience as a subject was to the experimenters. In one experiment, for example, I was hooked up to electrodes used
to measure small facial movements of which I was unaware
that would indicate my emotional responses to photographs
presented on the computer screen in front of me. I pressed
keys on the keyboard to register my conscious responses to
these images. A software program tallied the results. My responses were produced, I was told, by specific parts of my
brain. What the researchers sought were data about how my
brain reacted to the photographs. But there were confounding
elements all over the place in this experimental setting. For
example, although the monitor I was to attend to and make
my responses to was right in front of me, just on my left was
another monitor that showed the varying electrical impulses
from my electrodes. I noted to the experimenter that I could
easily see the readout of my own responses, and she said,
Thats fine; it doesnt matter. But it mattered to me. I could
Emily Martin is Professor in the Department of Anthropology, New
York University (25 Waverly Place, New York, New York 10003,
U.S.A. [em81@nyu.edu]). This paper was submitted 18 VI 12,
accepted 1 III 13, and electronically published 22 V 13.
2013 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved. 0011-3204/2013/54S7-0016$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/670388
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What did this mean? Wundts method was to let the subject
react as quickly as possible in trial 1 and then in trial 2 wait
until he distinguished the impression (like recognizing a
color or understanding a word). The difference between the
two times gave the perception-time (Cattell and Sokal 1981:
99). Cattell (Cattell and Sokal 1981) explains his problem: I
have not been able myself to get results by this method; I
apparently either distinguished the impression and made the
motion simultaneously, or if I tried to avoid this by waiting
until I had formed a distinct impression before I make the
motion . . . I added to the simple reaction, not only a perception [i.e., a discrimination], but also a volition [i.e., a
choice] (65). What was Cattells solution to this problem?
In 1886 he added an instrument to the experiment, namely,
the lip key. This was an electric switch the subject held between
his lips. When he was in the act of perceiving a color or a
word, it was assumed that he would move his lips unconsciously, as if silently naming the object of his perception.
Hence, the lip key would register the time of the perception
without the need for any problematic conscious introspection
on the part of the subject.
Why does such a minute-seeming change as the lip key
loom so large? It was at this moment that Cattell joined the
mind to the brain. As soon as he finished his experiments
using the lip key, he adopted a relentlessly physicalist perspective and questioned whether purely mental qualities existed. This was in 1886! As he explained this transition, it
takes time for light waves to work on the retina and to generate in cells a nervous impulse corresponding to the light.
It takes time for a nervous impulse to be conveyed along the
optic nerve to the brain. It takes time for a nervous impulse
to be conveyed through the brain to the visual center. It takes
time for a nervous impulse to bring about changes in the
visual center corresponding to its own nature, and to the
nature of the external stimulus (Cattell 1886:220). When all
this has happened, the subject sees a red light. The sensation
or perception of red does not take any time. The sensation
of a red light is a state of consciousness corresponding to a
certain condition of the brain (220). This immediacy is par-
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allel to the chemical changes in a galvanic battery: the chemical changes take time, but when they have happened the
current does not take any additional time. The current is
the immediate representative of these changes (Cattell 1886:
220; Cattell and Sokal 1981:334335). He concluded, Mental
states correspond to physical changes in the brain; henceforth, his goal was to inquire into the time needed to bring
about changes in the brain, and thus to determine the rapidity
of thought (Cattell 1886:241). The times he recorded were
now for cerebral processes without the intrusion of introspection. Cattells innovation paved the way for what Danziger
was to call the relentless discounting of the subjects experience in experimental psychology by the 1950s.
Torres Strait Islands: The Generalized Mind
Cattell opened a new road, but others continued to travel old
roads. Scientists on the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Strait Islands in 1898 continued understandings and practices sympathetic to Wundts introspection.
The members of the expedition included W. H. R. Rivers, C.
S. Myers, and Charles Seligman, among others, under the
leadership of Alfred Cort Haddon. Because the expeditions
scientists assumed that the social and natural environment
determined the way the mind perceived the world, they also
assumed that after immersion in the daily life of villagers on
the islands, they could serve as appropriate experimental subjects comparable with the native inhabitants. This enabled
their introspective reports of the time they took to react to
a stimulus to be measured and compared with the reports of
native Torres Strait Islanders. The notion of a generalized
mind (now extended to these islanders) entailed that the context in which such minds were trained determined their specific characteristics and made them commensurable.1 For this
reason, as in the Wundt lab, experimenters and subjects could
trade places. In one expedition photograph we see W. H. R.
Rivers sitting in front of the color wheel, a device used to
measure perception of different colors. Rivers and his Torres
Strait companion Tom are seated on the same side of the
table because Rivers is showing Tom how to use the color
wheel. Tom is being trained to operate the device in order to
gather perceptual information from the expedition scientists
(Kuklick 1998; Richards 1998).
These practices were especially well articulated by Rivers,
who believed that a resident of the Torres Straits Islands was
no different from any of Rivers experimental subjectsincluding Rivers himself (Kuklick 1998:174). Rivers explicitly
1. At the time of the Torres Strait expedition, the psychologists on the
team (W. H. R. Rivers and C. S. Myers) were haunted by the widely
accepted evolutionary theories of Herbert Spencer that primitives surpassed civilised people in psychophysical performance because more
energy remained devoted to this level in the former instead of being
diverted to higher functions, a central tenet of late Victorian scientific
racism (Richards 1998:137). Despite this, their experiments did not find
significant differences in the predicted direction.
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icized.9 Some critics have shown in detail how the psychological evidence that is the basis for the tenets of affect theory
is questionable and out of date (Leys 2010). Others have
detailed the ways affect theorists sometimes misread biological
and psychological research (Papoulias and Callard 2010). For
example, in a 1985 experiment by Benjamin Libet, subjects
were asked to decide to flex a finger at will and to note the
exact time they made the decision. The experimenters also
measured the exact time of any rise in the subjects brain
activity and the exact time of the subjects finger flexing. The
results showed that there was a 0.2-second delay between the
brains activity spike and the subjects decision, then a 0.3second delay between the subjects decision and his finger
flexing. In all, there seemed to be a half-second delay between
the subjects brains initial activity and the subjects finger
actually flexing (Libet 1985). This half-second gap provides
Massumi (2002:29) with the evidence of a gap between
(lower) brain activity and (higher) decision, intentionality and
action. He concludes that material processes of the brain generate our thoughts; conscious thoughts, decisions, and intentions come too late to be very significant. At most they are
reflections after the fact. No one would doubt that the brain
is necessary for thought and action. But Massumi and other
affect theorists place too much weight on this experimental
evidence. Other studies have shown that Libets evidence is
open to contrary interpretations from its publication in 1985
up until the present (Banks and Isham 2009, 2010; Gomes
1998). At the very least, before drawing such far-reaching
conclusions, one would hope scholars of cultural phenomena
would consider the experimental structures that generate psychological data. As I noted earlier, the psychological subject
becomes a particular kind of stripped down entity, a dataemitting being whose subjective experience is outside the
frame of the experiment. Perhaps this is not the most adequate
model for understanding human intentionality.
The mistakes and confusions in this position are laid bare
by the approach pioneered in the Cambridge Expedition and
later pursued in Wittgensteins account of intention, remembering, and other psychological terms. That account argues
that our criteria for whether they have happened are normative and conventional. These criteria are located in use,
not in the interior psyche. Saying that criteria for meaning
are normative and conventional does not mean that everyone
must agree, that there is harmony, or that there is not conflict
or change. It means that criteria for meaning cannot arise
from the mind of a single, isolated individual or from a primitive part of the brain. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Elizabeth
Anscombe argued for a social account of intentional actions.
Anscombe was arguing against the common-sense view of an
intention as composed of an action plus an interior mental
9. The point is too tangential to elaborate here, but I would add that
the theory involves a troubling alliance with neuroscientific findings
rather than a critique of the pervasive cultural effects of neuroscientific
findings.
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The point is that intentionality emerges from the whole structure of events from the inception of the notion to the execution of the action. We decide whether someone had a certain intention not by referring to an event or template in the
mind but by whether his or her gestures, postures, words,
and actions fit with a socially defined notion of being about
to whistle a tune or meaning to say something. Sometimes a
mental event (whistling the tune or saying the words in ones
head) might precede the action and sometimes not, but in
any case, that interior event could not constitute a usable
criterion for whether someone was intending to whistle or
meaning to speak.
Removing any interest in intentionalityconceived as a
social process, as affect theory doesremoves socially produced contexts of use as a necessary and sufficient basis for
what actions and words mean to people. Tackling mathematics, the realm of symbolic life perhaps most difficult to
regard as contingent on social norms, Wittgenstein commented that people found the idea that numbers rested on
conventional social understandings unbearable (Rhees
1970). Why is there resistance to allowing the meaning of
human acts to rest on social understandings all the way down?
Why such an idea is unbearable returns us to the Cambridge
Expedition. Rivers and the others thought that plunging into
a different social and physical environment would make them
different people, comparable in many ways to the islanders.
Potentiality
It is clear that the trait of potentiality is sometimes thrown
up as an object of desire because it seems to imply creativity,
openness, and infinite possibility unconstrained by social conventions. I want to suggest that in the ethnographic method
lies another kind of potentiality: the potential to examine the
ontological position that comparison between two social
worlds opens up. One key to what is unique about the ethnographic move is that it allows us to see an ordinary, everyday, natural setting in its context but from a certain point
of view. Wittgenstein muses,
Lets imagine a theatre, the curtain goes up and we see
someone alone in his room walking up and down, lighting
a cigarette, seating himself etc. so that suddenly we are ob10. A particularly useful reminder is Lutz (1995).
It is obvious that the theater creates its own context, but the
playwright/artist/ethnographer allows us to view that context
from a certain point of view, namely, from the point of view
of another embedded context: we can adopt the way of
thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves it
the way it is, contemplating it from above in its flight (Wittgenstein 1984:5e).11
In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein (1984) wrote of the
ethnological point of view and said that this point of view
allows us to take up a standpoint right outside so as to be
able to see things more objectively (37e).12 What could he
possibly have meant by more objectively, given his insistence that there is no external point, outside the immersion
in everyday forms of life, from which those forms of life can
be understood? I think more objectively means from a comparative point of view. Comparing two contexts means describing their differencesit does not mean placing them on
the same scale. Recall Myerss remarks on music: the ethnographic goal in understanding unfamiliar music is to banish to the margins our habitual focus of attention and make
the incomprehensible meaningful through faithful description.
Editor and biographer Rush Rhees (1970) wrote that what
Wittgenstein called the anthropological point of view had
often been misunderstood. He cited a comment of Wittgensteins about language games: The advantage of looking at
language games is that they let us look step by step at what
we otherwise could only see as a tangled ball of yarn (Rhees
1970:50; my translation). Wittgenstein warned against the
craving for generality as the real source of metaphysics. He
added, Instead of craving for generality I could also have
said the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case
(Rhees 1970:51). Ethnography could be said to be about particular cases set alongside one another but not balled up into
one another. Two tangled balls of yarn can look very much
the same; only when we look at them step by step (untangling
the ball of yarn) can we gather the details that make a context
specific, not general. Perhaps we could say that affect theorists
crave generality.
Is the widespread contempt for the particular case today
part of what drives the search for universal neural processes
11. Thanks to Michael Fried for his interesting discussion of this point
(Fried 2008).
12. Dass wir unsern Standpunkt weit draussen einnehmen, um die
Dinge objectiver sehen zu konnen.
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Conclusion
My interest is piqued by the ways Wittgenstein opens up to
theorize what kind of knowledge ethnography is. After my
early surprise while being a subject in a lab that was studying
emotions while disregarding my emotions, I have found a
number of labs in which I can observe and participate, labs
whose members are interested in the history of introspection
in psychology, for example, the work of Robert S. Woodworth,
who continued Wundts introspective methods and questions
(against the grain) into the 1930s. It would be a nice irony
if the practices of Rivers and the other Torres Strait researchers, indebted as they were to experimental psychology, could
clarify both what is important about ethnographic fieldwork
and why some contemporary psychologists are now beginning
to return to questions involving intention and introspection.
Although Cattells lip key opened a path to removing introspection, the historical record of earlier experiments that relied on introspective reports is extremely rich. A shared interest in this history is what opened laboratory doors to me.
If some experimental psychologists are becoming interested
in the role intentionality plays in their experiments, why are
some humanities scholars trying to rule out intentionality
from the literature, art, and media they study? Whatever the
reasons, it seems clear that to counteract the appeal of affect
theory and its notion of potentiality, we will need robust
ethnographic accounts that are specific about how humans
perceptions are social all the way down. Our history in the
Torres Strait guides us toward a limited and socially constrained but creative notion of potentiality.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to the spring 2011 seminar in the anthropology of
science at New York University for discussions of affect theory
and to Max Black, Georg von Wright, Norman Malcolm, and
Bruce Goldstein in the philosophy department at Cornell University for their lectures and discussions on Wittgenstein when
I was in graduate school there. I also appreciate help with the
historical sources from John Forrester, Alison Winter, Michael
Sokal, David Robinson, and Christopher Green. Most profound thanks to all of the members and organizers of the
Wenner-Gren symposium on potentiality and to the anonymous reviewers.
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