Topic: Due delegation

Administrative Agencies.

of

legislative

power

to

promulgate

laws

to

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner,

vs.
A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,respondents.
Citation: No. 47800.!December 2, 1940
Nature: Petitioner, a taxpayer of Manila, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondents.
Facts: Pursuant to Commonwealth Act 548, a resolution was issued by the
National Traffic Commission dated July 17, 1940, which recommended to the
Director of Public Works and Secretary of Public Works and Communications
to prohibit the passing of animal drawn vehicles from passing along the
national highway. After some revisions, such resolution was enforced by the
Mayor of Manila.
Issue: Is the petitioner correct in contending that the administrative
agencies exercise of regulation and control of the use of and traffic on
national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power?
Held: NO. As held in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil., 600)
The true distinction therefore between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, as conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made.
Under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548, it does not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred
upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations
now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of
the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The
delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom
is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.

Topic: Due delegation of legislative power

GIL BALBUNA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-14283; November 29, 1960
Nature: Appeal from a decision of CFI of Capiz dismissing their petition for
prohibition and mandamus against the Secretary of Education in
promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag
ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265.
Facts: Appellants are members of the Jehovahs Witnesses. They contend
that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue
delegations of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and
definite standard by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the
preparation of those rules and regulations which he has been authorized to
promulgate."
Issue: Whether or not Department order No. 8, which promulgated the law,
is an undue delegation of legislative power for want of specific standard.
Held: With this view we disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read as
follows:
Section 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth, observed daily
flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include
the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.
Section 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and
directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the
proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provide.
In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate
standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing
of the National Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards
heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest"(People vs. Rosenthal, 68
Phil. 328); "public welfare" (Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil.
547); Interest of law and order"(Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669;
justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case" (Int. Hardwood vs.
Pagil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and efficient
instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz.,
6230). That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is
no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the
laying down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the
regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of
exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative
flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.
Dispostive: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Ombudsman v Reyes
G.R. No. 170512
FACTS:Reyes as the Transportation Regular Officer/Acting OIC of LTO;
Penaloza as the Clerk III of LTO; Acero as the complainant
1)Acero failed the examination in obtaining a drivers license.
2) Penaloza offered him a choice to either retake the exam or pay the
additional cost.
3) Acero paid the additional cost
4) Acero filed a complaint against Penaloza and Reyes.
5) Penalozas counter-affidavit stated that Reyes was behind the scheme. He
also offered, as evidence, the affidavits of people confirming that such
scheme exists and that Reyes was the man behind it.
6) Reyes denied the allegations of Acero.
7) Ombudsman rendered a decision against Reyes and Penaloza. Reyes was
not furnished with a copy of Penalozas counter-affidavit involving him as the
person behind the scheme.
8) Reyes contention was that he was denied due process because he was
not furnished with the counter-affidavits.
ISSUE: WON failure to furnish counter-affidavits amounts to lack of due
process in an administrative case
HELD: Yes, there was a denial of due process.
In Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[38] that due process
inadministrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must
have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6)
in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it
and the various issues involved.[39]
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not
complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered
against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision
that found him guilty of grave misconduct. The records reveal that only the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the
said (Penaloza) affidavits.[40] Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the
affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a
co-respondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at
him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said

affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the
petitioners Decision dated September 24, 2001.