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ThoughtsonIndiasCentralAsiaStrategy
AmbRajivSikri,DistinguishedFellow,VIF

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Vivek:Issues&Options
May June 2015

ItisindeedencouragingthatinafewdaysPrimeMinisterModiwillbevisitingallthe
CentralAsiancountriessimultaneously,somethingthatnoIndianPrimeMinisterhas
done so far. However, India seems to be grappling with the same issues and
dilemmas in relation to Central Asia that were present in the nineties,
notwithstanding periodic efforts to kickstart the relationship. Why is this so? There are both objective
constraints,aswellassomemissedopportunities.
If it is to have an enduring impact, Prime Minister Modis visit will have to go beyond promoting goodwill
andtheusualbilateralagreementsanddiscussions.HemustgowithaclearstrategicperspectiveofIndias
relationswiththeCentralAsiancountrieswithoutthat,itwontbepossibletodevelopaviableCentralAsia
policy.IndiasrelationswiththeCentralAsianRepublics(CARs)musttakeintoaccountdevelopmentsinthe
wider Eurasian space that includes the five CARs, Afghanistan, Pakistan west of the Indus, Iran, Tibet,
Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including those regions currently
occupiedbyPakistanandChina.
Throughouthistory,Eurasiahasbeenastrategicnotameregeographicspace.Asageographicalareaonto
which the back doors, so to speak, of major Asian powers open, Eurasia has always attracted, and will
continue to attract, the attention of outside powers. It is a negative security space, an area where major
powerscannotaffordtoletcompetingmajorpowersorforcesexerciseadominatinginfluencebecausethat
would pose a threat to their own security. The Cold War and the impermeable political borders of Eurasia
duringthisperioddulledstrategicperceptionsaboutthisregion,butthatwasageostrategicaberration.
Forthelastquartercentury,Eurasiahasbeenonceagainatthecentreofglobalgeopolitics.Inthesecond

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halfofthe19thcenturyandtheearly20thcentury,itwasthesettingfortheGreatGamebetweenimperial
BritainandTsaristRussia.Acenturylater,thegeostrategicimperativesremainunchanged,onlythegame
has become more complicated, with energy emerging as an additional factor in strategic calculations.
ConnectivityacrossEurasiahasdramaticallyimproved.Roads,railwaytracksaswellasoilandgaspipelines
andpowertransmissionlinesarecrisscrossingtheregion.Ofcourse,soaredrugsmugglers,terroristsand
fundamentalists.
The CARs, both collectively and individually, are today much weaker than their geographically contiguous
largeneighbourslikeRussiaandChina.Betweenthetwo,RussiasinfluencehasdeclinedwhileChinashas
steadilyincreasedintheCARsoverthelastquartercentury.Since9/11,theUnitedStateshasalsobecome
anactiveplayerintheregion.Thesethreepowersaretheprincipaloutsideplayers.Otherpowerssuchas
Europe,Japan,Turkey,Iran,PakistanandIndiastillplayonlymarginalroles.

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RussiaistakingpurposefulstepstoregainitspreponderantinfluenceintheCARs.Ithasenmeshedmostof
theminregionalsecurityandmilitaryarrangementsliketheCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganization(CSTO)
as well as through bilateral military agreements. A Russiadominated Eurasian Economic Union including
KazakhstanandKyrgyzstanhasbeensetupTajikistantoomayjoinit.Russiahasmanyadditionalleversin
Central Asia viz. a significant and influential Russian origin population good networking dependence of
many CARs on remittances of migrants working in Russia transit facilities for landlocked CARs and
considerable economic interdependence of CARs with Russia. While wanting to reduce the strong grip of
Russia that held them for seven decades, the CARs realize that they can neither ignore nor do without
Russia.
A rising China is systematically and relentlessly sucking the CARs into its economic whirlpool. Energy
supplies for its fastgrowing economy, a proximate market for its products, and a security buffer for
XinjiangtheseareChinasmainconcernsvisvistheCARs.HavingtakenoverXinjiang,itnowseeksto
dominate the CARs. This wont be easy, since China faces many serious longterm challenges. Xinjiang,
which has extensive ethnic, economic, social and other ties with the CARs could turn out to be Chinas
Achillesheel.Uighurnationalismremainsstrong.The fate of the Muslim Uighurs carries resonance among
the Islamic ummah. Some Uighur elements appear to have developed linkages with the alQaeda, the
Talibanand,morerecently,theIslamicStatetoo.Xinjiangssecurityandstabilitycouldbecompromisedby
turmoilorturbulenceintheCARs.ChinarealizesthisitslatestDefenceWhitePapermentionsthedangers
from separatist forces fighting for East Turkestan independence. Moreover, despite benefiting from
Chinas economic growth the CARs remain wary of becoming economically too dependent on China, and

worry about creeping Chinese demographic expansionism. Historically, China has been viewed by Central
Asians as an expansionist and dominating power, and recent Chinese muscle flexing in Southeast Asia
wouldhavereinforcedtraditionalsuspicionsaboutChinasattitudetowardsweakneighbours.
Capitalizingonthefavourableclimateafter9/11,theUnitedStatesrushedtoestablishanumberofbasesin
theregion,whichithassincehadtovacateunderthecombinedpressureofRussiaandtheCARs.Whileits
otherglobalpreoccupationshavereducedUSinterestinCentralAsiaunderPresidentObama,USpolicyhas
always been to somehow detach the CARs from Russias sphere of influence and integrate them
economically with Afghanistan and South Asia. The ongoing RussiaUS standoff over Ukraine would have
only reinforced US determination in this respect. Central Asians welcome the United States as a check on
bothChinaandRussia,buttheyrealizetheficklenessofUSpoliciesandlevelofinterest,andremainwary
ofUSproclivitytoworkforregimechangeandexertpressureonhumanrightsissues.
WheredoesIndiafitintothispicture?OverthecenturiesthemostextensiveconnectionsofCentralAsians
with the outside world have been with India. Nor has India ever posed any ideological, demographic or
territorialthreattoCentralAsia.ThusCentralAsianshavealwayshadaromanticattractiontowardsIndia,
reinforced by close and friendly relations during Soviet times. That is a good starting point, but nothing
more. Today, at a general level, the CARs want a more active Indian presence to balance the other major
players who carry considerable baggage. So far, however, the CARs and India havent been able to
reconnect meaningfully principally because of the absence of easy and reliable connectivity. Since there
does not appear to be any immediate solution to this problem, economic and peopletopeople linkages
betweentheCARsandIndiaremainweak.Traderoutesarelong,cumbersomeanduneconomical.Thelegal
systems,regulatoryandtaxationprovisionsintheCARsleavemuchtobedesired.There are other factors
too why Indian private entrepreneurs find the CARs comparatively less attractive than many other places
viz. poor air connectivity difficulties in getting visas unfamiliarity with local languages and some bad
experiencesofIndiancompaniesintheCARsintheearlyyearsaftertheirindependence.Perhapseconomic
relations will get a boost if India were to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic
Union.Astudygrouphasbeenrecentlysetuptoexaminethisproposal.
Morethantradeingoods,thetwosidesshouldfocusontradeinservicesanduseoftheCARsasatransit
point.Leveragingtheirlocation,theCARscould,however,becomeapassengerandcargohubforairtraffic
from India to Siberia and the Russian Far East region in one direction, and to Europe in the other, in the
wayDubai,AbuDhabi,DohaandSingaporehavepositionedthemselves.TheCARscouldalsodeveloptheir
potentialasatourismdestinationforIndianswithcompetitivepricing,amoreliberalvisaregimeandbetter
airconnectivity.TherecouldevenbejointmarketingofCentralAsiaandnorthIndiatotherestoftheworld
asaMughalTrail.
A blueprint for IndiaCentral Asia cooperation was outlined in Indias Connect Central Asia Policy three
yearsago.Thisneedstobefleshedoutandimplementedearnestly.OneofthefirstthingsthatIndiashould
doistochangeitsimageintheCARs.InsteadofthetraditionalstereotypeofSoviettimes,Indiashouldbe
projectedasamodern,scientificallyandtechnologicallyadvancedcountrywithcapabilitiesthatarerelevant
forthedevelopmentoftheCARs.Someoftheconcreteinitiativesthatcouldbepushedare:encouragement
to private Indian airlines and charter flights to operate between India and Central Asia significant
expansionofexistingprogrammesoftechnicalcooperationsothatmoreyoungpeoplevisitIndiatodevelop
skills that are needed in their home countries larger loans on soft terms for infrastructure projects. In
return, India would very much like to gain access to the rich natural resources of the CARs and some
specializeddefencetechnologiesandproductionfacilities.
Itmustbeemphasized,however,thatIndiasinterestsinEurasiaarefundamentallystrategic.TheCARsare
superficially stable but inherently fragile states, with incomplete nation building, underdeveloped political
institutionsandtraditions,noacceptedmechanismforperiodictransferofpoliticalpower,andeconomically
stillconsiderablytiedtoabeleagueredRussia.Weakandunstablestateswithcentrifugaltendenciescould
become a haven for terrorists, separatists, drug dealers and fundamentalists, linked up with similar
elements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and West Asia. India has a strong interest in seeing stable and secular
CARs. This is a formidable challenge that will not be easily met without largescale investments that
promote economic development and reduce unemployment among the youth, thereby giving people long
termhopeaboutabrighterfuture.
AstableEurasiaisintheinterestofallcountriesoftheregion.However,theprospectsoflongtermstability
andpeacearebleakifthegreatpowersindulgeinanewzerosumGreatGameinEurasia.Wisdomliesin
all countries adopting a cooperative rather than a competitive approach. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) is potentially a promising vehicle for such cooperation. India hopes to join it as a full
member,butthisisnotagivensincetheattitudeofChinaremainsambivalent.Unfortunately, the SCO is
ChinadominatedandChinadriven.WhilefullmembershipwillcertainlyraiseIndiasprofileinCentralAsia,
it is unlikely to help India achieve its core interests in Central Asia. China and Pakistan, both individually
andjointly,seemdeterminedtounilaterallypursuetheirperceivedstrategicinterestsintheregion.
Apart from the CARs, developments in Xinjiang, geographically contiguous to both the CARs and India,
havedirectandfarreachingimplicationsforIndiassecurity.Indianeedstocarefullystudyandanticipate
various scenarios in Xinjiang. Chinas strong strategic partnership with Pakistan, and physical connectivity
viaXinjiang,hasbeenreinforcedbytheambitiousChinaPakistanEconomicCorridorproject.Thesuccessof
Chinas Silk Route Economic Belt initiative will enable China to dominate the Central Asian Republics and
Afghanistan(whereitismakingsignificantinvestmentsandisalsotryingtoplayapoliticalrole).If China
weretoemergeasthepreponderantpowerinEurasia,thiswouldconstituteatectonicgeopoliticalshiftthat

India, can countenance with equanimity, as this would significantly undermine Indias strategic interests
andsecurity.
Thus Indias approach to this region cannot be passive. India must strive to get a firm foothold in the
Eurasian space, including Afghanistan, so that forces inimical or hostile to Indias interests like China and
Pakistandonotdominateit,particularlyifeconomicandotherinfluenceisbackedbyamilitarypresence.In
ordertoensureitssecurity,Indiahastoexerciseatleastsomedegreeofinfluence,ifnotcontrol,overthe
transHimalayan strategic space in Eurasia. It must become relevant to the growth, development and
prosperityoftheCARs.Forthistohappen,ithastobeinvolvedinEurasianenergypolitics.Smallindividual
investmentsofthekindIndiahasmadeinKazakhstanareinadequate.Whatisneededisabigprojectthat
creates longterm mutually beneficial linkages of India and the CARs and, equally important, is in
conformitywiththestrategicinterestoftheconcernedparties.
Inthiscontext,IransstrategicrelevancetoIndiahasgoneup.ApartfromotherfactorslikeIransintrinsic
importance as a major player in the Persian Gulf, and Irans rich oil and gas reserves, Iran is currently
IndiasonlyroutetoAfghanistanandtheCentralAsianRepublics.IndiaandIranwillalsoneedtocooperate
to try to stabilize Afghanistan. Already a formidable regional power, Irans role will only increase after a
nuclear deal is clinched with the P5+1. After submitting to US pressure over Iran for a decade, India is
now repairing its disrupted ties with Iran. The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding on the
development of Chabahar port, not merely as an economic but more so as a strategic project, and the
reactivation of the NorthSouth Corridor are long overdue and important concrete steps in this direction.
Theseneedtobefollowedupurgentlywithhighlevelexchanges,includingatthePrimeMinisterslevel.
Since Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Qatar have about twothirds of the worlds exportable surplus of
naturalgas,EurasiashouldbeatthecentreofIndiasgasimportstrategy.Forallthesecountriestoo,India
is a proximate and attractive longterm market. Russia can no longer count on the longterm loyalty and
dependenceofitstraditionalEuropeancustomers,themoresoaftertheUkrainecrisis.Indiaisanimportant
alternativemarket.TurkmenistanisalreadypushingtheTAPIpipelineprojecttoexportitsgastoIndiaand
Pakistan.AsforIran,itwilldefinitelywanttotaplargegasmarketslikeIndiaoncesanctionsareremoved,
hopefully quite soon. Qatars future as a major gas exporter is linked with Iran, with which it shares the
same principal gas field (South Pars/ North Dome). India already has energy investments in Russia and
Kazakhstan and there is an agreement in principle with both countries to explore the possibility of energy
pipeline projects to India. If the Central Asian countries work with Russia and Iran, Eurasia can be hard
wiredwithIndiainawebofinterdependence.Thishastobeconceivedandexecutedasastrategicproject,
notmerelyasaneconomicorenergydeal.
India must try to persuade Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to let India develop, or at least
allocatetoIndia,somelargegasfieldsthatcanbeasourceoflongtermgassupplytoIndia.The greater
challengewilllieintransportingEurasiangastoIndia.TheLNGrouteistoolongandexpensive,atleastfor
now. Purely land routes from Eurasia to India pose many problems. Given the continuing lack of trust
between India and Pakistan, and the uncertainties surrounding Afghanistan, it is doubtful if either the
TurkmenistanAfghanistanPakistanIndia (TAPI) or the IranPakistanIndia (IPI) pipeline projects will
actually fructify. Under these circumstances, the only feasible alternative is a landcumsea pipeline from
EurasiatoIndiaviatheIranianportofChabahar.
One possible route is from western Siberia in Russia to Chabahar via west Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The advantage of this route is that it involves fewer countries and can also incorporate existing swap
arrangementsbetweenIranandTurkmenistan.AnotherrouteisfromeasternSiberiainRussiatosoutheast
KazakhstanviatheAltairegion,ontoKyrgyzstanandUzbekistansFerghanaValley,thencewesttoKhojent
inTajikistanatthemouthoftheFerghanaValley,andthereafterintoAfghanistan,alongtheMazaresharif
HeratDelaramZaranjroute(whichisoutsidetheTalibansareaofinfluence)beforeenteringeastern
Iran and down south to Chabahar. The advantage of this route is that it would also serve Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and western Afghanistan, and thereby help to stabilize these countries. On the flip
side, it would definitely be a more complicated project. Perhaps it might be better to start with the first
optionandthenconsidertheeasternroutelater.
From Chabahar, there would be an undersea pipeline via Oman to ports in Gujarat. Two gas hubs would
come up. One would be in Chabahar, fed by Russian, Turkmen and possibly also Kazakh gas from the
north,togetherwithIransowngasfromSouthPars.AnotherhubwouldbeinOmanwherethegaspiped
from Chabahar under the sea would meet up with Qatar gas piped across the UAE. An Indian company,
South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE), has done a study on the commercial and technical viability of such
underseapipelinesbetweenIran/OmanandIndia,andisactivelyworkingwiththeconcernedgovernments
totakeitforward.
OnehopesthatasPrimeMinisterModipreparestovisitCentralAsia,hisGovernmentandhisadvisersare
lookingatconceptualizingamajorstrategicprojectofthekindsuggestedabove.Ifsuchaprojectwereto
be endorsed by the CARs during his visit, that would be a significant breakthrough in Indias floundering
CentralAsiapolicy.
PublishedDate:2ndJuly2015,ImageSource:http://www.presstv.ir
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policyorpositionoftheVivekanandaInternationalFoundation)
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