IX.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Thinking Like a Lawyer

(Vandevelde)
final step in legal analysis- applying the law
law = rules + underlying policies
two methods of using rules deduction & analogy
Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on
the Role of the Judge
(John M. Walker, Jr.)

Textualism the judges job is to understand the law as given and to

convey that understanding in an interpretation thats faithful to the
command that preceded the judges involvement
o Criticism: it permits odd results that couldnt have been
intended by the legislature. It may lead to injustices in
particular cases
o Look to external sources such as legislative history to confirm
a plain meaning & to discern the meaning when the txt is
ambiguous

Purposivism - The judge isnt simply to adopt the statutory law as

stated but to read it in such a way as to improve upon it by reaching
an interpretation that comports w/ the larger purpose/s of the
enactment & any practical concerns, as well as general notions of
justice, social purpose & morality
o Criticism: it permits unelected judges to effectively enact their
own personal preferences, robbing the law of its objective
character while violating the Constis prescriptions on
lawmaking and the separation of powers
o Discerning the underlying general purpose expressed by the
legislature in enacting a particular law examine a wide range
of matls and sources
Statutory Interpretation - In the classroom and in the Courtroom
(Richard A. Posner)
He says that canons of Statutory construction are mechanically applied &
that should not be the case cause most of them are just plain WRONG!
Supposed to be functions of a Canon:
1. part of a code which gives it
2. common sense guide to interpretation
3. limits delegation of legislative power to court.
Specific Canons and their Errors:
1. plain text rules - judges really don't do this, he does not use it at
all; too ambiguous as a starting point
2. remedial statutes are to be construed broadly - unrealistic about
legislative objectives

3.

use of post enactment statements - courts cant predict the

preference of current legislature
4. interpretation of administrative agency given weight - officials
don't have fidelity to know intent of the Congress.
*StatCon rules are wrong mostly because they put to much omniscience to
Congress. But Congress, when it enacted the law bases it on something
that did not happen yet, so the laws are in themselves, incomplete.
5. every word of statute must be given significance - it is not true
that
statutes are carefully drafted.
6.
repeal by implication not favored - but congress cannot foresee
every law
that will be passed.
7. expressio unius est exclusio alterius - it would make sense only if
all
of legislative drafting are deliberate.
HEY, but there are meritorious statutes!!!
1. penal statutes must be construed liberally in favor of accused consistent with due process
2. statutes should be constructed not only to save them from being
invalidated but to avoid even raising serious constitutional
questions - minimizes frictions created by the institution of judicial
review.
SO WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE TO CANONS?
1. look at the values & attitudes so far as they are known today, & of
the period in which the legislation was enacted
2. Interpret only the obvious - words must be read within the context
so it would yield meaning.
3. NO TO JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (court's tendency to interpret so many
statutes)

1.

Definition, Concept & Purpose

Caltex v Palomar

FACTS:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines)
Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivers".

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls
within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the
requested clearance. Relying on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of
Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of
1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of
December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of
the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was
conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all
its representatives".
The trial court rendered judgment holds that the proposed 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under
the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal
Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said
rules by the mails. The respondent appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by
the appellee is a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt
with under the Postal Law.
RULING:
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery
that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal
Law.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using
almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof,
supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the
Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the
use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning
"any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon
these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is
used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery
settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics
noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although
only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that
the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than

that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith.
Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also
must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not
in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be
remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an
accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are
declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar
schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com.
vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is
inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger
amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the
contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to
obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and
no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving
the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City
of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and
Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
We find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise.
In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions
of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like
lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the
contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the
use of the mails for purposes thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
General v Barrameda
Refresher: Land was mortgaged to DBP and the property was foreclosed.
The owners wanted to redeem it but the TC said that redemption period
started from the date of sale at public auction and they tried to pay the fee
beyond the redemption period. CA reversed the decision.
Doctrine: Use of the words sale or auction sale means the same thing.
It is important to know the purpose and objective of the law in giving
mortgagors a period of redemption of their foreclosed property. Because

of this, we should construe sale as starting from the day the land was
registered to the new owners because that is the operative act of
transferring land.
Molina v Rafferty
Refresher: Petitioner here contends that his fish products are to be
regarded as agricultural product used in sec. 41, Act No. 2339, thus, he
should be exempt from the percentage tax on merchants sales. SC held
that it was an agricultural product.
Doctrine: Long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law, while
not conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous. The
underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature
should be sought in the words employed to express it, & that when found,
it should be made to govern. If the words of the law seem to be doubtful
import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in
order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was
taken; what evil, is any, was meant to be redressed. And where the law
was contemporaneously been put upon it, this construction, esp if followed
for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very
probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, & is not lightly to be
overruled, although it isnt conclusive.

2.

Power to Construe; Limitations

Endencia v David

Refresher: Congress passed RA 590 which states that any public officer
shall not be exempt from income tax. BIR nor collected from petitioner
judges income taxes.The issue of this case is whether or not the salaries of
the members of the SC and the judges can be diminished.
Doctrine: Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts
by the Constitution. The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-founded and
established province and jurisdictionof the Judiciary. The legislature cannot
lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the SC
has decided otherwise.
Angara v Electoral Commission [1936]
Refresher: for Congressman proclaimed by National Assembly already,
can Electoral Commission still accept protest against him?
Doctrine: Yes. as per law.
Settled rule of construction: where a general power is conferred,

every particular power necessary for exercise of the one is also

conferred [necessary implication!]