Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SWORDS2
and
since
introduced
MAARS;
tele-operated
tracked
robots
that
can
be
mounted
with
a
rifle,
light
machine
gun,
grenade
or
incendiary
rocket
launcher.
While
the
Samsungs
SGR-1
Security
Guard
Robot
does
operate
with
considerable
autonomy
(equipped
with
surveillance,
tracking,
firing
and
voice-recognition
systems,
it
is
does
have
an
automatic
mode
that
will
allow
it
to
decide
to
fire
upon
its
acquired
target)
most
devices
including
SWORDS
are
teleoperator
controlled.
What
is
initially
interesting
is
the
degree
to
which
autonomy
is
imputed
to
these
teleoperated
robots
despite
the
fact
that
they
are
in
essence
sophisticated
remote
control
devices.3
Accordingly,
this
paper
argues
that
underlying
these
representations
of
military
robots
as
autonomous
agents
is
a
kind
of
techno-fetishism.
However,
military
robot
fetishism
is
not
simply
based
upon
an
irrational
or
mistaken
belief
about
the
real
capacities
of
the
robots
but
instead
their
fetish
value
stems
from
their
positive
valuation
according
to
a
code
of
functionality
that
rests
upon
the
risk-transfer
labour
of
the
robot.
At
the
same
time,
the
values
imputed
to
the
mil-bot
fetish
are
understood
as
representing
multiple
constituencies
and
more
specifically
draw
upon
the
public's
historically
recent
veneration
of
the
soldier
in
order
to
rearticulate
differing
civil
and
martial
systems
of
value
into
a
hegemonic
ordering.
In
this
way,
it
will
be
argued
that
military
robotics
becomes
a
science
of
imaginary
technical
solutions
to
the
problem
of
war
legitimation.
Thus,
the
promotion
of
military
robot
fetishism
in
the
mass
media
means
that
the
military
robot
as
fetish
comes
to
circulate
within
both
martial
and
civilian
lifeworlds,
re-legitimizing
warfare
and
affording
further
the
militarization
of
civic
life.
It
is
only
after
about
a
minute
into
the
video
that
it
is
revealed
that
the
robot
is
not
operating
autonomously:
Narrator:
SWORDS
is
operated
by
soldiers
safely
out
of
harms
way
[shot
of
soldier-operator
at
a
controller]
who
control
its
movements,
choose
its
targets,
and
fire
its
weapons
all
from
a
laptop
computer.
With
its
night
and
thermal
vision,
and
seven
camera
capacity,
SWORDS
and
locate
and
destroy
an
enemy
up
to
a
mile
away.
Similarly,
in
the
Smart
Weapons
(2006)
episode
of
FutureWeapons,
the
portion
of
the
program
dedicated
to
the
SWORDS
robot
again
opens
with
footage
of
a
robot
that
seems
to
function
autonomously.
Host:
Imagine
a
soldier
that
never
has
to
eat
or
sleep.
Who
never
experiences
fear.
And
never
complains.
[Cuts
back
and
forth
between
medium
distant
full
shots
of
host
and
close
up
partial
shots
of
different
parts
of
the
moving
SWORDS
Talon
robot]
Host:
Who
is
three
feet
tall,
has
four
eyes,
and
can
see
in
the
dark.
[Cuts
between
POV
shot
of
robot
and
back
to
medium
close-up
of
host]
Host:
And,
who
is
so
attached
to
his
weapon
that
it
takes
a
screwdriver
and
pair
of
pliers
to
take
it
from
him.
[Cuts
between
close-up
of
host
and
SWORDS
robot
fitted
with
a
light
machine
gun
being
discharged.]
Not
until
just
past
one
minute
into
item
is
the
viewer
told
that
This
smart
wheeled
assassin,
is
controlled
by
a
soldier
calling
the
shots
from
a
safe
distance
from
the
enemy
and
the
device
is
revealed
to
be
operating
tele-remotely
by
the
visual
representation
of
the
soldier-operator.
Indeed
this
manner
of
introducing
the
robot
has
become
such
a
convention
that
in
the
film
The
Hurt
Locker
(Bigelow
2008),
which
is
fundamentally
about
an
EOD
technicians
addiction
to
going
into
harms
way,
the
opening
scene
also
commences
with
a
PackBot
seemingly
racing
independently
into
a
suspected
IED
site
as
it
is
being
evacuated.
This
animism
of
the
military
robots
is
further
accomplished
by
the
practice
of
representing
them
as
objects
of
affection.
For
example,
in
the
Future
Combat
episode
of
FutureWeapons
the
host
kneels
down
beside
a
Future
Combat
Systems
SUGV
robot
[robot
head
is
swivelling
and
then
rises
as
host
talks]
Host:
This
cute
little
guy
right
here
is
SUG-V
Small
Unmanned
Ground
Vehicle.
Its
a
man
portable
robot
that
goes
and
does
reconnaissance
missions.
You
can
send
him
into
harms
way
and
keep
your
soldiers
safe.
[host
pats
robot
on
head]
Host:
Good
job.
Another
example
of
this
appears
in
the
Popular
Mechanics
magazine
feature
Americas
Robot
Army:
The
MULE
is
toying
with
my
emotions.
After
running
through
its
full
range
of
articulated
positions
a
hilarious
diagnostic
dance
routine
that
has
it
pivoting,
rising
and
tipping
its
wheels
off
the
road
the
object
is
now
ramming
a
car.
The
sedan
offers
little
resistance,
sliding
across
the
asphalt.
Like
proud
owners
watching
their
pit
bull
tear
through
a
chew
toy,
the
small
crowd
of
defense
contractors
and
engineers
are
chuckling
(Sofge
2008:
63).
The
comparison
to
a
dog
is
not
an
uncommon
one
and
certainly
works
to
remind
the
reader
of
the
familiar
adage
about
the
dogs
relationship
to
man.
Of
course
robots
are
often
treated
by
their
operators
in
the
field
as
familiar
objects
of
affection
and
this
is
demonstrated
in
the
practice
of
naming
robots.
EOD
teams,
for
example,
are
often
quoted
providing
pet
names
for
their
assigned
robots
and
manufacturers
such
as
iRobot
have
made
great
mileage
out
of
this
practice
in
their
publicity.
Thus
in
Robo-Warriors
(2007)
a
clip
is
included
of
a
soldier
explaining
that
they
have
named
their
bots
Stimpy
and
Ren
(Ren
is
on
standby
in
the
truck
right
now)
and
that
Stimpy
is
probably
the
most
valuable
asset
we
have
to
the
team.
Treatments
such
as
these
all
contribute
to
the
image
of
the
robot
as
reliable
helpmate
that
can
only
be
of
benefit
to
soldiers
in
the
field.
As
the
above
examples
suggest,
the
robots
are
frequently
presented
in
an
animistic
fashion
or
as
artificially
intelligent
devices
capable
of
fulfilling
tasks
independent
of
the
actual
controller.
While
this
is
most
common
when
introducing
the
device,
it
is
also
not
uncommon
to
further
animate
the
robot
when
detailing
its
capacities.
Accordingly,
even
after
revealing
the
SWORDS
robot
to
be
tele-operated,
the
Robo-
Warriors
video
continues
to
represent
the
robot
as
if
it
were
an
autonomous
technology:
With
its
night
and
thermal
vision
and
seven
camera
capacity,
SWORDS
can
locate
and
destroy
an
enemy
up
to
a
mile
away.
Clearly,
it
would
actually
be
the
soldier-operator
that
would
locate
and
destroy
an
enemy
using
the
technical
features
of
the
SWORDS
robot4.
And
while
it
may
be
tempting
to
dismiss
this
predilection
for
representing
the
robots
as
autonomous
devices
as
a
symptom
of
the
over-valuation
of
the
robot
based
upon
a
misunderstanding
of
the
robots
real
capacities,
I
would
like
to
propose
a
somewhat
different
interpretation.
with
a
shot
that
includes
both
robot
and
operator.
Clearly
what
is
happening
is
that
the
robot
is
being
offered
up
to
the
viewer
as
a
marvellous
object.
In
this
way,
it
is
not
difficult
to
argue
that
the
military
robot
is
being
presented
as
a
techno-fetish.
It
initially
seems
to
behave
as
if
it
possesses
a
life
of
its
own
but
its
animation
is
not
the
result
of
spirits
but
rather
technology.
It
is
precisely
this
obsession
with
(re)presenting
the
robot
as
an
autonomous
technology
that
contributes
to
its
positive
valuation
as
a
technical
solution
to
a
needed
functionality.
Characterizing
military
robotic
devices
as
fetish
objects
is
not
without
its
problems.
Fetishism
as
a
concept
enters
into
social
theory
in
the
proto-anthropological
accounts
of
savage
peoples
and
their
supposed
practices
of
worshiping
objects
as
a
kind
of
pre-religion.
Both
Freud
and
Marx
inherit
this
conception
of
fetishism,
attributing
to
it
a
kind
of
misunderstanding
of
the
nature
of
the
significance
of
the
object
and
the
misattribution
of
qualities
properly
associated
with
human
subjects
to
objects
instead.
In
being
used
to
pass
judgment
on
a
perceived
over-valuation
of
an
object
that
is
indicative
of
a
false
consciousness
of
the
real
conditions
of
the
world,
fetishism
would
seem
to
be
of
limited
usefulness
in
thinking
through
the
actual
processes
of
valuation
that
endow
the
object
with
its
special
significance.
In
his
critique
of
Marxian
political
economy,
Baudrillard
(1981:
90),
for
example,
observes
that
the
term
fetishism
almost
has
taken
on
a
life
of
its
own.
Instead
of
functioning
as
a
metalanguage
for
the
magical
thinking
of
others,
it
turns
against
those
who
use
it
and
surreptitiously
exposes
their
own
magical
thinking.
For
Baurdrillard
(1981:
88),
calling
upon
fetishism
to
describe
human
relations
with
10
objects
is
a
kind
of
fetish
itself:
it
is
the
conceptual
fetish
of
vulgar
social
thought.
Turning
to
what
he
refers
to
as
the
great
fetish
metaphor
is
dangerous
he
argues
because
it
forestalls
analysis,
allowing
one
to
substitute
rigorous
thought
with
a
kind
of
magical
thinking
about
the
thinking
of
others.
As
such,
the
metaphor
of
fetishism
depends
upon
and
simultaneously
shores
up
a
rationalistic
metaphysics.
In
being
able
to
reveal
the
irrational
thought
and
erroneous
judgment
of
others,
one
can
readily
dispatch
any
doubts
that
ones
own
thought
is
anything
but
both
rational
and
sound.
In
this
way,
Baudrillard
(1981:
88)
warns
us
that
invoking
fetishism
is
dangerous
not
only
because
it
short-circuits
analysis,
but
because
since
the
18th
century
it
has
conducted
the
whole
repertoire
of
occidental
Christian
and
humanist
ideology
At
the
same
time,
I
argue
that
this
does
not
preclude
using
the
concept
of
fetishism
to
critically
think
about
the
magical
thinking
of
others
(see
also
Roderick,
2010).
Hornborg
(2006:
22)
for
example
draws
from
Latours
call
for
a
symmetrical
anthropology
to
propose
an
anthropology
that
does
not
merely
represent
an
urban,
modern
perspective
on
the
pre-moderns
in
the
margins,
but
that
is
equally
capable
of
subjecting
modern
life
itself
to
cultural
analysis.
For
Hornborg,
fetishism
is
not
simply
a
false
understanding
of
subject-object
relations
but
rather
constitutes
a
strategy
for
knowing
the
world.
What
Hornborg
is
pointing
to
is
a
more
positive
or
productive
understanding
of
the
process
of
fetishism.
Likewise,
for
Dant
(1999:
121),
the
fetish
object
is
understood
as
a
site
of
mediated
social
value
such
that
its
perceived
special
qualities
are
emergent
through
a
process
whereby
[o]bjects
are
noticed,
are
given
attention,
are
drawn
into
relevance
and
constituted
as
meaningful
11
through
social
interaction.
In
this
way,
the
fetish
object
is
not
simply
a
negation
of
a
repressed
or
misunderstood
reality,
nor
is
it
simply
reflecting
back
the
ideas
and
beliefs
of
its
worshippers,
it
is
transforming
them
or,
in
the
language
of
actor-
network
theory,
translating
them
(Dant,
1999:
44).
Thus,
the
fetish
is
actually
more
than
a
sign
like
any
medium,
the
materiality
of
the
fetish
does
not
simply
carry
the
sign
or
significance
of
its
value
but
rather
imbeds
itself
in
its
message,
(re)articulating
it
so
as
to
privilege
a
particular
trajectory
out
of
many
possibilities
(see
Akrich
and
Latour
1992:
259).
In
view
of
this,
the
fetish
has
inter-subjective
consequences
for
the
fetishists.
Despite
his
forewarning
of
the
fetishism
of
fetishism,
Baudrillard
opens
the
door
to
a
more
productive
or
positive
conception
of
fetishism.
Revisiting
the
etymology
of
the
term,
fetish,
Baudrillard
(1981:
91)
draws
out
an
earlier
meaning
that
precedes
its
more
familiar
usage
as
a
sign
of
misattribution
or
misunderstanding:
Today
it
refers
to
a
force,
a
supernatural
property
of
the
object
and
hence
to
a
similar
magical
potential
in
the
subject
But
originally
it
signified
exactly
the
opposite:
a
fabrication,
an
artifact,
a
labor
of
appearances
and
signs.
Baudrillard
(1991:
93)
proceeds
then
to
argue
that
[i]f
fetishism
exists
it
is
thus
not
a
fetishism
of
the
signified
it
is
a
fetishism
of
the
signifier.
The
fetish
value
of
the
object,
therefore
stems
not
from
obfuscated
social
labour
but
rather
from
the
very
social
labour
invested
in
fetishizing
the
object
itself.
It
is
precisely
this
role
the
fetish
plays
as
a
sign
or
mediator
of
social
value
(Dant
1999:
41)
that
begins
to
explain
the
fascination
the
fetish
holds
for
the
fetishist.
In
this
way,
fetishism,
understood
as
a
sign
of
cultural
labor
(Baudrillard,
1981:
91)
rather
than
of
a
mistaken
belief
in
12
the
order
of
things,
can
still
lend
itself
to
the
production
of
a
metalanguage
for
critically
thinking
about
the
magical
thinking
and
social
values
of
others.
My
intention
is
not
to
simply
adopt
a
celebratory
stance
towards
fetishism
in
general
but
rather
to
re-appropriate
the
term
so
as
to
critically
engage
with
the
magical
thinking
that
gives
the
military
robot
its
fetish
status.
We
may
at
some
level
all
be
fetishists,
but
what
we
choose
to
fetishize
is
telling.
For
an
object
to
acquire
the
status
of
fetish,
it
must
be
transformed
into
a
sign
of
cultural
value
and
this
transformation
is
accomplished
through
its
appropriation
into
social
relations.
If
we
accept
Baudrillards
(1981:
63-87)
thesis
that
both
human
need
and
object
use
are
socially
constituted,
then
the
fetish
object
derives
its
status
not
through
any
intrinsic
property
but
rather
through
the
significance
granted
to
its
perceived
or
attributed
capabilities.
And
just
as
needs
are
socially
derived,
the
functionality
of
the
object
is
not
so
much
an
intrinsic
property
as
it
is
what
ties
the
object
to
a
system
of
needs
and
practices
which
arise
in
relation
to
those
defined
needs.
To
Baudrillard,
(1996:
67)
functionality
in
no
way
qualifies
what
is
adapted
to
a
goal,
merely
what
is
adapted
to
an
order
or
system:
functionality
is
the
ability
to
become
integrated
into
an
overall
scheme.
An
objects
functionality
is
the
ability
to
become
a
combining
element,
an
adjustable
item,
within
a
universal
system
of
signs.
It
is
to
the
degree
to
which
the
robot
cannot
only
offer
a
needed
functionality
but
exceed
it
offer
it
in
excess
that
gives
it
its
value
and
thus
allows
it
to
gain
the
status
of
fetish.
Therefore,
in
order
for
the
object
to
be
venerated,
it
must
be
valued
according
to
a
code
of
functionality
which
orders
both
human
subjects
and
material
13
objects
(Dant
1999:
49).
The
mil-bot
fetish
ties
its
fetishists
to
what
I
shall
develop
below
as
a
scheme
of
risk-transfer
militarism.
Following
from
Dant
(1999:
56),
the
concept
of
fetishism
can
therefore
be
extended
as
an
analytic
tool
to
examine
the
how
the
social
value
of
some
objects
is
overdetermined
through
ritualistic
practices
that
celebrate
or
revere
the
object,
a
class
of
objects,
items
from
a
known
producer
or
even
the
brand
name
of
a
range
of
products.
One
could
argue
therefore
that
the
convention
of
animating
and
then
revealing
the
true
nature
of
the
robots
serves
as
such
a
ritual
of
organizing,
investing
with
significance,
endowing
with
values
and
capacities,
incorporating
into
social
action
and
relations,
and,
ultimately,
revering
the
military
robot.
Furthermore,
the
use
of
provided
footage,
corporate
spokespersons,
military
experts,
all
contribute
to
a
consistent
and
coherent
tone
of
reverence
towards
military
robots
as
a
class
of
objects,
specific
robots
manufactured
by
contractors
such
as
Foster-Miller
and
iRobot,
and
a
public
brand
awareness
of
their
wares.
The
point
is
not
so
much
whether
the
autonomous
representations
are
true
or
false
but
rather
that
the
military
robot
fetish
takes
on
a
special
status
through
multiple
positive
valuations
that
ultimately
overdetermine
the
value
of
the
robot
as
something
that
has
the
capacity
to
do
special
needed
things.
Thus,
while
the
fetish
value
of
the
military
robots
is
certainly
realized
in
part
through
their
animistic
representation,
fetish
value
is
further
accomplished
through
their
reverence
according
to
their
needed
functionality
as
a
life
saving
technology
that
is
able
to
keep
soldiers
out
of
harms
way
by
taking
on
the
risks
those
soldiers
14
would
otherwise
face.
Accordingly,
in
Robo-Warriors
(A
&
E
2007)
Vice
Admiral
Joe
Dyer
(Ret.),
President
-
Government
&
Industrial
Robots
Division
at
iRobot
declares:
In
the
old
days,
a
very,
very
courageous
person
would
put
on
a
bomb
suit
and
walk
out
and
with
great
focus
and
great
courage
deal
with
a
bomb
that
might
go
off
at
any
second.
Today,
you
send
the
robot.
This
sentiment
is
echoed
by
Maj.
General
Rob
Scales
(Ret.)
who
appears
in
Robo-Warriors
as
a
military
expert:
Its
the
Pentagons
dream
that
one
day
these
futuristic
machines
will
be
able
to
perform
functions
that
are
dangerous
for
men
and
women
in
uniform.
It
would
be
useful
if
we
had
a
surrogate,
a
machine
to
do
that.
And
again,
the
same
theme
is
repeated
by
military
research
scientist
Chuck
Shoemaker
of
the
Army
Research
Lab,
Development
and
Engineering
Command:
The
potential
to
have
robot
vehicles
go
out
ahead
in
harms
way
is
one
of
the
things
that
certainly
keeps
us
excited
about
pushing
the
technology
every
day.
It
is
the
cumulative
effect
of
these
practises
of
reverently
over-coding
the
robot
with
such
valued
forms
of
functionality
that
endows
them
with
fetish
value.
This
understanding
that
the
military
robot
is
a
proxy
for
the
human
soldier
is
taken
to
its
logical
extremes
in
the
Future
Warrior
episode
of
FutureWeapons
(2008):
Host:
But
is
it
pushing
it
a
bit
to
start
thinking
of
the
SMSS
as
a
robotic
member
of
the
squad?
Lockheed
Martin
contractor:
The
SMSS
should
be
treated
as
another
soldier.
Basically,
you
should
give
it
orders,
tell
it
what
you
want
it
to
do,
and
let
it
go
do
it.
And
like
the
soldier,
it
will
either
complete
the
mission
or
if
it
gets
confused,
doesnt
understand,
find
something
that
wasnt
expected,
turn
around
essentially
and
ask
you
for
further
instructions
just
like
a
soldier
would.
15
Host:
And
if
the
SMSS
is
really
expected
to
step
up
on
the
frontline,
then
it
seems
only
fair
to
give
it
a
gun.
Not
only
is
the
SMSS
or
MULE
robot
equal
to
the
obedient
soldier
is
the
SMSS
soldier-like
or
is
the
soldier
robot-like?-
but
in
an
appeal
to
fairness,
the
host
proposes
that
it
too
should
be
entitled
to
bear
arms.
When
Dant
(1999:
56)
asserts
that
the
fetishization
of
an
object
is
accomplished
by
[e]xpressing
desire
for
and
approval
of
the
object
and
what
it
can
do,
celebrating
the
object,
revering
it,
setting
it
apart,
displaying
it,
extolling
and
exalting
its
properties,
eulogizing
it,
enthusiastic
use
of
it
then
clearly,
nonfiction
entertainment
treatments
of
military
robots
follow
the
recipe
to
the
letter.
In
their
enthusiastic,
uncritical,
sycophantic,
and
willing
boostering
of
the
arms
industry,
the
producers
of
such
media
content
consistently
engage
unerringly
in
the
sorts
of
discursive
action
crucial
to
the
production
of
fetish
value.
16
17
18
For
Schutz
(1973:
5),
the
life-world
entails
not
only
the
nature
experienced
by
me
but
also
the
social
(and
therefore
the
cultural)
world
in
which
I
find
myself;
the
life-
world
is
not
created
out
of
merely
the
material
objects
and
events
which
I
encounter
in
my
environment.
The
life-world,
as
that
province
of
reality
which
the
wide-
awake
and
normal
adult
simply
takes
for
granted
in
the
attitude
of
common
sense
(Shutz
1973:
3)
is
something
akin
to
what
Bourdieu
calls
practical
sense
(1990:
69)
which
facilitates
the
making
of
choices
without
recourse
to
conscious
calculation:
social
necessity
turned
into
nature.
In
this
way,
we
need
to
acknowledge
that,
on
the
one
hand,
mil-bot
fetishism
is
not
reducible
to
the
values
of
the
militaries
and
their
contractors
and
that,
on
the
other,
as
the
mil-bot
fetish
circulates
through
both
civil
and
martial
life-worlds,
it
re-articulates
those
differing
systems
of
interpretation
into
a
hegemonic
ordering
of
social
values.
19
20
bot
fetishism
fits
perfectly
within
this
refinement
of
military
power
and
militarism
since
the
robots
are
made
to
operate
on
all
three
levels.
They
are
integrated
into
a
strategy
of
conducting
warfare
at
a
distance,
they
allow
soldiers
to
fight
tele-
remotely,
and
as
fetish
objects,
they
lend
themselves
perfectly
to
the
delivery
of
a
message
that
all
is
being
done
to
reduce
casualties.
As
such,
military
robot
fetishism
arises,
much
as
Mulvey
(1993:
5)
proposes,
out
of
the
difficulty
of
representing
reality
namely
that
waging
war
has
not
become
a
scientifically
guided
rational-
antiseptic
enterprise
but
continues
to
be
a
gruesome
and
violent
activity.
In
the
context
of
risk-transfer
militarism,
the
military
robot
functions
therefore
as
a
pataphysical
or
imaginary
technical
solution
to
the
political
problem
of
war
legitimization.
The
concept
of
pataphysics
is,
of
course,
derived
from
the
work
of
Alfred
Jarry
and
my
appropriation
of
the
term
here
is
admittedly
not
entirely
faithful
to
Jarrys
project.
As
Doctor
Faustroll,
Jarry
(1996:
21)
defines
pataphysics
as
the
science
of
that
which
is
superinduced
upon
metaphysics,
whether
within
or
beyond
the
latter's
limitations,
extending
as
far
beyond
metaphysics
the
science
of
imaginary
solutions,
which
symbolically
attributes
to
their
lineaments
the
properties
of
objects
described
by
their
virtuality
While
pataphysics
proper
is
proposed
as
a
transgressive
practice
of
examining
the
laws
which
seek
to
preside
over
exceptions
and
further
co-opting
science
in
the
name
of
poetics,
my
borrowing
of
pataphysics
is
intended
to
point
to
the
excess
that
is
crucial
to
the
functioning
of
mil-bot
fetishism.
21
22
In
Western
states
today,
war
is
experienced
very
differently
from
past
wars
of
attrition
that
fed
upon
total
mobilization
and
mass
call-ups.
With
little
first
hand
knowledge
by
the
general
public,
warfare
is
something
experienced
and
enters
into
knowledge
largely
through
mediated
forms.
As
Compton
(2005:
46)
observes
[t]he
experience
of
warfare
is,
for
a
majority
of
Western
citizens,
limited
to
spectacle.
Western
liberal
democracies
require
the
support
of
public
opinion
to
wage
war.
The
bulk
of
the
population
is
mobilized,
not
as
soldiers
and
producers
of
war
armaments,
but
as
spectators
of
war,
who
are
sold
on
the
rightness
of
battle
in
the
name
of
sacred
universal
values.
Seeing
the
mil-bot
fetish
come
to
life
plays
out
like
a
micro-spectacle
that
dramatizes
a
conception
of
war
that
imagines
it
to
be
a
scientifically
guided
rational-
antiseptic
enterprise.
Everyone
(the
Department
of
Defense,
the
contractors,
the
producers,
the
host,
and,
of
course,
the
audience)
understands
that
the
devices
are
not
able
to
function
autonomously
but
for
one
spectacular
moment,
they
seem
to
come
to
life,
able
to
solve
the
problem
of
how
to
protect
Western
soldiers
and
fight
wars
with
precision.
When
Compton
(2005:
41)
writes
that
the
news
spectacle
dramatizes
a
political
world
beyond
the
everyday
experiences
of
people
while
simultaneously
offering
explanations,
admonitions
and
reassurances
for
social
problems
it
is
not
difficult
to
extend
this
to
nonfiction
entertainment.
In
presenting
the
mil-bot
fetish
as
an
imaginary
technical
solution
to
the
problem
of
casualty
aversion
and
the
brutal
realities
of
war,
nonfiction
entertainment
becomes
constitutive
of
the
process
by
which
cognitive
maps
are
constructed
and
used
by
individuals
and
social
groups
(Compton
2005:42).
Such
entertainments
send
the
mil-bot
fetish
into
the
civilian
life-world
and
thus
serve
to
construct
a
set
of
spectacular
mediated
experiences
that
have
the
potential
to
restructure
the
civilian
23
life-world
paving
the
way
for
its
further
militarization
by
remapping
realms
of
experience
and
adjusting
the
common
sense
by
which
reality
is
to
be
perceived
and
judgments
made.
Conclusion
In
this
paper
I
have
sought
to
demonstrate
the
role
how
nonfiction
entertainment
engages
in
military
techno-fetishism
by
producing
the
kinds
of
ritualistic
practices
that
revere
the
military
artefact
and
invest
it
with
social
value.
In
the
case
of
military
robots,
this
value,
I
argue,
is
not
simply
based
upon
an
irrational
or
mistaken
belief
about
the
real
capacities
of
the
robots
but
rather
their
ability
to
be
over-coded
with
a
needed
functionality.
The
repeated
acts
of
extolling
the
robots
ability
to
go
in
harms
way
and
save
lives
over-determines
their
social
value,
giving
them
the
status
of
fetish
object.
As
such,
the
mil-bot
literally
seems
to
take
on
a
life
of
their
own
in
nonfiction
entertainment.
Not
only
are
the
robots
venerated
as
life-saving
technologies,
but
they
are
consistently
introduced
as
autonomous
if
not
anthropomorphized
technology.
However,
this
predilection
for
representing
the
robots
as
autonomous
devices
is
not
simply
a
symptom
of
over-valuation
based
upon
a
misunderstanding
of
the
robots
real
capacities.
Instead,
I
argue
that
the
convention
of
animating
and
then
revealing
the
tele-operational
nature
of
the
robots
serves
as
a
ritual
for
organizing,
investing
with
significance,
endowing
with
values,
incorporating
into
social
action
and
relations,
and,
ultimately,
revering
the
mil-bot
fetish.
24
25
Notes
1
According
to
a
2006
Boston
Globe
article
what
began
as
as
a
12-person
office
to
develop
quick
strategies
for
combating
homemade
bombs
in
Iraq
has
quietly
expanded
into
a
$3
billion-per-year
arm
of
the
Pentagon,
with
more
than
300
employees
and
thousands
of
contract
workers,
according
to
Pentagon
data
(Bender,
2006).
2
By
1982
the
US
Army's
Missile
Command
(MICOM)
had
already
begun
to
sponsor
research
into
the
development
of
mobile
robotic
platforms
that
would
allow
a
soldier-operator
to
remotely
fire
anti-armour
weapons.
Grumman
actually
introduced
a
tele-operated
weaponized
robotic
platform
similar
to
SWORDS
called
the
Robotic
Ranger
in
1985
(Geisenheyner
1989;
Everett
and
Gage
1996)
but
it
was
never
adopted
and
presumably
the
project
was
cancelled.
Since
the
deployment
of
the
initial
three
SWORDS
robots,
which
to
date
have
reportedly
not
be
used
in
combat,
Foster-Miller
has
developed
its
successor,
the
MAARS
robot.
To
date,
only
one
has
been
shipped
in
2008
under
contract
to
the
US
militarys
Explosive
Ordnance
Disposal/Low-Intensity
Conflict
(EOD/LIC)
Program
in
Iraq
(Foster-
Miller
2008).
3
While
addressing
the
interrelationship
between
the
development
of
control
military
are
in
fact
often
at
pains
to
remind
the
viewers
and
presumably
the
producers
that
when
it
comes
to
weaponized
robots,
it
is
always
a
human
that
makes
the
decision
to
fire.
5
Though
admittedly,
for
the
purposes
of
this
paper,
I
am
primarily
focussing
upon
the
sign
vale
of
the
object,
I
am
not
actually
proposing
a
social
constructivist
approach
to
technology.
Nonetheless,
Pretorius
argument
is
helpful
in
alerting
us
to
the
fact
that
the
significance
and
social
value
of
a
military
artifact
is
not
predetermined.
6 Indeed the Canadian Armed Forces has published a leadership manual entitled
Profession
of
Arms
in
Canada
which
sets
out
to
codify
the
values,
ethos,
and
role
of
the
military
in
civil
society.
26
7
I
use
the
deficient
term
Western
to
connote
those
minority
world
states
such
as
Canada,
the
United
States,
the
United
Kingdom,
Germany,
Italy,
Australia,
Japan,
etc.
which
are
tied
together
through
relatively
stable
and
enduring
political,
military
and
economic
relationships.
27
28
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