Reconceiving Social Movements

Author(s): Mark Traugott

Source: Social Problems, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Oct., 1978), pp. 38-49
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social
Problems
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/800431
Accessed: 27-05-2015 23:20 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press and Society for the Study of Social Problems are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Social Problems.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MOVEMENTS
RECONCEIVING
SOCIAL
MARKTRAUGOTT
University of California
at Santa Cruz
The study of social movements is a part of sociology still ill-definedand poorly
elaborated. Conventionalformulationshave borroweda social-psychologicalperspective from the study of collective behavior.As a result,assumptions have been
used that are unsuitedto the nature of social movements. In this study I propose
orientation-as essential parts of
two criteria-positive solidarityand antiinstitutional
a restrictedbut more coherent definitionto guide research on social movements.
I also explore brieflysome of the implicationsand advantages of this change in
perspective.

Social movements have long held a fascination for analysts of society. Because they
often arriveseeminglyunannounced,becausethey have enormouspotentialfor violence, and
becausethey are capableof profoundlytransformingthe socialorder,socialmovements,whatever their organizingprinciple,demand the attention of those who wish to understandthe
processby whichsocialsystemsresolveconflictsandeffectlarge-scalechange.
A large and fascinatingset of case materialsand of analysesof limited aspects of social
movementbehaviorhas been developedsince the origins of the sociologicalperspectiveand
continuesto grow, but no widely acceptedtheoreticalsystem has emergedto link together
isolatedfindings.The synthesisof theoryand researchon social movementsis less satisfactory
thanthaton manyothertopicsreceivingcomparableeffort.
Whatcan explainthis state of theoreticalunderdevelopment?
In this paperI will arguethat a
to
has been the tendency
the
of
social
movements
majorimpediment
sociologicalunderstanding
to lumpthemtogetherwith "collectivebehavior."'Thereare, of course,soundintuitivereasons
for borrowingfrom theorists concernedprimarilywith crowd behavior, the propagationof
rumors, fads, panics and similar phenomena.First, incidentsof collective behaviorare the
universalconcomitantsof large-scalesocialmovements.Rebellionsand revolutionsareinevitably
accompaniedby gatheringsof insurgents,by confrontationswith policeand troops, and by outburstsof destructiveand creativeimpulsesin volatilecombination.Consideredin isolation,each
incidentmightusefullybe examinedas collectivebehavior,but that need not implythat the collective behaviorperspectiveis a satisfactoryframeworkfor the explanationof whole social
movements.
The second reason for joining these two fields has been that collectivebehaviorand social
movementssharea sociologicallydistinctivecharacteristic:they occur outside the institutional
frameworkalreadyforming everydaylife. Both break through the familiarweb of ordered
expectations.But do both sets of phenomenainvolvesimilarattitudestowardsociety'sexisting
structures?
My point is that recognitionof such apparentsimilaritieshas obscuredthe equallyimportant
differencesseparatingthe two classes of behavior. As long as we see social movementsas
nothingbut an aggregationof ephemeralcollectivebehaviorprocessesand events, we cannot
accountfor the qualitativelydistinctstrategiesand objectiveswhichtheselong term,often highly
organizedphenomenamayimply.Becauseincidentsof crowdbehavioraccompanyrevolutionary
' The term"collectivebehavior"designatesa set of sociologicalphenomena,a subdiscipline
of sociology,
as well as a specifictheoreticalperspective.I applythe label "collectivebehaviortheory"to the workof Le
Bon, Freud,Feuerand Smelserbecausetheyattemptto explaincollectivebehaviorphenomena,eventhough
schoolwhichbearsthatname.
theydo not belongto the Chicago-derived

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SocialMovements

39

ferment,it does not follow that they encompassa movement'sfull significancefor the surrounding social system. Isn't sociology's basic premiseand justificationthe recognitionof the need
for a unit of analysisthat embracessystems of behavior?In the study of social movements,
such a recognitionrequiresa perspectivetranscendingthe psychologicaland individualistic,one
consideringparticulareventsas momentsin a longerprocessof systematicsocialchange.
Thereis anothercrucialdistinctionto recognize,concerningwhat is consideredinstitutional.
The spontaneityand the lack of internalstructurethat studentsof collectivebehaviorimpute
to the phenomenathey studyare consideredas noninstutitional.Socialmovements,on the other
hand, breakthroughthe frameworkin a completelydifferentsense. Whenwe ceaseto consider
mere episodes and begin to view movementsas coherentwholes, we discerna high degreeof
internalorder and purposefulorientation.It is just this organizationalpotentialthat permits
social movementsto challengeestablishedinstitutions.Becausethey seek to changeor replace
existingsocietalstructures,socialmovementsaremoreproperlytermedantiinstitutional.
These differencesin unit of analysisand institutionalorientationshould properlyset apart
the studyof collectivebehaviorand the studyof social movements.A clearline of demarcation
wouldalloweachto accomplishwhatit does bestby developingan internallyconsistentparadigm.
Whilethey would remaincomplementaryfor manypurposes,the clarificationof theirpointsof
differencewouldpermiteachto focus upon a distinctset of phenomenasubjectto an explanatory
frameworkof increasedspecificityand power. Positive proof of this contentioncan only be
establishedempirically.2In the next section I attemptonly the more modesttask of assembling
negativeevidence.Using a selectionof examplesdrawnfrom the historicaldevelopmentof the
fields in question,I proposeto illustratethe theoreticalconfusionsresultingfrom the lack of a
cleardefinitionof socialmovements,one emphasizingtheirdistinctivetraits.
IMPORTANCEOF A GROUP UNIT OF ANALYSISAND POSITIVESOLIDARITY
IN THE EXPLANATIONOF COLLECTIVEBEHAVIORAND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The disciplineof sociology defies purely substantivedefinition. It constitutesa perspective

appliedto subjectsas diverseas religionand revolution,suicideand sports, politics and parlor
games, in shortto a full rangeof social activities,includingthe pursuitof sociologyitself. The
essenceof this perspectiveis its adoptionof a groupunit of analysis.Sociology, at least within
the formulationdevelopedby its classicalproponents,focusesupon humanbehaviorcharacterized
by a senseof socialsolidarity.The existenceof relationalties accountsfor the emergentproperties
of the socialworldandjustifiesa sociologicalenterprisedistinctfromothersocialsciences.
This sociologicalperspectivecan be tracedback to a specific historicalperiod and cultural
setting. WesternEuropein the late eighteenthand earlynineteenthcenturieswas the point of
origin for a series of changesamong which the developmentof sociology may be counted as
one of the more modest. These changeshad ramificationsin all aspectsof social life but were
most clearlyassociatedwith the growthof capitalismin the economicrealmand the emergence
of the "masses" in the politicalsphere.This process,convenientlysummarizedby the idea of
modernization,createdboth the needfor andthe possibilityof a scienceof society.The conflicts
generatedby changingpatternsof socialbehaviorspurredthe searchfor new institutionalforms.
The renewed faith in rationalityencouragedconcern with interventionin the social realm.
The advanceof the division of labor and the increasein aggregatewealth made possiblethe
existenceof full-time specialistsin the analysis of collective life. The consequencesof these
convergingtrendswas speculationof a protosociologicalnature.
mobilization"
2 This is providedin part by the work of the "resource
school.Its membersare
inpractice
to developtheoretically.
establishing
manyof thepointsthispaperattempts

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

40

TRAUGOTT

The French Revolution represented one culmination of these changes. Many individuals
important in the development of the sociological tradition were tied to it, either as inspirators
(Montesquieu and Rousseau, for example) or as its analysts and interpreters such as Burke,
Tocqueville, and Marx. Indeed, European social theorists continued to be preoccupied throughout the nineteenth century by this true turning point in modern history, the immediate impetus
for so much of the nineteenth century intellectual activity that laid the foundations for a branch
of sociology concerned with social movements. In a sense, then, the attempt to explain crowd
behavior and social unrest sociologically is nearly as old as the sociological enterpriseitself.
Gustave LeBon is considered by many to be the originator of what became a collective
behavior research tradition. His interest in mass-based social change first had been aroused by
his study of the events of 1789. As chief of ambulance services in Paris at the time of the Commune
of 1871, LeBon had ample firsthand experience of crowd phenomena and popular insurrection.
Fascinated by their vitality and at the same time provoked into a hostile and reactionary response
by their destructive potential, he dedicated a major portion of his scholarly activity to the
study of the revolutionary process.
Despite the eclecticism of his interests, two themes pervade and unify LeBon's work. The first
is his reliance on a psychological perspective. The second is his preoccupation with what he
terms revolution, but what, because of his psychological bias, amounts to the interpersonal
aspect of the crowd behavior assuming such importance in revolutionary periods.3 Nowhere in
LeBon's extensive writings are these themes more fruitfully combined than in his most celebrated
work, The Crowd, significantly subtitled, A Study of the Popular Mind.
The significance of The Crowd for the later development of social movement analysis is that
LeBon offered two approaches to the explanation of his subject. Psychological arguments predominated, but there were also many insights of a truly sociological character, although his
immediate successors virtually ignored them.
From the very first page of the preface of that book (1960:1), LeBon grapples with the
essential sociological problem:
When... a certainnumberof ... individualsaregatheredtogetherin a crowdfor the purposesof action,
observationprovesthat, from the mere fact of their being assembled,there resultcertainnew psychoanddifferfromthemat timesto a very
whichareaddedto the racialcharacteristics
logicalcharacteristics,
considerabledegree.'
In this passage LeBon not only correctly identified the emergent quality of crowd phenomena,
he also hesitantly pointed to the relational context as the most direct and parsimonious solution
to the apparent anomaly between individual and social behavior.
Yet LeBon left this insight undeveloped. Instead, he elaborated a line of reasoning which was
to have great influence on later thinkers, and give collective behavior its social-psychological
focus. Crowd behavior was seen as the triumph of the participants' unconscious impulses over
their faculties of reason. The lead toward a group unit of analysis was rejected, and LeBon's
implicit standard of comparison became the behavior of abstract individuals. When group
members were found to act differently in a collective context from what might have been
I These concernsare reflectedin the titles of books LeBon
publishedafter 1895:The Psychologyof
Socialism(1909);PoliticalPsychologyandSocialDefense(1910);The FrenchRevolutionandthe Psychology
of Revolutions(1912);The Psychologyof the GreatWar(1916);The Psychologyof our Times(1920);and
ThePsychologyof Revolution(1931).
4 LeBon, a medical doctor who also took an active interestin physical anthropology,spent years
collectingmeasurementof the cranialcapacityof both fossil and living specimens.On this comparative
datahe basedhis naivehierarchicalcategorizationof intelligentorganismsaccordingto species,raceandsex.
(It was this work which Durkheimcited in The Divisionof Labor.)The contemporaryreader,however,
mightwishto read"geneticandculturalheritage"in placeof "racialcharacteristics."

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Social Movements

41

expectedof themin isolation,the discrepancywas takenas presumptiveevidenceof irrationality.

For example,LeBon saw clearlythat crowd conditionscould createin participantsa sense of
power and anonymity.This observationcould have constituteda point of leveragetowarda
sociologicalinterpretationof emergentcharacteristics.It wouldhavebeen sufficientto point out
that groupmembersdareto attemptacts that as individualsthey would nevercontemplate,precisely becausethe existenceof bonds of solidaritycreatesa qualitativelydistinct situation. In
case of failure,they enjoy a relativeimpunitythat is no mereillusionbecause,actingas a collectivity,participantscan neutralizethe efficacyof socialcontrolby concentratingequalor superior
forces. Similarly,their sense of poweris often realistic,basedboth on the strengthof numbers
andthe opportunityto coordinatethe effortsof individualsjoinedby a senseof commondestiny.
But insteadof acknowledgingthe rationalelementin the changeof perceptionsaccompanying
the formation of solidarygroups, LeBon retreatedto an explanationbased on such socialpsychologicalprocessesas suggestion,contagion, rumorpropagationand reciprocalreinforcement. Thesephenomenainvolvecongregationsof individuals,to be sure, but in no way depend
on the existenceof relationalbonds.
LeBon'semphasisunderscoredthe discontinuitybetween"normal"individualbehaviorand
crowdbehavior,a differentand, by implication,"pathological"form of behavior.The termsof
this oppositioncould have been reconciledby recognizingthe existenceof a transcendentsocial
reality.LeBon, however,kept so closely to the individualisticstandardthat he was led to the
in individual
sociologicallyquestionableassertionthat collectivephenomenanot understandable
termsmustlie beyondthe limitsof normalbehavior.
Through LeBon's work, the field of collective behavior was actually offered a choice
betweentwo sets of orientingassumptions.But later thinkersselectivelydevelopedthe socialpsychologicalalternative,relegatingthe sociological aspects to a secondarystatus. Freud's
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego is instructive for it shows how the sociological

core of The Crowd-the recognitionof emergentphenomena-was rejectedin favor of reductionistexplanations:

Fromour pointof viewwe neednot attributeso muchimportanceto the appearanceof newcharacteristics.

Forus it wouldbeenoughto saythatin a grouptheindividual

is broughtunderconditions
whichallow

him to throwoff the repressionof his unconsciousinstinctualimpulses.The apparentlynew characteristics whichhe then displaysare in fact the manifestationof this unconscious,in which all that is evil in
the humanmindis containedas a predisposition(1965:9).
From this stress on the role of the unconscious and on the essentially malevolent impulses
underlyingcrowd behavior it is only a short and easy step to a fully elaborated pathological model.
Of course, the psychological approach is undeniably useful in certain aspects of collective
behavior analysis, for example in the study of group process or in accounting for the appeal of

certainideologicalsystemsto highlyspecificsegmentsof a differentiatedpublic.

This psychologicalapproachis, however, severelylimited as an explanationof large-scale
it ignores
changeof lastingconsequence.For in projectingoutwardfromindividualcharacteristics
the role of largersocialconstraintstranscending
individualfactorsand shapingthemsignificantly.
The abstractindividualfloats suspended,cut off from considerationsof time and place. To
explain, for instance, student unrest as the result of unresolved Oedipal conflicts (Feuer, 1969) is
to raise as many questions about the development of social movements as one answers. For if a
presumably universal developmental crisis in the human (male) life cycle is supposed to underlie
definite social movement manifestations, it remains to be shown why they erupt in one historically specific set of social circumstances rather than another. The psychological approach cannot,
in short, provide answers to an issue of great sociological interest: what accounts for the variation
in the probability of emergence and in the form of social movement activity?

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

42

TRAUGOTT

There are specifiable benefits when analysis is based on a group rather than an individual unit
of analysis. The most immediate benefit is to permit the social movement analyst to cover less
ground. Mixing social-psychological and sociological perspectives has produced a field of study
loosely joining phenomena so diverse as to defy explanation by any single theoretical framework.
The desire for inclusiveness has had a high but hidden cost in theoretical specificity.
Brief consideration of Neil J. Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior will help to demonstrate the drawbacks of such theoretical inclusiveness. I have selected this particular book not
because the eclecticism of its approach is exceptional, but on the contrary, because it is the outstanding attempt to systematize the field. Smelser tries to incorporate within a unified theory the
explanation of panics, fads, crazes, booms, riots, lynchings and revival meetings in addition to
reformist and revolutionary social movements. Not surprisingly, his propositions are posed at a
highly general level. We are offered a six stage sequence of causal inputs (structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs, mobilization, precipitating events and social control) that only in combination determine a particular outcome. The "value-added" scheme which
Smelser appropriates from economics is an ingenious way of accommodating the existence of
multiple causes. However, these forms of behavior are so diverse, and the accompanying situational factors so complex that Smelser's conclusions are just too vague.' The entire framework
can only be applied post hoc. For past social movements it is assuredly possible to point to
conditions and events fulfilling each of Smelser's six categories of cause. The existence of the
movements seems sufficient testimony to their efficacy. But what about the predictive capacity
of the theory for future movements? Here the determination is difficult, if not impossible,
to make. Moreover, in dealing with the acquired facts of existing movements, we rarely find
that the six stages develop in neat temporal order or lend themselves to a clear judgment that
they were inarguably present or wholly absent.
Smelser recognizes these difficulties, and offers as a solution the notion of "activation." He
argues that the conditions or events constituting a given stage of the causal sequence may lie
dormant or may undergo a lengthy process of development before being effectively set in motion.
But has our ability to explain really been advanced by this refinement? Differentiating between
causal factors remaining dormant and achieving active status can only be done after the fact, in
a specific research situation. Under what conditions could Smelser's model of causation be disproved? All past or present movement fulfill the necessary conditions virtually by definition.
Is there, after all, a moment when no conduciveness or strain exists in society? Is there a movement mobilizing no one, or offering no system of belief or involving no act construable as a
precipitant? As for social control, a movement's existence seems sufficient proof that control
was absent or inadequate. For movements which did not occur or have not yet occurred, the
existence of appropriate causal conditions-even in all six categories-will not disprove the
theory, since it is always possible to invoke the lack of "activation" of one or more.
The relative scarcity of specific social movement research based on Smelser's scheme, despite
its prominence, is eloquent testimony to the gap still separating theory and research in the field as
presently conceived.6.The failure to distinguish like from unlike phenomena inevitably leads to
overly general conclusions. On a continuum so broad as to encompass both panics and revolutionary social movements, the extremes will inevitably have little in common.
Panics presume no bonds of solidarity among participants, but the opposite. Once the cry of
I An additional
difficultyis thatelementsof Smelser'sdefinitionof his objectof studyreappearas elements
of his proposedanalyticalscheme,creatingthe problemof circularityin his reasoning.
6 Quarantelliand Hundley (1969) have made one of the rare attemptsto apply this frameworkto
an actual (minor)incidentof studentunruliness.They encounteredmuch the same kind of difficulties
suggestedhere.

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Social Movements

43

"Fire!" is raised in the proverbialcrowded theater, each person revertsto action based on
individualinterest.Becauseof theirindividualisticcharacter,panicsand relatedformsof collective behaviorhave been quite adequatelyexplainedby gaming theory, an extension of neoclassicaleconomics'assumptionsabout the abstractindividual'sbehavior(Mintz, 1951;Berk,
1974; Johnson, 1974). One need only imaginea wildly skewed rewardstructure(participants
will eitherescape or burn to death) involvingasymetricallydistributedprobabilitiesof success
(among those near or distant from inadequateexits). If "players"are assumedto act according to sheerself-interest(the lack of positivesolidarity),the "solution" emergesas fast as one
can say "prisoner'sdilemma."
The success of the gamingapproachshould astonish no one. Although collectivebehavior
theoristspersistin the attemptto explainthem, panicsare not obviouslysociologicalbehavior.
Those caughtup in a panic reactionrespondto one anothernot in a sociologicallymeaningful
relationalcontext but as objects, in an almost purelyphysicalsense, aiding or impedingescape
from danger.If one addsas a factorin the gamingformulaan appropriatedegreeof preexisting
positive solidarity(imaginethat the group is not a randomlyassembledfilm audiencebut a
gatheringof relatives),organization(an armyplatoon),or leadership(a conferenceon civildefense
less
conductedby an expertin evacuationprocedures),then panicis correspondingly
preparedness
likely to occur. Yet the very factorsinhibitingthe panic reactionare among the most essential
preconditionsof socialmovements.
The analystwilllaborin vainto drawgeneralizationsboth substantiveand validfromthe study
of phenomenathat are polar opposites. Yet this seems a fair descriptionof past attemptsto
generatea theoryof collectivebehaviorand social movements.The fundamentaldifferencebetween these two types of behavioris the existenceof bonds of positivesolidaritythat makesit
possiblefor social movementsto generatecommon ideology, internalorganization,continuity
of leadershipand a sense for strategicnecessity.The elementaryforms of collectivebehavior
lack these traits becausethey lack the cohesivenessand stayingpower that depend on a sense
of commondestinyamongmembers.
Moreover,it is the existenceof thesebonds of solidaritythat makesthe sociologialperspective
necessaryand useful. Just as social movementparticipantsadopt a group unit of analysis-for
example,in acceptingindividualsacrificein the name of collectiveideals-so social movement
analysts must adopt a group perspectiveto understandthe "idiosyncracies"of collective
action, that is, their differencesfrom individualbehavior.7Bonds of positive solidarityare so
essentialto socialmovementsas to constituteone of theirdefiningcharacteristics.
It is true that in confining one's attention to solidary behavior, a number of fascinating
to socialmovementswouldbe eliminated
phenomenahavinga moreor lesssuperficialresemblance
fromconsideration.But they could continueto providethe focus of the relatedbut independent
field of collective behavior. The study of social movements,meanwhile,would be liberated
from the ambiguityof its presentcharge.Redefinedin termscompatiblewith a groupperspective, it would quicklyrediscoverits true vocation and specialaptitudefor the explanationof
lasting,large-scalechallengesto existinginstitutions.
AN ANTIINSTITUTIONAL
ORIENTATIONAS ESSENTIALTO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The criterionof positivesolidarityis necessarybut not sufficientto define social movements.

It is a characteristiccommon to most of the phenomenasociologists study and perhapsall
phenomenato which sociologicalassumptionsproperlyapply. However,the solidarybehavior
7

of crowdphenomenamighthave yieldedis
Some idea of what the sociologicalinterpretation

providedby the work of George Rude, especiallythe Crowd in the French Revolution (1959). Rude'

andthe
thatthetimingof the Parisianjournees,no lessthantheirideologyandobjectives
demonstrates

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

44

TRAUGOTT

that most sociologists examine occurs within institutionalized settings enjoying the presumption
of legitimacy. Collective behavior and social movements stand outside this constraining framework. It is for this reason that the association between the subdisciplines devoted to their study
makes intuitive sense.
Still, one might ask whether this point of commonality conceals an equally significant distinction, for collective behavior and social movements actually assume quite different orientations to established institutions. Disregard for this difference has led to the attempt to assimilate
these two fields. Herbert Blumer's 1939 essay on collective behavior exemplifies this approach.
It begins with a consideration of the elementary forms of collective behavior. Blumer strikes at
their essence when he underscores their spontaneous and ephemeral character. His contribution
was to acknowledge their "non-institutional" quality, to perceive that they arise only in situations
where "preestablished understandings or traditions" have been suspended. It is the lack of structure and stability that he uses to define collective behavior.
Had this perspective been confined to the study of elementary collective behavior, it would
have been beyond reproach. But Blumer sought to explain social movements as well, although
these structured and enduring phenomena contravene his initial definition and assumptions.
Blumer, for example, observed that millennial sects grow out of revival meetings and that
revolutions grow out of riots. Why then, he asked, are not social movements merely collective
behavior writ large?
Blumer erred in identifying the part with the whole. This tendency to project the indeterminateness of elementary collective behavior onto fully elaborated social movements is a consistent weakness of the "Chicago school."' Kurt and Gladys Lang, for example, begin Collective Dynamics by stating that its title was chosen to emphasize the lack of structure and the state
of flux characterizing the phenomena examined. They include as part of their very definition
the assertion that collective dynamics are "not reducible to social structure" (1961:3-4) and
promise that "the forms of collective behavior that have the characteristics of organization are
excluded from the discussion in this book" (1961: 11-12). To that extent, the Langs appear to
favor the separation of the two fields. Yet to their otherwise coherent treatment of collective
behavior they append two chapters on social movements. They rationalize this inconsistency by
claiming that social movements, especially in their formative phases, fit the collective dynamics
model. The Langs even state explicitly what Blumer had only hinted at. "A social movement
always refers to elementary collective behavior on a large scale" (1961:496). With this assertion
they undo what was best and clearest in their approach.
What the members of the Chicago school have failed to see is that in the course of development social movements acquire unique characteristics. The inherent limitations of noninstitutional status-the inability to extend in time and space, and thus to achieve lasting changeare shed in favor of a higher destiny. Structure and organization permit social movements to seek
more than an evanescent escape from the constraining influence of their institutional settings:
they become capable of systematically transforming those settings in line with collective goals.
Rather than noninstitutional, their governing principle is essentially antiinstitutional. The order
and stability they routinely exhibit are the preconditions for effecting a type of social change
beyond the scope of elementary collective behavior.
compositionof the crowditself can be relatedto the economicand politicalconditionsof revolutionary
Frenchsociety. In general,riots exemplifybehaviorrecentresearchhas shown to be more solidarythan
individualisticin character,and consequentlymore amenableto social movementthan collectivebehavior
analysis.
I It is only fair to note that Turner and Killian's Collective Behavior
(1957) is in many respects an
important exception to the social-psychological bias of this theory group. The "emergent-norm" idea
represents a valuable attempt to lead collective behavior research in a more sociological direction.

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SocialMovements

45

In the study of collectivebehavior,the analysisof structureinevitablyplays an insignificant

role becauseit is considered,by definition, to be absent or inoperative.This assumptionhas
justified the field's almost exclusivefocus on groupprocess. But if we stopped carryingthe
corollariesof noninstitutionalityinto a clearlyinappropriaterealm,and startedrecognizingthe
antiinstitutionalcharacterof socialmovements,new analyticalpossibilitieswouldemerge.Social
structures-those which alreadyexist and againstwhich the collectivityreacts, those which it
employsinternally,and thosewhichit proposesto institutein the largersociety-offer an alternativeset of explanatoryvariables.Withoutdenyingor diminishingthe importanceof groupprocess,
the recognitionof social movements'distinctiveorientationtowardinstitutionsopens up a line
of structuralanalysis.
How can we effectivelyrecognizethe antiinstitutionalcharacterof the true social movement?
One useful though by no meansexclusivetest would be the occurrenceof eventsthat, because
theychallengeexistinginstitutions,aredeemedillegal.A rangeof behavior,fromillegalassembly
and civil disobedienceto terrorismand insurrectionaryviolence, would satisfy this criterion.
One apparentdifficultyin applyingit is that illegalityconstitutesa flexiblestandardsubjectto
wide variationsof meaningin the stressfulsituationsgeneratingprotestbehavior.But this very
indeterminancycan actuallyhelp us assess the putativemovement'sinstitutionalorientation,
because the constitutedauthoritiesinvoke the idea of illegalityto justify the interventionof
various social control forces on the basis of how serious a challengethe collectivity'sbeliefs
and activitiespresentto the existingsocial order. For example,the mobilizationof republican
sentimentfor politicalreformin the seeminglylawfuland innocuousFrenchbanquetcampaign
of 1847-48 was judged to surpassthe limit of legalitywhen its size and scope were perceived
as definite dangersto the monarchicalregime. In this analyticalsense there are no inherently
illegalacts. Rather,the same behaviorthat might pass overlookedin a small and isolatedcollectivitywill incite repressiononce it representsa threatto the existingorder. The concept of
antiinstitutionalityfocuses attentionon the confrontationbetweenopposinggroupsin a social
settingwhereconflicthas reachedcriticalproportions.
Illegalityand antiinstitutionalityare by no means synonymous.Crime, for example,implies
no necessarychallengeto the social order. Indeed, many forms of criminalbehaviorpresume
the continuedexistenceof a given set of social institutions.Only illegalbehavioraimedat the
reconstitutionor overthrowof the structuresthat it attacksfulfillsthe definitionof antiinstitutionality. Conversely,not all social movementactivitieswill be illegal. Throughoutmost of the
movement'slife history,the greaterpart of members'efforts will be directedat organizational
maintenance(recruitmentand mobilization)and the preparationof its alternativeprogram(the
generationof appropriateideology and tactics). To be consideredantiinstitutional,it is sufficientthatthe movementengagein or envisionactsthatwhensuccessfulbringit into an inevitable
confrontationwiththe existingorder.
The implicitnotion that social movementscoalescearoundsocial conflicts involvingparties
with widely varyingcoercivepotential suggestsa furtherqualificationof our use of the term
antiinstitutional.In certainstagesof theirdevelopment,particularlythe early, formativephases
or those followingup a test of forces wherethe social movementcollectivityfinds itself hopelesslyoutmatched,the characteristicorientationis morecorrectlydescribedas extrainstitutional.
The movementadopts an institutionalorientationwhich, if not passive,at least avoids the sort
of overtdefiancethat mightprovokea hostilereactionfromthe forcesof socialcontrol. It seeks
to withdrawfrom the jurisdictionof the constitutedauthoritiesor to offer indirectand veiled
resistance.
Sucha responseis particularlyfrequentamongmillennialsectsthoughnot becausepassivityis
an inherentattributeof a religiousorientation.Thesesectsarea formof socialmovementtypical
of societiesat the stage of materialand culturaldevelopmentthat places such religiousgroups

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

46

TRAUGOTT

at a severedisadvantagerelativeto their opponents,often a centralizedstate or an externally

imposedset of colonial institutions.This institutionalorientationcan also be observedamong
more franklypoliticalmovementsforcedundergroundby intenserepression.Melanesiancargo
cults, for example,haveevolvedsyncreticdoctrinessometimesincludingother-wordlyelements,
but also counselingthe withholdingof taxes and the refusalto work in the commercialsector
of the economy.Thesemovementsaroseearlyin the twentiethcenturyafterthe futilityof open
rebellion had been brutally demonstrated.They have been correctlyperceivedby colonial
officialsas a challengeto authority,but have managedto resisteradicationthroughthe skillful
exploitationof a facade of submissivenessto disarmthe repressiveapparatus.Observerswho
pointto the "irrationality"of cargodoctrinesoverlookthe latentcontentand unanticipatedconsequencesof a belief system permittingthe movement to survive in hostile circumstances.
Such observersignore how outwardlymillennialcult activitycan serve also as a "vehicle of
nationalism"(Worsely,1968).They fail to apprehendthe inherentrationalityof an extrainstitutional strategywhere more direct avenuesare blocked or have produceddisaster,and where
only a seemingpassivitycan insurethe survivalof the movementorganizationuntilthe equation
of forcesprovesmorefavorableand overtprotestcanbe resumed.
Using the criterionof antiinstitutionalitypermitsthe analyst of social movementsto discriminateamongsuperficiallyrelatedphenomena.Collectivebehaviorwouldbecomea separate
subdisciplineconcentratingon the temporarysuspensionof institutionalconstraintsand directing attentionto interpersonalprocesses.Purelyreformistsocialaction, operatingentirelywithin
the existinginstitutionalframework,wouldsimilarlybe excluded,becomingthe provinceof other
fields, alreadyhavingcompatibleassumptions,notablypoliticalsociologyand the sociologyof
behaviorwould constitutea subcategory
organizations.Whatwe have termedextrainstitutional
focusing upon the formativeor transitionalphases in social movementdevelopment.Social
movementsproperwould be identifiedby a franklyantiinstitutionalorientationsettingthem
apartfromotherformsof socialbehavior.The resultingfield wouldconcentrateits effortsupon
socialchangeaccomplishedby solidarygroupsoutsideinstitutionalchannels.
IMPLICATIONS

Use of the two distinguishingcriteria--positivesolidarityand an antiinstitutionalorientationwould define a field of study concernedexclusivelywith social movements.It would insurethe
essentiallysociologicalnatureof that field's subjectmatterand approachand also fix its focus
upon the resolutionof socialconflict. But it is not enoughsimplyto clarifythe field's object of
studyand its orientation.Whatare some of the morespecifictheoreticaland practicalgainsthis
makespossible?
reconceptualization
One immediatebenefit of using the first criterion,that of positive solidarity,would be to
resolvethe ambiguoususe of the conceptof rationality.In sociologicalterms,rationalityrefers
to the appropriateness
of the choice of specificmeansfor the attainmentof givenends (Weber,
1968).Behavioris irrationalif it willnot leadto the desiredgoalor if it is a lessthanoptimalalternative for the goal's achievement.But both solidarygroupsand the individualswho comprisethem
maydefineobjectivesin theirown terms;thereis no necessarycontradictionif this processyields
discrepantresults.Rationalityand its obversemay actuallyhave eithercollectiveor individual
referents.Discrepanciesshould merelyraise the questionof what conditionscause one or the
otherlevelof goal definitionto predominatein observedbehavior.
Confusionresults,however,whenthe termsof the means-endsrelationshipareseenas existing
at differentlevelsof generality.As previouslynoted, panicsappearirrationalonly becausedifferent units of analysis are being lumped together. The judgment that action is irrational
(because,let's say, moreindividualsaretrampledto deaththanwouldprobablyhavediedin the
flames) presumesa group perspective,a calculationof aggregateoutcome, when in fact no

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Social Movements

47

groupin the sociologicalsense exists becausethereis no solidarity.Weresuch a groupto exist,

panicbehaviorwouldbe at leastless likely, perhapsprecluded,and a "rational"outcomewould
prevail. In the absence of solidarity, panic behavior is explicable-even "rational"-when
viewed as individualisticefforts to achieve the individualgoal of escape from danger. The
allegation of irrationalityenters the picture only because levels are mixed, that is, because
individualisticmeans (panic behavior)are judged as failuresto achieve an imputedcollective
end (minimizingcasualitiesin the aggregate).The implicationof this perceptionis not that all
social action is rational. It is ratherthat we can reasonablyexpect the rationalityof social
behaviorto emergeonly whenthe appropriatecollectiveunitof analysisis applied.
Though it is possibleto eliminatethe initiallyconfusingcase of panics, the generalproblem
remains. In the study of social movements, the opposite error is even more common:
behavioraimedat collectiveends is often assessedin individualisticterms.The personalsacrifices
enduredby social movementadherentsmust appearirrationalif viewed outside the collective
context.Withinthe socialmovementthe riskof injuryor deathis justifiedby one's commitment
to group idealsand one's sense of commondestinywith those linkedin the collectivestruggle.
Psychologicallyoriented observersinvoke the label of irrationalityand seek to explain (or
explain away) the power of social movementsas pathology or the surfacingof unconscious
impulses.The sociologist sees the same behavioras groundedin a realisticperceptionof the
qualitativelyincreasedpotential for change that social movementscreate. Certainly,what is
rationalfor the groupmaywell be irrationalfor the individual(andviceversa):it is imperativeto
separatetheselevels.
To returnto an earlierexample,cargocultistsacquirea reputationfor irrationality
by squandering theiraccumulatedwealthin non-stopfeastingor by engagingin ritualisticattemptsto make
contact with ancestors, which the Western observer'"knows"are doomed to failure. Yet,
viewed from a group perspective,the consequencesof this behavior-whether the recruitment
and mobilizationof new membersor the strengtheningof bondsof solidarityacrosssocialunits
previouslyisolated or antagonistic-representprogresstowardthe collectivegoal of economic
and political liberation.Similarly,the frame-smashingor machine-wrecking
of Ludditesmay
appearirrational,first becauseit seemsso hopelesslyreactionary,but also becauseit appearsto
harmthe interestsof the very individualswho practiceit, destroyingtheir meansof livelihood.
But by adoptinga group unit of analysis, Hobsbawm(1952) has shown such actions can be
appropriatepathsto the collectivegoal of regulatinggrowthin a volatilesectorof the economy.
In fact, he is so impressedby its rationalbasisthat he dubsthe process"collectivebargainingby
riot."
Of course,the systematicapplicationof a groupunitof analysiswill do nothingto mitigatethe
improperimputationof irrationalitybased on culturalbias or lack of a sense of historical
relativity.It will, however, eliminatethe many cases of apparentirrationalityactually produced by the observer'sown compoundingof two distinct levels of generalization.Careful
scrutinyof theories assuminga priori the irrationalityof such behaviorhas discreditedtheir
conclusionswith such regularitythat it seems wiser to shift the burden of proof. When we
observepeoplewillinglysubjectingthemselvesto sacrificein the nameof a collectiveideal,sociologistsat leastoughtto startlookingfor explanationsrationalfor the groupinvolved.
Use of our second criterion,the antiinstitutionalorientationof social movements,could also
increaseour understandingof movementdynamicsin severalspecific ways. For example, it
directsattentionto the processof creatingsalientsocial movementsfrom that complexfund of
diffuse tensionsor latent social problemsso commonin complexsocieties.For it is when strain
is perceivedas the product of systemic forces that an antiinstitutionalorientationemerges.
Social movements,and the potentialfor changethey create, are the organizationalmanifestations of this process.

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

48

TRAUGOTT

Use of this perspectivewouldalso illuminatethe strengths,limitations,and dynamicqualityof

social movementaction. Like the charismaticphenomenawith whichthey are frequentlyassociated,socialmovementsoffer an invaluablealternativeto existinginstitutionalmodesof action
whenthe latterare perceivedas incapableof dealingwith a crisis.But socialmovementsare also
like episodesof charismaticinterventionin that most quicklyfail. Unfortunately,we knowlittle
of the dynamicsof failure,since these negativecases seldomarousethe interestof sociological
analysts.
"Successful"movements,on the other hand, may last for years or decadesbefore, by the
veryact of achievingtheirobjectives,they lose theirstatusas socialmovementsproper.Whether
they are absorbedby or replacethe preexistingstructures,they undergoa seriesof adjustments
in their constituency,tacticsand the degreeof pragmatisnof objectives.Membersfind themselves not only in the novel position of being arbitersof policy but often becomingthe object
of countermovements
generatedby theirverysuccess.
Becausesocial movements,unlikethe ephemeralformsof collectivebehavior,are capableof
enduring,they may also induce a sort of societal exhaustionand reaction,the most obvious
exampleof which is the Napoleonicsolution to the vagariesof the FrenchRevolution.They
may place exorbitantdemandson humanand materialresources,divertedfrom "productive"
pursuitsinto socialcontrolactivityby constitutedauthoritiesand insurgencyby theiropponents.
The proposedfocus on institutionalorientationleadsnaturallyto heightenedinterestin developmentalpatternsandthe processof socialmovementinstitutionalization.9
In short, the criterionof antiinstitutionality
allowsus to tradethe evolutionand to assessthe
consequencesof social movementsin the only context suited to their nature, one involving
the existenceof socialconflictbetweenan organizedcollectivityandthe institutionalstructure.
When used in combination,our two criteriacan help redressthe balancebetweenstructure
and processas variablesused to explainsocial movements.Both variablesquite evidentlyhelp
determineactualoutcomes.The collectivebehaviortheoristshave shown alreadyhow valuable
use of a group processperspectivecan be in understandingsuch issuesas mobilizationand the
generationof ideology. Requiringthe presenceof positivesolidarityfor a phenomenonto be
analyzedas a social movementwould encouragethe sociologicaltreatmentof such specific
problemsas consciousnessformation,patternsof recruitment,growthand decay, and the role
of leadership.Concernwithprocesswillremainan importantaspectof socialmovementtheory.
A companiontype of concentrationon the collectivity'sinstitutionalorientationcould temper
the neglect-in some cases the outrightdenial of the efficacy-of the structuraldeterminants
of social movementbehavior.It could give greaterweightto the considerationof culturaland
historicalconditionsand clearlypose the questionof how the characteristicsof specificinstitutional frameworksboth elicit definite types of social movementbehaviorand determinethe
institutions'abilityto respondto challenge.It could lead studentsof social movementsto ask
why this form of collectiveactionariseswhenand whereit does, why it attractsadherentsfrom
certainsocialstrata,whatrelationits choiceof organizational
formandtacticsbearsto the environsocial
and
these
influence
its
how
factors
conditions,
ing
probabilityof success.
If used togetherin ways possible only to outline here, the propertiesof positive solidarity
and an antiinstitutionalorientationcould become clear standardsfor includingor excluding
phenomenafromwhatis now the veryvaguefield of socialmovementanalysis.An independent
9 An important advance in this direction is the article by Zald and Ash (1965). It constitutes:a

or oligarchization
as it appliesto
responseto the Weberand Michelshypothesisof bureaucratization

social movements. The authors suggest that the hypothesis is generaliy but not universally valid, and
specify the conditions under which institutionalization is more or less likely to occur. Much of the
power of their analysis derives from adopting a group unit of analysis and posing the problem as a
struggle between social movement organizations and the institutional order they confront.

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Social Movements

49

subdiscipline could emerge from the larger body of sociology, and its relation to other areas of
sociological inquiry become further clarified. The study of social movements would be distinct
from the field of collective behavior, with which it has too long been locked in superficial and
sterile association. These two specializations would still have some family resemblance but be
free to pursue their separate paths to mutual advantage. Most important here, the sociology of
social movements would regain its proper focus: the analysis of large scale social change outside
institutional channels.
REFERENCES
Berk,RichardA.
1974 "A gamingapproachto crowdbehavior."AmericanSociologicalReview39:355-73.
Blumer,Herbert
1951 "The field of collective behavior." Pp. 167-222 in Alfred McClungLee (ed.), Principles
[1939] of Sociology.New York:BarnesandNoble.
Feuer,LewisS.
1969 TheConflictof Generations:TheCharacterandSignificanceof StudentMovements.New York:
BasicBooks.
Freud,Sigmund
[1920] Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Tr. James Strachey. New York:
1965 Bantam
Hobsbawm,EricJ.
"Themachinebreakers."PastandPresent1:57-70.
1952
Johnson,NorrisR.
1974
"Collectivebehavioras group-inducedshift." SociologicalInquiry44: 105-10.
Lang,Kurtand GladysEngelLang
1961
CollectiveDynamics.New York:ThomasY. Crowell.
LeBon,Gustave
[1895] TheCrowd:A Studyof the PopularMind.New York:Viking/Compass.
1960
Mintz,Alexander
1951 "Non-adaptivegroupbehavior."Journalof AbnormalandSocialPsychology46: 150-59.
Quarantelli,E.L. andJamesR. Hundley,Jr.
1969 "A test of some propositionsabout crowdformationand behavior."Pp. 538-54 in RobertR.
Evans(ed.), Readingsin CollectiveBehavior.Chicago:RandMcNally.
Rude,George
1959 TheCrowdin the FrenchRevolution.London:OxfordUniversityPress.
Smelser,Neil J.
1962 Theoryof CollectiveBehavior.New York:FreePress.
Turner,RalphH. andLewisM. Killian
1957 CollectiveBehavior.EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Weber,Max
1968 Economy and Society: An Outline of InterpretativeSociology. GuentherRoth and Claus
Wittich(eds.). New York:Bedminster.
Worsley,Peter
1968 TheTrumpetShallSound:A Studyof 'Cargo'Cultsin Melanesia.NewYork:Schocken
Zald,MayerN. and RobertaAsh
1965
"Social movementorganizations:Growth,decay, and change."SocialForces44:327-41.

This content downloaded from 112.198.90.36 on Wed, 27 May 2015 23:20:59 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions